Neither is- there any generation and corruption of these, but after a different manner they are, and are not, both the house itself, which is unconnected with matter, and health, and everything that is produced according to art; but if forms subsist, they subsist in the case of those things that are in the following eentenoo, Aristotle means what we may trace pheno- mena ultimately to — ^as, for example, all things are resolvable into a certain matter and a certain form. ^ ViiU book YL chap. is. ' Vide book YI chap, viii OH. IV.J DIVERSITY IN nitST FRI&CIPL£S. 321 generated by Nature. Wherefore, doubtless, not injudiciously affirmed Plato that forms belong to it,' in things those things as many as involve a natural sub- {hSr^sut* sistence, on the supposition of the existence of siBtences from forms different from, or independent of, these; ^**"'®* as, for example, fire, flesh, the head, and so forth. For all these things are matter, and belong to siibstance especially — I mean, such a description of matter as is ultimata Some causes,^ therefore, that are those that 4, cauaea impart motion subsist as entities that have been either prior to previously generated, whereas other causes which coincident 'with subsist as the formal principle are simultane- *^®™' ously generated with their results; for when a man is in sound health then also is there present with him sound health, and the form of the brazen sphere subsists simul- taneously with the brazen sphere.
And whether, also, there remains anything 5 rpj,^ separa- Bubsequently to the separation of form from the biiity of form subject of form, we must examine; for in the case in some cases is of some forms there is no hindrance to this favJJSc? IthV" taking place; as if soul were a thing of this de- ideal hypothe- scription: not, to be sure, every soul, but the un- ®*"' derstanding; for that this should be so with every soul is not, perhaps, a thing that is possible. It is evident, therefore, that there is no necessity that on account of these, at least, ideas should have an existence; for man begets man, the singular begets a certain individual. And in like manner does the case stand with the arts; for the medicinal art is the formal principle of health.
CHAPTER IV.
And as regards causes and first principles,' j Have things in a manner are they different according as they different prin- belong to different things, and in a manner this * ^ " is not the case. Supposing one to express himself universallj, %nd according to analogy the causes and first principles of ' This is an erroneous principle in cauBatioii. * Vide book II. chap. it.
X THK HGTAFHTfilCS OF ABISTOTLE.
[BC I. A«ih<ti«- all tilings will be the same. For one might i[an"8°L'ir'^ the questiou as to whether the first priaoiplea reiuiYfB itie aud elements of Eubstimces, and of things which •»me! Bubsist as relatives, are different or the same't and, therefore, iu like matiaer is it the case with each of the oategories. But it would be ab&urd if there were the same principles and elemeats of all things, for from the same things will relatives derive their subsistence aa well as Bub- stanoe. What, thei-efore, will this be? for besides aubstanoe and the rest of the thiogs that are predicated there is nothing that is in common. Prior, however, ia the element to those things of which it ia aii element; but, aseui'edly, neither is substance an clement of relatives, nor is any of oriiitthBcue thesc ail element of substance. Further, how ia ■rithuuhinai! it admissible that there should be the same elements of all things 1 for none of the elements can be the same with that which is a composite nature of the elements; as, for iostauce, neither B nor A. can be the same with BA. Neither, therefore, is it possible that any one element of those natures that are intelligible — aa, for example, unity of entity — can be the element of all ttings; for these are pr^ eent with each of the compound natures likewise. No one of them, therefore, will have a subsistence either as aubatauce or relation; but it will be a thing expedient,' however, that they I should subsist in some form or other. The elements, then, of I all things are not the same. i ahaIoki all ^^' ^''*" '"'^ ^y — ■j"^'" ^ '^^ have already ue ihe niinci- affirmed — that iu one way this is the case, and nl™itrf'»n ™ another that it is noti aa, perhaps, in regard of ihingi uii! sensible bodies that which is hot subsiats in one '*°"' way as form, aud after another mode that which is cold Buhsista as the privation thereof: but matter BubNsta as that which primarily and essentially constitutes both of these in capacity; substances, Lnwever, are both these BqJ Bueh aa consist of those things of which these ore the first prin- ciples. Or, if any one thing is generated from what is hot and from what is cold, as flesh or bone, still that which is produced from thence must needs be different from these. The first principles and elements of these, 1 admit, then, an the same, yet there are different elements of different things^ * I htve addwl tbem wordi to complete tha 1 "I I IV.] PR1NCIPLE8, CAUBEB, ASD ELEMENTS. 