ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS BOOK V CHAPTER I ARGUMENT (continued) wards. We have already examined the nature af ἡ move- ment’ (in its extended sense, including ‘ modification’ and ‘expansion or contraction’) and have now to note that ὁ shape’ and “‘ state’ and ‘ place’ are the ‘ whence’ and ‘whither’ of change, but are immovable in themselves It is important, however, to note that these immovable points of starting and arriving are just as subject to the distinctions of ‘incidental,’ ‘in virtue of a part,’ and ‘primary and integral,’ as the movements are (Ὁ 16-22).
Summary (Ὁ 22-26).
Dismissing the indeterminate incidental cases and con- fining ourselves to proper and primary ὁ changes,’ we note that they ‘reside solely in the primary and integral subject that experiences the change, and must be in the direction From one opposite to the other, both opposites being declared in positive (not negative) terms (Ὁ 26-35).
This last point must be elaborated. To speak of the ‘ nat- hot’ as the primary and integral ἡ subject’ that undergoes the change would be idle. For ‘ knowledge,’ or ‘ sound’ or ‘angularity’ are ‘not-hot’; and though “ not-hotness’ may incidentally undergo change when any of these things Ἷ ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (contenued) do, it cannot be the proper and integral subject of the change. Taking the“ subject,’ then, to be a positive and not a negative, though the predicate may be a negative, we seem to have three possibilities. The change (for instance) might be from ‘ hot to cold,’ from ‘ hot to not-hot,’ or from ‘ not-hot to hot,’ or JSrom ‘ not-hot to not-cold.’ Obviously the last of these falls out, for it would include such changes as that from ‘ treble to triangular ’ (Ὁ 35-225 a 12).
The forms from * hot to not-hot ’ and its inverse are signi- ficant if the negation in one term is specific, and is confined to what is posited by the other term, and if the subject is potentially capable of renouncing or acquiring (as the case may be) the shape, state, or place, posited by the ‘ whither ’ of the movement. But if the negation were absolute, e.g.
Μεταβάλλει δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλον πᾶν τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ μουσικὸν βαδίζειν, ὅτι ᾧ συμβέβηκε μουσικῷ εἶναι, τοῦτο βαδίζει: τὸ δὲ τῷ τούτου τι μεταβάλλειν ἁπλῶς 2% λέγεται μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ὅσα λέγεται κατὰ μέρη: » aA ὑγιάζεται yap TO σῶμα, ὅτι 6 ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ 6 θώραξ, ταῦτα δὲ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου σώματος. ἔστι δὲ δή τι ὃ οὗτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖται οὔτε τῷ ἄλλο τι τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι. πρῶτον" καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ TO καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινητόν. κατ᾽ ἄλλην 30 δὲ κίνησιν ἕτερον, οἷον ἀλλοιωτόν: καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ὑγιαντὸν ἢ θερμαντὸν ἕτερον. στι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος ὡσαύτως" TO μὲν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος (τῷ PHYSICS, V. 1.
ARGUMENT (continued) * from hot to non-entity ᾿ or the inverse, we should be in the Jace of absolute genesis or absolute annulling, neither of which (if there were such things) would be movements at all, since the one would have no ‘ whence,’ and the other no All change, transition, or movement, then, must be between two positeely indicated terms each of which is a member of a specific parr of opposites or is intermediate between the pair. But note that ‘ shortages’ can be positively, as well as negatively, indicated (a 34~b δ).
An examination of the categories will convince us that “movement, in its extended sense, must be from and to either quality, or quantity, or place (b 5-9).
WHEN we say that anything moves or changes, (1) it may be that the change mentioned is incidental to some other change or dependent on it; as we might say ‘ here comes Culture,’ when it is really the apostle of culture who ‘ comes,’ and incidentally brings cul- ture with him. Or (2) it may be that we ascribe to a whole a change that has taken place in some one of its parts; for ᾿ the body is healed ’ when the diseased eye or chest is cured. But (3) there must always be something that moves or changes, neither incidentally nor in the sense that some part of it moves, but in that it is in motion itself and directly. This last is what is essentially capable of movement or change. It is different for each kind of change; for instance, there is that which is capable of qualitive change, and within the field of qualitive change, there is a dis- tinction between ‘ what can be healed’ and * what can be warmed.’
