This chapter, together with much repetition, points out that, whereas the efficient cause must to some extent coincide with the‘ formal’ determinant of the result, the coincidence between the formal determinant and the‘ final’ cause appears to be complete. It would seem, therefore, that the final ‘ because’ might be left out of consideration, as already included in the formal‘ because.’ And, as a matter of fact, natural philosophers do generally concern themselves with the starting-point, the actual result, and the moving forces that push from the one to the other. Nevertheless ἡ form,’ con- sidered under its aspect of ‘aim,’ 18 a dastinet factor in causation that can least af all be neglected, for ‘ purpose’ is the ultimate ‘ because’ of all physical change.
What automaton and tyche are, and how they differ, has now been stated; and it follows that both are causes of the ‘ efficient’ order, that set processes in motion; for they are always attached to efficient causes either of the natural or volitional order, such attachments being indefinite in number.
And since the results of automaton and tyche ave always such as might have been aimed at by mind or Nature, though in fact they emerged incidentally, and since there can be nothing incidental unless there is something primary for it to be incidental to, 1t follows that there can be no incidental causation except as incident to direct causation. Chance and fortune, therefore, imply the antecedent activity of mind and Nature as causes; so that, even if the cause of the heavens were ever so casual, yet mind and Nature must have been causes antecedently, not only of many other things we could mention, but of this universe itself, CHAPTER VII ARGUMENT (continued) Since this question of aim is the point ai which Physics leads directly up to Metaphysics or Theology, some references are here introduced to this higher branch of philosophy (parenthetically, to the disturbance af the main progress of the discourse, and with repetitions that suggest the confluence of two distinct recensions); and a new classification is inei- dentally introduced, constituted by Metaphysics (draling with the immaterial and unchanging) on the one hand, and twe departments of Physics on the other hand, dealing, respec- tively, the one with Astronomy (the study of things that move, indeed, but are not subject to other change or to decay), and the other covering all sublunary phenomena (in which both decay and generation reign).
15 20 26 ARISTOTLE Ὅτι δ᾽ ἔστιν αἴτια, καὶ ὅτι τοσαῦτα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅσα φαμέν, δῆλον. τοσαῦτα yap τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸ Ἂ, 7 a Ἅ a ES eS 3 ca διὰ τί περιείληφεν" ἢ yap εἰς TO τί ἐστιν ἀνάγεται ι AY Φ' ἐὰν 2 ~ 3 la? na TO διὰ τι εἐσχατον εν τοὶς ακινητοὶς (οἷον εν τοὶς μαθήμασιν' εἰς δρισμὸν γὰρ τοῦ εὐθέος ἢ συμ- ᾿ aN wv εἰ a / uv ν᾿ 2 AY μέτρου ἣ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀνάγεται ἔσχατον), ἣ εἰς τὸ a n τ ὃ s 2 λέ. Μ' ΒΟ; κινῆσαν πρῶτον (οἷον ta τι ETFO ELNOAY | OTL εἐσυ- a > la Ais - λησαν), ἢ τίνος ἕνεκα; (ἵν᾽ ἄρξωσιν), ἢ ἐν τοῖς ¢ ἕ ca γινομένοις ἡ ὕλη. x ι Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα, φανε- pov. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί a ‘ we \ κι ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς---τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, ͵ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἕν πολλάκις" τὸ μὲν yap τί ἐστι Kal TO οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν ἐστι, τὸ ὃ ὅθεν n Κινῆσις πρῶτον τῳ εἴδει Ταῦτο TOUTOLS’ αν- θρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. καὶ ὅλως ὅσα κινού- μενα κινεῖ: (ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκέτι φυσικῆς" οὐ yap ἐν a wv. > “a αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, * [The illustration is more fully stated in Anal. post. 94036. The Athenians were involved in war with Persia becanse they raided Sardis with the Eretrians.—C.]
» [Literally, ‘and in referring to them all, he will be answering the question δ΄ why?” as a natura] philosopher ἢ (keeping within his province).—C.]
