Since ‘ nature ’ is used ambiguously, either for the form or for the matter, Nature, as we have seen, can be regarded from two points of view, and therefore our speculations about it may be likened to an inquiry as to what ‘snubnosed-ness’ is; that is to say, it can neither be isolated from the material subject in which it exists, nor is it constituted by it.
At this point, in fact, we may again raise two questions. Which of the two aspects of Nature is it that claims the attention of the physicist? Or is his subject the compositum that combines the two? In that case—if he is concerned with the compositum— he must also inquire into its two factors; and then we must ask further whether this inquiry is the same for both factors or different for each.
In reading the ancients one might well suppose that the physicist’s only concern was with the material; for Empedocles and Democritus have remarkably little to say about kinds of things and what is the constituent essence of them.” But if art imitates ARISTOTLE 1946 φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην μέχρι του (οἷον ἰατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ Kal 25 οἰκοδόμου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας Kal τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι TAG καὶ ξύλα, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Ela \ ~ a Ἃ ww Ε # ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρας τὰς φύσεις. Ere τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς Kal a, 4 e x 4 ra \ OLA ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα. ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος Kal οὗ ἕνεκα' ὧν γάρ, συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἔστι τι τέλος 80 τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦτο ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. (διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς γελοίως προήχθη εἰπεῖν “ἔχει τελευτήν, ἧσπερ οὕνεκ᾽ eyévero’s βούλεται yap οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον.) ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην---αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς, αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν--καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν 86 ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων: ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ς a“, a s 4 e ὦ, ΝΜ ae ἢ ἡμεῖς τέλος. διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα (εἴρηται δὲ 194b ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φιλοσοφίας)" δύο δὴ αἱ ἄρχουσαι τῆς ὕλης καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι---Ἶ τε χρωμένη, » [And consequently Physics will embrace both the form (end) and the matter (means).—C.]
° {Meineke, Frag. Comic. Graec. v. Ὁ. 128 (addenda to anonymous fragments). In a modern book this criticism of the poet would stand in a footnote.—C.]
4 1Cf. Met. 1072 b 2 ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ (good for someone, e.g. a patient, who is like ὁ χρώμενος) τὸ οὗ ἕνενα «καὶ τινός (good PHYSICS, II. τι.
Nature,@ and if in the arts and crafts it pertains to the same branch of knowledge both to study its own distinctive aspect of things and likewise (up to a point) the material in which the same is manifested (as the physician, for instance, must study health and also bile and phlegm, the state of which constitutes health; and the builder must know what the house is to be like and also that it is built of bricks and timber; and so in all other cases), it seems to follow that physics must take cognisance both of the formal and of the material aspect of Nature.
And further the same inquiry must embrace both the purpose or end and the means to that end.? And the ‘ nature’ 1s the goal for the sake of which the rest exist; for if any systematic and continuous movement is directed to a goal, this goal is an end in the sense of the purpose to which the movement isa means. (A confusion on this point betrayed the poet’ into the unintentionally comic phrase in refer- ence to a man’s death: ‘ He has reached his end, for the sake of which he was born.’ For the‘ goal’ does not mean any kind of termination, but only the best.) For in the arts, too, it is in view of the end that the materials are either made or suitably prepared, and we make use of all the things that we have at our command as though they existed for our sake; for we too are, in some sort, a goal ourselves. For the expression ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing exists or is done has two senses (as wg have explained in our treatise On Philosophy).? fAccord- ingly, the arts which control the material and possess the necessary knowledge are two: the art which uses for the sake of some product, 6.9. health); De anim, 415 Ὁ 2. Aristotle refers to his lost work Περὶ φιλοσοφίας.---(.]
σι 10 ARISTOTLE καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική. διὸ καὶ ἡ χρωμένη ἀρχιτεκτονική πως" διαφέρει δὲ ἦ ἡ μὲν τοῦ εἴδους γνωριοτική [ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική]), ἡ δὲ ὡς ποιητική, τῆς ὕλης" ὁ μὲν γὰρ κυβερνήτης ποῖόν τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδαλίου γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκ ποίου ξύλου καὶ ποίων κινήσεων ἔσται. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν 4 τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὖσα ᾿, ¢ ῳ Μ A mu ” Ert τῶν πρός τι ἡ ὕλη: ἄλλῳ yap εἴδει ἄλλη ὕλη.
