Again, how could the elements severally make for their proper places if place were matter or form? For there can be no place where there is neither motion nor ‘ above ’ and ‘ below.’ We must there- fore look for place where such things are.
And if a thing’s place is intrinsic to itself (as it must be if it is either its form or its matter), ‘place’ must itself occupy ‘ place,’ for both the defining (formal) and the intrinsically indefinite (material) factor move, and change? place, together with the thing itself.
Platonism distinguished four kinds of place or space: ἄλλος οὖν τόπος σωμάτων φυσικῶν (physical space), ἄλλος ἐνύλων εἰδῶν (matter), ἄλλος μαθηματικῶν σωμάτων (imagination), ἄλλος ἀύλων λύγων (higher intellectual conception).—C.]
ARISTOTLE 5105 οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀλλ᾽ οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα’ ὥστε τοῦ τόπου ἔσται τόπος.
w Ἔτι ὅταν ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ γένηται, ἀπόλωλεν ὁ το τόπος" οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὸ γενόμενον σῶμα: τίς οὖν ἡ φθορά; TE ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν dv τις αὐτοῦ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴρηται.
CHAPTER ΠῚ ARGUMENT (This chapter, still digressing from the direct line of advance, is mainly occupied by a discussion, elaborated in substance, but highly elliptical in expression, whether a thing can be ‘ in itself,’ so as to constitute its awn place.
The importance of this question hurdly reveals wtself till, in a later part of the treatise (Book VIII. Chaps. iv. ff), we come to examine the sense in which an animal can be said to ‘move itself’; which latter question 1s crucial to Aristotle's whole theory of the First Cause. Compare General Intro- duction, pp. wl, lxvri sqq.)
Can a thing be ‘in itself’?? Only of ut is ambiguously designated after its parts. Thus (again ἐν vary Aristotle's illustration) we might have: Question: ‘ Has the kettle Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ληπτέον ποσαχῶς ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ λέγεται. ἕνα μὲν δὴ τρόπον ὡς 6 δάκτυλος ἐν τῇ χειρὶ καὶ ὅλως τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἄλλον α [οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ can be construed with μεταβάλλει καὶ κινεῖται, Form aud matter change at the same time as the PHYSICS, IV. m.-11.
They do not stay where they were but are always where the thing itself is.¢ So the place that. was already intrinsic in the thing has now come to occupy the place the thing itself has come into.
Further, when ar beeomes water the place (if intrinsic to the air) will have vanished, as the air has, For the nascent body (water) has not the same place as the vanished body (air) had. But how are we to conceive of a‘ place’ vanishing ὃ So much for the considerations, on the one hand, that coinpel us to suppose that ‘ place ’ has an actual existence, and those, on the other hand, which perplex us as to the mode of its existence.
CHAPTER IT ARGUMENT (continued) come back from the tinker yet?’ Answer: ‘ Yes, and I’ve put it on the fire, and it’s just burling.’ Here the ‘ kettle’ means 1° the empty kettle, 2° the kettle with the water in it, 89 the water in the kettle. So kettle 3° 1s in kettle 1° and both are comprised in kettle 2°, Not otherwise can ἃ thing The solution of Zeno’s dilemma, already mentioned, and @ 92 23sq¢ summary of conclusions, clase the chapter (b 22-81).
At this point we must examine the different senses in which one thing is said to be “τῇ another. (i.) The finger may be said to be ‘included in’ the hand, or, to put it more generally, the part ‘in’ the thing, vot in every case in respect of such changes as can oceur in the same place (e.g. rotation of a sphere, changes of quality) bué moving wherever the thing moves,—C.]
