2 (Cf. Leucippus, frag. 2 οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ba’ ἀνάγκης. Democritus is referred to, according to Eudemus (Simplic. 330. 14; Diels, Vors. 55 A 68). See C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists, Ὁ. 121.~-C.} PHYSICS, II. ww.
speak of in that way has really a definite cause.? For instance, if a man comes to market and there chances on someone he has been wishing to meet but was not expecting to meet there, the reason of his meeting him was that he wanted to go market- ing; and so too in all other cases when we allege chance as the cause, there is always some other cause to be found, and it is never really chance. And indeed it might be urged that, if there really were such a thing as luck, it would present a genuine problem, and the question might be raised, why none of the earlier philosophers should have had anything to say about it when discussing causes in relation to genesis and perishing, so as apparently to think that nothing comes about by chance. Maybe. But is it not equally strange that, how- ever freely men admit that every kind of luck and everything that ‘happens accidentally’ can really be assigned to some definite cause, still, while accepting this venerable argument for the elimination of chance from their thoughts, they nevertheless invariably distinguish, in fact, between things that do, and the things that do not, depend upon chance or luck? So in any case the philosophers should have given some account of what are called chance happenings. If they gave none, it was not because they identified chance with any one of the causes they recognized—Love or Strife, Mind, or Fire or some other element, But surely, whether they believed or disbelieved in chance, they were bound in reason to take some note of it; especially as, on occasion, they actually had recourse to it, as when Empedocles says that air is sifted out upwards not uniformly ARISTOTLE 198 a κρίνεσθαί φησιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἂν τύχῃ---λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ ὡς ᾿ οὕτω συνέκυρσε θέων τότε, πολλάκι δ᾽ ἄλλως ᾿---καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖστά φησιν.
a Hiol δέ τινες οἱ καὶ τοὐρανοῦ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κόσμων πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον" ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν διακρίνασαν καὶ ᾿καταστήσασαν εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν. καὶ μάλα τοῦτο θαυ- μάσαι ἄξιον! λέγοντες" γὰρ τὰ μὲν ζῷα καὶ τὰ so φυτὰ ἀπὸ τύχης μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἦτοι φύσιν ἢ νοῦν q τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον (οὐ γὰρ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν. ἐκ τῦ σπέρματος ἑκάστου γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐϊς μὲν τοῦ τοιουδὶ ἐλαία ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τοιουδὶ ἄνθρωπος), τὸν δ᾽ οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου 86 γενέσθαι, τοιαύτην δ᾽ αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν εἶναι οἵαν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν. καίτοι εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄξιον ἐπιστάσεως, καὶ καλῶς ἔχει 196 b λεχθῆναί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι ἀτοπώτερον τὸ λέγειν ταῦτα ὁρῶντας ἐν μὲν τῷ οὐρανῷ οὐδὲν 1 [The lack of a construction for λέγοντες is repaired in F by the reading καὶ μάλα τοῦτό ye αὐτὸ ϑαυμάσαι ἄξιον λέγοντας τὰ μὲν κτᾺ.---Ο,} «[γαρ, 53‘ (Air) in its course meets, now in this way, now in that (with the other elements).”. At De gen. et corr. 834 a 1 Aristotle complains that Empedoeles sometimes makes air move upwards * by chance’ ἡ υδείης this verse), but seems sometimes to attribute to it a downward movement, which he must consequently regard as ‘ natural’ to air. Should we read here ἄνω 4 κάτω (for the strange superlative ἀνωτάτω, though read by Simplicius): ‘ E. speaks of the air as PHYSICS, IT. τν.
but as it happens—for he says of it, in his Cosmo- gony,? Thus did it chance to hit one while, but other whiles not thus— and he says that the members of animals, for the most part, came out haphazard.’
Some ¢ indeed attmbute our Heaven and all the worlds? to chance happenings, saying that the vortex and shifting that disentangled the chaos and established the cosmic order came by chance. This is surely most amazing—for these people actually to say that, whereas neither animals nor plants are, or come to be, by chance, but are all caused by Nature or Mind or what else (for it is not a matter of chance what springs from a given sperm, since an olive comes from such an one, and a man from such another), yet the heaven and the divinest things that our sight reveals come anyhow and have no such causes as animals and plants have. But if this really were so, that very fact ought to give us pause and convince us that the matter needs investigation. For, in addition to the inherently paradoxical nature of such an assertion, we may note that it is exactly in the movements of the heavenly bodies that we never observe what we call separated out, not always up or always down, but as it happens *p—C.]