Μέχρι δὴ πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἰατρὸν νεῦρον ἢ χαλκέα χαλκόν, μέχρι Tou τινὸς γὰρ ἕνεκα 1 (Omitting ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική (as perhaps a marginal gloss on 4 δ᾽ ὡς ποιητική), the construcuon is: ἡ μὲν τοῦ εἴδους γνωριστική (ἐστιν), ἡ δὲ (ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ) ὡς ποιητικὴ (γνωριστική ἐστι) τῆς ὕλης, which I have translated. If 4 ἀρχιτεκτονική is retained, it might be construed: ‘the art which knows the form (15) the (true) architectonic art, whereas the other (is architectonic) as operating on the matter.’ But Aristotle is not contrasting Anowing with operating, but two arts which both have knowledge and both contro] the matter (Wl. 2 and 5-7). I have repunctuated all this paragraph and modified the translation correspondingly.—C.
4 (This distinction is taken from Plato, Crat. 390 p (the steersman, who uses the helm, knows what shape it should have, and directs the carpenter who mukes it) and Polit. 259 = (the master-builder, architecton, by his knowledge, directs the workmen). The user's art has ‘use’ for its end; ‘the manufacturer’s end is the product.—C.]
» [ think Pacius is right in following Philoponns in his interpretation of ποίων κινήσεων; ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκ ποίων φυσικῶν pordv καὶ δυνάμεων. [As the use of the product by ourselves is the supreme end, the art of the user (8.0. the helmsman has as good a right to be called architectonic (nee, PHYSICS, 11. 1.
the product and the art of the master-craftsman who directs the manufacture.* Hence the art of the user also may in a sense be called the master-art; the difference is that this art is concerned with knowing the form, the other, which is supreme as controling the manufacture, with knowing the material AT hus, the helmsman knows what are the distinctive characteristics of the helm as such—that is to say, its form—and gives his orders accordingly; while what the other knows is out of what wood aud by what manipulations the helm is produced.® In the crafts, then, it is we that prepare the material for the sake of the function it is to fulfil, but in natural products Nature herself has provided the material. In both cases, however, the preparation of the material is commanded by the end to which it is directed.
And again, the conception of ‘ material’ is relative, for it is different material that is suited to receive the several forms.° How far then, is the physicist concerned with the form and identifying essence of things and how far with their material? With the form primarily and essentially, as the physician is with health; with the material up to a certain point, as the physician is with sinew and the smith with bronze For his as the art of the literal arehitecton, e.g. the master-carpenter, who directs the production of the helm.—C.]
ὁ [Hence ‘ matter’ cannot be studied apart from appro- priate forms.—C. | 4 (Literally, ‘ wp to a certain point (but not to the point of abstracting form for matter), as the physician is concerned with sinew (but not to the point of losing sight of its function and considering it merely as matter).’ The reading and punctuation of this sentence were debated by the ancient commentators and remain doubtful.—C.]
ARISTOTLE 194b ἕκαστον, Kal περὶ ταῦτα & ἐστι χωριστὰ μὲν εἴδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος. πῶς δ᾽ ἔχει τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τί ἐστι, 15 φιλοσοφίας τῆς πρώτης διορίσαι ἔργον.
* There appears to be a hiatus in the original after ἥλιος, but the meaning, as I have tried to restore it, is obvious. [ΟἹ Met. 1071 a14 ἀνθρώπον αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα.. » καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω, οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος...De gen. et corr. B 10 explains that the inclination of the ecliptic (‘ oblique circle ᾽) to the equator, whereby the sun is further off in winter, nearer in summer, accounts for the rhythm of generation and decay.