PHYSICS, If. vu.
It is clear, then, that there are such things as causes, and that they can be classified under the four heads that have been enumerated. For these are the four ways of apprehending the ‘ how and why ’ of things: we may refer 1t either (1) to the essential nature of the thing in question, in the sphere of unchanging objects (as in mathematies, where the conclusions ultimately depend upon the definitions of straight line, or commensurabihty, or whatever αὖ may be); or (2) to that which first initiated the movement (as in: ‘Why did they go to war? Because the others had raided them’) 4; or (3) to the result aimed at (as: ‘To gain an empire’); or (4) in the case of anything that comes into existence out of something already there, to the material.
Clearly, then, the ‘becauses’ being such and so classified, it behoves the natural philosopher to under- stand all four, and to be able to indicate, in answer to the question ‘how and why,’ the material, the form, the moving force, and the goal or purpose, so far as they come within the range of Nature.” But in many cases three of these ‘ becauses’ coincide; for the essential nature of a thing and the purpose for which it is produced are often identical (so that the final cause coincides with the formal), and more- over the efficient cause must bear some resemblance in ‘form’ to the effect (so that the efficient cause too must, so far, coincide with the formal); for instance, man is begotten by man. And _ this applies universally to all things that cause motion and are themselves moved. (Where that is not the case, we are no longer in the domain of Physics at all, since we are dealing, not with things that move other things in virtue of their own motion or because ARISTOTLE 198230 ἀλλ᾽ ἀκίνητα ὄντα. διὸ τρεῖς at πραγματεῖαι, ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκίνητον, ἡ δὲ περὶ κινούμενον μὲν ἄ- ω 3 A φθαρτον δέ, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰ φθαρτά). ὥστε τὸ διὰ τέ καὶ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγοντι ἀποδίδοται, καὶ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ εἰς TO πρῶτον κινῆσαν. περὶ γενέσεως yap μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὰς αἰτίας σκο- 80 ποῦσι, τί μετὰ τί γίνεται, Kal τί πρῶτον ἐποίησεν ἢ τί ἔπαθε, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. Διτταὶ δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ αἱ κινοῦσαι φυσικῶς, ὧν ἡ 198b ἑτέρα od φυσική" od yap ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτῇ. τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐστὶν εἴ τι κινεῖ μὴ κινούμενον, ὥσπερ τό τε παντελῶς ἀκίνητον καὶ τὸ πάντων πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ ἡ μορφή" τέλος γὰρ καὶ od ἔἕνεκα' ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του, Kal ὁ ταύτην εἰδέναι δεῖ. καὶ πάντως ἀποδοτέον τὸ διὰ τί, οἷον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦδε ἀνάγκη τόδε (τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦδε ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ)": καὶ εἰ μέλλει τοδὶ ἔσεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα" PHYSICS, 11. vi.
they have the principle of motion in themselves, but with something that moves other things, though itself motionless. So that we have three fields of inquiry, concerned respectively with (1) things motionless, (2) things that, though in motion, are imperishable, and (3) things perishable) Thus to give an account of the how and why of anything is to trace it to its material, to its essential character- istics, and to its provoking cause; for in investigating the genesis of 4 thing men are chiefly concerned with the nature of what emerges from the pracess, with the impulse that initiates the process, and with what was already there to undergo the process, at the start; together with all the successive steps that lie between the starting-point and the end.
But the principles which direct physical movement or change are of two orders, one of which is not itself physical, for it is not in motion, nor has it in itself the principle of motion. Such would be anything that should move other things while itself motionless, as being absolutely unchanging and primary, and such the cssential characteustic or form in its capacity of constituting the end and aim to be reached, and therefore, since Nature is purposeful, de- manding to berecognized by the natural philosopher. In short, under all four aspects, we must give an account of the how and why, so as to show (1) that from this efficient cause this result must follow, or if the cause in question does not absolutely involve a certain definite result, we must show that it will lead to it normally. We must also show (2) that, if such and such a thing is to exist, there must be a material substrate, related to it as the premisses to the conclusion,* and (3) that the result manifests the ARISTOTLE τι od on ι 4 τ 198} καὶ ὅτι τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι’ καὶ διότι βέλτιον οὕτως--οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς THY ἑκάστου οὐσίαν.
