« The whole section, b 23-35, ἔτι daa...ἄρα τὸ πᾶν is of dificult and doubtful interpretation. My rendering derives some countenance from the note of Simplicius (183. 13 sq.) that a very obvious way of establishing the plurality of existing things would have been to define ‘ genus’ (ἔτι προχειρότατον ἣν δεῖξαι πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα διὰ τοῦ ἐκθέσθαι τὸν τοῦ γένους ὁρισμόν " κατὰ πλειόνων γὰρ τὸ γένος), and further from the option given us by Philoponus (79. 18, 8.) to take ἀδιαιρέτων, in the last hne, as equivalent to οὐσιῶν, Pate here takes the proposition whose predicate defines ts subject, eg. ‘Man is a biped animal.’ (In his view ‘biped’ and ‘animal’ are essential atiributes—xué’ αὐτά, Anal. Post, 18 a 34—as distinct from separable accidents, e.g. ‘sitting,’ and inseparable accidents, 6.05. ‘snub,’ which contains in its definition its subject ‘nose’; for whatever 18 snub must be ἃ nose.) What is the status of these defining predicates, according to our opponent? ‘ Biped’ is not an inseparable accident, for it does not contain ‘man’ in its definition. Nor is it a separuble accident, for man must be biped. And our opponent does not recognize accidental predication at all, but holds that whatever is must be a substantive existent. So ‘ biped’ and ‘ animal’ must be substantive existents, and so must ‘man.’ If so, either ‘man,’ a substantive existent, must be divisible into other substantive existents (J, 14-16), and we shall have a plurality; 36 PHYSICS, T. πὶ.
PHYSICS, T. πὶ.
definition of ‘biped’; and this is not so, for it is the other way about, ‘biped’ being included in the definition of ‘man.’ And if both ‘ biped’ and ‘animal’ were attributes of some other subject. than man and were not themselves, severally, subjects at all, then man himself would belong to the class of ‘things attributed to a subject.’ We must, then, absolutely lay it down, that the substantivally existent is not an altribute of something else; and also that what is true in this respect of the elements of a definition, severally and collectively, is also true of the thing which they define. The universe then_, is composed of a plurality of distinct individual entities.”
~ Note that some thinkers have given in to both the Eleatic arguments—to the argument that, if‘ being ’ has only one meaning, all things are one, by con- ceding that ‘ what is nol.’ exists;® and also to the argument from dichotomy by supposing the existence of indivisible magnitudes.° Now it is obvious that, from the premisses‘ being has only one meaning’ and or every such substantive existent must be indivisible, and we shall have a universe consisting of a plurality of indivisibles (Jl. 34-85), See Maier, Syllogistik, ii. 286.
> (Plato, in the Sophist, ‘ gave in’ to Parmenides to the extent that he ‘ thought that all things that are would be one (viz. Bemg itself), 1f one did not 1etute Parmenides’ saying: Never will this be proved, that things that ure-not are, and he supposed it necessary to prove that what-is-not is ’ (Met. 1088 wpe Cf. Ross, Met. 1. xc.; Maier, Syllogistik, in.
4 [Alexander (Simplic. 138. 3) saw here a reference to Zeno’s arguments against the view that reality consists of a plurality of indivisible monads, and to Xenocrates, the Platonist, wlio mamtatined the existence of indivisible lines. Zeno, frag. 3; Diels, Vors. 19 a 22.—C.]
51 ARISTOTLE 187 a5 ἐν σημαίνει TO OV Καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε dua τὴν ἀντίφασιν, Ὶ Θ οὐκ ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν' οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει (μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἀλλὰ) μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ δὲ δὴ φάναι παρ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃν ὡς εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἄλλο, ἕν πάντα ἔσεσθαι, ἄτοπον. τίς γὰρ μανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὃν εἰ μὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ὅμως κωλύει πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἕν εἶναι τὸ ὃν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον.
δῆλον.