ὃ 1 atet E 1, Physics deals with natura] bodies, which have CHAPTER III ARGUMENT ‘ Because’ (=by cause of) may answer the question of the ‘how and why’ of a thing from various directions. How comes it, for instance, that we have a‘ saw’ here before us? (1) Because cutting wood in a certain way is a useful function that causes the creation of such a tool to be contemplated as an end or purpose. (2) Because there existed a suitable material (iron, to wit) out of which such an instrument could be forged. (8) Because a voluntary agent (the smith) with suitable apparatus and accessories (furnace, anvil, hammer, etc.) chose to effect the purpose-serving modifications in the iron. (4) Because the contemplated result actually occurred, so that there really came out a tool having the form or distinctive attributes which constitute what we mean by a‘ saw’ (194b 16-195 26).
(These four αἰτίαι, or essential conditions of the thing being there and being what it is, are spoken of in histories of philosophy as the four ‘ causes,’ final, material, efficient, and Jormal. But it does violence to the English idiom to call the PHYSICS, II. τι.--τῖτ.
main concern is with the goal, which is formal; but he deals only with such forms as are concepLually, but not factually, delachable from the material in which they occur. In Nature man generates man; but the process presupposes and takes place in natural material already organized by the solar heat and so forth.t But how we are to take the sejunct and what it is, is a question for lirst Philosophy to determine.?
separate existence (χωριστά) and can change; Mathematics, with unchanging entitics, which exist not separately but only as qualifying substances; Theology, with pure forms, unchanging and separately existing.—C.]
CHAPTER III ARGUMENT (continued) material out of which a thing is made, or the distinctive attributes which define it, its ‘ causes, whereas the Greek αἰτία and the corresponding adjective αἴτιος can be applied to anything that is ‘ guilty of’ or ‘ responsible for’ a thing, or *to the account of which,’ for praise or blame, the thing may in any sense be put down. Paraphrase or barbarism offer the only escape from using English words in a sense that they cannot really bear.)
{Various distinctions of ὁ modes’ of causation cut across this classification: (1) A cause may be described specifically (a physician ἢ or by a wider generic term ( a professional man’). (2) Incidental are distinguished from proper causes: the statue is made properly by ‘the sculptor,’ incidentally by ‘ Polycleitus.’ (8) The actual and the potential: ‘ Builder” may mean a man actually building or merely one who has the capacity to build (a 26-b 80).
(This chapter, from 194 b 23 to 195 b 21 is almost word Jor word identical with Met. A 2, where Mr. Ross’s teat and commentary may be consulted).—C.].
ARISTOTLE 194p16 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, ποῖά τε καὶ πόσα τὸν ἀριθμόν ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία, εἰδέναι δ᾽ οὐ πρότερον οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον πρὶν ἂν λάβωμεν 9ὺ τὸ διὰ τί περὶ ἕκαστον, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦτο ποιητέον καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ πάσης τῆς φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς, ὅπως εἰδότες αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνάγειν εἰς αὐτὰς πειρώμεθα τῶν ζητου- μένων ἕκαστον. Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ o5 γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον 6 χαλικὸς τοῦ ἀν- δριάντος καὶ 6 ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη" ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα’ τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν 6 λόγος 6 τοῦ τί ἣν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη, οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν καὶ ὅλως 6 ἀριθμός, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι 80 ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμή- σεως, οἷον 6 βουλεύσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ α [ἐνυπάρχοντος. Matter (like Form) is an immanent ‘ cause,’ contrasted with the external moving cause, Met.
> [καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη, the wider classes to which these terms belong; ¢.g. bronze 1s a species of ‘ matter’; statue, ἃ species of ‘ image,’ as explained below, 195 a 29.—C.} ° That is to say, it must have actually ‘ arrived’ and realized its ὁ being-what-it-had-to-be.’
4 [The ratio 2: 1 is a wider class, including the musical PHYSICS, II. τὰ, We have next to consider in how many senses ‘ because ’ may answer the question ‘why.’ For we aim at understanding, and since we never reckon that we understand a thing till we can give an account of its ‘ how and why,’ it is clear that we must look into the ‘how and why ’ of things coming into existence and passing out of it, or more generally into the essential constituents of physical change, in order to trace back any object of our study to the principles so ascertained.