CHAPTER VITI ARGUMENT [In support of final causality in Nature, Aristotle reviews and critiiges the tacit assumptions and explrert arguments of those who deny rts existence; in particular, Empedoctes’ theory of the origin of animal species. (Empedocles held (1) that in the period when a world is formed by the action of Love, gaining upon Strife, the parts of animals artse separately and are united by Love in all sorts of casual ways.
10 Λεκτέον δὴ πρῶτον μὲν διότι ἡ φύσις τῶν ἕνεκά ~ y na του αἰτίων" ἔπειτα περὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, πῶς ἔχει ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς. εἰς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάγουσι πάντες, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ TO θερμὸν τοιονδὶ πέφυκε καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν τοιού- 4 των, ταδὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστι καὶ γίνεται' καὶ yap Laat uy; SMe ” ω ς ͵, 1 ἐὰν ἄλλην αἰτίαν εἴπωσιν, ὅσον ἁψάμενοι χαίρειν Leal 3 A a A 4 a ς \ \ ἐῶσιν, ὁ μὲν THY φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, ὁ δὲ τὸν νοῦν.
“Eyes δ᾽ ἀπορίαν τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά τοῦ ποιεῖν μηδ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιον ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεύς, ody ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης--τὸ 80 γὰρ ἀναχθὲν ψυχθῆναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ ψυχθὲν ὕδωρ PHYSICS, II. νι. ΜΙ].
essential nature aimed at by the process, and (4) why it was better thus—not absolutely, but relatively to the being of the thing in question.
CHAPTER VII ARGUMENT (continued) Monsters like man-headed owen, ow-headed men, ete., perish; those forms survive which happen to be fitted to survive. (2) In the opposite period, when Sirife is gaining on Love (as in our world), animal species are developed from undiffer- entiated ( whole-natured’) forms produced by fire rising Srom the earth ‘to meet its like’ and mumng with water).—C.]
We must now consider why Nature is tu be ranked among causes that are final, that is to say purposeful; and further we must consider what is meant by “necessity ’ when we are speaking of Nature. Tor thinkers are for ever referring things to necessity as a cause, and explaining that, since hot and cold and so forth are what they are, this or that exists or comes into being ‘ of necessity’; for even if one or another of them alleges some other cause, such as ‘Sympathy and Antipathy’ or ‘ Mind,’ he straight away drops it again, after a mere acknowledgement.
So here the question rises whether we have any reason to regard Nature as making for any goal at all, or as seeking any one thing as preferable to any other. Why not say, it is asked, that Nature acts as Zeus drops the rain, not to make the corn grow, but of necessity (for the rising vapour must necds be condensed mto water by the cold, and must then on 30 85 ARISTOTLE γενόμενον κατελθεῖν, τὸ δ᾽ αὐξάνεσθαι τούτου γενομένου τὸν σῖτον συμβαίψει---" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἴ τῷ ἀπόλλυται ὁ σῖτος ἐν τῇ ἅλῳ, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ὕει ὅπως ἀπόληται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε τί κωλύει οὕτω καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἷον τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως: ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα.
Ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, ᾧ dv τις ἀπορήσειεν, οὗτος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν" ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ᾽ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, GAN ἐὰν ὑπὸ Kiva: οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν χειμῶνος. εἰ οὖν ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ᾽ ἀπὸ α [2,6.. if we attribute the bad result (destruction of the corn) to accident or necessity, why attribute the good result ey of the crop) to benevolence?—C.} [Cf. De part. anim. 661 Ὁ τ, Xen. Alem. i. 4, where the kip of the teeth is alleged among other evidences of design.