ARISTOTLE 2100 δὲ ὡς τὸ ὅλον ἐν Tots μέρεσιν' οὐ γάρ ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὡς 6 ἄνθρωπος ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ ὅλως εἶδος ἐν γένει. ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ εἴδει καὶ ὅλως τὸ μέρος τοῦ ᾿ ἴδ ἢ - lod ἴδ λό wv e [7 ¢, 2 εἴδους ἐν τῷ τοῦ εἴδους λόγῳ. ἔτι ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν “Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ. ἔτι ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ τέλει: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. πάντων δὲ κυριώτατον τὸ ὡς ἐν > é oe > τὰ ἀγγείῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τόπῳ. 3 fal % ᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ dv τις, dpa καὶ αὐτό τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ f ~ a“ an ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἢ οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Διχῶς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ἤτοι καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἣ καθ ἕτερον. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἢ μόρια τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἢ ey, Ψ. ὦ Η ε A καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ, λεχθήσεται τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ" 30 λέγεται yap καὶ κατὰ μέρη, οἱον Λεύκος OTL Ἢ ἐπιφάνεια λευκή, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ὅτι τὰ λογιστικόν, 4 According to Aristutle the heart warms and the brain cools. Wealth hes in the halance. Cf. General Intro- duction, ἢ. Invi.
> ‘Surface,’ here and on Ὁ. 297, means, of course, the physical surface, not the abstract surface of mathematics, PHYSICS, IV. ut.
whole. (ii.) The whole is said to ‘consist in’ the full tale of its parts; for there is none of the whole ‘ outside‘ of the collective parts. (iii) In one way ‘man’ is ‘ included in’ the wider term ‘ animal,’ or more generally the species ‘in’ the genus. Qv.) But yet in another way the genus as one factor (the differentia being the other) is ‘ included in’ the definition of the species, Or (v.) health may be said to “have its seat in’ the balance of warm and cold*; or generally the‘ form ’ to‘ have its seat in ’ the material. Or (vi.) one may say ‘The affairs of Greece lie ‘in’ the King’s hands”; or generally ‘ wherever’ or ‘ in what place soever’ the prime initiative (or efficient cause) resides, Or again (vii.) we may say that the motive lo action ‘is found in’ the ‘ expected good,’ or more generally ‘in the contemplated end’ (or final cause). But the primary sense, from which all these are derived, is that in which we say that a thing is ‘in’ a vessel, or more generally‘ in a place.’
And here the question may arise whether a thing can be in itself or whether it must always be in some- thing other than itself, if it be anywhere at all.
Now, a thing may be said to be ‘in’ this or that either primarily on its own account, or in virtue of some less direct relation, For instance, that which is properly applicable to the part may be predicated, by extension, of the whole. Thus we attribute pallor to a thing the surface’ of which is pale, and knowledge to one whdse intellect has ordered contents. If, then, a whole should chance to consist of two parts, one of which is the ‘ content ’ and the other the ‘ continent,’ then that whole, in virtue of the contained part, may be said to be ‘in’ that same whole, in virtue of its ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE 4 at a10ad μὲν οὖν ἀμφορεὺς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδ᾽ ὁ οἶνος" ὁ δὲ τοῦ οἴνου ἀμφορεὺς ἔσται: ὅ τε γὰρ καὶ ἐν ᾧ, ἀμφότερα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μόρια. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται αὐτό τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι, πρώτως δ᾽ obi ἐνδέχεται, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι. 00 ἡ ἐπιφάνεια yap ἐν σώματι, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ. κατὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ αἱ προσηγορίαν μέρη ὄντα, as γε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ. ὁ δ᾽ ἀμφορεὺς καὶ ὁ οἶνος χωρὶς μὲν ὄντα οὐ μέρη, ἅμα δέ. διὸ ὅταν ἣ μέρη, υ ἔσται αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ" ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκέτι κατ᾽ ἄλλο. Καὶ ἕτερά γε τῷ εἴδει ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλην φύσιν ἔχει 4 ἑκάτερον καὶ δύναμιν, ἥ τ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ τὸ λευκόν. Οὔτε δὴ ἐπακτικῶς σκοποῦσιν οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατ᾽ οὐδένα τῶν διορισμῶν, τῷ τε λόγῳ 10 δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον’ δεήσει γὰρ ἀμφότερα ἑκάτερον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸν ἀμφορέα ἀγγεῖόν τε καὶ οἶνον εἶναι καὶ τὸν οἶνον οἶνόν τε καὶ ἀμφορέα, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται αὐτό τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι. ὥστε εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶεν, ὁ μὲν ἀμφορεὺς δέξεται 15 τὸν οἶνον οὐχ ἡ αὐτὸς οἷνος ἀλλ᾽ H ἐκεῖνος, ὁ ὃ 4 [ have changed the order of the clauses in this paragraph, for the sake of lucidity.
