* Propositions of this sort require the condition of experience to evoke ilmm.; but they stand on a basis purely rational This distinction is the key-stone of the arch of modem metaphysics. Vide Cousin's Psychology; Chalybaus' History of Philosophy in (Germany: article^ Eant; Sir William Hamilton on Cousin.
^ Small sayings suggest great ones. Perhaps the reader is reminded, hi meeting with the above, of our Saviour's words: ** The light of the 31C THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK Z, moved in itself or essentially, and this is that which may have motion impressed upon it from itself. And there is also something of the same sort in the case of that which imparts motion likewise; for one thing imparts motion ac- cording to accident, and another according to a portion, but a third essentially or of itself: and there is something that is the primary source of motion, and there is something that has motion impressed upon it; further is there the time in which, and there is the place from which, and the direction to- wards which, a thing is moved. But the forms, and passive states, and place into which,are moved the things that are being moved, themselves are immovable, as science and heat; but the heat does not constitute motion, yet the process of heating does. The change, however, that does not ensue according to accident does not reside in all things, but in contraries and media, and in contradiction. But a reliance upon this state- ment may be drawn from induction.
Now, that which undergoes a change is changed n'era of changes, either from a subject into a subject, or from that which is not a subject into a subject, or from a subject into a non-subject, or from a non-subject into s^ subject: ^ but I mean by a subject that which is made ma- nifest by afl&rmation. Wherefore, changes must needs be three in number; for that which is from a non-subject into a non-subject is not properly a change, for it subsists ^ neither between contraries nor between contradiction, because there is not opposition in the case of a transition from a nonJeubject into a non-subject. The change, indeed, therefore, from that which is a non-subject into a subject, according to contradic- tion, amounts to generation; and such a change, of course, when simply considered, is simple generation, and when it is partial, it is partial generation: but the change from subject into that which is non-subject amounts to corruption, which, when it is simply so, is simple corruption; but when it is partial, it is partial corruption.
body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light."— St. Matt. vi. 22.
^ These words are not found in the Leipsic edition. I have followed Didct*B text.
^ Aristotle's principle is this, — where there is change there is opposi* tion; where we can discover /acto/SoA^, there also is to be found unidtais.
tSL XI.] ' MOTION ANT CHANGE. 311 If, therefore, nonentity is predicated raulti- s. The relation feriously,* and that according to composition or and\^e"™three division does not admit of being put in motion, changes ex- Bo neither can it be so with thpt according to p^*"*®^* capacity, which is opposed to that which subsists simply; for a thing that is not white, or not good, nevertheless admits of being moved according to accident: for that which is not white may be a man; but this cannot by any means be the case with this particular thing which subsists simply: for it ifi impossible that nonentity should be moved; and, if this be admitted, it is impossible, also, that generation amounts to motion; for nonentity would be produced if it did, for in such a case most especially would it be produced according to accident; yet, nevertheless, it is true to assert of that which is generated simply that a nonentity has a subsistence. In like manner, also, stands the case with the being in a state of rest And, doubtless, such are the difficulties that attend on this hypothesis, even on the supposition that everything that is being moved is in place; but what is a nonentity is not in place, for it would be somewhere. Hence neither does cor- ruption constitute motion, for motion or rest is a thing that is contrary to motion, but corruption is contrary to genera- tion. Since, however, every motion amounts to a certain change, and there are three changes, as just now enumerated, and of these the changes that ensue according to generation and corruption are not motions — ^and these are those that sub- sist according to contradiction — it is necessary that the change from subject into subject should alone constitute motion. Subjects, however, are either contraries or media; and let privation be considered as a thing that is contrary: and it is made manifest by affirmation; for instance, that which is naked and toothless, and that which is black.