PHYSICS, II. viz.
descend, and incidentally, when this happens, the corn grows), Just as, when a mam loses his corn on the threshing-floor, it did not rain on purpose to destroy the crop, but the result was merely inci- dental to the raining? ® So why should it not be the same with natural organs like the teeth? Why should it not be a coincidence that the front teeth come up with an edge, suited to dividing the food, and the back ones flat and good for grinding it, without there being any design in the matter καὶ ὃ And so with all other organs that seem to embody a purpose, In cases where a coincidence brought about such a combination as might have been arranged on purpose, the creatures, it is urged, having been suitably formed by the operation of chance, survived; otherwise they perished, and still perish, as Empedocles says of his “ man-faced oxen,’ δ Such and suchhke are the arguments which may be urged in raising this problem; but it is impossible that this should really be the way of it. For all these phenomena and all natural things are either constant or normal, and this is contrary to the very meaning of luck or chance. No one assigns it to chance or to a remarkable coincidence if there is abundant rain in the winter, though he would if there were in the dog-days; and the other way about, if there were parching heat. Accordingly, if the only choice is to assign these occurrences either to coincid- ence or to purpose, and if in these cases chance coin- cidence is out of the question, then it must be pur- W. Theiler, Zur Geschichte der teleoloyischen Naturbetrachtung (Ztrich u. Leipzig, 1925), Ὁ. 25, argues that both Keno- phon and Aristotle borrowed from Diogenes of Apollonia. —C ARISTOTLE 1988 ταὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά Tov av εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.
"Ere ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἐστί τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράτ- τεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. οὐκοῦν «ὡς 10 πράττεται, οὕτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται ἕκαστον, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ. πράττεται δ᾽ ἕνεκά του" καὶ πέφυκεν ἄ ἄρα τούτου ἕνεκα. οἷον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει γινομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίνετο ὡς νῦν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὡσαύτως ἂν γίνουτο 16 ἡ πέφυκεν. ἕνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἕνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν' ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει. πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 30 τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα. ' Μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ" ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῷ 4 τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἵ τ᾽ ἀράχναι καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. κατὰ μικρὸν δ᾽ οὕτω προϊόντι 4 [At Met. 980 Ὁ 22, bees and other such species are called * intelligent ’ (φρόνιμα) but unteachable, as having no hear- ing. De part. an. 6484 5, Bees, cte., are more intelhigent than some sanguineous animals,’ because of the thin and cold nature of the fluid corresponding to blood in them. ‘Some similar faculty,’ perhaps the unreasoning intuition of instinct, which resembles the human faculty of intuition (vénats).—C.]
PHYSICS, If. vro.
pose. But, as our opponents themselves would admit, these occurrences are all natural, There 1s purpose, then, in what is, and in what happens, in Nature.
Further, in any operation of human art, where there is an end to he achieved, the earlier and successive stages of the opcration are performed for the purpose of realizing that end. Now, when a thing is produced by Nature, the earher stages in every case lead up to the final development in the same way as in the operation of art, and vice versa, provided that no impediment balks the process, The operation is directed by a purpose; we may, therefore, infer thal the natural process was guided by a purpose to the end that is realized. Thus. if a house were a natural product, the process would pass through the same stages that 1 in fact passes through when it is produced by art; and if natural products could also be produced by art, they would move along the same line that the natural process actually takes, We may therefore say that the earlier stages are for the purpose of leading to the later. Indeed, as a general proposition, the arts either, on the basis of Nature, carry things further than Nature can, or they imitate Nature. If, then, artificial processes are purposeful, so are natural processes too; for the relation of antecedent to consequent is identical in art and in Nature.
This principle comes out most clearly when we consider the other animals. For their doings are not the outcome of art (design) or of previous research or deliberation; so that some raise the question whether the works of spiders and ants and so on should be attributed to intelligence or to some similar faculty. And then, descending step by ARISTOTLE 189. 35 καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γινόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης. ὥστ᾽ εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά ᾿ του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ 6 ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα ἕνεκα τῶν καρπῶν Kal τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω ἕνεκα 10 τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.