{Fragg. 57-61. In the period when Love is gaining on Strife, animals are formed by the casual coming together of limbs separately produced. C'f. 198 Ὁ 29.—C. | ἀ [The Atomists believed in an indefinite number of worlds in infinite space. Diels, Vors. 54 A 21.—C.]
VOL, I L 145 ARISTOTLE 106» ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γιγνόμενον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐκ ἀπὸ Ἀ A Cf ΓΑ 3 τύχης πολλὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀπὸ τύχης" καίτοι εἰκός Bye ἦν τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαι. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ws θεῖόν τι οὖσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον. Ὥστε σκεπτέον καὶ τί ἑκάτερον, καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον τό τε αὐτόματον Kal ἡ τύχη, Kal πῶς εἰς τὰ διωρισμένα αἴτια ἐμπίπτουσιν.
CHAPTER V ARGUMENT The phrases we are examining are never used in con- newton with normal or expected sequences of things.
Now man has purposes, and Nature has trends, which normally determine the course of deliberate action or of natural processes; but in either case such actions or pro- cesses may incidentally involve unexpected results outside their normal progress towards the goal they are making for; ~ A δος, ΑΝ 10 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ \ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα Ta δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἡ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ - > fol ἀπὸ τύχης, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ οὔτε τοῦ ws ἐπὶ πολύ. GAN ἐπειδὴ ἔστιν ἃ γίγνεται καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα, καὶ ταῦτα πάντες φασὶν εἶναι ἀπὸ « [Aet. i, 99, 7 ᾿Αναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ (τὴν τύχην). Diels, Dow. 326; Vors.46 66. Cf. also Hud. Eth. 1947 Ὁ 6.—C,] Ὁ (Cf. Anal. post. 96 a 8, Some occurrences are uni- versal (for they are as they are, or occur as they do, always PHYSICS, II. r1.-v.
casual or accidental variations, whereas in all that these people tell us is exempt from chance such things are common. Of course it ought to be just the other way.
Some, moreover, hold that fortune is a genuine cause of things, but one that has a something divine and mysterious about it, that makes it inscrutable to the human intelhgence.* So we must obviously investigate the whole matter, and must see whether the phrases in question can be classified or distinguished from each other, and how they fall m with the causes and determinants we have defined.
CHAPTER V ARGUMENT (continued) it is such results that we attribute to chance. Every concrete thing has incidentally a number of attributes which are not essential to ite being the thing tt is. And the same ts true of agents and actions regarded as causes. (196 b 10-197 a 8.)
Hence the sense of vagueness that attaches to inerdentad or accidental causation. (a 8-85.)
To begin with, then, we note that some things follow upon others uniformly or generally, and it is evidently not such things that we attribute to chance or luck. Necessary or customary successions, there- fore, are excluded from our present inquiry. On the other hand irregular and exceptional conse- quences do occasionally occur, and since it is precisely to this class of actual happenings that we ourselves and in every case); others occur only as a general rule; é.g., ἃ man generally grows a beard, but not always.—C.]
ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE toebis τύχης, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι ἡ τύχη Kal τὸ αὐτό- ματον" τά Te yap τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης τοιαῦτα ὄντα ἴσμεν. Τῶν δὲ γινομενὼν TT μεν ενεκα TOV γιγνέεταν Ta δ᾽ ob τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὰ δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά Tov, 0 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι Kal ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ TO ὡς επὶι πολὺ εστιν EVLA περὶ α ἐνδέχεται Ὁ7- αρχειν TO €VEKQ TOU. ἐστι ὃ ένεκα τοῦ οσαὰα TE ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθείη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως. τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φαμὲν εἶναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστι τὸ 8 μὲν καθ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίας καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ TO μουσικόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ww e, A A AY εἴ 5. αἴτιον ὡρισμένον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον" La ‘ nn a ey é ἄπειρα yap av τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη. ων a 30 [Καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά roy γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταὐτο- ® And if it happened that the cultivated tastes of the builder, which had not influenced our choice, brought us a Ld acquaintance, our selection of him would have been irected to one purpose primarily, but would have served another, purpose incidentally, and that would be a ‘lucky chance, PHYSICS, IT. v.
apply such terms as ‘luck’ or ‘lucky’ and of this class that we think when anyone else uses these terms, it follows that what we call luck or chance corresponds to some reality and is not a mere fiction.