323 and, without doubt, we cannot say that the case stands in this way with all things; but analogically nre the elements and first priuciples of all things the same: juBt as if one | should Bay_thi(t there are three fitat priEoiplES. iii_eaiatence — namely, form^and privation, and matter,; each of these, how- | ever, is different acooi-ding aa it is conversant about every genus, as in colour, white, black, surface, light, darkness, air; and from these emerge forth day and night. _ __. ' Since, however, not only things that are inhe- 4 cmKianUi J I* rent are causes, but also causes of things tLat eietneppcom-jj are external— aa, for example, in the case of what *^^ ■''^'' "f ' imparts motion — it is evident that a first principle is a dif- ferent thing from an element; yet both are causes, and into these ia a first principle divided: but what subsists as that 1 whioh imparts motion or rest conatitutea a certain first piin- ciple and substance...^^ Wherefore, there are in eiistence three elements, s. Eiemmn I. C^ indeed, according to analogy, but four causes and "i«'f''i''- \ ^-^ first principles; and a different cause subsists where the subject 1 Tt*< is different, and the first cause constitutes, as it were, that whictk imparts motion, and is different aecording aa the sub- ' ject is different. Thus, health is as form, disease as priva- tion, body as matter; that whioh imparts motion is the medicinal art Again, a house is as form, this certain sort oi I I confusion^ as privation; the bricks are aa matter, and that / which imparts motion, or the efficient cause, is the builder's art. And into these, therefore, is a first principle divided.
But since that which impai-ts motion in phy- g camei aical or natural things is a man, and in thinga iiireetniii or springing from the understanding form, or the contrary, in one respect would there be three causes, and in another four; for the medicinal ajl, constitutes in a manner health, and the building art the form of the house, and man begets man; further, beside these — as that which is the firat of all thinga — is that whioh imparts motion, or is the efficient cause, to all things.
•B reduced bj Ihi I 322 TRK METAFHTSIC8 OF ABISTOTUE. [boOK JU.
i. Ate the ei«- ^ things will be the same. For one might raise SSS«*Bnd^ the question as to whether the first principles relatives the and elements of substances, and of things which samet subsist as relatives, are different or the same) and, therefore, in like manner is it the case with each of the categories. But it would be absurd if there were the same principles and elements of all things, for from the same things will relatives derive their subsistence as well as sub- stance. What, therefore, will this be? for besides substance and the rest of the things that are predicated there is nothing that is in common. Prior, however,- is the element to those things of which it is an element; but, assuredly, neither is substance an element of relatives, nor is any of or is it the case these an element of substance. Further, how is with all things t it admissible that there should be the same elements of all things? for none of the elements can be the same with that which is a composite nature of the elements; as, for instance, neither B nor A can be the same with BA. Neither, therefore, is it possible that any one element of those natures that are intelligible — as, for example, unity or entity — can be the element of all things; for these are pre- sent with each of the compound natures likewise. No one of them, therefore, will have a subsistence either as substance or. relation; but it will be a thing expedient,^ however, that they should subsist in some form or other. The elements, then, of all things are not the same. ,.,,,, Or, shall we say — just as we have already are the princi- amrmed — that in one way this is the case, and mentVof *au ^^ another that it is not 1 as, perhaps, in regard of things the sensible bodies that which is hot subsists in one *"^®* way as form, and after another mode that which is cold subsists as the privation thereof: but matter subsists as that which primarily and essentially constitutes both of these in capacity; substances, however, are both these and buoh as consist of those things of which these are the first prin- ciples. Or, if any one thing is generated from what is hot and from what is cold, as flesh or bone, still that which is produced from thence must needs be different from these. The first principles and elements of these, I admit, then, are the same, yet there are different elemeuts of different things^ * I have added these words to complete the senseb OB. IV.] PRINCIPLES, CAUSES, AND ELEMENTS. 323 and, without doubt, we cannot say that the case stands in this way with all things; but analogically are the elements and first principles of all things the same: just as if one should say that thpro nrA thrftfl firfff^ pgnfiJplf^R ^n ftyiw^fiTifiP — namely^ fi^' ^^4 £rivation^and jnatter,; each of these, how- ever, is different according as it is conversant about every genus, as in colour, white, black, surfipice, light, darkness, air; and from these emerge forth day and night Since, however, not only things that are inhe- 4 causes and/ rent are causes, but also causes of things that eiememy cpmJ are external — as, for example, in the case of what ^~*^~ — *^^®* *7 imparts motion — it is evident that a first principle is a dif- ferent thing from an element; yet both are causes, and into these is a first principle divided: but what subsists as that ^v^ieh imparts motion or rest constitutes a certain first prin- ciple and substance.