Kal ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δ᾽ ὡς μορφή, τέλος δ᾽ αὕτη, τοῦ τέλους δ᾽ ἕνεκα τἄλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα.
Αμαρτία δὲ γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην-- ἔγραψε γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς 6 γραμματικός, καὶ he ‘ A 86 ἐπότισεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸ φάρμακον---ὦστε 199b δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἔνια κατὰ τέχνην ἐν οἷς τὸ ὀρθῶς ἕνεκά του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἕνεκα μέν τινος ἐπιχειρεῖται ἀλλ᾽ ἀποτυγχάνεται, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἁμαρτήματα υ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἕνεκά του. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα συστάσεσι τὰ βουγενῆ, εἰ μὴ πρός τινα ὅρον καὶ τέλος δυνατὰ ἦν ἐλθεῖν, διαφθειρομένης ἂν ἀρχῆς τινος ἐγίνετο, ὥσπερ νῦν τοῦ σπέρματος. ἔτι ἀνάγκη σπέρμα γενέσθαι πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐθὺς τὰ Cha’ καὶ τὸ “ οὐλοφυὲς μὲν πρῶτα᾽ σπέρμα ἦν.
« (Frag. 62 οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον, ‘ whole-natured forms first arose from the earth’ (Burnet), PHYSICS, II. vin.
step, we find that plants too produce organs sub)- servient to their perfect development—leaves, for instance, to shelter the fruit. Hence, if itis by nature and also for a purpose that the swallow makes her nest and the spider his web, and that plants make leaves for the sake of the fruit and strike down (and not up) with their roots in order to get their nourish- ment, it is clear that causality of the kind we have described is at work in things that come about or exist in the course of Nature.
Also, since the teim ‘ nature’ is applied both to material and to form, and since it is the latter that constitutes the goal, and all else is for the sake of that goal, it follows that the form is the final cause.
Now there are failures even in the arts (for writers make mistakes in writing and physicians administer the wrong dose); so that analogous failures in Nature may evidently be anticipated as possible. Thus, if in art there are cases in which the correct procedure serves a purpose, and attempts that fail are aimed at a purpose but miss it, we may take it to be the same in Nature, and mon- strosities will be like failures of purpose in Nature. So if, in the primal combinations, such ‘ ox-creatures ἢ as could not reach an equilibrium and goal, should appear, it would be by the miscarriage of some principle, as monstrous births are actually produced now by abortive developments of sperm. Besides, the sperm must precede the formation of the animal, and EiEmpedocles’ ‘ primal all-generative’* is no other than such sperm.
rohgeballie Erdklumpen (Diels); primitive forms of life, in which sex and species were not yet differentiated, composed of water and fire.—C.]
198 bly 16 20 ARISTOTLE "Ere καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά τοῦ, ἧττον δὲ διήρθρωται. πότερον οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐγίνετο, ὥσπερ τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα, οὕτω καὶ ἀμπελογενῆ ἐλαιόπρωρα, ἢ οὔ; ἄτοπον γάρ: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔδει γε, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. ἔτι ἔδει ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι γίνεσθαι ὅπως ἔτυχεν.
Ὅλως δ᾽ ἀναιρεῖ ὁ οὕτω λέγων τὰ φύσει τε καὶ φύσιν: φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπό τινος ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος" ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὃ τούτου ἕνεκα, γένοιτο ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης" οἷον λέγομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης ἦλθεν ὁ ξένος καὶ λυσάμενος ἀπῆλθεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἕνεκα τούτου ἐλθὼν πράξῃ, μὴ ἕνεκα δὲ τούτου ἔλθῃ. καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ συμβεβηκός--- γὰρ τύχη τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν---ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν τοῦτο ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ * [In this final argument Aristotle brings together all three kinds of ‘causation’: Luck, Nature, Art. By Luck a desirable result which serves a puipose is achieved in- cidentally and once in a way. In Nature, since denirable results are produced normally or invariably, @ fortiori they must be purpose-serying, though we cannot see the purposing agency. Even in Art we can imagine the purpose-serying process carrying itself out without the previous conscious design which is certainly present.—C.]
