In the next chapter — chapter ix. — ^Aristotle's object is i;. Energy to show that energy is more excellent than capacity; more excellent and one chief reason of this is, that capacity presupposes J,^^ capacity, the possibility of change and corruption, wnereas this cannot take place in the case of energy, for it would be sub- versive of our notions of it as well as of its own nature. Corruption, we know, is an alteration into what is worse; but if we allow the existence of energy in the case of things having an evil tendency,* we may give up the whole point about the superiority of energy, and acknowledge its inferiority to capacity. But this certainly is. This agrees would conflict so much with our notions of what is ^th <>"' no- eternal as quite to. ignore its existence, because we liave ******* ® * already seen how energy constitutes the very essence of the Divine nature. And if we couple energy in any way with what is bad or tends to worse, we shall be guilty 3f detracting from the Divine per- fections, and allowing evil to be mixed up alon^ with them. But this is impossible; for, although we ma^ recogmse the existence of evil in things themselves, yet, to make it independent of them — ^to (l).Thi8 then would amount to a recognition of the independent existence of • frtaiciple of evil.
Iviii ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTUfS HETAPHTSICS. [bOOKYUL give evil an objective existence — is most false, and we must trace it np either to God Himself as its source, or we must regard it as an inde- pendent power — a principle coequal and coeval with Gk^d Himself.
This superiority of energy to capacity is confirmed tioii o?the°*^ from the case of mathematical diagrams, where the above from several properties reside in a dormant, unknown con- Sid ofchapter ^^^^^^> ^^^ ^^ ^nind of the mathematician is brought to ix. bear upon them, and he discovers and makes known by the mere energy of thought, those various relations which constitute truth, and are inherent in those figures potentially or in capacity.
20. Chap. X. 1^1 chapter x., which is the last one in book VIH^ is concerned Aristotle proceeds to show the relation subsisting tii?o'nruth" between truth and falsehood, as compared with that and falsehood Subsisting between energy and capacity; and this rela- ca*acu^^"**^ tion is explained as involving a further proof of the capaci y. superiority of energy to capacity. In things involving capacity, deception is possible — an assertion about their existence may be true or false; — but in the case of energy this cannot be the fact, because, where actuality is concerned, there is an end of any- tliing like an exercise of mind as to its reality or unreality. With respect, then, to things potential, the same opinion may be at one time true, and at another time false: with respect to things impoten- tial, this cannot be; but the same assertions are always true and always false. And this depends, not on the things themselves, but according as the mind connects together ideas where they are dis- joined in reality, or disjoins them where they are connected. Now, this proclaims the purely subjective character of truth and falsehood, at least according to Aristotle; but where we are concerned with what is objective, as in energy, there is then no question about it, as in the case of what is potential; for in the former instance the thing is before you, and if you are furnished with the powers of sense, there is no necessity for your calling into play the faculties of the nund in such a way as you do when you predicate truth or false- hood of anything. Now, as I take Aristotle to mean tion points to ^*®re, this is another proof of the superiority of energy the superiority to Capacity, bccausc, whereas capacity may furnish a capacity! ^** matter of doubt, because its reality often depends on the subjectivity of mind, yet, on the other hand, energy possesses an objective existence, and it is outside the mind, independent of its operations of compounding and dividing. There- fore, when a thing actually exists, it does not admit of being the subject of a false opinion; a false opinion in regard of such amounts to ignorance. If an object of sight was before a man who had not the power of vision, any mental exercise on his part as to its exist- ence would be quite beside the question of its existence. The thing is there, think as you may: you may not knoT it, because you BOOK IX.] AKALTBIS OF ABi'STOTLF*B METAFHTBIOB. Hi want the power of sensatiDn to perceive it; but this is not the case with others, who do not labour under this ignorance, but are supplied with the means that Nature furnishes for this purpose. This brings book YIII. to its close.
BOOKnX.