^ Probably by the multifarious predication of the "non-ens" AristotUr wmld mean that of its synonyme rb if^c^Soy. Vide book IV. chap, xxix 31 S THE METAPHYSIOS OF ABISTOTLS. [bOOK X CHAPTER XII. , „,, If, therefore, the categories are divided by according to suDstance,' quautj, place, action or passion, rels^ ^latiion.^* ^^'^ tion, quantity, there must needs subsist three motions of quality, quantity, and of place; but according to substance there does not subsist any motion on account of there being nothing contrary to substance; nor is there a motion of relation: for it is possible, when either of the relatives has not undergone a change, that a verification should take place in regard of the other, as having undergone no change. Wherefore, the motion of these will subsist according to accident.
2. Why there is Neither is there a motion of that which is not motion in active and passive, or of that which is the effition or of pas- cicut cause 01 motion, and has motion impressed sion. upon it, because there is not a motion of motion, nor a generation of generation, nor, in general, a change ol a change. For in two ways is it possible that there be a motion of a motion; first, either as of a subject — for instance, as man is moved because from white he is changed into black; wherefore, thus also is it with motion, either a thing is made warm or cold, or undergoes alteration in place or increase: this, however, is impossible; for the change does not amount to any of the subjects; — or, secondly, there may subsist a motion of motion, in respect of some different subject from change being altered into a different form, as man is changed from sickness into health. Neither, however, is this possible, except according to accident; for every motion constitutes a change from one thing into another: and, in like manner, the case stands with generation and corruption, except that those changes, I admit, that are wrought from things that are opposed in this or that way are not motions.
3. This point At the samc time, then, is man changed from illustrated. health into disease, and from this very change into a different one. It is, therefore, evident that when a man shall have become indisposed he shall undergo a change mto a disease of some sort or other; for it is admissible for such to remain in a state of rest: and, further, it is evident ' Vide Categories, cliap. iv.
OH. XII.1 NO MOTION IN ACTION AND PaOSION. 31S •J that he will not be changed into that state which is iryari < ably casual, and that will amount to a change from some- thing into something else, so that health will be an opposite motion, but from accident; as, for instance, one undergoes an alteration from memory into oblivion, because that wherein oblivion is inherent undergoes a change, sometimes into scientific knowledge, and sometimes into health. Further will the progression advance on to infinity, if there will subsist a change of a change,^ cas'^of^action and a generation of a generation. Therefore, or passion, also, must there be the former on the supposi- pose an infinite tion that there is the latter; for instance, if the J^^^eVr" ""^ simple act of generation take place at any time, that also which is being generated simply has been produced. Wherefore, not as yet in existence would be that which is being produced simply; but something does exist that is being generated or produced, or which already has been generated. If, therefore, also, this thing once was generated, for what reason was that not yet in existence which is being then gene- rated ] Since, however, as regards things that are infinite there does not subsist anything that is primary, there will not be that which is first generated, and for this cause neither that which is in order consequential. Therefore, that any of these either should be generated, or be moved, or undergo any change, is not possible. Further, contrary motion, and rest, and generation, and corruption, trary motio^n, ' will belong to the same subject. Wherefore, a f^e^^uygc^. thing that is being generated, when it may become that which is being generated, is then undergoing a process of corruption; for neither is it immediately corrupted as soon as it is generated, nor subsequently to this; for that must necessarily exist which is undergoing a process of cor- ruption. Further, it is the case that matter and matter as ought to subsist under that which is being gene- t^e subject of rated and undergoing a change.^ Therefore, *^ *°**' ^ Aristotle had abready exposed the absurdity of such a system as an infinite progression of causes, in book I. the Less, chap. iL ^ The necessity of this principle the ancients made to rest on thf dogma that " ex nihilo nil fit." If the student is desirous of knowing intimately the bearing of this dogma on the ancient philosophy, ho will consult Cudworth's Intellectual System, HaiTison*s edition, witll Mosheim's Dissertation on Creation out of Nothing, vol. III. p. 140.