Again, the distinctions now drawn apply to that which causes motion, as well as to that which moves; 9 ARISTOTLE 24a τῶν τούτου τι), τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πρῶτον" οἷον 6 μὲν ἰατρὸς ἰᾶται, ἡ δὲ χεὶρ πλήττει. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστι μέν τι τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον, ἔστι δέ TL TO κινούμενον, ἔτι ἐν ᾧ (ὃ χρόνος), καὶ mapa 224b ταῦτα ἐξ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὃ (πᾶσα yap κίνησις ἔκ τινος καὶ εἴς τι ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον κινούμενον καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται καὶ ἐξ οὗ, οἷον τὸ ξύλον Kal TO θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅ, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὅ, τὸ δὲ ἐξ οὗ), ἡ δὴ κίνησις δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ, δοὺκ ἐν τῷ εἴδει: οὔτε γὰρ κινεῖ οὔτε κινεῖται τὸ εἶδος ἢ ὁ τόπος ἢ TO τοσόνδε. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται (μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰς ὃ ἢ ἐξ οὗ κινεῖται, ὀνομάζεται ἡ μεταβολή" διὸ Kal ἡ φθορὰ ets τὸ μὴ ὃν μεταβολή ἐστιν---καίτοι καὶ 10 ἐξ ὄντος μεταβάλλει τὸ φθειρόμενον---καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς OV, καίτοι Kal ἐκ μὴ ὄντος). τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις, εἴρηται πρότερον: τὰ δ᾽ εἴδη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ὁ τόπος, εἰς ἃ κινοῦνται τὰ κινούμενα, ἀκίνητά ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ θερμότης. (καύτοι ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις εἰ τὰ πάθη κινήσεις, ἡ 15 δὲ λευκότης πάθος" ἔσται γὰρ εἰς κίνησιν μεταβολή.
* [This statement (cf. the summary at 294 Ὁ 25) contains the main point of the paragraph: the change oceurs in the subject undergoing it, not in the termini (qualities, quanti- ties, places) from which the change starts and at which it ends. Cf. Simplic. 804. 18 πρῶτον δείκνυσιν ἐν τίνι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις, That the change occurs in the moved rather than in the mover has been shown in Book III., chapter iii—C.]
> [This possible difficulty is due solely to the ambiguity of the Greelx word for ‘ affection’ (πάθος). Aristotle him- self sometimes uses it (instead of πάθησις) for the process of being affected (e.g. ‘ whitening’) as well as for the state 10 PHYSICS, V. 1.
for the healer is primarily a physician and incidentally aman; and the contusion raised by the fist is said to be raised by the man whose fist it is.
Now, if there is always a thing that causes move- ment directly and a subject that is moved, and there is also a time zn which the movement takes place, and further a whence and a whither (for every movement is ‘from that to this,’ and the thing that passes from ‘that’ to ‘ this’ is distinct from both of them; the kindling log, for instance, is not itself either the ‘heat’ into which, nor the ‘ coldness ’ out of which, it passes) —all this being so, the movement, or passing, clearly pertains to the log itself and not to the condition of heat or coldness *; for no quality or place or magni- tude either causes movement or experiences it. We have, then, a mover and a moved and the ‘ whither ’ of the movement. (I say the ‘ whither’ rather than the ‘ whence,’ because it is from its ‘ whither’ that a process of change takes its name. Thus we call a change into non-existence ‘ perishing,’ though the ‘whence’ of the change is existence no less truly than its ‘ whither’ is non-existence; and we call it ‘genesis ’ if its “ whither’ is existence, in spite of non-existence being its ‘whence.’) Thus, to our previous account of movement we may now add that the “ forms’ and ‘ conditions ’ and ‘ place,’ which are all goalseof movement, are themselves without move- ment, as for instance ‘knowledge’ and ‘heat.’ (Yet the question might occur whether anything that affects a subject should not be regarded as a move- ment,? and whether ‘ whiteness’ does not so affect its subject—in which case there would be a move- (‘ whiteness ’) resulting from the process. Bonitz, Index 11 ARISTOTLE 254} ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐχ ἡ λευκότης κίνησις, GAN ἡ λεύ- κανσις). ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος καὶ Kar ἄλλο, Kal TO πρώτως καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ GAAo* οἷον τὸ λευκαινόμενον εἰς μὲν τὸ νοούμενον μεταβάλλει κατὰ συμβεβηκός (τῷ 20 γὰρ χρώματι συμβέβηκε νοεῖσθαι), εἰς δὲ χρῶμα ὅτι μέρος τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ χρώματος, καὶ εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην ὅτι μέρος at ᾿Αθῆναι τῆς Edpwans, εἰς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα καθ᾽ αὗτό. Πῶς μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὐτὸ κινεῖται, Kal πῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Kat πῶς Kat’ ἄλλο τι, Kal πῶς τὸ 25 αὐτὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἐπὶ κινοῦντος καὶ ἐπὶ κινουμένου, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κίνησις οὐκ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Τῷ κινουμένῳ και ΚΟΙΡΉΏΤΩ ΚΑΤ ἐενεργξειαν.