Ὁ Τ might ‘ drink a bottle of wine’ or I might ‘ break a bottle of wine’; and the bottle of wine I might drink 15 in the bottle of wine IT might break; but neither of them, severally, is in itself, ¢ One is a quality and the other js its insmediate material substrate | Met. 1022 a 16 ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ), and therefore neither of them can be PHYSICS, IV. πὶ.
containing part.¢ Tor example, though neither the flask nor the wine can be said to be ‘in itself,’ yet the ‘ flask-of-wine’ can. For the wine-cuntent and the flask-continent are both of them parts of the same whole.”
In this sense, therefore, a thing can be in itself, hut not in the primary and direct sense.
TL is like this:—Pallor is in a man (that is in his body), because the pale ‘ surface ’ is; and knawledge is in him, because the well-stored ‘mind’ is. But these atlubutions are extended to the man in virtue of the parts, as eaisting m the man, not otherwise. And in the same way it 1s only while the wine and the flask are taken together as a whole (not severally, and asunder) that they can be regarded as parts of a whole, to which their attributions can be extended.
And note that these two, the pallor and the surface, belong to different categories, and are unlike cach other in their nature and in their capabilities.’
Nor, if we take all the meanings of ‘in " successively, shall we find that a thing can be in itself according to any of them.
Nor can a thing be in itself, by virtue of definition.4 For to make it so, cach of the two parts would have to be defined as being both of them, the flask as being both flask and wine and the wine both wine and flask. So, however much they were ‘in each other’ by definition, the flask would continue to receive the wine not in the capacity of itself being wine, but in its flask-c@pacity; and the wine would be in the so identified with the other as to make one ‘being in the other ’ the same thing as ‘ being in itself.’ ὦ [τῷ λόγῳ, ‘hy process of reasoning,’ as opposed to a review of all the instances (ἐπακτικῶ3),---,} ARISTOTLE 210b οἶνος ἐνέσται ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὸς “ἀμφορεὺς ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐκεῖνος. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶναι ὅτι ἕτερον, δῆλον" ἄλλος γὰρ ὃ λόγος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ,συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται" ἅμα γὰρ δύο ἐν ταὐτῷ ἔσται- αὐτός τε γὰρ ἐν "0 αὐτῷ ὁ ἀμφορεὺς ἔσται, εἰ οὗ ἡ φύσις -δεκτιικοή, τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται ὧν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι ἐκεῖνο οὗ δεκτικόν, οἷον, εἰ οἴνου, ὁ οἶνος. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τι εἶναι πρώτως, δῆλον. Ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ἠπόρει, ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος, ἐν τίνι ἔσται, λύειν οὐ "χαλεπόν" οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει as ἐν ἄλλῳ “μὲν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον, μὴ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς, ὡς ἕξις, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἐν σώματι ὡς πάθος. ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη cis ἄπειρον ἰέναι. ᾿Εκεῖνο δὲ φα νερόν, ὅτι ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν Τὸ ἀγγεῖον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ" (érepov γὰρ τὸ “πρώτως 6 τε καὶ ἐν 20 ὦ), οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον. ἐκείνου γάρ τι ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνόντος, καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ μ μορφή. αὗτα μὲν οὖν ἔστω διηπορημένα. 1 [αὐτῷ Simpl. 564, 27; Bonita: αὐτῷ eodd.—C.]} * Compare 195 ἃ 35 ff. The man of general culture and the artificer may coincide in the person of Polyeleitus; but this does not make room for two men in his body.
® The sting of an ad infinitum as a reductio ad absurdune consists in its being ἃ serie» of * steps that make no progress, 180 97 each apparent advance landing you exactly where you were 4 Hefore. This is the oint of the illustration from health and warmth, The ‘in’ that you end with is not the same ‘in * thyt you besa ae Rut we ‘have not y et been told whata‘ pluce’ really 18 > and how it is ‘in it.’ We have only been told PHYSICS, IV. m.
flask not in the capacity of itself being flask, but in its wine-capacity. Obviously then, as actually exist- ing, they differ from each other; for the rationale of the ‘ continent ’ is other than that of the ‘ content.’