314 TH?B METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK X.
what matter will there subsist in like manner as an alterable body or soul? in this way, also, anything that subsists on being produced constitutes either motion or gencratioa And, further, what is that into which the thing is moved for it is necessary that something amount to the motion o\ this particular thing from this particular thing into that, and yet that it should not be motion at all. How, let me ask, then, is this to take place? for the generation of discipline does not amount to discipline; so neither is it true to say that there will subsist a generation of generation. 5. It is accord- Since, however, there is not in existence motion quanti?y"*and* ^^^^^^ ^^ substaucc, or of relation, or of action place that mo- and passion, it remains that there should subsist tion subsists, jjjotion according to quality, and quantity, and place, for to each of these doth there belong contrariety. Now, I mean by motion according to quality not that which is found in substance — ^for difference also constitutes quality — but that which is passive, in accordance with which a thing is said to be passive or to be devoid of passion. « n * ^ « A With regard, however, to that which is imin relation to movable, and that which, upon the whole, it is immovable."^ impossible should have motion impressed upon it, and that which with difficulty, in a long portion of duration, or slowly, commences its motion, and that which having been by nature, no doubt, adapted for having motion imparted to it, yet does not possess the capacity or ability of being moved when it is naturally fitted for motion — both as to the place where and the manner how — this id what I term merely a condition of rest amongst those things that are immovable; for rest is a thing that is contrary to motion.
Wherefore, it would amount to a privation of of locaranc?' *^^^ which is reccptive or capable of motion; and separate mo- things are Said to be moved according to place at ' °" ' the same time as many as are to be found in one original locality; and those things are said to be moved sepa- rately as many as are to be found in a different place, and of contact And things are said to be in contact with each and a medium, other ^ the extremities of which subsist together. And that is a medium into which that is fitted bv nature * Vide book IV. chap. vi.
CH. XII.] LOCAL CONTRARIETY AND SUCCESSION. 315 first to proceed which is undergoing a change, before it arrives At that into which it is ultimately changed— I mean, what is uninterruptedly undergoing a change according to the constitution of nature.
m a straight line is at the greatest distance pos- of local con- sible: and a thing is successive between which J'lJ^eSion^ — when it is after its first principle, either in position or form, or some other definite mode of subsistence— and that to which it is consequent there subsists no interven- ing medium of things in the same genus; for instance, lines are successive to a line, or monads are successive to a monad, or a house to a house. There is no hindrance, however, to there subsisting any other medium between them; for that which is successive belongs to something in succession, and is something that is subsequent: for one is not successive tc two, nor are the Kalends to the Nones.^ And a thing is coherent which, being successive, is in contact. Since, how- ever, every change takes place in those things that are opposed, and thabc are contraries and contradiction, and since of contr«.i*ction there is nothing that is a medium, it is evident thai *n contraries there subsists a medium. And that which is continuous is that which has as well as of something of the nature of the coherent, or of continuity, that which is in a state of contact. And a thing is called continuous when the extremity of either of the parts by which they are in contact, and in continuity, may be one and the same. Wherefore, it is evident that what is con- tinuous is to be found amongst those things from which, as compounds, there subsists anyone thing naturally adapted for being generated according to contact.
And that what is successive ranks as what is 9. Relation primary is evident likewise; for everything that ^*^®«» ^^^ ^ As to the definition of contrariety in general, compare book IV. chap. z.
3 fi povfiripla tils ScvTcpos. This is the rendering of Taylor, tliough the literal interpretation would be, "the first day of the month is not Bucoessive to the second.** Taylor, <u usual, has his eye fixed on th« Latin version: perhaps by devrepas he meant the second decade of tha Greek month, which would correspond with the nones in the Roman Calendar. For an account of the Greek year, vide Potter's Antiquitie% ^ok II. chap, xxvi 816 THE METAFHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [boCEXI.
eesHior. and is successlve does Dot subsist in a state of con- continuity. tact; but this is the case with what is successive on the supposition that what is continuous' subsists in a state of contact. Even, however, though they should subsist in a state of contact, they yet by no means amount to that which is continuous. Those things, however, in which there is not found contact there does not subsist natural coherence in. Wherefore, a point is not the same thing with a monad; for, indeed, in points may be found contact: but this is not the case with monads, but these are successive to each other, and between points there may be found a certain medium; whereas we cannot discover any such between monads.