Η μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεταβολὴ ἀφείσθω" ἐν ἅπασί τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ πάντων. ἡ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς 1 [The mss. have τὸ before both κατ᾽ ἄλλο and “if κατ᾽ ἄλλο, It was excised by Bonitz.—C.]
* {In such expressions Aristotle sometimes uses the neuter, though the thing or subject he has in mind may be a person. This makes the example of ‘ travelling to Athens’ less odd. Cf. τὸ βαδίζον, 232 a 4.—C.]
ment, the goal or ‘ whither’ of which would itself be amovement. But, I take it, it is not really the affection ‘ whiteness’ that is a movement, but the process of ‘ whitening.’)
Note, further, that in these unmoving goals of movement also the distinctions hold between in- cidental and primary and between ‘in virtue of a part other than the whole’ and ‘in its own entirety.’ Thus, a thing that is turning white ¢ may incidentally pass into being an object of thought (for the ‘ being an object of thought’ is incidental to its colour); and it progresses into ‘ colour’ in virtue of the whiteness it passes into being a ‘part’ (species) of the genus ‘colour ’ (just as one might say that so and so had ‘gone to Europe’ if he had gone to Athens); whereas the primary fact is that the subject has progressed into ‘ white colour.’
So now all is clear as to a movement of a subject as such ‘ on its own account,’ as contrasted with move- ment that is ‘ incidental’ or “in virtue of a part ’; as to what is meant by a thing moving or being moved ‘ itself directly ’®; and as to the applicability of these distinctions alike to the cause of movement and the subject of movement; and further it is clear that movement takes place not in the form (which is its ‘whence’ or ‘ whither’) but in the subject itself which, being potentially movable, is at the time actually in motion.
Here, then, we may dismiss the ‘incidental’ change; because it is always at work in subjects of all sorts and in respect of any of their properties. But change which is not incidental is not found in subjects of all sorts but moves on the line between terms which are 13 ARISTOTLE 254. 30 ἐναντίοις Kal Tots’ μεταξὺ καὶ ἐν ἀντιφάσει" τούτου δὲ πίστις ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ μεταβάλλει: χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῷ ὡς ἐναντίῳ ὄντι πρὸς ἑκάτερον" ἔστι γάρ πως τὸ μεταξὺ τὰ ἄκρα. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κἀκεῖνα πρὸς τοῦτο λέγεταί πως ἐναντία" οἷον ἡ μέση βαρεῖα πρὸς τὴν νήτην καὶ ὀξεῖα πρὸς τὴν ὑ ὑπάτην, καὶ τὸ φαιὸν 35 λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ μέλαν καὶ μέλαν πρὸς τὸ λευκόν. 25ιλ' ΒΕιπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστιν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι (δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα" μετ᾽ ἄλλο Τὴ τι καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ τὸ δ᾽ ὕστερον), μεταβάλλοι ἂν τὸ μεταβάλλον τετραχῶς" ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ καταφάσει δηλούμενον). ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τρεῖς εἷναι μεταβολάς --τήν τε ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὴν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὴν ἐκ 10 μὴ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον" ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἔστι μεταβολὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κατ᾽ ἀντίθεσιν: οὔτε γὰρ ἐναντία οὔτε ἀντίφασις ἐ ἔστιν.