« [Aristotle seems to criticize Plato (somewhat unfairly) for not atlacking Parmenides’ fundamental premisses and inferences more drastically in the Sophist. W. rendered the foregoing paragraph a 1-10 more freely as follows: ‘ Note that some thinkers have not shrunk from the conclusion that, if “ existent’ has only one meaning, there are things that do not exist; and also that, if magnitude were infinitely divisible, there could be no motion—they themselves heliev- ing in atomic magnitudes. And indeed it 1s sufficiently obvious that we might take “ existent”’ to have only one meaning and might still escape the Heracleitean paradox; for it 18 quite possible that a thing might ‘‘ have a being ” CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT Of the Physicists (who do recognize plurality and change) there are two schools. One finds unity in a universal under- lying material (water, air, fire, or some intermediate form), and diversity in some such condition as degree of com~ pression (or, in Plato’s case, the other way round, variations ina‘ more or less’ of materiality, and unity in the participa-~ tion in the Idea). The other holds distinct substances to have been already present in the primal ‘ migvture’ 07 Examination and refutation of the doctrine of Anax- 38 ‘contradictories cannot co-exist,’ it is not a true inference that there is nothing which ‘is not’: for ‘what is not ’ may very well (not ‘ exist’ absolutely, but) be ‘ what is not this or that.” But to assert that, if there is to be nothing over and above ‘ just what is,’ it will follow that all things are one, is absurd. For who would take this expression ‘ just what is’ to mean anything but ‘ something that substantively exists’? But if it means that, there is nothing against the things that exist being a plurality, as we have seen,.@ 10 is clear, then. that the existent cannot be all one’ in this sense. in a general sense, without having the “ substantive being "ἢ to which we had agreed to confine the term “ existence.” But, in any ease, even if “at is? could be said of nothing save the primarily existent, the assertion that all things are one would be senseless; for who would take the “ primarily ” existent to mean anything but the “ sub- stantively existent? Anct in that case why should not there be a multiplicity of ‘ primarily existent” things, as we see to be the actual case? ’—C.]
CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT (continued) agoras that all things were confounded together till ‘ In- telligence ᾿ disentangled and arranged them (a 26-188 a 5). But, though the Anawvagorean theory of martures that cannot be unmiaed (80 that nothing can exist apart by itself in its purity) breaks down, yet there really are such things as qualities and characteristics that cannot ewist upart by themselves. So that, if Anaxagoras had included ‘particles’ of them in his primal ‘ mixture,’ he would hare had the best of reasons for saying that they could not be ‘ sifted out’ am their purity, any more than ‘ magnitude’ could, since there ig nothing so sniall as to have no size at all (a 5-18). 39 ARISTOTLE 187912 ‘Qs δ᾽ of φυσικοὶ λέγουσι, δύο τρόποι εἰσίν. οἱ an s μὲν yap ἕν ποιήσαντες τὸ ὃν σῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον κ᾿ in ~ at mw oe 3 \ A f --ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι ἢ ἄλλο 6 ἐστι πυρὸς μὲν πυκνό- 1s τερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον--τᾶλλα γεννῶσι πυκ- νότητι καὶ μανότητι πολλὰ ποιοῦντες. ταῦτα δ᾽ \ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καθόλου δ᾽ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα φησὶ ἸΠλάτων καὶ τὸ μικρόν, πλὴν ὅτι ὁ μὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ ὕλην τὸ δὲ ἕν τὸ εἶδος, ot δὲ τὸ μὲν ἕν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὕλην τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία 0 διαφορὰς καὶ εἴδη. of δ᾽ ἐς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς 3 ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ ναξίμανδρός φησι, καὶ ὅσοι δ᾽ ἕν καὶ πολλά φασιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας" ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος 3 [After εἶναι Τὸ has τὰ ὄντα,---(.} α (Whether this phrase could describe any factor in Anaximander’s system (as most of the ancient commentators supposed) is still disputed. See Ross on Met. 988 a 30.—C.]
Alexander (quoted and supported by Simplicius) tells us of Plato’s hearers mentioning the ἀόριστος δυάς, ἣν μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἔλεγεν (the indeterminate dyad, which he [Plato] called great and small). Though Plato has nowhere in his written works developed the ‘ great and small’ nomen- elature, yet its connexion with the ‘ indeterminate dyad’ (of. Philebus) makes it fairly certain that it stands for the purely dimensional ‘ not-anything ᾿ that occupied in Plato’s system the place taken by the conceptually abstracted hyle or ‘matter’ in Aristotle. (Cf. note on 201 Ὁ 20.)