BOOK XL* CHAPTER I.
t onto- / ^^^ present speculation is concerned about iogyisconcemy substanocj for the first principles and causes of 5r substance?/ s^bstanccs are under investigation. For both ' if the Universe be as one whole, substance con- stitutes the earliest portion; and if things subsist in a conse- quent order, in this way, likewise, would substance be first, and next quality, then* quantity. But at the same time neither, so to say, are these, simply considered, entities, but qualities and motions, in the same manner even as that which is not whole and that which is not straight. There- fore, we say that these also are in existence; for instance,^ that such a thing is not white. Further, still no one of the others possesses a separable subsistence.
1 This is a remarkable book — ^book XL, or, according to others, book XII. Some of the principles laid down in it have already been enunciated.-- The chief aim of Aristotle, however, is to endeavour to ascertain the number of the primary substances, vpSnai ova-iai: and this inquiry ii| based on the assumption that over these presides a certain substancei in its eflaciency prior and paramount to them alL ' Vide book VI. chap. L.
CH. n.] OLASSIFIOATION OF BUBSTANCBS. 317 And to the truth of this statement bear wit- 2. tms xm- ness also, in reality, the Philosophers of Anti- ^S^t^^^d quity; for they from time to time have inves- modern pwio- tigated into the first principles, and elements, ®®^^^* and causes of substance. Those, to be sure, that are Philoso- phers, now-a-days, have in preference sought to establish universals as substances; for the genem are universals — which they say are first principles and substances — ^rather on account of their examining them logically. The Philosophers, how- ever, of old regarded singulars as substances — for example, fire and earth — but not a common body.
Now, substances are three in number; one, indeed, is cognisant by sense, the existence of eit^aswfof which all acknowledge; and one part of this is substances eternal,^ and the other subject to decay, as plants cessity of such and animals: but of the eternal portion of it, it is mJtaphysi". necessary that we should admit as elements either one or many. But another substance is immovable: and this, some say, involves a separable subsistence; amongst whom some make a division of it into two; others, however, rank into one nature forms and mathematical entities: whereas others of these admit mathematical entities only as subsist- ing. The substances that are cognisant by sense belong, £Een7\ of course, to the department of physical science, for they in- \ volve a connexion with motion; but the immovable substance | belongs to a different science, on the supposition that this / possesses no first principle in common with the others. / CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
Substance cognisant by the senses, however, 1. change pre- is susceptible of change. Now, on the suppo- Io£?thhi/a« sition that change takes place from things that the subject of are opposed, or such as are media, and not from ***** c^^^nge- sll things that are opposites — for the voice is not a thing that is white — ^but from that which is contrary, it is nece»- sary that something, also, subsist capable of undergoing an alteration into contrariety; for contraries do not undergo % 1 Ffcie book YII. chap. L 318 THE HETAPH7SIGS OF ABISTOfLB. [bOOK 21 change. Further/ does this, no doubt, contmue permanent; that which is contrary, however, does not continue perma- nent; and hence doth there subsist a something third beside contraries — namely, matter. If, therefore,^ changes are foui in number, either according to quiddity, or according to quality, or quantity, or the place where; and if simple gene- ration, indeed, and corruption be what subsist according to quiddity, and increase and diminution be what subsist ao cording to quantity, and alteration be that according to passion, and motion be that according to place — allowing all this to be the case, the several changes would take place into contrarieties: I mean, such as are involved in singulars. Therefore, it is necessary that matter should undergo a change which can pass into both.
I. chan!?e is a Since entity, however, is twofold, everything -A^sute of ca"™ which uudcrgoes a change is changed from that /city into that which is au entity in capacity into that which I of energy. -^ ^^ entity in energy; as, for example, fiom what is white in capacity, or potentiality, into that which is white in energy: and in like manner, also, does the case stand with increase and diminution. Wherefore, not only accord- ing to accident is it possible that all things be generated from nonentity, but likewise from entity do all things derive their generation — I speak of what is an entity in capacity deriving its generation from a nonentity in energy or activity.
8. iiiustratec -^.nd this is the unit of Anaxagoras;^ (for it is by the tenets of better to maintain this than the tenet of certain Atiaxfrnalfder, Speculators who are of opinion that all thing? and others. subsist simultaneously;) and it is tantamount to the philosophic dogma of mixture adopted by Empcdocles ' Bekker begins chap. ii. with these words.