Ἢ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴ Kar’ ἀντίφασιν γένεσίς ἔστι, ἡ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἁπλῆ, ἡ δὲ τὶς τινός" οἷον. ἡ μὲν ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ εἰς λευκὸν γένεσις τούτου, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ Δ ὄντος ἁπλῶς εἰς οὐσίαν γένεσις ἁπλῶς, καθ᾽ ἣν on μι tn ¢ fAristotle notes that he is here using’ ὑποκείμενον, ‘ subject,’ to mean, not ‘ substance,’ but anything (whether 14 PHYSICS, V. t.
either (a) contraries (or their intermediates), or (0) contradictories; as is evident by asurvey of instances. A change may start from an intermediate between two contraries because for the purposes of change the intermediate can be treated as opposed to either extreme, so that it may be regarded as a kind of contrary to them, and they toit. Thus, baritone may be contrasted with either bass or alto, and grey is light compared to black and dark compared to white.
Well then, since every transition is from something to something else (for the very word ‘ trans-ition ’ implies a ‘ going across ’ from where you were before to where you are afterwards), there seem to be four ways of transit, as follows. Using ‘ positive’? to mean something denoted by an affirmative term, a transition may be (1) from positive (A) to positive (B), or (2) from positive (A) to negative (not-A), or (3) from negative (not-A) to positive (A), or (4) from negative (not-A) to negative (not-B). But since a transition from not-A to not-B would not be a change at all, because there is no opposition (there are no contraries and no contradiction), it drops out with our exclusion of the ‘ incidental.’ This leaves only three transitions or changes to consider.
Of these (3) the transition from not-A to its contra- dictory A is genesis—either an unqualified ‘ coming into being ’ out of the mere negation or a qualified “coming to be this or that’ from being not this or that. Thus the transition of ᾧ from ᾿ not-white’ to “white ’ is a coming-to-be of white; whereas the trans- ition of x from simple non-existence to existence is an unqualified coming into being: we mean that a substance or attribute) that is denoted by a positive name.
men, 15 ARISTOTLE 25a ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐ τὶ γίγνεσθαι λέγομεν. ἡ δὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς οὐχ ὑποκείμενον φθορά, ἁπλῶς μὲν ἡ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, τὶς δὲ ἡ εἰς τὴν ἀντικειμένην ἀπόφασιν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη 90 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως. Ei δὴ τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγεται πλεοναχῶς, Kal μήτε τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι μήτε τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ τῷ ἁπλῶς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ὄντι ἀντικείμενον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ὅμως ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός 2—ein γὰρ ἂν ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὴ λευκόν---τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς μὴ Tose οὐδαμῶς), addvarov’ τὸ μὴ ὃν κινεῖσθαι: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὴν γένεσιν κίνησιν εἶναι" γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ μὴ ov (εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ μὴ ὃν κατὰ τοῦ 80 γιγνομένου ἁπλῶς). ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν. ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει δυσχερῆ τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ¢ [More literally: ‘Now if ‘“‘that which 1s not” has several senses, and there can be no movement of “ that which is not,’’ whether we take it (1) in the sense of ‘ the false, whether affirmatively or negatively stated’ or (2) in the sense of “‘ that which has only potential as opposed to actual existence in the full sense’ (for whereag ὁ“ what is not-white “ἢ or “‘ not-good’”’ can nevertheless be in move- ment incidentally—e.g. “that which is not-white’’ might be a man—what is simply not a particular thing at all cannot be in movement in any way), then it is impossible for “that which is not” to be in movement; and, that being so, ““coming-to-be’’ cannot be a movement, for ὁ that which is not ’’ does come to be.’ The next sentence, εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνεται (sc. τὸ μὴ ὅν =the shortage or στέρησις) κτλ, justifies the last statement, that there is 16 PHYSICS, V. τ.
has simply come into existence, not that it has ‘ come- to-be (become) this or that.’ In like manner (2) the transition from A to not-A is ‘ perishing "—either un- qualified if it be from existence to simple non-exist- ence or qualified if it be to the negation of some speci- fied thing asserted of the subject, just as in the case of genesis.