Nor is it possible for a thing to be in itself by coincidence of subject, since, if it were, two bodies would have to coincide.* For the flask itself can only be in uself if that which has the receptive character can be in itself in addition to its own content, to wit the wine—or whatever it may be—that is already in it.
Thus the impossibility of anything bemg, in the primary sense, in itself, is clearly demonstrable.
We shall now have no difficulty in escaping Zcno’s dilemma that either there is no such thing as a place, or it must itself occupy a place; for there is no reason why the proper place of a thing should not itself be ‘in’ somcthing else~only not in the same local sense as that in which its own content is‘in’ it. Similarly health resides ‘ix’ the balance of warmth and coolness as a habit (and is a vital experience), whereas warmth and coolness, in their turn, ‘cxist in’ the body as physical modifications, And this involves no ad infinitum process.’
So much, then, is clear: that since the vessel is no part of its own content (for the primary and proper * thing in the place ’ is other than the ‘ place the thing isin *), a thing’s place can be neither its matter nor its form. It must be something other than either of these, for both matter and form are intrinsic to the * content,’ * whereas 1ts place is extrinsic to it.
Let this close the discussion. that it need not be a ‘place.’ Cf. chap. iv. 211 Ὁ 1-5, and Intraduction, p. 270, ὁ Ἰσοῦ ἐνόντος, ‘the thing that is in the place’ Uf. Simpl. 564, 29 τοῦ yap ἐν τύπῳ ὄντος ἐστὶ radra.—U.]
ARISTOTLE CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT Returning to the directly constructive side of his argument (from the digression beginning at 91), Aristotle proceeds to consider + The data for the inquiry and the conditions which a satis- factory solution should fulfil (210 b 82-211 a 11).
The problem of the nature of ‘ place’ arises in connexion with the observed phenomenon of motion, which mmvolves the change af place, Varieties af local motion. Shifting, rotation, ewpansion or contraction. Direct and depend- ently-involved motion (a 12-28).
Place-proper, pluce-coninon, and place-universal. Cf. chap. ti. and Argument (a 23-29).
Place-proper rmplies a recognizable division, marhing off the content from its embracing continent and allowing of motion of the content ‘ints, ‘out of’ or ‘within’ the continent,—whether that continent rtself is stationary or in motion. Understanding by ‘undifferentiated’ the absence of uny such division, we may speak of the parts of an undifferentiated mass as being ‘in’ the whole mass ‘ as parts’; but for a part to have a‘ place’ in that whole mass there must be both differentiation and contact where the sard part, as content, meets its continent,—the continent being no part af the content, but dimensionally fitting τὲ exactly.
A part, or factor, af a whole, which is nat‘ in it as in a place,’ may there in tt, as vision does in the eye, or may be coherent with it, as the hand is with the body; but in neither case when the part moves ‘ with’ the whole docs it move because it is‘ in’ it, in the sense in which water ia‘ in’ the cask, ic. as a content in a continent, or a placed in a place (Ὁ 1-5).
This seems to establish our definition of place. But it wilt be rustructive to confirm tt by the method of exhqustion, PHYSICS, IV. iv.
CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT (continued) Enumeration of the four conceivable alternatives (ly 5-9).
Exclusion of ‘ internal dimensionality.’ If a place is concerved as sumething (other than the material content) inside the vessel-continent, extending from inner wall to inner wall in every direction, then the vessel will be able to carry that place about uth vt when if moves. Rut since (on this showing) the vessel itself also occupies a place, which place extends from its outer wall to outer wall, and therefore includes the place occupied by its content, two places will be in the same place, one upon the other, And uf the vessel itself changes its place, it takes the ‘ place that is in it? out of * the place it is itself in’ and puts it down in another place. Besides (on this showing) all the undifferentiated parts of the content are in places in the whole place. But the whole place extends from wall to wall, and so the places of the parts (one within the other indefinitely) must all be superimposed upon each other, And when the whole place shifts they must be collectively superimposed upon another place α (Ὁ 9-29).