40 PHYSICS, 1 w.
40 PHYSICS, 1 w.
We turn now to the Physicists. There are two schools of them. Those of the one school reduce existence to unity by positing a single underlying substance—whether one of the familiar three, or a something that 1s denser than fire and rarer than air @—and arrive at a plurality by conceiving all clse to be generated from it by condensation and rare- faction. Now dense and rare are opposites and may be brought under the more general conception of excess and defect. So Plato,” too, has his ‘ great and small,’ only he makes matter consist in this diversifying antithesis, and finds unity in the Idea; whereas the others find unity in the underlying matter and distinetions and forms in the opposites, or, like Anaximander, extract the eontrasis themselves out of the indeterminate prime substance.” The other school, to which Empedocles and Anaxagoras belong, start from the first with both unity and multiplicity; ¢ The association of Anaximander with the first school, in the translation, cannot he justified by the text. But I follow Philoponus in thinking that a rearrangement is necessary, and that the text cannot be accepted as sound in its present form. He does not undertake to restore it. The division between the two groups is marked by oi δέ ῃ 20) answering οἱ μέν (1. 12). Cf. Met. 1069 b 20, where Anaximander is grouped with Empedocles and Anaxagoras, He would be assigned to this second group hecause his Unlimited contained (ἐνούσας) a plurality of opposites which were ‘ separated out’ (ἐκκρίνεσθαι, as φησί seems to imply, was perhaps his own word). So, though his Unlimited stuff was not a mechanical mixture of distinct things, a plurality was originally in it and emerged out of it. Hence Aristotle regards this Unlimited as analogous to the primitive ‘mixtures’ of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, from which ‘they also separate out’ their plurality (καὶ οὗτοι ἑκιρίνουσι τἄλλα). Theophrastus (Diels, Vors. Anaximandros, 9, 9a) also couples Anaximander with Anaxagoras.—C.]
41 ARISTOTLE 187a yap Kal οὗτοι ἐκκρίνουσι τἄλλα. διαφέρουσι δ᾽ ἀλλήλων τῷ τὸν μὲν περίοδον ποιεῖν τούτων, τὸν 2 δ᾽ ἅπαξ, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄπειρα τά τε ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία, τὸν δὲ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μόνον. Ἔοικε δὲ ᾿Αναξαγόρας ἄπειρα οὕτως οἰηθῆναι διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ 30 ὄντος" διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσιν “ἣν ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοιόνδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: οἱ δὲ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν. Ἔστι δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία" γ ui ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα. εἰ yap πᾶν μὲν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἣ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (περὶ a γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως), τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, 181} διὰ μικρότητα δὲ τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν. διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι, διότι πᾶν ee 4 [Anaxagoras ‘has an unlimited number—his substances composed of homogeneous parts and also his opposites.’ He specifies four pairs (hot, cold; wet, dry; dense, rare; bright, dark, frags. 4, 12). It is not clear if this was a complete list, nor whether Aristotle here means that he had an indefinite number of opposites. See note on 184 b 20.
> (That Empedocles’ elements were not each unlimited in quantity Aristotle states at 203 a 18, and Empedocles’ own language Mids bs 17) supports him.—C.]} o {CA De gen. et corr. 314 a 6 ff, which seems to imply that Anaxagoras somewhere used the word ἀλλοιοῦσθαι to describe the process by which the many arise out of the one mixture. This use is, from Aristotle’s standpoint, incorrect; ἀλλοίωσις would be more properly applied to the ‘ modnfica~ tion ' of the single element (water, air) of the monists. The 42 PHYSICS, I. rv.
for they assume an undistinguished confusum, from which the constituents of things are sifted out. But they differ in this, that Empedocles supposes the course of Nature to return upon itself, coming round again periodically to its starting-point; while Anaxagoras makes 1t move on continuously without repeating itself. Moreover, he assumes an un- limited number of distinguishable substances, from the first, as well as an unlimited number of uniform particles in each substance;* whereas Empedocles has only his four so-called elements.”
Anaxagoras appears to have based his conviction that the primal substances are unlimited in number on his uncompromising acceptance of the dogma, common to all the Physicists, that ‘ nothing can come out of what does not exist.’ This made him declare that originally ‘ all things existed together’ and explain that genesis was nothing more than the modification mdueed by setting them in order; whereas the same dogma made the others attribute genesis to transforming combination and resolution.”