¢ And though ‘is’ and ‘isn’t ’ have other significa- tions in addition to ἡ exists ’ and ‘ does not exist,’ yet in no case can that which ἡ is not ’ partake of motion. In assertion or negation it is a relation and not a sub- ject of any kind, of which we say that it ‘ is ’ or ‘ isn’t,’ and a relation cannot ‘ move.’ Nor again is the poten- tially existent, that ‘ does not exist ’ actually, capable of motion—except indeed incidentally, in the sense that, if the man moves, his non-paleness or non- excellence incidentally moves with him. Lastly, that which is absolutely ‘ not anything’ can in no sense move. From all this it follows that genesis cannot be a movement, for, if it were, the non-existent in its transit to existence would have to move. So (how- ever much incidental genesis there may be) the case of absolute genesis would imply that the non-existent was already there and moving. But it cannot be in motion, nor, for that matter, at rest either.2 Besides these obstacles to any movement of ‘ that which is a genesis of what is not. ‘ For however true it may be that the coming-to-be of what is not (ἴ.6. the shortage) is inci- dental (to the matter that accompanies it), it is none the less true that ‘‘ non-existent ” is predicable of whatever comes- to-be in the unqualified sense.’—C.]
ὃ [Later, at 230 a 7, it is explained that for abiding in being (or in not-being), the term ‘ unchangingness ” should be used, not ‘ rest,’ which is properly opposed to ‘ move- ment.’—C. ] VOL. Il σ 17 ARISTOTLE 2258 μὴ ὄν, καὶ εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τόπῳ" TO δὲ μὴ ὃν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ" εἴη γὰρ ἂν πού. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ φθορὰ κίνησις: ἐναντίον μὲν γὰρ κινήσει ἢ κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ γενέσει ἐναντίον. met δὲ πᾶσα κίνησις μεταβολή τις, μεταβολαὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ εἰρημέναι, τούτων δὲ αἱ κατὰ γένεσιν 225b καὶ φθορὰν οὐ κινήσεις (αὗται δ᾽ εἰσὶν ai κατ᾽ ἀντίφασιν), ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑπο- κείμενον μεταβολὴν κίνησιν εἶναι μόνην. τὰ δὲ ὑποκείμενα ἢ ἐναντία ἢ μεταξύ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις κείσθω ἐναντίον, καὶ δηλοῦται καταφάσει---τὸ 5 γυμνὸν καὶ νωδόν᾽ καὶ μέλαν).
Ki οὖν αἵ κατηγορίαι διήρηνται οὐσίᾳ καὶ ποιότητι καὶ τῷ ποῦ καὶ τῷ ποτὲ καὶ τῷ πρός τι καὶ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶναι κινήσεις---τήν τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ τὴν κατὰ τόπον.
1 [νωδὸν Prantl, following some mss. at Met. 1068 a 7.---Ο,] CHAPTER II ARGUMENT [The statement that there are only three kinds of ‘movement’ —change of quality, of quantity, and of place—ts established by showing that things belonging to the other categories do not admit of change.
A substance (though it can ‘come into being’) cannot change into its contrary, for it has none (225 Ὁ 10-11).
not,’ it may be urged, further, that anything that moves must have position, which the non-existent cannot have, since it is not anywhere. Neither can perishing be a movement; for the opposite of a move- ment is either movement or rest, whereas the opposite of perishing is genesis.
Since, then, every movement is a transition, and two of the three forms of transition, viz. genesis and perishing (which are transits to and from contradic- tory opposites) are not movements, it remains that the only transition that is a movement is that from positive to positive. And these positive terms may be either contrary or intermediate; for we must count shortage (which can often be expressed by a positive term, such as ‘ naked,’ “ toothless,’ or ‘ black’) as a contrary.