Residuary hypothesis vindicated (a 2-7).
ih of bewilderment as to ‘ place’ enumerated (a 7- As a vessel has been called, by an extension of terms, a ‘movable place’ (because the place, though not directly * Remembering that Aristotle regarded the ‘ void’ of Demoeritus* as demonstrably maternal, and equating the ‘ void’ with what we should call ‘ space,’ we can sce that he is trying to commit behevers in the ‘ void ’ to the paradox that ‘ pieces of space’ can be fenced off and carried about, or laid wpon each other, so that they coincide with and interpenctrate each other.
ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) movable, accompanies the moving vessel, and is involved in ite movement), so a casmecally determined place may, ly a dike extension, be called an ‘ immovable vessel, because it really is‘ immovable’ and vs like a‘ vessel’ in 80 far as it is a continent.
Lhe place-rniversal 1s such a fired continent, or vessel, So are (potentially) all cosmically determined places, Thus, if there is na physically determined place-common (like the bed and banks of a river) which is cosnucally stable, and a fluid body (like the water af the river) is passing through it while a solid bodu (ike a boat on the river) is changing its place-proper in the fltid, the mind fends to regard the water , ce δου Τί δέ ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, ὧδ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅσα δοκεῖ > “- sok ts ἃ, ὃς ἀληθῶς καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ. ξιοῦμεν δὴ τὸν τόπον εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν περι- atta ἔχον ἐκεῖνο οὗ τόπος ἐστί, καὶ μηδὲν τοῦ πράγ- ματος εἶναι" ἔτι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον μήτ᾽ ἐλάττω μήτε μείζω" ἔτι ἀπολείπεσθαι ἑκάστου καὶ χωρι- στὸν εἶναι" πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πάντα τόπον ἔχειν τὸ ὕ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ φέρεσθαι φύσει καὶ μένειν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ ἄνω ἢ κάτω. ποκειμένων δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ θεωρητέον. δεῖ δὲ πειρᾶσθαι τὴν σκέψιν οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι,. ὅπως 1 (The comma after ποιεῖσθαι might be omitted, lo indicate that ὅπως...ἀποδοθήσεται is not governed by οὕτω, ‘We must try so to conduct our inquiry designed to give an account of its nature, as to’ (satisfy éhree conditions which any such account should satisfy).—C.} PHYSICS, IV. 1.
ARGUMENT (continued) as‘ carrying’ the boat (as a vessel carries something that is moving about inside it), and to locate the boat not by reference to its own shifting place-proper, but with reference to the banks wireh form a stable frame of reference both for it and the water that forms ‘the whole river’? at the moment The cosnue plare-universal vs the ultimate frame of reference (12 a 21-29), Epilogue. Cosmically determined places do not grow, but the expansion of a body involves the expansion af the physte- ally determined surfuce-continent, ar place, that fits and environs it (12a 29 54.).
It. should now be possible to reach a clear concep- tion of what the place of a thing really is, by gathering up such properties of ‘place’ as appear to have emerged sccurely as ils characteristics, and proceed- ing as set forth mm the sequel.
Well then, to begin with, we may safely assext— (i.) That the place of a thing is no part or factor of the thing itself, but is that which embraces it; (11.) that the immediate or ‘ proper ’ place of a thing is neither smaller nor greater than the thing itself; (iii.) that the place where the thing is can be quitted by it, and is therefore separable from it; and lastly, (iv ) that any and every place implies and involves the cor- relatives of ‘above’ and ‘ below,’ and that all the elemental substances have a natural tendency to move towards their own special places, or to rest in them whensthere—such movement being ‘ upward’ or ‘ downward,’ and such rest ‘ above ’ or ‘ below.’