Further, Anaxagoras argued from the genesis of unlikes from each other that they were already in each other; for since whatever comes to be must arise either out of what exists or out of what does not exist, and since the latter was universally held to be impossible, it remamed that all things arose out of what existed, and so must be there already, only in particles so minute as to escape our senses, So he and his school argued that particles of every- other pluralists (οἱ δέ, Empedocles, frag. 8, the Atomists) saw that it must be a process of ‘ combination ᾽ and ἡ separa- tion’ of unchanging elements, Anaxagoras, however, also clearly asserted this in Fragment 17. See Diels, Pores.
48 ARISTOTLE 187 b παντὸς ἑώρων γινόμενον' φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων" ὁ εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. \ » g ἂν My \ Ei δὴ το μεν QTTELPOV ἡ απεῖρον αἀγνώστον, TO μὲν κατὰ πλῆθος ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἄγνω- στον πόσον τι, τὸ δὲ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον 1 ποῖόν τι. τῶν δ᾽ ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων; οὕτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμ- βάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐξ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν.
"Ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ ἀνάγκη, οὗ τὸ μόριον ἐνδέχεται ὁπηλι- κονοῦν εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, καὶ αὐτὸ γ ἐνδέχεσθαι (λέγω δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τι μορίων, εἰς ὃ ἐνυπάρχον διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον), εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον ζῷον ἢ φυτὸν ὁπηλικονοῦν εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων ὁτιοῦν" ἔσται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ὁμοίως. σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μόρια ζῴον, καὶ οἱ καρποὶ τῶν @ [Aristotle is paraphrasing Anaxagoras, frag. 11 (and elsewhere), ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα évecte; frag. 12, μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι, παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ érépov πλὴν νοῦ, « ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι ταυτα ἐνδηλότατα ὃν ae ἐστι καὶ fv. He now begins a series of objections. id eres frag. 3, οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ᾽ ἔλασσον del. τὸ γὰρ ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ (τομῇ a οὐκ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλον del ἐστι μεῖζον.---( 7 ° Not the sections of a mathematical line, for instance, which do not exist in advance before they haye been con- 44 PHYSICS, I. 1.
thing must exist in everything else, since they saw all kinds of things emerging from euch other. And they held that things have a different appearance and reecive different names according to the pre- valence of one constituent or another in the mixture 3 and that accordingly, no such thing exists as pure black or white or sweet or flesh or bone, but the nature of a thing is judged by what it has most of But (1) if a thing has no limit under some certain aspect, then we cannot define it in respect of that said aspect as to which it is unlimited. Thus we cannot say how great a thing is, or how many of it there are, if it) has no limit as to size or number; nor can we say what kind of thing it is if there is no limit to its diversity. If, then, the constituents of a thing are unlimited both as to magnitude and as to lund, we cannot know what that thing is; for we reckon to know about a thing that is put together when we know the quality and quantity of its components.
Again, (2) a thing, the parts of which can be of any magnitude, great or small,? can itself be of any magnitude—I am speaking of parts into which, as already existing in it, the whole can be resolved. If this is a necessary consequence, and if it is im- possible that an animal or plant should exceed all limit in greatness or smallness, the same must be true of any part of it; for the whole and the parts must bear a definite proportion to each other? Now flesh and bone and so forth are parts of animals, stituted by section. There are no atomic lengths out of which a given line is made. C/. Bk. VIII.
Ἢ A eat 6 ‘for otherwise it will be possible for the whole similarly (to be of any size).’—-C.]} 45 30 80 35 ARISTOTLE υτῶν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ἀδύνατον σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν ἄλλο τι ὁπηλικονοῦν εἶναι τὸ μέγεθος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον 7 7 ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον.