Well then, (1) the existence of material for the generating process to start from (whether specifically or generically considered) ὃ is one of the essential factors we are looking for. Such is the bronze for the statue, or the silver for the phial. (Material aitia.) Then, naturally, (2) the thing in question cannot be there unless the material has actually received the form or characteristics of the type, conformity to which brings it within the definition of the thing we say it is, whether specifically or generically. Thus the interval between two notes is not an octave unless the notes are in the ratio of 2to1; nor do they stand at a musical interval at all unless they conform to one or other of the recog- nized ratios. (Formal aztia.) Then again (8), there must be something to initiate the process of the change or its cessation when the process is com- pleted, such as the act of a voluntary agent ὁ (of the smith, for instance), or the father who begets a child; or more generally the prime, conscious or unconscious, interval of the octave, and itself included in the still wider class ‘ Number’ (195 4 31). So τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ‘ the constituent terms’ (¢.g. biped, animal} ‘in the definition ’ (of man), are wider classes than the term defined.—C.]} 4 [Or ‘e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action’ (Ross).—~C.]
ARISTOTLE 194b μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περι- a ς ς ͵ὔ Ν if ἃς ας a πατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια' διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμέν, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀπο- 35 δεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. Kal ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους, οἷον τῆς 1955 ὑγιείας ἡ ἰσχνασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις, ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα' πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἊΝ ἐστι, διαφέρει δ᾽ ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δ᾽ ὄργανα. Τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια σχεδὸν τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται" συμβαίνει δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένων τῶν αἰτίων καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἴτια εἶναι od κατὰ ουμ- βεβηκός, οἷον τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ἡ ἀνδριαντο- ποιικὴ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς οὐ καθ᾽ ἕτερόν τι ἀλλ᾽ ἣ ᾿ ἀνδριάς: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ς U4 4 ϑ ee “ ἐ iA ὡς ὕλη τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις. "Ἔστι δέ τινα καὶ ἀλλήλων αἴτια, οἷον τὸ πονεῖν 10 τῆς εὐεξίας καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πονεῖν" ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς τέλος τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἀρχὴ κινή σεως.
4 [The ‘ tools’ of the doctor’s trade include the drugs and instruments.—C.]
PHYSICS, IT. in.
agent that produces the effect and starts the material on its way to the product, changing it from what it was to what it is to be. (Efficient aitta.) And lastly, (4) there is the end or purpose, for the sake of which the process is initiated, as when a man takes exercise for the sake of his health. ‘ Why does he take exercise?’ we ask. And the answer ‘ Because he thinks it good for his health ’ satisfies us. (Final aitia.) Then there are all the intermediary agents, which are set in motion by the prime agent and make for the goal, as means to the end. Such are the reduction of superfluous flesh and purgation, or drugs and surgical instruments, as means to health. For both actions and tools ¢ may be means, or ‘ media,’ through which the efficient cause reaches the end aimed at.
This is a rough classification of the causal de- terminants (aitiai) of things; but it often happens that, when we specify them, we find a number of them coalescing as joint factors in the production of a single effect, and that not merely incidentally; for it is qua statue that the statue depends for its existence alike on the bronze and on the statuary. The two, however, do not stand on the same footing, for one is required as the material and the other as initiating the change.
Also, it can be said of certain things indifferently that either of them is the cause or the effect of the other. Thus we may say that a man is in fine condition ‘ because ’ he has been in training, or that he has been in traming ‘because’ of the good condition he expected as the result. But one is the cause as aim (final aitia) and the other as initiating the process (efficient aitza).
16 25 ARISTOTLE "Ere δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν' ὃ yap παρὸν αἴτιον τοῦδε, τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸν αἰτιώμεθα ἐνίοτε τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὴν ἀπουσίαν τοῦ κυβερνήτου τῆς τοῦ πλοίου ἀνατροπῆς, οὗ ἦν ἡ παρουσίᾳ αἰτία τῆς σωτηρίας.