Book IX. is by no means equal in importance with ]^ ^^^ i^ book YIIL, or, indeed, any of the foregoing; it is occupied with entirely occupied with the consideration of unity — the JJJjJy» ^® "'*^* tA iv — ^which, to the metaphysician, is an interchange- able term with entity — ^the ro liv. The subject of unity has already been brought before our notice in book I v. chapter tl; and in the commencement of this book we have a sort of summary of the defiui* tiona given there, with this difference, however, that here no atten- tion is paid to anything save essential or absolute unity; whereas in book rv. this sort, as well as unity according to accident, are taken into consideration. Now, unity is predicated of what ^ gj is continuous and indivisible, especially so in regard ofanfty^f^ap?? of its motion; but the strictest notion of unity is com- prehended in its being a measure in quantity; and this we see in the fact of the measurement of various magnitudes and dimensions by means of number — ^their measurement, for instance, in length, breadth, depth, weight, velocity, and so forth. Now, the measure in general requisition is such a one as is uniform and indivisible; ana such, unity already has been defined to be. It is in itself simple, and in its case we look in vain for the possibility of addition to, or subtraction from it, as a measure; so that, all points considered, unity^that is, number — is the most precise standard of measure we could fix upon. Now, this may be seen in astronomy, where there has been a sort of unity adopted as to the measurement of the velocities of the heavenly bodies, and in music, and in grammar.
And as the subject has been mentioned, Aristotle, rorf.fn<^ti sets down certain considerations m regard of measure, sideiations in and amongst others mentions a metaphorical or derived 'eg&rd of signification of the word in the phrases that science °^®*""®' • was the measure of the objects of science, and sense the measure of the objects of sensation. The case is just as if another person were measuring us; we would be able to decide as to how large we in reality were by the extent to which the rule of measurement reached over our persons. But Arintotle would not 4. Disavowal ot wish to be misunderstood in tbis matter; by all this he the dogma of did not mean to harmonise with the opinion of Prota- ^otagoraa. goras, who held that man was the measure of all thuigs, for it is fideno^^ and not a scientific person — it is sense, and n)t a sentient «3 Ix ANALYSIS OF ABLSTOTLS-8 METAPHT8IC& [bOOK IXi I. Is man Um person, that he pronounces as a measme. Not that measure ofaU Aristotle makes the remark here, but one may say that things t ^|j,g dogrna of Protagoras has its spark of truth in it.
But when you come to apply it to things, you see bow silly it is, and Low false, for it would merge all objectivity into pure subjectivity. 1 may add, that the tendency which people have to allow this element of truth in the tenet of Protagoras to exercise its silent influence over their philosophic reasonings, often weakens the argument, for example, that has been urged from experience against miracles.^ 6. Chap. u. Chapter iL opens with the question as to whether Is unity a sab- unity is a substance or subject; and this Pytha^rean stance r ^^^^ Platonic view of the t6 tp — namely, considenne it equivalent with ovaia, or substance— Aristotle, as already before^ expresses his dissent from. Now, for the present purpose we may regard the to <v as a term interchangeable with the r6 bw; and pro- ceeding on this, he illustrates the absurdity of this Pythagoric dogma in the cases of colours, and music, and vocal sounds, and mathe- matical figures. And as to the to %9 and the ro ov beine interchangeable terms, we may assume this from the fact of their following upon the cate^ries in an equal number of ways with each other, and not being found in any of them; thus the rhlvm the case of substance and quality is similarly disposed with the to op.
In chapter iii. Aristotle treats of the modes of the mSes of Opposition between unity and plurality, and thus is led opposition be- to treat of contradiction, contrariety, and so forth. In and^piural^ tracing, however, this opposition, Aristotle points out what he conceives to be tne concomitants of unity; viz. sameness, similarity, and equality; and of pluralitjr; viz. diversity, dissimilarity, and inequality; and he furnishes a brief notice of the meanings of these several terms.
bn the greatest presupposes a difference in a greater or smaller degree; contrariet' '' ** ^ ^® ultimately come to the greatest possible con rarie y. difference, and this Anstotle styles contrariety, which he asserts to be evident from induction, and which he accordingly proves in this way, proceeding on the assumption of the greatest difference being in each instance the most perfect difference. Con- trariety thus constitutes the greatest difference, and the greatest contrariety amounts to habit and privation. Though ever^ con- trariety, however, amounts to privation, yet not every pnvation constitutes contrariety, save that one which is perfect; and this depends on the multifarious predication of privation. We have then au examination into the various senses of contrariety, and into the (DA popular illustration of this principle might be found in one of Sir Valtef Scott's Novels, " The Talisman," where an Oriental is represented as disbelieving in tike existence of ice, because contrary to kit own exptrience, thereby making k,mfii m measure of things BeOKIX.] AKALTSIS OF ARISTOTLB'S METAPHYSICS. Iz!