If, then, the categories are enumerated as sub- stantive existence, quality, whereness, whenness, relation, quantity, action, and being-acted-on, it follows that there are three kinds of movement— qualitive, quantitive, and local.
α [This ek prs concludes the argument of the chapter.
The next should stand at the beginning of chap. ii., the main thesis of which it announces.—C.]
CHAPTER II ARGUMENT (continued) A relative term cannot change, except incidentally In the category of action or passion (which would include the active ‘ moving ’ and the passive ἡ beeng moved ἢ there can be no change of any sort of change (including generation) (b 18-16). A series of proofs follows: 19 ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) (1) (a) A change is not a subject such as can undergo a change of quality, quantity, or place; and if (Ὁ) we merely mean that something other than the change itself passes from one process of change into another process of change, tt is this subject that changes from one to the other; the first process of change does not itself pass into the second process of change. So we have not a change of a change (Ὁ 16-33).
(2) Change of change, and, in particular, generation of generation, would involve an infinite regress (Ὁ 83-226 a 6).
(8) Generation of generation would involve perishing of generation, which could occur only when generation is coming into being. This is absurd (a 6-10).
(4) In a change of change what can serve as the necessary aie undergo the change, and what does it change into?
(5) Since there are only three kinds of change (of quality, 25b10 Kar’ οὐσίαν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις, διὰ TO μηδὲν εἷναι οὐσίᾳ τῶν ὄντων ἐναντίον.
Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ πρός tu ἐνδέχεται γὰρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος (μὴ ἀληθεύεσθαι θάτερον μηδὲν μεταβάλλον, ὥστε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ κίνησις αὐτῶν.
Οὐδὲ δὴ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος, οὐδὲ παντὸς 1 [τοῦ om. E Simplic. 834. 20 (lemma): τῷ cett. τοῦ is read by Dr. Ross at Afe¢. 1868 a 11 with A>.—C.]
α [Aristotle’s doctrine of substance, with its logical premiss: ‘ every proposition has a subject and a predicate,’ ecnioeaee him from recognizing relations as a class of entity istinct from predicates and subsisting between subjects without belonging to, or inhering in, them. In his view, a woman loses her relative predicate ‘wife’ when her husband dies, her loss being ‘ incidental’ to the change (perishing) which occurs in the husband; no change of any 20 PHYSICS, V. τι.
ARGUMENT (continued) quantity, place) the change which undergoes change as well as the change it undergoes must be of one of these kinds; which leads to absurditres (a 16-19).
The conclusion is: a change can change only in the inci- dental sense already dismissed (a 19-23).
There remain, then, only three kinds of ‘change’: (1) of quality, called * modification,’ (2) of quantity, ‘ increase’ and ‘ decrease,’ and (8) of place, ‘ locomotion ’ (a 23-b 1).
A note, pointing out that ‘ modification ’ includes changes in degree of the same quality, e.g. from ‘ sweet’ to ‘ sweeter’ or ἡ less sweet’ (Ὁ 1-8).
The various meanings of ἡ moveless’: (1) ‘ essentially immovable’; (2) * hard to move’; (8) ‘ not moving, though movable.’ Only this last can be properly described as ‘ at Tue field on which movement takes place is not that of substantive existence; for movement is between contraries, and there is nothing contrary to substance.
Nor is it relation; for, when one of two related subjects changes, the relative term may cease to be true of the other, though that other has not changed at all. All changed relation, then, must be inci- dental to something else.
Nor is it action and passion, whether in the wide of the types Aristotle recognizes has occurred in the wife. What we regard as space relations fall under his category of Place. If I move my position, a pillar which was ‘ on the right ’ ceases to be ‘ on the right,’ though the pillar has not moved. Here the change in the relative term from ‘ on the right ’ to ‘ not on the right ’ is incidental to a change (per se) of place on the part of the other subject. Οὐ. Themistius 170. 21; Alex. ap. Simplic. 834.27. At 246 Ὁ 11 Aristotle says that ‘relative terms’ (τὰ πρός τι} are not subject to coming- into-being or change of any kind.—C.]
21 ARISTOTLE 225b 15 κινουμένου καὶ κινοῦντος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδὲ γενέσεως γένεσις, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως μεταβολὴ μεταβολῆς.