"Amavra δὲ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα αἴτια εἰς τέτταρας τρόπους πίπτει τοὺς φανερωτάτους. τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῶν σκευαστῶν καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου καὶ αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπερά- σματος ὡς τὸ ἐξ οὗ αἴτιά ἐστιν: τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον (οἷον τὰ μέρη), τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι---τό τε ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος. τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ 6 βουλεύσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ στάσεως ἢ κινήσεως. τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων' τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι (διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν εἰπεῖν αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν).
Τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι τῷ 5 The technical term for the propositions of a syllogism apart from their logical connexion is ‘ material,’ so that the propositions ‘mammals ae animals,’ ‘squirrels are animals,’ squirrels are mammals,’ are the ‘ material’ of the syllogism: ‘mammals are animals, squirrels are animals, therefore squirrels are mammals.’ Here all thee propositions, major, minor, and conclusion, are true. Therefore the conclusion is materially sound, but formally the syllogism is not sound; for the conclusion does not follow from the premisses, though they are all true. Aristotle frequently points out that the θρλοιιείοῦ of a syllogism is materially true, but not formally proved.
(Cf. Anal. post. 94 a 22, where ‘the (logical) antecedent PHYSICS, IT. τη.
Again, the same cause is often alleged for precisely opposite effects. For if its presence causes one thing, we lay the opposite to its account if it is absent. Thus, if the pilot’s presence would have brought the ship safe to harbour, we say that he caused its wreck by his absence.
But in all cases the essential and causal deter- minants we have enumerated fall into four main classes. For letters are the causes of syllables, and the material is the cause of manufactured articles, and fire and the like are causes of physical bodies, and the parts are causes of the whole, and the premiscs are causes of the conclusion,* in the sense of that out of which these respectively are made?; but of these things some are causes in the sense of the subsiratum (e.g. the parts stand in this relation to the whole), others in the sense of the essence—the whole or the synthesis or the form. And again, the fertiliz- ing sperm, or the physician, or briefly the voluntary or involuntary agent sets going or arrests the transfor- mation or movement. And finally, there is the goal or end in view, which animates all the other deter- minant factors as the best they can attain to; for the attainment of that ‘ for the sake of which’ anything exists or is done is its fma] and best possible achieve- ment (though of course ‘best’ in this connexion means no more than ‘ taken to be the best ἢ).
These are the main classes of determinant factors which necessitates a consequence ’ seems to be equated with the ‘ material cause.’—C.]
Ὁ [Mr. Ross (on Met. 1013 Ὁ 17) points out that Aristotle here includes both the material cause and the formal (dis- tinguished at the beginning of the chapter) under the ἐξ of (iminanent or internal constituents}, and then divides this again into the ὑποκείμενον and the τί ἣν elvar.—C,] ARISTOTLE 1966 cider: τρόποι δὲ τῶν αἰτίων ἀριθμῷ μέν εἰσ p ριθμῷ μέν εἰσι πολλοί, κεφαλαιούμενοι δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐλάττους. Λέγεται γὰρ αἴτια πολλαχῶς, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν 80 ὁμοειδῶν προτέρως καὶ ὑστέρως ἄλλο ἄλλου, οἷον ὑγιείας ἰατρὸς καὶ τεχνίτης, καὶ τοῦ διὰ πασῶν A rs ἢ δ ἃ ὔ " on \, τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ ἀριθμός, καὶ del τὰ περιέχοντα πρὸς τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. "Ere δ᾽ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη, οἷον ἀνδριάντος ἄλλως Πολύκλειτος καὶ ἄλλως 86 ἀνδριαντοποιός, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ ἀνδριαντοποιῷ τὸ Πολυκλείτῳ εἶναι' καὶ τὰ περιέχοντα δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ὁ ἄνθρωπος αἴτιος εἴη ἀν- 1065 δριάντος ἢ ὅλως ζῷον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν συμ- βεβηκότων ἄλλα ἄλλων πορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον, OLOV εὐ 0 λευκὸς καὶ ὁ μουσικος αὐὑτιος λέγουτο τοῦ ἀνδριάντος. Παρὰ πάντα' δὲ καὶ τὰ οἰκείως λεγόμενα καὶ 57a κατὰ συμβεβηκός, TA μὲν ὡς δυνάμενα λέγεται “ [Afeé. 1013 Ὁ 33 has καὶ ἀεὶ τὰ περιέχοντα ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ‘and the classes that include any particular cause are always causes of the particular effect.’ Mr. Ross notes that the antithesis between the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον and the περιέχον PHYSICS, IT. m1.
and causes; and, though within these many other distinctions may be drawn, yet they too can be reduced to a manageable number of classes.