Or taking it from another side: some things make for a purpose and some not; and of the ‘ ends’ actually achieved some are those we aimed at, but some are not. In this latter case our actions were as a fact, making for the uncontemplated result just as much as if it had been intended; so that an action may actually ‘serve a purpose’ which does not necessarily or normally follow upon it, and which it was not intended to serve. In this sense any action may be regarded as purpose-serving if it leads to a result that might have been voluntarily sought, or to ἃ result which stands in the corresponding relation to the movements of Nature. Now when such results accrue incidentally, we say that they come ‘ by chance.’ ‘ Incidentally,’ I say; for as a thing takes its name, and is what it is, in virtuc of certain essential attributes, but incidentally has other attributes, not essential to it as that thing, so too it may be with causes. Thus the essential efficient cause of a house being built is the application of the builder-craft to the task by a builder; but if the man in whom that builder-craft is embodied is a pale-complexioned or cultivated person, then these characteristics are incidentally part and parcel with the direct cause of the building. Thus direct causation is determinate and calculable, but incidental causation indeter- minate; for one and the same person or thing may have an indefinite number of incidental qualifications.
As we said, then, what we mean by luck or chance (for at present we are attempting no distinction 85 ARISTOTLE μάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης (αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων ὕστερον διοριστέον, νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω φανερόν, ὅτι ἄμφω ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά τού ἐστιν)" οἷον ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἄν, κομιζομένου τὸν ἔρανον, εἰ ἤδει" ἦλθε δ᾽ οὐ τούτου a a \ a ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν καὶ πονῆσαι τοῦτο τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα' τοῦτο δὲ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης" ἔστι 3 ἄπ τας, "» J δὲ τὸ τέλος--- κομιδή---οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας. καὶ ,} na λέγεταί ye τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἐλθεῖν: εἰ δὲ προ- ehdpevos καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἢ ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ κομιζόμενος, od ἀπὸ τύχης. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά Tov. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 1 [The reading κομιζομένου is guaranteed by the ancient commentaries. Ἐπ (according to Prantl) has κομισαμένου. The variants κομιζόμενος, κομισόμενος may be due to the notion that the same transaction is meant as by κομίσασθαι (i. 36).
* (The definite article (‘the sum subscribed’) can be ex- plained by supposing that Aristotle, as often, is alluding to a scene in some well-known comedy, already used as an illus- me by those who denied the existence of chance, 196 a 1.
PHYSICS, 1. v.
between different terms within this gencral purport) is the incidental production of some significant result by a cause that took its place in the causal chain incidentally, and without the result in question being contemplated. I call actions purpose-serving, and speak of them as accomplishing ‘ ends,’ when the result is such as would have been recognized as a purpose and would have determined the action, had it been anticipated. Thus the man who came to the market-place for some other reason would have come there on purpose to recover his debt if he had known that he would there meet lus debtor in the act of receiving the? sum subscribed by his fnends; and though he did not come for that reason, yet his coming there incidentally made for that end, though directed to another. But we must suppose that he did not habitually go to the place (frequented occa~ sionally by his debtor), and still less that he was compelled to go there habitually on some other business; so that in his case the achieved end of recovering his debt was a result not normally involved in his action, but was yet of the class of things that may be deliberately determined upon and purposed. In this case he would in fact be said to have come there ‘by luck’; whereas, if that had been the purpose he contemplated, or if he always went to market, or if he generally recovered a debt when he did, we should not say that the result came by luck. Clearly then luck itself, regarded as a cause, is the name we give to causation which incidentally inheres in deliberately purposeful action taken with respect to some other end but leading to the event we call fortunate. And the significant results of such causes we say ‘come by Tacks Thus, since ARISTOTLE 1970 διάνοια καὶ τύχη" ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας. ᾽Αόριστα μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. ὅθεν καὶ ἡ τύχη τοῦ 10 ἀορίστου εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δόξειεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, ὅτι εὐλόγως. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς γίνεται ἀπὸ τύχης" κατὰ συμ- βεβηκὸς γὰρ γίνεται, καὶ ἔστιν αἴτιον ὡς συμ- βεβηκὸς ἡ τύχη, ὡς δ᾽ ἁπλῶς οὐδενός’ οἷον οἰκίας οἰκοδόμος μὲν αἴτιος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ αὐλητής, καὶ τοῦ ἐλθόντα κομίσασθαι τὸ ἀργύριον, μὴ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐλθόντα, ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν τινα βουλόμενος καὶ διώκων καὶ φεύγων καὶ θεασάμενος). καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς" ὁ yap λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἢ a0 τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις 1 [The translator omitted καὶ θεασάμενος, which is not in E, but was read by Simplic. (lemma 841. 19) and Themis- tius (53. 9), FI have καὶ θεασόμενος (before καὶ φεύγων,) of which another trace appears in Simplicius’s paraphrase (340. 26) καὶ θέαν τινὰ ὀψόμενος.---(] * [This serves to distinguish τύχη from ταὐτόματον. τύχη is to purposive thought as ταὐτύματον is to the unconscious purposiveness of Nature (Ross on Met. 1065 a 31},.—C.]
PHYSICS, II. v.
choice implies intention, it follows that luck and intention are concerned with the same field of objects.2 The incidentally causative forces are, in the nature of the case, indefinite as tonumber. This is why luck appears to have something evasive about it and to be inscrutable by man; and why, on the other hand (since everything really has a definite cause) there is a sense in which it might seem that nothing at all really goes by luck or chance. For all these opinions have some justification in the facts; inasmuch as there is a sense in which things do go by luck, when they come to pass incidentally to some other chain of causation, and ‘luck’ is the name we give to causes that act incidentally; but in the absolute sense, without this qualification, luck is not the cause of anything. For instance, the builder, as such, is the efficient cause of the house being built, but his skill in flute-playing is incidental, and therefore might equally well attach itself to any other man, not a builder. In like manner the man’s meeting his debtor was a by-product incidentally determined by the purpose, whatever it was, that brought him to the market-place; and it would have attached itself in the same incidental way to any other of the count- less reasons that might have brought him there at that moment, such as the desire to meet a friend, or legal business as prosecutor or defendant. It is only if he had come on purpose to meet his debtor that his meeting him would have followed not incidentally but primarily from his purposeful action. And this is why we are justified in saying that luck cannot be calculated; for we can calculate only from necessary or norma! sequences, and luck acts outside such. So ARISTOTLE 191. παρὰ ταῦτα. dor ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ οὕτως αἴτια, 3 καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστον.
Ὅμως δ᾽ én’ ἐνίων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, dp’ οὖν τὰ τυχόντα ait’ ἂν γένοιτο τῆς τύχης. οἷον ὑγιείας ἢ πνεῦμα ἢ εἵλησις ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ ἀπο- κεκάρθαι' ἔστι yap ἄλλα ἄλλων ἐγγύτερα τῶν 65 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων.
Τύχη δὲ ἀγαθὴ μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἀγαθόν τι ἀποβῇ, φαύλη δὲ ὅταν φαῦλόν τι, εὐτυχία δὲ Kal δυστυχία ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα Taira: διὸ καὶ τὸ a / a mapa μικρὸν κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν μέγα λαβεῖν 7 εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὡς ὑπάρχον λέγει ἡ 80 διάνοια’ τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρὸν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ. "Er. ἀβέβαιον ἡ εὐτυχία εὐλόγως" ἡ yap τύχη ἀβέβαιος" οὔτε yap ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης οὐθέν. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄμφω αἴτια (καθάπερ εἴρηται) κατὰ \ συμβεβηκός--καὶ ἡ τύχη Kal τὸ αὐτόματον--ἐν ab τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις γίγνεσθαι μὴ ἁπλῶς μηδ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ τούτων Go” ἂν γένοιτο ἕνεκά του.
2 (Literally, ‘ whether any and every accidental cuuse can be considered responsible for the lucky event.’—C.]