Taking these as our data we may now pursue our investigation, and we must try so to conduct it (1) that a full account shall be given of the meaning and ARISTOTLE Qita τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀποδοθήσεται, ὥστε τά τε ἀπορού- μενα λύεσθαι, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν τῷ τόπῳ τὸ ὑπάρχοντα ἔσται, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τῆς δυσκολίας αἴτιον καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπορημάτων ἔσται φανερόν' οὕτω γὰρ ἂν κάλλιστα δεικνύουτο ἕκαστον. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατανοῆσαι ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐζητεῖτο ὃ τόπος, εἰ μὴ κίνησίς tis? ἦν ἡ κατὰ τόπον’ διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν μάλιστ᾽ οἰόμεθα ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἐν κινήσει. i Ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν φορά, τὸ δ᾽ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις" καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ αὐξήσει καὶ φθίσει μετα- βάλλει, καὶ ὃ πρότερον ἦν ἐνταῦθα πάλιν μεῦ- ἕστηκεν εἰς ἔλαττον ἢ μεῖζον. "Hore δὲ κινούμενοι τὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός" τοῦ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς wo τὸ μὲν ἐνδεχόμενον κινεῖσθαι καθ᾽ αὑτό, οἷον τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὃ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ἦλος, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενα. ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἡ λευκότης καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη: ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτω μεταβέβληκε τὸν τόπον, ὅτι ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχουσι μετα- βάλλει. ᾿Επεὶ δὲ λέγομεν εἶναι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ, as διότι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ" καὶ ἐν 1 [rs om. I, Simpl. 603, 18, Philop. 543. 27 (lemma), Themist. 111, 18—C.]
® We are to see later on that it is a fact that ‘ heaven ’ is always moving (with the motion of rotation), but that it is a mistake (however natural) to infer that it must therefore be always changing its place, and so must have a place to change. ΟἿ, chap. v.
ἢ {Prantl takes the clauses from ἐπεὶ (2. 24) to ἁπτομένων (1. 34) as asingle sentence. The new point is in the apodosis, beginning ὅταν μὲν οὖν (1, 29).—C.]
PHYSICS, IV. τν.
nature of ‘ place’; (2) that the problems we have encountered on our way shall find their solution in it; (3) that the characteristics of ‘ place ’ which we have noted shall reveal themselves as integral to its nature as we have defined it: and lastly (4) that the per- plexities we have met shall be seen to rise naturally out of the facts, as explained. No more can be demanded of any solution than that it should satisfy all these conditions.
To begin with, then, we must recognize that no speculations as to place would ever have ausen had there been no such thing as mavement, or change of place, Indeed, the chief reason of the persistent tendency to think of heaven itself as having a‘ place’ is {πῶ} at is always moving.”
Now change of place may occur either by way of translation, or by way of mercase and decrease, for in this case too what was formerly in such and such a place is now in a larger or a swaller one.
Again, of things which are in motion some are moved by the actuahzing of their own inherent potentialities, and others only by being involved in the movement of something else in which they inhere; and of this latter class again some (being substantive) are capable of movement on their own account as well (such are limbs of the body, or a rivet in a ship), whereas others, like ‘ whiteness’ or ‘wisdom’ (being attributive) are not so much as capable of moving otherwise than incidentally, for the only ssnse in which they move at all is that they inhere in something that moves.
Again,’ when we say that a thing is ‘in the uni- verse, as though that were its place, it is because it is in the air, which air is in the universe. And we VOL. I x 805 ARISTOTLE 8114 τῷ ἀέρι δὲ οὐκ ἐν παντί, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτοῦ καὶ περιέχον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι φαμὲν εἶναι" εἰ s ον "" γὰρ πᾶς ὁ ἀὴρ τόπος, οὐκ ἂν ἴσος εἴη ἑκάστου ὃ τόπος καὶ ἕκαστον, δοκεῖ δέ γε ἴσος εἶναι. Τοιοῦτος δ᾽ 6 πρῶτος ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν μὴ διῃρημένον ἢ τὸ περιέχον 80 ἀλλὰ συνεχές, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ λέγεται εἶναι ἐν , ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ ὅταν δὲ διῃρημένον ἢ καὶ ἁπτόμενον, ἐν πρώτῳ ἐστὲ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἐστὶ μέρος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντος οὔτε μεῖζον τοῦ διαστήματος ἀλλ᾽ ἴσον' ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν ἁπτομένων. as Kai συνεχὲς μὲν dv οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου, διῃρημένον δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ. καὶ ἐάν Mtb τε κινῆται τὸ περιέχον ἐάν τε μή, οὐδὲν ἧττον.