"Ἔτι εἰ πάντα μὲν ἐνυπάρχει τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ γίνεται ἀλλ᾽, ἐκκρίνεται ἐνόντα, λέγεται δὲ a ἀπὸ τοῦ πλείονος, γίνεται δὲ ἐξ ὁ ὁτουοῦν ὅτιοῦν--οἷον ἐκ σαρκὸς ὕδωρ ἐκκρινόμενον καὶ σὰρξ ἐξ ὕδατος---ἅπαν δὲ σῶμα πεπερασμένον ἀναιρεῖται, ὑπὸ σώματος “πεπερασμένου, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν. ἀφαιρεθείσης “γὰρ ex τοῦ ὕδατος σαρκός, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλης γενομένης ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀποκρίσει, εἰ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλάττων ἔσται ἡ ἐκκρινομένη,, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐχ ὑπερβαλεῖ μέγεθός τι τῇ σμικρότητι. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν στήσεται. ἡ ἔκκρισις, οὐχ ἅπαν ἐν παντὶ ἐνέσται (ἐν γὰρ τῷ λοιπῷ ὕδατι οὐκ ἐνυπάρξει σάρξ)" εἰ δὲ μὴ στήσεται. ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἕξει ἀφαίρεσιν, ἐν πεπερασμένῳ μεγέθει i ἴσα πεπερασμένα ἐνέσται ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ ἅπαν μὲν σῶμα ἀφαιρε- θῶτος τινὸς ἔλαττον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ὥρισται. τὸ ποσὸν καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἐλαχίστης σαρκὸς οὐθὲν ἐκκριθήσεται σῶμα" ἔσται γὰρ ἔλαττον τῆς ἐλα- χίστης.
α |For ἀναιρεῖν (exhaust, use up) ef. 238 a 27,---ΟἹ) > [toa so understood by Alexander and Themistius, ap. Simphe. 169. 17, σάρκες ἴσαι τὸ μέγεθος. But is Aristotle alluding to Anaxagoras, rag. 8, καὶ ἴσον ἐστὲ (τὸ μεῖζον) τῷ σμικρῷ πλῆθος and Srag. 6, ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλον καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλῆθος ῦ “In a limited magnitude there will always be as man Ly limited particles (as ever), in fact an unlimited number.’—C.] ® [Aristotle assumes this as proved above (187 b 18 ff.)
46 PHYSICS, I. 1.
and fruits parts of plants. It is clear then that neither Hesh nor bone nor anything of the hind can be great or small beyond lint.
(3) Further, 1f on the one hand (as Anaxagoras holds) all such things are already there in cach other and do not come into existence but are merely sifted out from where they are and take their names from their dominant constituents, and anything can be sifted out of anything (water out of flesh or flesh out of water), but, on the other hand, any limited body must use up? any other limited body in such a process, then clearly 1t is impossible for every thing to exist in every thing. Vor if flesh has been sifted out of a given body of water, and then more flesh is sifted out of the remaining water, even if the suc- cessive extracts constantly diminish in quantity they cannot diminish below the minimum particle. Con- sequently, if, when they reach this minimum, the process is of necessity arrested, then it will no longer be true that everything is contained in everything, for there will be no flesh in the water that is left over. If, on the other hand, you can always go on sifting out one minimum particle at a time, it follows that there are an unlimited number of bodies of equal size ® contained in a hmited body, which is impossible.
(4) Besides, since the subtraction of anything from a given body must reduce the size of that body, and since a mass of flesh cannot be indefinitely great or small,¢ it is clear that from the minimum of flesh no other body can be extracted, for that would reduce it below its minimum.
Anaxagoras would deny that there can be a minimum piece of flesh—an ἐλάχιστον. See p. L4, note b.—C,] 47 ARISTOTLE 18a “Hire δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις σώμασιν ἐνυπάρχοι ἂν ἤδη σὰρξ ἄπειρος καὶ αἷμα καὶ ἐγκέφαλος, κεχω- ρισμένα μέντοι ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, οὐθὲν δ᾽ ἧττον ὄντα, 5 καὶ ἄπειρον ἕκαστον" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἄλογον.
Τὸ δὲ μηδέποτε διακριθήσεσθαι οὐκ εἰδότως μὲν λέγεται, ὀρθῶς δὲ λέγεται" τὰ γὰρ πάθη ἀχώριστα. εἰ οὖν ἐμέμικτο τὰ χρώματα καὶ αἱ ἕξεις, ἐὰν διακριθῶσιν, ἔσται τι λευκὸν ἢ ὑγιαῖνον οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὃν οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου. ὥστε ἄτοπος τὰ 10 ἀδύνατα ζητῶν ὁ νοῦς, εἴπερ βούλεται μὲν διακρῖναι, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῆσαι ἀδύνατον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν---κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποσὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστον μέγεθος, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποιὸν ὅτι ἀχώριστα τὰ πάθη.
Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν γένεσιν λαμβάνει τῶν ὁμοιοειδῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς 6 πηλὸς εἰς πηλοὺς 15 διαιρεῦται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ: καὶ οὐχ 6 αὐτὸς τρόπος, ὡς πλίνθοι ἐξ οἰκίας καὶ οἰκία ἐϊς πλίνθων, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ ἐξ ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ γίνονται.
4 [Literally, ‘ separate of course from one another ’ (μέντοι in this sense, Plato, Rep. 389 8; Charm. 159 c), i.e. the bits of any one substance being separate from other bits of the same substunce. καὶ ἄπειρον ἕκαστον ‘and each (substance existing) in unlimited amount.’—C.} > ἔτι...ἄλογον. Anaxagoras apparently assumed molecules of tissues and of all ditingnidheble components of organic things, but not actual microscopic organisms. Thus, bone or fruit, being integral parts of animal or plant, were made up of molecules like themselves, and must be as many times as large as a molecule as they had, in each case, molecules in them. And the organism, plant or animal, 48 PHYSICS, J, 1.
(5) Again, in each of the unlimited number of primal substances an unlimited amount. of flesh and blood and brains would exist, not indeed gathered together inrecog nizable aggregates," but still existing. So that each of “these substances would exist » ithout limit within each of the others, which would also exist without limit within il. And this is impossible.?
And yet this notion of something being there that can never become completely distinct is very sound, though Anaxagoras had not got the right hold of it. For modifications ‘ cannot exist apart, by themselves. So if such things as colours and states were included in the primal Anaxagorean confusum and could have been wholly disengaged from it, there would have resulted a‘ white’ and a‘ healthy’ that was nothing else but itself—not even to the eatent of having any subject! So it was just as well that ‘ Intelligence ’ did not desire to sever such things out; for it could not be done, either with respect to quantity, since there is no minimum magnitude,? nor with respect to quality, for modifications cannot exist apart by themselves.
Nor was his conception of genesis from similar particles adequate; for although in one way a piece of mud is divided into smaller pieces of the same stuff—mud, in another way it is not (but is divided into earth and water—dissimilar parts). Also, water and air do not consist of one another or come out of one another in the same way that bricks come out of a house that is broken up, or a house consists of bricks.
was itself made up of these differing component parts. Ultimatcly then a Sdefnite proportion must subsist between the size of a molecule and ite size of any given organism.
5 [πάθῃ, ‘affections’ or ‘qualities’ which inhere insubstances, —C.] ὦ (Cf. De yen, et corr. A 2.—C.]
VOL. I E 4 2 φ ARISTOTLE Βέλτιον δὲ ἐλάττω Kai πεπερασμένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς.
CHAPTER V ARGUMENT Surveying the ground we have covered, we may note that, while most of the thinkers were intent on considering the material of which things are composed, and put their speculations on that subject in the foreground, they all assume less obtrusively some antithesis between opposing or contrasted states and movements, which determine the changes that take place in the material. And these pairs of opposites have every right to be considered ‘ principles’ Πάντες δὴ τἀναντία ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν, of τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἕν τὸ πᾶν καὶ μὴ κινούμενον (καὶ γὰρ Παρμενίδης θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀρχὰς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν) καὶ οἱ μανὸν καὶ πυκνόν, καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλῆρες καὶ κενόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὃν τὸ δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ὃν εἶναί φησιν" ἔτι θέσει, σχήματι, τάξει' ταῦτα δὲ γένη ἐναντίων" θέσεως ἄνω κάτω, πρόσθεν ὄπισθεν, σχήματος γωνία, εὐθύ, περιφερές.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία mws πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ὁ [πεπερασμένα may mean that each of Empedocles’ elements is limited in quantity, of. 187 a 26.—C.]
4 fAnaximenes first used these terms; but Aristotle (187 a 15) and Theophrastus (Simplic. 149. 39) attribute the conception to the other Ionian monists. Diels, Vors. δ0 PHYSICS, I. w—v.
Enipedocles, then, was, so far, sounder in assuming a small limited “ number of prime substances.