' Wherefore, there are in existence three elements, 5. Elements indeed, according to analogy, but four causes and tt»««foid- fi3t_piioicipIes;,and a diflferent cause subsists where the subject is different, and the first cause constitutes, as it were, that which imparts motion, an^ is difiereni; according as the sul)-| ject is different. Thus, health is as form, disease as priva- tion, body as matter: that which imparts motion is the medicinal art Again, a house is as form, this certain sort of confusion ^ as privation; the bricks are as matter, and that which imparts motion, or the efficient cause, is the builder's art. And into these, therefore, is a first principle divided.
But since that which imparts motion in phy- g causes sical or natural things is a man, and in things threefold or springing from the understanding form, or the '*^"'^*^*^- contrary, in one respect would there be three causes, and in another four; for the medicinal art constitutes in a maimer health, and the building art the form of the house, and man begets man; further, beside these —as that which is the first of all things — is that which imparts motion, or is the efficient cause, to all things.
^ That is, the materials of the house before they are reduced hj tlii DTiilder to the form and shape of a house.
f X% [booi THK METAFUTdlOS OF ARISTOTLE.
/ I. Substances the principles of all things.
2. The same- ness of the principles of all things illus- trated in the case of energy and capacity.
\ CHAPTER V.
And since some things involve a separable^ subsistence, and some do not involve a sepa- rable subsistence, tliaJGormer are substfugioes; and on this account these are the causes of aU things, because the passive states and motions of things do not involve a subsistence independent of substances. In the next place, perhaps, will these constitute soul and body, or understanding, and appetite, and body.
Moreover, in another manner analogicaUy are first principles the same; for example, take the instances of energy and capacity. These, how- ever, are both different according as the subjects of them are different, and they subsist in diffe- rent ways; for in certain bodies the same thing subsists sometimes in energy and sometimes in capacity — as wine, or flesh, or a man. But also do these &I1 under the category of the causes above enumerated; for fQrro..fi2nsti- $Utes an energy, no doubt, if it be that which has a sgpacable subsistence, and which is compounded from both: and this is thJEJ case with^privation, — for instance, darkness, or a creature that is sick; but matter subsbts in capacity, for this is that which is endued with the capability of becoming both. But after another mode do those things differ in energy and capacity of which the matter is not the same, and of which the form is not the same, but different, — as a cause of man are both the elements fire and earth, as matter; and his proper form, and if there is anything else extrinsic — I mean, such as his father; and beside these the sun and the oblique circle, which constitute neither matter, nor form, nor priva- tion, nor are of the same species, but are motive natures.
8 Universal / ^^^f further, it is expedient for us to perceive causes practi- /that as regards causes it is possible to enumerate eSstemje! "** '^ SQjnfi that are universal and some tbat,.ar©,^^ot; therefore, the original first principles of all things .'ire that which subsists in energy as this first thing, and something else which subsists in potentiality. Those, indeed.