Thus, (1) causes belonging to one and the same class may be more or less closely determined by being reduced to subordination to each other. Health may be restored by a ‘physician,’ or by ἃ ‘ professional man’ (a term which includes physicians). The octave may be described as a case of the ratio 2:1, or less specifically as a ‘number’; and generally, an inclusive term may be used instead of a more special one.* And again, (2) an agent may be described not qua agent, but as something that characterizes him in- cidentally; and in this case also the specification may be more or less inclusive. We may say that the statue was made by ‘ the sculptor,’ or that it was made by ‘ Polycleitus,’ in as much as the art resided in the person of Polycleitus and was incidentally associated with all his other irrelevant characteristics. Incidentally, too, the sculptor was a man, or more generally still an animal. And the ‘ incidental’ itself may be more or less remotely related to the essential. Thus the sculptor’s being a man of culture or light in complexion is even more incidenta] and irrelevant to his production of a statue than his being Polycleitus or a man.
(8) Besides all these ways of describing the agent, whether in his agential capacity or by attributes that fall to him incidentally, we may be speaking of his potentialities merely or of the actual exertion of his seems to include both the antitheses, specific—generic (here) and individual—universal (below).—C.]
ARISTOTLE 15h Τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐνεργοῦντα, οἷον τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι οἰκίαν οἰκοδόμος ἢ οἰκοδομῶν οἰκοδόμος.
Ὁμοίως δὲ λεχθήσεται καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἴτια τὰ αἴτια τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἷον τουδὲ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἢ ἀνδριάντος ἢ Kal ὅλως εἰκόνος, καὶ χαλκοῦ τοῦδε ἢ χαλκοῦ 7) ὅλως ὕλης" καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων 1 ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ συμπλεκόμενα καὶ ταῦτα κἀκεῖνα λεχθήσεται, οἷον οὐ Πολύκλειτος οὐδὲ ἀνδριαντο- 9 ποιὸς ἀλλὰ Πολύκλειτος ἀνδριαντοποιός.
"AM ὅμως ἅπαντα ταῦτά ἐστι τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἕξ, λεγόμενα δὲ διχῶς" ἢ γὰρ ὡς τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς τὸ γένος, ἢ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἣ ὡς τὸ γένος τ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ἢ ὡς συμπλεκόμενα ταῦτα a ς ς a, ᾿ δ πα 5 a nN ἢ ὡς ἁπλῶς λεγόμενα' πάντα δὲ ἢ ἐνεργοῦντα ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἅμα ἔστι Kab ? Ww \ Ὄ Ν ἐμ a7Q> i ee Γ nm οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ὧν αἴτια--οἷον 68’ ὁ ἰατρεύων τῷδε PHYSICS, 11, im.
powers. Thus, we may say that‘ the builder ’ caused the house ta be built, meaning the man who knew how to build, but it was only when he was in the act of building that he was really causing the house to be built.
And all this holds just as good for the product as for the producer. The product may be regarded as this particular statue, or as a statue in general, or still more generally as an image; or again the craftsman as working upon this particular piece of bronze, or upon bronze in general, or still more generally upon material. And these distinctions, too, may be crossed by the distinction between ‘ directly ’ and ‘incidentally.’ And again both the incidental and the direct may be united together, if we speak, not of ‘ Polycleitus,’ nor of ‘the sculptor,’ but of ‘Polycleitus the sculptor.’