opposition subsisting in the cases of contradiction, privation, con trariety, and relation, assigning the first place to contradiction. These investigations, however, belong so palpably to the province of the logician, that some have considered them quite out of placo here, and suspected that they have found their way from some logical treatise of Aristotle, into the Metaphysics, and have been inserted in them by some mismaua^ment or otber.^ We nave a continuation of the same subject in chap- b. The question ter v., where Aristotle remarks that one may ask the ^^gP{,y^'JJ question, how unity is opposed to plurality, as well as chap. v. equality, to the great and small? And the question as to the opposition between equality and the great and the small is discussed to the end of this chapter. Li the beginning of chapter vL we have the question examined as to the opposition between unity and plurality; and Aristotle starts the surmise, as to whether there may not prevail certain absurd consequences, as the results of this opposition, depending on the opposition between plu- rality and the few. And in the course of this discussion he attacks the Anaxagorean tenet of the subsistence of all thin^ simultane- ously in a condition of infinity, both in multitude and in smalLiess. This was not a correct or philosophic method of speaking for Anax- agoras to adopt; the innnity he should have amrmed as having reference to smallness and fewness — kqI fiiKpoTrjTi Koi oXiyonyri.
In chapter vii we have the doctrine inculcated of the jo. chap. vii. necessity of media^ arising from contraries, on the sup- on the subject Eosition of the admissibmty of there being a medium ®^ ™edia. etween contrariety and some things else. And this leads to the showing that media belong to the same genus, as well as being com- pounded of contraries.
The discussions which occupy us to the end of book j| ^he iu- IX. do indeed seem quite irrelevant to the subject in quiries in book hand, and from chapter viiL onwards we are busied with J^^^^^^Jj ^ investi^ions strictly logical, e.gf. as to how things that treatise on differ m species may be found in the same genus, on Metaphysics, account oTIome chiracteristic belonging to them in l^l^^,:"^' common with each other; as, for example, man and horse, though differing in species, belong to the same genus, namely, animal. And this leaos to the question, why difference of species is not to be found in cases where contrariety is; as, for example, a man and a woman do not differ in species, though it must be acknowledged that contrariety is involved in the distinction of male from female. Aristotle therefore proceeds to show what difierence of species really is, and why some tnings may involve this difference in species, and some things may not. And all this, in chapter x., is jg ^j^^^ ^ brought to bear on the nature of the relation between * * ' * what is corruptible and incorruptible; in this way: contrarirs am (1) Fkit Mr. HaulM't remArks on this book, in kit Analysis.
I Uii ANitYsis OF Aristotle's metaphysics. [book x.
different in species; but cormplibles and incomqitiblcs are contrariea; •nd therefore we are to iwDiiit a generic difference as subsisting fcetTcen what is incormptible and what is corruptible j and this qnit« OTGrtlirowa the Platouic dognia of forms. This docs not clash with what Aristotle sajs about things, though different in species, belong- iue to the same genus, because this ool; takes place where they belong to the some co-ordinate series of the categories, which cer- tajnlv can never take jilaoe in the case of what is conuptihle, com- pared with what is mcomiptible. This beings boot iX. to its BOOK X.
J. Book X. Book X. is chiefly n recapitulation of questions that eiiiefl)f««- already have occupied our attention, and the implied wpiiulstion. object of which is to establish the unity and complete- ness of Metaphysics as a science. One would doubt^ says Aristotle, in the very banning of the first chapter, as to whether we ought to consider Wisdom, that is, Ontology, to constitute one science or many. And all of what follows oouTerges towards the unity of ontnlogicol science, Cor it takes notice of metaphysics as a soienee about apodeik' tic prinoiplea, that is, those principles which lie at the basis of all the sciences. Again, which of the four causes is Ontology principally concerned with? not with the material causes, for it deals with imma- terial substances; not with the efficient cause, for it takes notice of what is immovable; and not so much with the final cause, which has its place in the case of things that are practical rather than specu- lative; not so much, then, with the final as the formal cause — a fact which is shown in book VI. chiefly.