> [Philoponus and Simplicius interpret as follows: A sick man happens to have his hair cut (not as part of his treat- ment, but for the usual reason), and the cold wind or hot sun to which he is consequently exposed happen to cure him. Shall we say that this lucky result is due to the nearer accidents (heat or cold) and not to the more remote (hair- cutting)? The ate 18 not answered (Simplic.).—C.]
4 [ Purposeful action’ includes here the unconscious pul pesveness of Nature, and so covers ταὐτόματον. This ast sentence would be better placed at the beginning of the PHYSICS, II. v.
the indeterminate nature of these incidental lines of causation makes luck indeterminate.
But when we have said all this, the question still remains in some cases how far we are to carry back our search for this incidental causation.¢ If a man has his head shaved for some special treatment, and afterwards goes out for some reason indifferent to his cure, and the air and sun cure him, is the exposure to air and sun (which is the efficient cause of his cure) incident to ns going out? Or must we go further back and say that it is incident to his being shaved, without reference to going out, his going out itself being without reference to the cure? The only answer to such questions is that, here 85 elsewhere, ‘ incidence ’ may be more or less proximate or remote.
We speak of ‘ good luck’ when luck brings us something good, and‘ bad luck’ in the opposite event, or, in serious cases, of‘ good fortune’ or‘ misfortune’; and accordingly if we just miss some important good thing or just escape a bad one, we call that also bad or good fortune, because by anticipation we regard the good or ill as having been actually present, so close did it seem.
Yet again, we may well say that good fortune is unstable; for so is all luck, inasmuch as nothing that is constant or normal can be attributed to luck.
Both luck and chance, then, as we have said, are causes that come into play incidentally and produce effects that possibly, but not necessarily or generally, follow from the purposeful action to which in this case they are incident, thongh the action might have been taken directly and primarily for their sake.° next chapter, which introduces the distinction between τύχη and ταὐτόματον.--Ο,] ARISTOTLE CHAPTER VI ARGUMENT As the greater part of this chapter is devoted to the defini- tion of two Greek words to which there are no exact English equivalents, I have preserved the Greek words themselves and only attempted to translate the commentary. If the English reader cares to substitute’ luck’ or‘ fortune ’ for tyche, and ‘ accident’ or ‘chance result‘ for automaton,® it may make it easter to understand the general drift of Aristotle's analysis, but he must not expect it to fit the English words with any approach to precision, Note that Aristotle, swayed by a false etymology, inclines throughout to treat the incidentally emergent result as super- seding the intended one, rather thun as additionally accruing to it. And this is the more remarkable inasmuch as his examples and illustrations signally fail 10 conform to this prepossession; since they are drawn either from human actions that may very easily uchieve their contemplated result as well as the uncontempéated one that incidentally emerges; 197096 Διαφέρει δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν ἐστι" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τοῦτο 1874 δ᾽ οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης.
Ἢ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις. διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην --σημεῖον δ᾽ drt δοκεῖ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὖ- 5 δαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἢ ἐγγύς" ἡ δ᾽ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς « Automaton may be translated by ‘ of itself’; δι...ὁ it happened of itself.’
> {Anstotle refers both to the etymological sense of eudaemonia, * haying: a good daemon (destiny, fortune) ’ and to his own doctrine that happiness consists in the Inghest activity (πρᾶξις, ἐνέργεια) of the soul, conditioned by virtue, PHYSICS, II. vi.
CHAPTER VI ARGUMENT (continued) or else from natural processes which, as such, are in no way deflected by their incidental results to human beings, how- ever casual or unusual. It is only quite at the end of the analysis, as a sort of supplement, that he notwes, as a different kind of thing from what he has been investigating, the case of a warp in nature, where the fulfilment of the normal ‘ intention’ of the process 18 really precluded by the incidental deflection.
In the concluding section af the chapter Aristotle unmasks his battery, and we see why he has been so insistent on chance being always incident to purposeful activities, whether of man, or of Nature, and on its always resulting in something that might have been directly aimed at. It is because it enables him to bring out the necessary antecedence of purposeful to casual causation, by insisting that, as substantive existence must always underlie atiributive or relational existence, 80 direct must always underlie incidental causation, direct causation beng always purposeful, In Greek tyche and automaton differ in this, that automaton is the more general term and includes tyche as a special class.