All these distinctions, however, may be brought under six heads, each of which may be predicated in two different senses. For every determining factor, qua determinant, may be designated (1) individually, or (2) as belonging to a class; and (3) incidental coincidences may have a more specific character, or (4) a more general one; and both direct and indirect agency or passion may be indicated (5) separately or (6) in combination, And finally in every case it may be either (a) a potentiality that is indicated, or (6) an actual energizing. But they differ to this extent, that the actual energizing agent, being an individual, exists as energizing, or ceases to do so, according as that which is experiencing its energy ceases or continues so to experience it (for instance, a particular physician ceases from the actual exercise of his art at the same moment as the ARISTOTLE 195 b20 τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, καὶ ὅδε ὁ οἰκοδομῶν τῷδε τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ---τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ovK ἀεί' ee yap οὐχ ἅμα ἡ οἰκία καὶ 6 οἰκοδόμος.
δ᾽ ἀεὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἑκάστου τὸ ἀκρότατον Το: (ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), οἷον ἄνθρωπος οἰκοδομεῖ ὅτι οἰκοδόμος, ὁ δ᾽ οἰκοδόμος κατὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν" τοῦτο τοίνυν πρότερον τὸ αἴτιον. καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων.
Ἔτι τὰ μὲν γένη τῶν γενῶν, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἀνδριαντοποιὸς μὲν ἀν- δριάντος, ὁδὲ δὲ τουδί. καὶ τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις τῶν δυνατῶν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐνεργοῦντα πρὸς τὰ ἐνεργού- μενα.
Ὅσα μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια καὶ ὃν τρόπον αἴτια, 80 ἔστω ἡμῖν διωρισμένα ἱκανῶς.
~~ [1 CHAPTER IV INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTERS IV-VI We have now learnt to regard the purpose or end (finis) to which a voluntary act is directed as the final cause of that action being taken, and the action itself as the efficient cause of the purpose being accomplished. Here the connexion between the efficient and final causes ig direct, and the result normally follows the expectation.
But sometimes we aim at one thing and ‘ by accident ’ hitanother. Thus aman may go to the market to purchase wares and there may accidentally meet a debtor and recover the debt; or he may dig his plot for the purpose of planting it and may find a hidden treasure. In such cases the action is directed towards one purpose, but accomplishes another. And this we attribute to Chance or PHYSICS, II. m1.-1v.
particular patient ceases from being actually in the process of restoration to health; and a particular builder ceases from actual building at the same momént as the house ceases from being actually in course of erection); but in the case of potentiality it is not always so, for the potential builder and the house need not perish at the same time.
And in every case we must try to determine the point at which the causality is focused, both here and elsewhere. Thus a man builds qua builder, and a builder builds qua expert in the building art; so it is in the application of the building art to the material that the building art is focused. And so with all the rest.
Again, the general is related to the general, and the individual to the individual: a statue is produced by a sculptor, but this individual statue by such and such an individual sculptor. And the relation of the potential to the potential and of the actualized to the actualized is analogous.
Let this suffice for the definition of the different classes of determinants and the ways in which they are severally related to the result.
CHAPTER IV INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTERS IV-VI (continued) Fortune. In these cases the final cause (6.5. desire for the crop) has no normal relation to the effect (discovery of a treasure), though the action incidentally caused that discovery. The efficient cause of the discovery, then, viz. the digging in that place, quite definitely and directly led ARISTOTLE INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTERS Iv-VI (continued) to the result, and is exactly the action which would have been dictated by the desire to secure the treasure, had the man known it was there; but the final cause that actually dictated the action was only incidentally connected with the result; for the act of digging as determined hy the desvre for the crop had no reference whatever to the treasure, and no such effect as the discovery could be expected as normally following from 1t.
It 1s in cages of this kind that Aristotle traces the causalty of what we call Fortune or Accident, and he confines his attention to accidental results which are significant and which therefore might have been aimed at for their own sake, but as a matter of fact were hit upon without having been aimed at.
ARGUMENT [Besides the four causes above distinguished, the agency of Chance or Luck has been recognized in popular and philo-~ sophic thought, and events are spoken of as occurring spon- taneously ‘ af themselves ’ (ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου) (195 b 30-85).