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ διχῶς ἐνδέχεται κινήσεως εἶναι κίνησιν: ἢ ws ὑποκειμένου, οἷον 6 ἄνθρωπος κινεῖται ὅτι ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς μέλαν μεταβάλλει, ὥστε οὕτω" καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ θερμαίνεται ἢ ψύχεται ἢ τόπον μεταλλάττει ἢ αὐξάνεται ἢ φθίνει----τοῦτο 20 δὲ ἀδύνατον: οὐ γὰρ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τι ἡ μετα- βολή---ἢῇ τῷ ἕτερόν τι ὑποκείμενον ἐκ μεταβολῆς μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸν πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. αὕτη γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου 1 [ὥστε οὕτω Met. 1068 a 18: οὕτω EH: Gpd γε οὕτω cett.—C. ] α [’ Subject’ here means that which undergoes change and persists through it. That all change between two con- traries involves this third term was proved in Book I. chap. vi.
* > [The argument is very obscure. I suggest the following as a more literal rendering. ‘ Or (6) change of change might occur in virtue of some subject, other than the change itself, shifting out of a process of change (towards a certain con- dition) into a change towards some different condition. For instance, a man passing from sickness to health Gi te shift into a aaa ἢ towards some other condition). But this (change in the subject’s changes) 15 only possible incident- ally.’ (Aristotle proceeds to prove that it can only be incidental by arguing that the second change, into which the subject passes out of his original change, can only be the reverse of that original change. If he is falling ill, the shift can only be to getting well: we can’t imagine a process of falling ill turning into any other sort of process.) ‘ For this latter change (viz. the change towards some different con- dition) is a change from one condition towards another— this is true of any change, including becoming and perishing, 22 PHYSICS, V. 1.
sense of the terms or as they are applied to the agent and patient of movement; for there can be neither movement of movement, nor generation of generation, nor, in general, change of change.
For (1) in the first place, there can only be two conceivable senses in which movement of movement could be understood. (a) It might mean that a movement was itself the subject * or mobile, corre- sponding to the man who changes from fair to dark, so that in the same way movement is warmed or chilled, or removes to another place, or expands or contracts. But this is impossible, for movement is not a subject at all. ὃ Or (δ) it might mean that some subject, other than the movement itself, might pass out of one process of change into another, as a man may pass from disease to health. But neither is this possible except incidentally; for this movement itself must be along a definite line from one ‘ form’ though the terms are contradictories in becoming and perishing, contraries in the case of movement. Our man, then, is changing simultaneously (1) from health to sickness, and (2) from this original process of sickening into another process of change (towards some other condition). It appears, then, that, after he has begun to fall ill, he is to have changed into (that other supposed process of change) whatever it may be—for (logically, though not in the case supposed) it might be (not another change Wut) a state of rest—and further that this other change must, in any case, be not any random change (but of the appropriate kind), and it must be a change from some one definite condition to another. It follows that this change must be actually the reverse change—getting well. But (falling ill cannot itself change into getting we]l; so) the change occurs incidentally, just as, supposing there is a change from the process of recollecting to the process of forgetting, that is only because the subject to whom the processes belong is changing, now into a state of knowledge, now into a state of ignorance.’—C.]