For (1) tycke itself, as a cause, and the results that accrue by the action of tyche, are only spoken of in connexion with beings capable of enjoying good fortune, or more generally of ‘ doing well’ or ‘ doing ill,’ in the sense either of ‘ faring’ or of ‘ acting ’ so. Therefore tyche must always be connected with our doings and farings—a truth indicated by the common belief that good fortune (dyche) is the same, or much the same, thing as ‘ happiness’; and to be‘ happy’ in beings capable of deliberate choice and moral conduct.— ARISTOTLE 101 Tis (εὐπραξία γὰρ) --ὦσθ᾽ ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν" οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχία οὐδ᾽ ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ 10 καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα, ὥσπερ ἔφη ΠΠρώταρχος εὐτυχεῖς εἶναι τοὺς λίθους ἐξ ὧν of βωμοί, ὅτι τιμῶνται, ot δὲ ὁμόζυγες αὐτῶν καταπατοῦνται. τὸ δὲ πά- / axew ἀπὸ τύχης ὑπάρξει πως καὶ τούτοις, ὅταν ὁ πράττων τι περὶ αὐτὰ πράξῃ ἀπὸ τύχης" ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. Τὸ δ᾽ αὐτόματον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ πολ- nm la 2 4 vt ἘΠ, ὙΨΗ ὁ A 15 ots τῶν ἀψύχων" οἷον ὁ ἵππος αὐτόματος (φαμέν) ἦλθεν, ὅτι ἐσώθη μὲν ἐλθών, od Tod σωθῆναι δὲ x sof # ἕνεκα ἦλθεν. καὶ ὁ τρίπους αὐτόματος κατέπεσεν" ἔστη μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἕνεκα κατέπεσεν. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἕνεκά του ῳ a 20 γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται οὗ ἔξω τὸ αὔτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου λέγομεν" ἀπὸ τύχης δέ, τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.
α (Perhaps the Protarchus, son of Callias, who appears in Plato’s Philebus. (Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 629.)—C.]
> (Or ‘ we say the horse came “‘ of itself’ (spontaneously) ’ —though, in Aristotle’s view, the cause in this case was external to the horse.—C.]
© (Literally, ‘ It is clear that, in the field of occurrences which are in a general way for some purpose, we use the expression ‘chance result’ in any case where a thing of which the cause is external occurs not for the sake of the PHYSICS, Lf. νι.
is to have ‘ done well’ in life; so that ‘ doing well’ or ‘ill’ by tyche is impossible to creatures that have no self-direction. That is why neither inanimate things nor brute beasts nor infants can ever accomplish aigthin by tyche, since they exercise no deliberate choice; nor can such be said to have good or bad lyche, except bya figure of speech, as when Protarchus? speaks of the ‘ fortunate ’ stones that have been built into altars and are treated with reverence, while their fellows are trampled under foot. But even such things may be brought, as passive agents, under the action of tyche, if a rational agent does something with them which turns out by tyche to affect his well- being; but not otherwise.
(2) Automaton, on the other hand, may be used to describe the behaviour of brute beasts and even of many inanimate things. Tor instance, we attribute it to automaton ὃ if a horse escapes a danger by coming accidentally to a place of safety. Or again, if a tripod chances to fall on its feet for a man to sit down upon, this is due to audomaton, for though a man would put it on its feet with a view to its being a seat, the forces of Nature that controlled its fall had no such aim.
It is clear, then, that when any causal agency incidentally produces a significant result outside its aim, we attribute it to automaion®; and in the special cases where such a result springs from deliberate action (though not aimed at it) on the part of a being capable of choice, we may say that 1t comes by dyche.