* Aristotle's doctrine is this: there are four chans^es; these changes are all changes into contraries — contraries themselves undergo no change, but they presuppose something as the subject of the changes, that is, the matter, Sktj, Thus, there are four changes, but three first principles, or doxai — namely, torm, privation, and contraristy. Vide Physics, book V. chap. i.
^ Anaxagoras, according to Aristotle, held this very tenet that he now mentions parenthetically — namely, that irdvra hfiov ^v, or that " all things were one potentially." Some dogma akin to this, I conceive, if nhat he means by the unit of Anaxagoras.
fSH. III.J UNDER CHANGE LIES THE SUBJECT OF IT. 319 and Anaximauder;^ and resembles the theory of Democritua viz. that all thiugs subsisted in capacity simultaneously, ani) not in energy. Wherefore, in this case they would touch upon matter, that is, the material canne. All things, 4. confirmatioB however, involve matter as many as undergo of the fore- a change; but entities involve different matter from one another:^ and of the things that are eternal as many as are not generable, but movable by an orbital mo- tion, possess matter, yet such matter as is not generable^ but is merely moved from this place towards that.
Now, one might raise the question, from what 5 p^^^ ^^^^ sort of nonentity generation could arise 1 for kind of non- nonentity subsists in a threefold way. If, there- generation fore, there subsists aught in capacity, from this ^'^^^ will generation subsist; yet, nevertheless, not from anything whatsoever without distinction, but one thing will be gene- rated from another. Neither is it sufiBcient to say that all things subsist simultaneously; for entities differ in matter: since why would things infinite in number be generated, but not one thing? for the faculty ^ of the human understanding is one. Wherefore, if likewise matter be one, that would have been generated also in energy the matter even of which would subsist in capacity.
Therefore are there three causes, and three e. RecapUuia- first principles,— two, indeed, amounting to con- *^®"* trariety, — of which one sort constitutes the formal principle and the species, and the second privation; but the third cause is matter.
CHAPTER III.
After these inquiries there remains for us j ^^ genera- | ^ to make our readers aware that neither matter tion of matter nor form is geneialed::*" ' ITSWyTi^k tbos of ®' ''"""• ^ Anaximander floonBhed about 610 B.O., and put forward the ex* Utonce of the Infinite. Vide Physics, book L chaps, iv. and v.; and Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 57, translated in '*Bohn's Philo- logical Library."
* Vide book VII. chap. iv.
* The word in the original is pous, * Vide book YI. chap, ziii By the phrase r^ l<rxaTa, which occm 92U THE K2TAPHTSI0S OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOE XI the. extremities of things; for everything that undergoes any change is changed both by something and into something — by something, of course, I mean that which is the first imparter of motion, and of something, that is, matter, and that into which the thing is changed; this is the form. Therefore, they go on in a progression to infinity, if not only the brass becomes spherical, but also the spherical or the brass is gene- rated: therefore, must we sooner or later come to a stand- still in the series.
2. The mode of After thcsc inquiries we must show how that fh^ifff'""!^ each substance is generated fi:om one synony- sorts of sub- mous with itself; for those things that are being stance. generated by Nature, as well as other things, are \ stitutes a first pnncipie wnibh subsists in another subject, whereas Nature constitutes a first principle which subsists in the thing itself; for man begets man: and the remaining causes are the privations of these. Substances likewise are three in number, and one of these is matter; which is this certain particular thing in consequence of its appearance as such; for as many things as are one by contact, and not by cohesion, constitute matter and a subject: but another of these substances is Nature, which likewise is this certain par- ticular thing, and into Nature is there the transition of a certain habit. Further, the third substance is that which subsists from these, and is ranked as a singular; for example^ Socrates or Callias.
3. Fonn8,if they As regards* some things, therefore, this be^foundin** Certain particular thing involves no subsistence composite sub- independent of a composite substance, as the Btances; form of a housc, unless art constitutes this form.