^ Aristotle in this chapter is preparing the way for establishing tlM existence of the First Substance CH. V.J bAMENEgS IN nBST PBINCIPLEft.
therefore^ that are univcrsals have not any subsistence; foi the singular constitutes a first principle of singulars: for man, to be sure, is the principle ^ of universal mnn^^rt thart -ia-nojinizfirsal man; but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular letter B is the cau8<^ of this syllable BA, and, in short, B of BA absolutely.
In the nfiyt plafifl, t.hf> forms-of substancea are 4.j¥]MMmWer fiiyf prin/^ipiaa; but thcrc are different causes and ^?^'"""J?^' elements of difi^rent things, as has been declared: may^ the-?* thus, of the things that are not contained in the ^*°^^' same genus, such as colours, sounds, substances, quantity, the elements are not the same, except analogically: the causes, likewise, of those things that are contained in the same Bpecies are different, but they are not different in species; but because the matter of singulars is a thing that is dif- ferent, both your matter and form, and that which imparts motion and the species, differ in number from mine, though, according to tho.fornial principle of the universal, they are the same.
Therefore, as to the inquiry, what^are-_fir8t Howtode- principles or elements of substances, and rela- cide the ques. tious, and qualities, as to whether they are the J^^gMM or* same or different? ^ it is evident that, if they diyerBity ofthe are predicated multi&riously, there are the same tfing?^** ^' principles and elements belonging to everything; but, if they are divided, ther^ are not the same, but different first principles of everything, unless that, also, in a certain Tespect there are the same principles of all things. Thus, they are the gama analogically^,! admits because there is matter, form^ privation, that which imparts motion: and in that way the causes of substances are as the 'causes of all things, be- cause, on the supposition of^^ubstaneea being destroyed, all things are destroyed. Further, that which is ^t subsists in actiudity, and in this way are these primaries different, — aa many as are contraries, — seeing that they neither are predi- cated as genera, nor denominated multi£a.riously; further. likewise, are there different kinds of matter that are styled ^causes. What, therefore, the first principles of sensibles arc^ ^ ThiB IB a fiiTourite principle with Aristotle, and one whioli he put! fbrward in opposition to the tenets of others. * Vide book IL chap.!▼.
r X Si6 THK METAFHTSIOB OF ARISTOTLB. f^BOOK XI tnd what sort they are, and after what mode they are the 4tBane, and after what mode they are different^ all this has been declared.
r CHAPTER YU BcTT siuoe there have appeared three snb- «isb0t«nee'ii«- stanoes — ^two, indeed, that are natural or physical, mnS^^moved ^^^ ^^® which is immovable— regarding thk im- i^om the nature movable substance we must endeavour to esta- ^ime and \y\[t^ that it is necessary that it should constitute a certain eternal substance, one which is im- movable; for the first of entities are substances; and if we suppose all of them to be corruptible, all things are corrup- tible. It is impossible, however, that in such a case motion should be either generated, or that it should be corrupted, for it was always in existence; nor is this possible with dura- tion; for it is not possible that there can be that which is prior and subsequent, on the supposition that time or dura- tion has no existence: and motion, then, in this way is con- tinuous, as also duration; for duration either is the same as motion,^ or it is a certain passive condition of motion. But there is not any motion that is continuous save that which is local or topical, and to this belongs the motion that is circular; but, doubtless, if there is anything that is fit for being moved, or that is productive, but not anything that energizes^ in this case motion has no existence; for it is admissible that what involves capacity should not energize.
There would, then, be no advantage gained,' of •ubstancM^ ^^^ ®^®^ ^^ ^® could make substances eternal, of no vahie, un- as those do who constitute as such the forms or nVxionwUh ideas, unless there will be inherent some first tiMfieextst. principle capable of working a change. There- enceo en rgy. ^^^^ neither would this be competent for such, * The reasoning contained in this chapter is well worthy of attention.
* We are reminded by this passage of Locke on Succession. Vide Coatin*8 analysis of Locke's doctrine hereupon, in his Psychology, ehap. iii.