1 ἔτι' ὅταν μὴ διῃρημένον ἦ, ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ λέ- yerat, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἡ ὄψις ἢ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ χείρ, ὅταν δὲ διῃρημένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ κάδῳ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεραμίῳ ὁ olvos: ἡ μὲν yap χεὶρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐν τῷ κάδῳ. H8y τοίνυν φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων τί ἐστιν ὃ τόπος.
1 ere...ὅ κάδῳ was rejected as a doublet of the preceding sentences by Alexander and ignored by Aspasius PITYSICS, IV. iv.
say il fy in the air not because it is in all of it, but in virtue of ils being embraced by a certain surface of the a, which fits round its; for if the whole of the air were its place, then the place a thing occupied would not be of the same size as the thing itself, which equality of size we have accepted as one of our data, Such then—the inner surface of the envelope, namely—is the immediate place of a thing.
Now if a thing is not separated from its embracing environment, but is undifferentaicd from it, it is indeed ‘included in’ it—not, however, as in its place, but only in the sense in which a part is said to be ‘ ineluded in’ its whole; whereas when the thing is differentiated fiom its immediate continent but is in direct contact with it, then it is ‘in’ the inner surface of this continent as its inmnediate and proper * place,’--which inner surface is neither a part of the content nor dimensionally greater than it, but equal to it; for when things touch each other their surfaces coincide.
A constituent or part of a whole (visual faculty as a‘ constituent ’ of a seeing eye, or the ‘ hand’ as a ‘part’ of the body) cannot change ‘ the place it occupies in’ the whole, but it ‘shares with’ the whole any change of place that whole may imake; whereas a ‘ contained part,’ such as water in a cask or wine in a flask, which 1s contiguous with but detached from the ‘ continent part.’ can ‘ move about in it ’—and@ that whether the said continent move or no, lor the movement of the hand is ‘involved’ in that of the body, but the water is ‘ contained in’ the cask.
From all this the answer tu the question ‘ What ARISTOTLE 21ib σχεδὸν yap τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν τόπον ἕν τι εἶναι" ἢ γὰρ μορφή, ἢ ὕλη, ἢ διάστημά τι τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἢ τὰ ἔσχατα εἰ μὴ ἔστι μηδὲν διάστημα παρὰ τὸ τοῦ ἐγγινομένου σώματος μέγεθος. 1. Τούτων δ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ τρία εἶναι, φανερόν" ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τὸ περιέχειν δοκεῖ ἡ μορφὴ εἶναι: ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ τοῦ περιεχομένου. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄμφω πέ- Ἰλλ᾽ > = h inl 3 A \ Α 18. lel para, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος, 6 δὲ τόπος τοῦ περιέχοντος σώματος. 15. Διὰ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλειν πολλάκις μένοντος τοῦ περιέχοντος τὸ περιεχόμενον καὶ διῃρημένον, οἷον ἐξ ἀγγείου ὕδωρ, τὸ μεταξὺ elvai τι δοκεῖ διά- στημα, ὡς dv τι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα τὸ μεθιστάμενον. ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχὸν ἐμπίπτει σῶμα τῶν μεθισταμένων καὶ ἅπτεσθαι πεφυκότων. εἰ 20 δ᾽ ἦν τι [τὸ] διάστημα τὸ πεφυκὸς καὶ μένον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ [τόπῳ], ἄπειροι ἂν ἦσαν τόποι: μεθιστα- μένου γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τὰ μόρια πάντα ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὅπερ ἅπαν τὸ ὕδωρ 1 [μετεμπίπτει Simpl. 572. 17 (lemma), Philop. 553. 9 —C.]
46} Simpl. 571, 22 τὸ διάστημα τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ περιέχοντος τὸν τόπον, not (as interpreted e.g. by A. E. Taylor, Commentary on Timacus, p. 673) ‘a gap or interval between container and contained,’ ¢.¢, between a pail dnd the waler it hoalds.—C.]
» In rejecting τό (Ὁ 19) and τόπῳ (Ὁ 20) 1 follow the text (apparently) of all the Greek commentators. τόπῳ is omitted by FP. [εἰ δ᾽ ἦν τι διάστημα καθ᾽ αὐτὸ πεφυκὸς εἶναι καὶ μένειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ (Them. 116, 12), Laas, Prantl, Carteron.—C.]