J What tui)- -^"' '''^ recognition by the metaphysician of the ■ixnccB are ihs existence of supra-sensual substances suggests the ques- •ubjoct-mitwr tion, what are Eupra-senanal substances? Are, for ex- n'o "«> ■ ample, fiMTus of this nature, and mathematical entities F and are they to he regarded as the subject-matter of Metaphysics, or not? Metaphysics certunly ore not conversant about mathematical entities; for although they are immovable, yet they do not possess a separable subsistence; and the; are not conversant with objects that foil under the notice of the senses, for these arc subject to corruption. s Thi> del ^'^^ ** ^^^ '""^ time, so far forth as the matter which niiiiHTbyVn- mathematics take co^sonce of is immovable, and so fttsncf to 111* far forth as the question of its immobilitv is overlooked MUei •ciencos. ^^ jj^^ mathematician, as lying beyond his province, so tar Ontoloey is a science speculative of fial matter. It does not, undoubtedly, fall uniier the deparmient of Natural Philosophy t« enter into an examination of such, for it is concerned with what a mov- able, and capable of having motion impressed upon it from cxtriniia BOOKX.] ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE's METAPHTSICS. Ixiil sources. About what sort of first principles likewise is the science of Metaphysics conversant P — about those that are primary and uni- versal in the most eminent sense of that term, and denominated generally elements. Again, do entity and unilv, the t6 op and to ev, fall under its notice as the primary ^nera of ioings?
Farther, must we admit the existence of a some- 4. ig there a thing separable and independent of singuIai'sP Are something that there any substances, beside those cognisant to sense, "^^P^abief which suDsist in a condition of actual separation P This involves the entire question as to the reality of metaphysical science, whose object is to try and discover the existence of sucli) and make it manifest to others. But the absurdity involved in supposing that there is no such supra-sensual substance in existence is apparent from its recog oition merely of the existence of matter. Now matter, ^ Matter pre we kuDw, merely subsists in capacity, and without the supposes the operation of energy or the formal principle, its existence «3cwtence of would be to us a nonentity; its existence, however, ^^^ ' proves the presence of energy, and ener^ presupposes the subsist- ence of an Eternal Substance. Besides, if we deny the g. other argu- existence of this Eternal Substance, we ignore the nients from the existence of order and design in the Universe; but |i*etenia^^^"' this wiU amount to the practical absurditv of denying the reality of what are matters of fact. Again, are we to recognise any identitv as subsisting between the first principles of mortals and immortals r certainly not, as has been abunaantly discussed in book II., chapter iv. Again, what position are we to assign to entity and unity in the category of first principles P and are we to recognise the subsistence of a something beside entirety P — the t6 trvvoXov, Farther, are we to assign any limit to first principles, or not P In chapter iii Aristotle shows that the subject- 7. chap. iii. matter of Metaphysics is strictly and properly entity as the subject- such; and he lays down what already he has demon- Seuphysics. strated, namely, that the unity of metaphysical science is not destroyed by the multiplicity of the subjects which it em- braces, consequent upon the many subdivisions ot entity. And this he illustrates, as heretofore, by the case of medical science; and, in general, we may take it for granted that all the various details of any science are kept within the limits of unity, by being examined and cultivated in reference to one certain genus, as well as one definite purpose. And all this is confirmed from the instances of the sciences of Geometry, Natural Philosophy, and Dialectics.
But, though there is a wide divergence in the subject- matter of Mathematics and Metapnysics, yet in some compares Ma- poiuts they intersect each other; for the mathematician thematies and makes use of those apodeiktic principles which fall Jj!^*SeJ'^*'* under the notice of the ontologist likewise. After all, boweyer, his use of them is peculiar to himself, and he leaves to the Ixiv ^5ALT8I8 OF AB1BT0TLK*S HBTAPHTSICS. [tOOKZ.
metaphysioian to speculate into the prinoiples of these. And fnrthei wo are to bear in mind, that althougn in some respects the snbject- niatter of Mathematics and Metaphysics is the same, because they both contemplate what is immoval)le, yet that the former scienoe merely views a certain portion of that which the latter investigates into in its entirety.