> Aristotle is most hostile against all those who do not recognim the priority of energy, as a principle, to all things; for instance, h« Uames Hesiod far his theory about Chaos, and on these yery grounds.
CH. VI.] OOD AN imiATBRIAIi XNERGT. S87 nor would there be any other substance different from, or in- dependent 0^ the forms; for, on the supposition that it will not energize, there will be no motion in existence. Further, neither will this be the case if the substance will energize, but if the substance thereof constitutes capacity; for there will not be in existence a perpetual motion, for it is possible that that which subsists in capacity should not exist It is^ therefore, necessary, that there should be a first principle of this kind whereof the substance constitutes an energy.
Further, therefore, it is necessary that these ^ ^^ ^^^^ substances do not involve a connexion with first substance matter.^ For it is requisite that they should be J^** *™°»* eternal, if, in sooth, there is also, at least, any- thing else that is everlasting. It is, then, in enei^ that they subsist Although this involves a matter of doubt; for it appears to be the case that what energizes should subsist entirely in a state of potentiality: but that everything that is endued with capacity should not altogether energize. Wherefore, we may assume that potentiality is a thing that is antecedent to energy. But, surely, if this be the case, no one of the entities will be in existence; for it is possible that a thing possess a capacity of existence, but that yet it should not be in existence.
If the case, however, stands as the Theologians 4. jj^e neces- affirm — I mean, those who are for generating all "^ty of this things from Night ^— or as the Natural Philo- LusHnvoived sophers, who say that all things subsisted simul- ^ the'*h*8i-* taneously, the same impossibility will ensue, cists and theo- For how, let me ask, will matter be put in ^®«**°"- motion if nothing that subsists in energy will be a cause) fof the matter of a house, at least, will not itself move itself, but the builder's art will; nor does the menstrual blood move itself, nor earth, but seeds, and human seed. ' — \ "Wherefore, some have recourse to an energy ^ th that is always in action, as Leucippus and Plato; liatonic dogma for they maintain that motion is always in exist- ^§^2**^*^ ence: but why, and in what way, they do not state, nor how this is the case; nor do they assign the cause | of this perpetuity of motion. For nothing is put in motioa ^ ThiB is most important as oomiDg from AriBioUe. « Vide nesiod, Theog, 116.
S28 THE MBTAFHTSICIS OV ABISTOTUB. [BOOin at random; but it is necessary that there be something always in subsistence: as now, indeed, one thing is by nature moved in this way, and again is moved by force, either by Mind, or something else, after a different manner.
. Then, what sort is the first motion? for this really assumes inevitably differs as much as possible. But, enSrg?"'^ *' Certainly, neither is it possible for Plato, at least, to call that a first principle which imparts motion to itself, and which he sometimes considers to be a first principle; for subsequent to, and yet coincident with, the heaven is the soul, as he says.^ Therefore, the supposition of the priority of potentiality to energy is in a manner a correct one, but in a manner is not so. And how this is correct has been declared.
But that energy may be a thing that is ante- ffoingreuon. Cedent to potentiality Anaxagoras testifies, (for iS^/lT^x "Jras *^® understanding subasts in energy,) and Empe Empedocies, ' doclcs, iu his theory about Harmony and Discord; Sate'.*** ^'****" and this is confirmed in the assertion of certain philosophers, as to the existence of perpetual motion, as Leucippus. Wherefore, not in an infinite time did Chaos or Night subsist; but the same things continually ^were in existence as are iu existence at present, either in a evolutionary system, or otherwise, on the supposition that nergy is a thing that is antecedent to potentiality. Supposing a thing, therefore, to be the same continually in a revolu- tionary system, it is necessary that something always should emain energizing in like manner. But if there is likely to ensue generation and corruption, it is necessary that there be something else which continually energizes at one time in one way, and at another in another. It is necessary, then^ that it energizes in this way, no doubt, essentially, or from itself but in a different way according to something else. It must in this case energize either according to something that is different, or according to what is primary or original. It is, therefore, necessary that it energize according to this; for again