PHYSICS, TV. rw.
is place?’ already emerges. For we may take it that il must be either (1.) the form or (ii.) the matter of the body itself, or (iu.) some hind of dimensional extension lying between the points of the containing surface, or (iv.)—if there be no such ‘intervenient,’ apart from the bulk of the included body—ihe contaming surface itself, Now it is clear that no one of the three first alterna- tives 1s admissible; though ‘ that which embraces’ may suggest the moulding ‘form’; for the limiting surfaces of the embracing and the embraced coincide. Ti is true, then, that both the ‘ place’ and the ‘form’ are limits, bul not of the same thing, for the form determines the thing itself, but the place the body- continent.
But. because the encircled content may be taken out and changed again and again, while the en- circling continent remains unchanged-—as when water passes out of a vessel—the imagination pictures a kind of dimensional entity left there, distinct from the body that has shifted away.
But this is not so; for what really happens is that (instead of anything being Ze/t) some other body— it matters not what, so long as it is mobile and tangible—succeeds the vacating body without break and continuously. Whereas if that ‘ which abides where it was ’ (the place itself, to wit) were a dimen- sional entity,° there would be an unlimited number of ‘places ’ there; for, when the water—or air—shifts, all the portions of the water will play the same part in the whole mass of water that that mass itself plays in the vessel; that is to say, each will leave behind it a dimensional deposit constituting a ‘ place’; and at the same time the whole place of the mass of ) 26 80 36 ala ARISTOTLE ἐν τῷ ἀγγείῳ" ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὁ τόπος ἔσται μετα- βάλλων. ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τοῦ τόπου τ᾽ ἄλλος τόπος, καὶ πολλοὶ τόποι ἅμα ἔσονται.
Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἄλλος τόπος ὁ τοῦ μορίου, ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, ὅταν ὅλον τὸ ἀγγεῖον μεθίστηται, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ αὐτός: ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀντιμεθίσταται ὃ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ 7 ἢ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ὕδατος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ᾧ γίνονται τόπῳ, ὃς μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου ὅς ἐστι τόπος ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.
Καὶ ἡ ὕ ὕλη δὲ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τόπος, εἴ γε ἐν ἠρεμοῦντί τις σκοποίη καὶ μὴ κεχωρισμένῳ ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ, ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἀλλοιοῦται, ἔστι τι ὃ νῦν μὲν λευκὸν πάλαι δὲ μέλαν, καὶ νῦν μὲν σκληρὸν πάλαι δὲ μαλακόν (διό φαμεν elvat τι τὴν ὕλην), οὕτω καὶ ὃ τόπος διὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ φαντασίας, πλὴν ἐκεῖνο μὲν διότι ὃ ἦν ἀήρ, τοῦτο νῦν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ τόπος ὅτι οὗ ἣν ἀήρ Ps ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶ νῦν ὕδωρ.
᾿Αλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, οὔτε χωριστὴ τοῦ πράγματος οὔτε περιέχει, ὁ δὲ τόπος ἄμφω.
Et τοίνυν μηδὲν τῶν τριῶν 6 τόπος ἐστί, μήτε τὸ & [Futerally, * place in which they come to be’ (when the vessel with its contents is moved),—C. i > For συνεχές =duoopepés of. 212 b 5. For χωρίζεσθαι as apphed to the differentiation of the homogeneous cf. De gen. et corr. 315 a 8. [ἐν ἠρεμοῦντι, ‘in (or ‘in ¢he case of’) a stationary body.’-—-C « [ὺ», ‘ the only ere being that we imagine a subject matter underlying change because air is transformed mto water, while we believe m the existence of the place because water hay tuken the place of air” The objection follows in the neat sentence.—C, | PHYSICS, IV. 1.
water will change its place, if the vessel itself shifls, so that a place will come to occupy another place, itself the while being a nest of superimposed places.
But in truth when the vessel as a whole, contents and all, changes iis place, it is not true that the contents, as a part of that whole, also change their place. On the contrary, they remain in the same place; for when we speak of water and air ‘ replac- ing’ each other we refer to the * proper’ place in which the one was and the other is, not to any cominon place," ultimately determined by its relation to the whole cosmic place.