actual result’ (as in the instance of the horse, which was not brought to a place of safety by an internal purpose of its own).—C,] 25 30 85 ARISTOTLE a 4 Ay ͵ et ig Ὁ 4 (Σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μάτην, ὅτε λέγεται ὅταν μὴ γένηται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἐκείνου evexa,’ οἷον τὸ βαδίσαι λαπάξεως ἕνεκά ἐστιν' εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο βαδίσαντι, μάτην φαμὲν βαδίσαι καὶ ἡ βάδισις ματαία, ὡς τοῦτο ὃν τὸ μάτην, τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου A. a ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει" x uw ἐπεὶ εἴ τις λούσασθαι dain μάτην ὅτι οὐκ ἐξέλιπεν ὁ ἥλιος, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη" οὐ γὰρ ἣν τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. οὕτω δὴ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα, ὅταν αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται' κατέπεσε γὰρ οὐ τοῦ πατάξαι ἕνεκα ὁ λίθος’ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἄρα κατέπεσεν 6 λίθος, ὅτι πέσοι ἂν ὑπὸ τινὸς καὶ τοῦ πατάξαι ἕνεκα.) Μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐστὶ χωριζόμενον τοῦ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐν a a δ \ τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις" ὅταν yap γένηταί τι παρὰ φύσιν, τότε οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ Tabro- i Φ lo μάτου γεγονέναι φαμέν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἕτερον" τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔξω τὸ αἴτιον, τοῦ δ᾽ ἐντός. 1 [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, a reading recorded by Simplicius (849, 6): τὸ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐκείνου ἕνεκα codd.—C.]
α {Prellwitz (Ztym. Worterbuch, 1905) supports the de- tivation from μάτην. Boisaeq (Dict. Etym. 1910) prefers a root meamng ‘think’; ‘one who thinks (and acts) for himself.’—C, [ΤῸ no purpose’ has the same ambiguity as μάτην: (1) failure of purpose (walking which fails to produce evacua- tion); (2) absence of purpose (a stone falls with effect which might have been, but was not, purposed).—C.]
α (Literally, ‘ the distinction (of the chance result, auto- maton) from the lucky result is best seen...° The con- nexion of thought (broken by the parenthesis on the etymo- logy of automuton) is with the last paragraph but one: the chance result with an eaternal cause. If we might be tempted to call such a result ‘ lucky,’ we can see the dis- PHYSICS, 1]. νι.
PHYSICS, 1]. νι.
(The etymology of automaton indicates this¢; for the expression maten— for nothing,’ ‘ to no purpose ὃ —is used in cases where the end or purpose is not realized, but only the means to it. Walking, for instance, is a means to evacuation; if a man takes a walk and this natural effect does not follow, we say that he took his walk ‘for nothing’ and the walk was ‘to no purpose,’ meaning by this phrase what fails to accomplish that purpose to which it is naturally a means. ‘Naturally a means,’ for it would be ridiculous to say one had taken a bath ‘ to no purpose ἡ because an cclipse of the sun did not follow: an cclipse is not a natural consequence of taking a bath, So then automaton, as the form of the word implies, means an occurrence that is in itself (auto) to no purpose (maten). A stone falls and hits someone, but it does not fall for the purpose of hitting him; the fall accordingly was ‘ in-1tself-to-no-purpose ’—a chance result—because the fall might have been caused by someone who had the purpose of hitting the man.)
It would be most inappropriate of all to speak of tyche° in cases where Nature herself produces un- natural monstrosities; and accordingly in these cases we may attribute it to an ‘ accident ἡ (automaton) in Nature, but can hardly say that a piece of bad ‘ Inck’ (tyche) has come to her. But this case is different from that of the horse; for the horse’s escape was due to an external cause, but the causes of Nature’s miscarriage are internal to her own processes. tinction better by taking the case of monstrosities, where the cause is internal, but the effect is anything but ‘lucky’ or such as Nature might have purposed; for the purpose of Nature is actually thwarted (rapa φύσι») by a monstrons birth.—C. ] VOL, I M 161 10 ARISTOTLE Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ τί ἡ τύχη, σεως ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν" ἢ γὰρ τῶν φύσει τι ἢ τῶν ἀπὸ διανοίας αἴτιων ἀεί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τούτων τὸ πλῆθος ἀόριστον.
᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη αἴτια ὧν ἂν ἢ νοῦς γένοιτο αἴτιος ἢ φύσις, ὅταν κατὰ συμ- βεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι γένηται τούτων αὐτῶν, οὐδὲν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι πρότερον τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτό, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιον πρό- τερον τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτό. ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ νοῦ καὶ φύσεως" ὥστ᾽ εἰ ὅτι μά- λιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἴτιον τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγκη πρότερον νοῦν καὶ φύσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.
CHAPTER VII ARGUMENT