23 ARISTOTLE 23 ARISTOTLE γέ \ e 4 A 225h εἴδους εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή. (Kat ἡ γένεσις δὲ 25 καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ὡσαύτως, πλὴν αἱ μὲν εἰς ἀντικείμενα woi, ἡ δὲ Wdi—y κίνησις.) ἅμα οὖν μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ταύτης τῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς ἄλλην. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ὅταν νοσήσῃ, μεταβεβληκὸς ἔσται εἰς ὁποιανοῦν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἠρεμεῖν) καὶ ἔτι εἰς μὴ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀεί, κἀκείνη 80 €K τινος εἴς TL ἕτερον: ὥστε Kal ἡ ἀντικειμένη ἐσται, ἡ ὑγίανσις. ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως eis λήθην μεταβάλλει ὅτι ᾧ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο μεταβάλλει, oré μὲν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ὁτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄγνοιαν." “A ἐπ ~ Ἔνι εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, εἰ ἔσται μεταβολῆς μεταβολὴ καὶ γενέσεως γένεσις. ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ a5 τὴν προτέραν, εἰ ἡ ὑστέρα ἔσται: οἷον εἰ ἡ ἁπλῆ 226 a γένεσις ἐγίγνετό ποτε, καὶ TO γιγνόμενον ἐγίγνετο" εν fd ς “~ ὥστε οὔπω ἣν γιγνόμενον ἁπλῶς ἀλλά τι γιγνόμενον Ἷ wl ἡ κίνησις in lit. Ks ἡ δὲ κίνησις Ἡ: ἡ δὲ κίνησις οὐχ ὁμοίως 3 ee Smith (cf. Ross, Met. 1068 a 33): ὑγίειαν codd.
* [More literally, understanding ἀνάγκη 3% καὶ τὴν προτέραν (γένεσιν εἶναι γενέσεως γένεσιν), εἰ ἡ ὑστέρα ἔσται (γενέσεως yéveois). ‘If there is to be a process of coming- into-being B, resulting in the (final) coming-into-being 4, that earlier ΠΕ Β must itself result from a still earlier process C. ‘Thus, if our (final) simple process 4 was ever in process of coming-into-being, then that which was coming- to-be it was itself in process of coming-into-being, so that we should not yet have arrived at something simply coming- into-being, but only at something that was already coming- PHYSICS, V. 1.
PHYSICS, V. 1.
to another. (The same principle applies to genesis and perishing as well as to movement, only that the terms in the former case are direct contradictories and in the latter case not so, though contrasted.) We are to suppose, then, that the subject changes from health to sickness and at the same time changes out of this change into some other. Now it is obvious enough that when he has actually become sick, he may start upon any other change or cease to change at all; but this is one change succeeding (or not) another, it is not one change changing into another. And each successive change must always be along a definite line, though it might be along any one of all the possible lines, including the direct opposite of the one it succeeds—in this case the change from sickness to health. But naturally the subject of change may incidentally carry with him his change of one kind into a change of another kind that he enters into while the first change is going on; for instance, he may shift from the process of recollecting something and so arriving at knowledge to the pro- cess of forgetting it and so arriving at ignorance.
(2) Again, if genesis is to have a genesis, and there is to be change of change, then we must go back ad infinitum. The consequent necessarily pre- supposes the antecedent,* so that if the ultimate genesis was once in the course of being generated, the ultimate generand was at best only in process of being generated and was not in itself there, even though the subject that was in course of becoming to-be-something-that-was-coming-to-be. And this again was at some time coming-into-being, so that even then we should not yet have something (simply) coming-into-being.’
ΠΣ 25 ARISTOTLE 226a[Kat|’ γιγνόμενον ἤδη" καὶ πάλιν τοῦτ᾽ ἐγίγνετό ποτε, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἦν πω τότε γιγνόμενον. ἐπεὶ" δὲ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ ἔστι τι πρῶτον, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ 5 ἐχόμενον. οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὖν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οἷόν τε οὔτε μεταβάλλειν οὐδέν.
“Ere τοῦ αὐτοῦ κίνησις ἡ ἐναντία (καὶ ἔτι ἠρέμησις), καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ὥστε τὸ γιγνό- μενον, ὅταν γένηται" γιγνόμενον, τότε φθείρεται" οὔτε γὰρ εὐθὺς γιγνόμενον οὔθ᾽ ὕστερον" εἶναι γὰρ 10 δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον.
Ἔστι ὕλην δεῖ ὑπεῖναι καὶ τῷ γιγνομένῳ καὶ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι. τίς οὖν ἔσται; ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλλοιωτὸν ἢ σῶμα ἢ ψυχή, οὕτω τί τὸ γιγνόμενον κίνησις" ἢ γένεσις; καὶ πάλιν τί εἰς ὃ κινοῦνται; δεῖ γὰρ 1 [καὶ excised by Bonitz, who also (perhaps rightly) cut out τι before yryrduevor.—C.]