ὃ [ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστης δὲ κτλ. might possibly mean: ‘The final development reached from any one principle (eg., human seed) is neither (exactly) the same for every individual (for no two men are exactly alike), nor yet 1 it any random result (e.g. dog or horse); there 1s, however, in each species, always a tendency towards an identical result (6.7. the perfect human type that Nature strives, but never success- fully, to produce), if nothing interferes.’—C. ] PHYSICS, II. vi.
In plants, too, though they are less elaborately articulated, there are manifest indications of purpose. Are we to suppose, then, that as there were ‘ ox~ creatures man-faced’ so also there were ‘ vine- growths olive-bearmg’? Incongruous as such a thing seems, il ought to follow if we accept the principle in the case of animals. Moreover, it ought still to be a matter of chance what comes up when you sow this seed or that.
In general,* the theory does away with the whole order of Nature, and indeed with Nature’s self. For natural things are exactly those which do move con- tinuously, in virtue of a principle inherent in them- selves, towards a determined goal; and the final development which results from any one such prin- ciple 1s not identical for any two species, nor yet is it any random result; but in each there is always a tendency towards an identical result, if nothing inter- feres with the process.» A desirable result and the means to it may also be produced by chance, as for instance we say it was ‘by luck’ that the stranger came and ransomed the prisoner before he left, where the ransoming is done as if the man had come for that purpose, though in fact he did not. In this case the desirable result is incidental; for, as we have explained, chance is an incidental cause, But when the desirable result is effected invariably or normally, ¢ [W. translated λουσάμενος, but Avodpevos is the better reading. The allusion cannot be to the Διισούμενος of Menander (Ovyr. Pup. No. 1013), to which Simplic. 384, 14 refers. Philoponus 324. 21 suggests the ransoming of Plato at Aegina (Diels compares Diog. L. iii, 20 λυτροῦται δὴ αὐτὸν κατὰ τύχην παρὼν ᾿Αννίκερις ὁ Kupnvatos).—C.]
VOL. I N 177 ARISTOTLE 199b 25 γίγνηται, od συμβεβηκὸς οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τύχης" ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον. καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται" καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν φύσει emote: ὥστ᾽ 80 εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, καὶ ἐν φύσει. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἐατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν" τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἕνεκά του, φανερόν.
CHAPTER IX ARGUMENT [Most philosophers recognise in the process of natural generation only an ‘ unconditional,’ mechanical necessity, whereby the furces inherent in matter blindly produce their effects, Aristotle elsewhere (e.g. De part. anim. 642 a 1) admits that many things are produced by the ‘ simple’ necessity of material and efficient causes alone; but he argues that we must also recognize a ‘ hypothetical’ necessity, seen in the processes of Nature, as in those of art, where purpose Sixes a goat to which the mechanical chain of causation shall lead, rather than in other derections. If a given desirable ss Τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει * [Cf Eth. Nic. iii. 3. In some arts (δι. writing) there is no deliberation; the right spelling of a word is not debatable. In others (e.g. medicine) we deliberate about means (how to heal), not about the end ( heahng).—C.]
" {The * hypothetically’ necessary is described as ‘ the sine qua non of a desirable result’ (of οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, Met. 1072 b 12)—necessary, if that result is to be achieved.—C.]
PHYSICS, II. vit.-1x.
it is not an incidental oy chance occurrence; and in the course of Nature the result always is achieved either invariably or normally, if nothing hmders. It. is absurd to suppose that there 1s no purpose because in Nature we can never detect the moving power in the act of deliberation. Art, in fact, does not deliberate either,* and if the shipbuilding art were incorporate in the timber, it would proceed by nature in the same way in which it now procecds by art. If purpose, then, is inherent in art, so is it in Nature also. The best illustration is the case of a man being hus own physician, for Nature is hke that—agent and patient at once.