CHAPTER V ARGUMENT (continued) This fundamental agreement amongst all the superficial contradictions in the several systems is the more significant because it seems to have been arrived at unintentionally, and even unconsciously, by men who were looking im other directions, At any rate there it is, and ié is obviously what we want; for if we assume, as a primary fact, some such ‘ contrasted possibilities’ in our materral, we at once escape from the deadlock of the ‘ nothing-out-of-what-is-not already-there’ dogma, and can bridge the chasm between the ‘already’ and the‘ not yet’ there (Ὁ 26-189 a 10).
Tus brings us to observe that all these thinkers assume as principles some ‘couple’ of antithetical qualities or forces, and this whether they declare the sum of things to be one and rigid (for even Parmenides erects ‘hot’ and ‘ cold,’ which he calls ‘ fire’ and ‘earth,’ into principles)?; or whether they speak of ‘rave’ and ‘dense’ *; or whether with Democritus, they speak of ‘solidity * and ‘vacancy’ (the one regarded as the ‘ existent ’ and the other as the ‘ non- existent ’), and further distinguish the atoms by position, shape, and order,? all of which are expressed in antithetical couples: position as‘ above and below,’ ‘before and behind,’ and shape as ‘ angular, straight, or curved.’
Clearly, then, they all assume certain numbers of antithetical couples as principles; and not without $1 BC 35 ARISTOTLE ͵ὕ ἀρχὰς μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ éx τούτων πάντα' τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα---διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ 3 ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου σκέψασθαι πῶς συμβαίνει.
Ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον ὅτι πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν οὔτε ποιεῖν πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίνεται ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν, ἂν μή tis λαμβάνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. πῶς yap ἂν γένοιτο τὸ λευκὸν ἐκ μουσικοῦ, πλὴν εἰ μὴ wv n a συμβεβηκὸς εἴη τῷ μὴ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ μέλανι τὸ μουσικόν; ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μουσικοῦ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ. οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν πρῶτον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν (πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός) ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς TO τυχὸν ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ TO μεταξύ" 52 PHYSICS, Τὸν.
reason, for ‘ principles,’ being themselves primary, must not be derived either from each other or from anything else, and all other things must arise out of them. And the terms of a primary antithesw fulfil this condition; for, because they are primary, they cannot be derived from anything else, and because they are antithetical, they cannot rise out of each other. But we must go more closely into the question what this means and how 1¢ works out.
Note, then, to begin with, that things cannot act upon each other and turn into one another at random, unless it be by incidental concomitance; for how (to take an example) could culture, as such, ‘ become’ pallor? Aman of culture, who had been of a swarthy coinplexion, might indeed become pale, and so the person we had described as ‘ cultured’ might come to be a person we describe as ‘ pale,’ but only inci- dentally to the fact that the cultured person who became pale had other qualities concomitantly with his culture; for he cannot ‘become’ pale on the mere strength of already having some quality other than pallor to start from, unless that quality is on the specific line of antithesis to pallor—swarthiness or some intermediate shade. So too a man cannot ‘become’ cultured merely because he already has some characteristic which is not culture, unless it is the specific characteristic of complete or partial want of culture. And all this holds of the loss of qualifica- tions just as much as of their acquisition. A man does not become cultured when he ceases to be pale (unless it be by incidental concomitance), for what “ceasing to be pale’ means is not only becoming something not pale, but something on the line anti- thetical to pallor that leads to swarthiness. So too, ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE 5 A Α 1888 ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν εἰς τὸ μὴ μουσικόν, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν GAA’ εἰς TO ἄμουσον 7 εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ. a =~ li ‘Opolws δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων' ἐπεὶ καὶ 17d μὴ ἁπλᾶ τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ σύνθετα κατὰ τὸν ‘ αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰς ἀντικειμένας διαθέσεις ὠνομάσθαι λανθάνειν τοῦτο συμβαίνει. ἀνάγκη yap πᾶν τὸ ἡρμοσμένον ἐξ ἀναρμόστου γίνεσθαι Kal τὸ ἀνάρμοστον ἐξ ἡρμοσμένου, καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἡρμοσμένον εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν, καὶ τὸ ταύτην οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. \ f > cal διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἐπὶ ἁρμονίας εἰπεῖν ἢ τάξεως ἣ συνθέσεως: φανερὸν yap ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἀλλὰ ᾿ \ νι ἈΠῸ Δ. ὃ ‘ 1, oe a. TAA, μὴν καὶ οἰκία καὶ ἀνδριὰς καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο γίνεται ὁμοίως" ἥ τε γὰρ οἰκία γίνεται ἐὶς τοῦ μὴ συγ- κεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διῃρῆσθαι radi ὡδί, καὶ 6 ἀνδριὰς 80 καὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχημοσύνης" καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων τὰ μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσίς τίς ἐστιν.