The mention, however, of these apodeiktic principles ^tion^oflhe*' s^iggests the consideration of those few fundamental HyatanuDfthe axioms that lie at the bottom of all reasoning, and, Hceptica in therefore, all systems of science. And this suggests the chapter v. reconsideration, in chapter v. of this book, of those who ventured to deny the validity of these fundamental axioms^ reoonjtideration, I say; for the subject has been already treated of in book III. In book X., however, we have the same topic brought before us, and are furnished with a second, and somewhat more elaborate, refutation of the sceptical philosophies ^ of Protagoras and Heraolitus. The course that Aristotle adopts, in his refuUktion of these systems, in book X., is pretty much the same as he has fol- lowed in book III. He enlarges on the absurdity involved in the denial of such a simple principle — ^nay, such a flat truism — as thai the same thin^ may and may not be at one and the same time, or that contradictions may be both true. It subverts our notions of the difference between negation and affirmation; and, accordingly, one capital mode of refutation may be derived from the necessity that the sceptic finds himself under, of assigning some meaning or other to that, the existence or non-existence of which he affirms to be the same. Now, when this meaning has been signalised by some name, the folly of the sceptic will be made apparent even to himself; as is shown more fully m book III. chapter iv. And all this Anstotle deems would be sufficient to convict Heraclitus himself of his incon- sistency: but there is another adversary, to whose system the same will be anta^nistic, and that is Protagoras; as he proceeds to show MOKZ.] ANALYSIS OF ABIdTOTLS's MBTAFHTeZG& IxV notice in book in., as embodied in the assertion of the truth of thi apparent; whicb assertion has been already refuted there.
But as to the truth of the apparent, we may lay it jj origin of down as certain that the origin of this opinion, namely, the dogma of from the tenets of certain Natural Philosophers, who all JJ® t^"'** »' appeared to have arrived at the same scientific inferences ® appar*" • in regard of the generation of nothing out of nothin£^, — ^that this origin is tantamount to a refutation of the paradox itself. And the sensational origin of the paradox is likewise a refutation of it; for to affirm the reauty of what is apparent to the senses, is to take no account of the possibility of the senses themselves being injured^ or otherwise incapacitated n'om deciding about truth; for example, just as if one were to place the fingers under his eye, and make objects item double, whic^ were single in point of fact. Here, at least, would be an instance where uie apparent — ^the to ffHibfoiitvov-^'sngk not true.
But pray why permit the sceptic to pronotince dog- 12. Scepticism matically as regards phenomena which he himself allows excludes to be fleeting and uncertain, and on which, as such, he ®^ ™* founds his system? This characteristic, of fiux and motion, in itself, must render impossible the attainment of truth at all, and therefore, why has the sceptic any ri^ht to contend for the truth of his scepti> ism P But apply this sceptical pliilosophy to the affairs 13 poetical of common life, and see how completely it fails there— recitation of how entirely discordant it is with everything that it *^® '^ 'S^*' finds there. When life and death are concerned, and ^^ *p ' • when the doctor prescribes a particular sort of food, we take that food according to his prescription, and we do not raise any subtle Questions as to whether it is the food that it seems to be, or whether tnis is impossible, consequent upon the flux and motion of things. And if thiuffs are in this continual state of change as regards the sensations that make themselves apparent to us, why do the same sensations always appear the same under the same circumstances P why do not they appear to us the same as they do to the sick P Why, because we are not sick. Do we continue, then, during such times, in a state in which our organs of sense are unimpaired by disease P The sceptic must say. Yes; but this is giving up the whole point, for it is an admission that we continue the same for a certain period of time, or, in other words, that things are not in that t^ate of flux which he contends they are.
This constitutes the Aristotelian mode of attacking. the Philosophy of the Sceptics, and he considers that ot'jSS!S\^% their whole system is shivered into fraj^ments by this overtiirow of method of refutation, which is the more ingenious, as it t^© sceptical is based on the principles of the sceptics themselves. ^ **'**^ ^' The overthrow, not so much of the speculative difficulties as of the practical absurdities involved in the STstem of the sceptic, to whick llYl ANALTSIS OF ABI8T07LB*B METAFHTSIGS. BOOK Z.
ArisbOtle has given such prominence, is called the argoment from Common Sense, and is the one, as is well known, which became such a favourite with the school of the Scotch metaphysicians ^ in modem times. All the sceptics, however, we must Dear in mind, are not to be refuted by one and the same argument, and what will prevail with one class will fail with another. For, according to Aristotle, amongst the sceptics themselves we discover the existence of different classes, and some are much easier refuted than others, for some adopt their system from what they fancy rational grounds, and therefore such may be foiled with the arms of reason; but others are for ignoring the authority of reason altogether. The sceptics belonging to this latter, whidi may be considered as the most ex- treme school of scepticism, will not allow that there is any reason in things, or any trutn at all: but how absurd, for if so, what reason have they for their theory? and if all things are false, how can they demand of men to recognise the existence of truth in their own philosophy P