That Nature is a cause, then, and a goal-directed cause, is above dispute.
CHAPTER IX ARGUMENT (continued) result ia to be achieved, such and such matter is necessary. The existence of the matter and its forces is a condition sine qua non of the realization of such ends, but will not account Sor the process of realization, which is explained and directed by the end to be brought about. (Of. the fuller discussion in De part. anim. i. 1).
The physicist is primarily concerned with the form, definable essence, or end; but where the form ‘ necessitates ’ a certain kind of matter, his definitions will include mention of the appropriate matier.—C.]
The phrase ‘ must of necessity’ may be used of what is unconditionally necessary or of what is ‘necessary to this or that.’ Of which kind is the 10 ARISTOTLE ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς; viv μὲν yap οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα" κουφότατα γάρ. "AMV ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα---πλὴν ὡς δι’ ὕλην--ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἅττα καὶ σώζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν rots ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά τού ἐστιν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, od μέντοι ye διὰ ταῦτα--ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὡς ὕλην---ἀλλ ἕνεκά του. οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδί; ὅπως τοδὶ Kal ἕνεκα rovdi: τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα “ ἊΝ. ya ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ἢ" ἀνάγκη dpa σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς τέλος" ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.
w A 4 3 a a a if A Eom δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν τε τοῖς μαθήμασι καὶ 4 [γῆῇ, unbaked brick, of which house walls were commonly made.—C.]} > (Literally, ‘So the “necessity δ᾽ here is necessity in the hypothetical sense, but not in the sense in which an end (is a “necessary” consequence of its antecedents); for it resides in the matter, whereas the end is contained in the notion (or definition of the thing’s essential nature, e.g. “what itis tobeasaw”).’ Cf. De part. anwm. 639 b.—-C.| PHYSICS, IT. rx.
necessity that exists in Nature? For people ignore this distinction and talk about things bemg ‘ neces- sarily generated,’ much as if they thought that a wall would come up in the necessary course of things becausé what is heavy naturally descends and what is light is naturally on the top, so that stones go down and make the foundations, while the lighter brick ὦ rises above them, and the timber, lightest of all, roofs them above.
No doubt it is a fact that the building cannot dis- pense with these materials, and in that sense they “must be there’; but they do not themselves “make ’ the building in the sense of constructing it, but only in that of constituting its material. What causes the building to be made is the purpose of pro- tecting and preserving certain goods. And so in all other cases where a purpose can be traced, It cannot be accomplished without materials that have the required nature; but it is not they that ‘make ’ the purpose-fulfilling instrument, except materially. For what makes it, in the formative sense, is the purpose- ful intention of the maker. For instance: ‘ Why is a saw like this?’ ‘In order that it may have the essential character of a saw and serve for sawing.’ This purpose, however, could not be served if 1t were not made ofiron. So if it is to be a saw, and to do its work, it “must necessarily’ be made of iron, The necessity, then, is conditional, or hypothetical. The purpose, mentally conceived, demands the material as necessary to its accomplishment; but the nature of the material, as already existing, does not ‘necessarily ’ lead to the accomplishment of the purpose.?
Note, too, that in a certain respect, there is a kind ARISTOTLE 8008 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν γινομένοις τρόπον τινὰ παραπλησίως" ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ εὐθὺ τοδί ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν: ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπεὶ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο: ἀλλ᾽ εἴ γε τοῦτο μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ ἔστιν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς γινομένοις ἕνεκά του - ἀνάπαλιν, ει TO τέλος ἔσται ἢ ἐστι, καὶ TO εἐμ- Ε ΝΥ μὴ > ἢ, v LI ~ Ν προσθεν ἔσται ἢ ἔστιν' εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μ' ὄντος τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔσται, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα' ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη, οὐ τῆς πράξεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ (ἐκεῖ δὲ τοῦ λογισμοῦ: πράξεις γὰρ οὐκ εἰσῶ). ὥστ