>, aA > κγΨὶ in θέ. o bi 2 Ki τοίνυν τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἅπαν ἂν γίγνοιτο \ τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ φθείροιτο τὸ φθειρόμενον ἢ ἐξ Ἷ Ψ 4 ἐναντίων ἢ εἰς ἐναντία καὶ τὰ τούτων μεταξύ. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν (οἷον χρώματα 4 [Or ‘in tune.’ Aristotle refers specially to the ‘ attune- ment’ or adjustment (ἁρμονία) of a musical instrument.—C. ] 54 PHYSICS, I. v.
if culture lapses from itself, it cannot lapse into any chance thing you may name other than itself, but only into a more or less complete ‘ want of culture.’
And it is the same with everything clse; for structural combinations no less than isolated qualities obey the same law: only that we fail to note it because we have not specific names for the several ‘absences of structure’ correspondmg to different structural forms. But, all the same, anything that is articulated “ must rise out of something from which that particular articulation is absent; and if, in its turn, it falls out of aiticulation it must go back again to the absence of the specific articulation it had. It makes no difference whether we speak of ‘ harmony ’ or of arrangement or of combination in this con- nexion; for the principle is clearly the same. And so too with a house or a statue or any such product. For what the house replaces by being made is the unordered relation of the materials to each other; and what passes away in the making of the statue, or any other shapely work, 1s the unshapeliness of the material; for all such things are constituted either by the formative disposition or the combining of the material or materials.
Tf then all this is so, it would seem that whenever anything comes into existence or passes out of it, the movement is along the determined line between ihe terms of some contrast; or (if we start from some intermediate state) the movement is towards one of the extremes. And since the intermediates are compounded in various degrees out of the opposite terms of the contrasted couple (colours, for instance, 55 ARISTOTLE 198 bon ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος)" ὥστε πάντ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὰ φύσει γινόμενα ἢ ἐναντίαϑὴη ἐξ ἐναντίων.
Μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκο- λουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον" πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν “καλουμένας ἀρχάς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ᾽ 30 αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. διαφέρουσι δ᾽ ἀλλήλων τῷ τοὺς μὲν πρότερα τοὺς δ᾽ ὕστερα λαμβάνειν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δ' ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἕτεροι δὲ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, οἱ δὲ νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν 85 αἰτίας τίθενται τῆς “γενέσεως: ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀλλήλων διαφέρει κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον. ὥστε ταὐτὰ λέγειν πως καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων--ἕτερα μὲν ὥσπερ 1892 Καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις, ταὐτὰ δὲ q ἀνάλογον' λαμβάνουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας" τὰ μὲν γὰρ περιέχει, τὰ δὲ περιέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων.
Ταύτῃ τε δὴ ὡσαύτως λέγουσι καὶ ἑτέρως, καὶ χεῖρον καὶ Boer, Kal οἱ μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ 5 τὸν λόγον (ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον) οἱ δὲ κατὰ « The modern reader must familiarize himself with the conception, deeply entrenched in the Greek and the scholastic mind, that the members of any defined group of things ma be regarded as having a directly linear relation to eac other, according ay they manifest the characteristic of the group in the perfection of its standard representative or only in some less pronounced degree.
ὃ [The Pre-Socratics did not use the word στοιχεῖον, but used ἀρχή of their primitive stuff.—C.]
The Pythagoreans, who regard as the ‘ elements of number ’ the ‘ Odd ’ (the principle of Limit) and the ‘ Even ’ 56 PHYSICS, I. v.
out of white and black), 1t follows that all things that come into existence in the course of nature are either opposites themselves or are compounded of oppusites.“