Some question the existence of Chance; lucky events always have some definite cause. On the other hand, men do (6980 Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ τύχη Kal τὸ αὐτόματον τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι διὰ τύχην καὶ διὰ τὸ αὐτόματον. τίνα οὖν τρόπον ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον, καὶ δ 36 πότερον τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ἢ ω νι ΣΝ ε eA Ν + > é ἕτερον, καὶ ὅλως τί ἐστιν ἡ τύχη Kal τὸ αὐτόματον, ἐπισκεπτέον.
wv A 4 > Mv a 7 > fol ΕΣ A 1968 Ἔνιοι γὰρ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἀποροῦσιν" οὐδὲν A i ᾿ γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης φασίν, ἀλλὰ πάντων PHYSICS, II. τν.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTERS IV-VI (continued) This clue must be firmly held in following the argument through the three chapters in which it is developed. It1s crossed by many repetitions and obscured by elliptical omissions. Aristotle used two words, one the more general, αὐτόματον (unperfectly represented by ‘ chance’ or ‘ acci- dent ’), the other of narrower range, τύχη (imperfectly repre- sented by ‘ fortune’ or ‘ luck’). The English word that seems best to bring out the argument will be used in every case, without any attempt being made to secure exact correspondence.
{It will appear that, strictly, a ‘ chance result ’ means a result which (1) is produced ‘ incidentally ’ or ‘ in virtue of a concomitant’ (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), and also (2) is ‘ purpose- serving ’ (évexd του), in that it is desirable and might have been designed either (a) by conscious human purpose (it is then called ‘luck,’ τύχη) or (ὁ) by the unconscious purposiveness of Nature (it is then called ‘ chance,’ ταὐτόματον).---.
ARGUMENT (continued) call some events lucky, others not; and some philosophers, who allow Chance a place in their systems, ought to have given some account of it (Ὁ 85-196 Ὁ δ).
Others see in Fortune an inscrutable divine cause. The whole question calls for examination (b 5-9).—C.]
We often allege fortune, or luck, and accident as causes, saying that something came about ‘as fortune or luck would have it’ or ‘ accidentally.” What then is the place of fortune and accident amongst the causes we have reviewed? Is there any distinction between them? And, in a word, what are they ὃ For some question their existence, declaring that nothing happens casually, but that everything we ARISTOTLE 1965 εἶναί τι αἴτιον ὡρισμένον, ὅσα λέγομεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτο- μάτου γίγνεσθαι ἢ τύχης---οἷον τοῦ ἐλθεῖν ἀπὸ τύχης εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ καταλαβεῖν ὃν ἐβούλετο bpev οὐκ ᾧετο δέ, αἴτιον τὸ βούλεσθαι ἀγοράσαι ἐλθόντα" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης λεγομένων det τι εἶναι λαβεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τύχην. ἐπεὶ εἴ γέ τι ἦν ἡ τύχη, ἄτοπον ἂν φανείη ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τί mor οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχαίων σοφῶν τὰ αἴτια περὶ το γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς λέγων περὶ τύχης οὐδὲν διώρισεν, ἀλλ᾽, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν ᾧοντο οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι εἶναι ἀπὸ τύχης. ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο θαυμαστόν: πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἃ οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι ἔστιν ἐπανενεγκεῖν ἕκαστον ἐπί τι αἴτιον τῶν γινομένων (καθάπερ ὃ παλαιὸς 16 λόγος [εἶπεν]; 6 ἀναιρῶν τὴν τύχην), ὅμως τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι πάντες ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης" διὸ καὶ ἁμῶς γέ πὼς ἦν ποιητέον αὐτοῖς μνείαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνων γέ τι ᾧοντο εἶναι τὴν τύχην, οἷον φιλίαν ἢ νεῖκος, ἢ vobv,. πῦρ ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἄτοπον ο οὖν εἴτε μὴ ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι εἴτε οἰόμενοι παρέλειπον, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐνίοτε χρώμενοι, ὥσπερ ᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀέρα ἀνωτάτω ἀπο- 1 [εἶπεν om. Simpl. 330. 14, Torstrik, Diels.—C.]