For we are assuming that things undergo qualitive modification in virtue of some action which affects what are called their ‘ affective qualities.’* That which is of a certain quality is modified in so far as it is perceptible to some sense, sensible character- istics being those which distinguish one body from another according as any body possesses more or fewer such characteristics or the same characteristics in a greater or less degree. And it is these sensible characteristics that produce the qualitive modifica~ tion; for they are affections of the ‘affective quality ’ we have assumed above. Thus we say that a thing is being modified when it is becoming warm or sweet or dense or dry or white. Moreover, we speak of all these processes taking place both in animate and inanimate beings, and in animate beings as occurring not only in parts that have no sense but in the senses themselves. For the process of sensation involves a kind of qualitive modification, actual sensation being a motion transmitted through the body when the sense-organ is affectedin acertain way. Accordingly, all the modifications that the inanimate patient can experience are common to the animate, but the animate subject experiences modifications which are not shared by the inanimate. For the inanimate does not experience modifications of sensation, nor is it aware of its modifications, as the animate is— though the animate too, for that matter, may be unconscious of such modifications as do not affect the senses. Since, then, qualitive modification is viz. those which are the objects of the five senses as consti- tuting the contrarieties of touch, taste, smell, hearing, vision. They are called ‘ affective’ as having the power to modify contrary qualities in other things, and as producing ‘ affec- tions’ (πάθη) of our senses.—C. | VOL. II Q 995 ARISTOTLE 245.a μενον ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐν ἅπασί ye τούτοις sdavepov ὅτι dua ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀλλοιοῦν Kal TO πρῶτον ἀλλοιούμενον. TH μὲν yap συνεχὴς 6 ἀήρ, τῷ δ᾽ ἀέρι τὸ σῶμα. πάλιν δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα γῷ φωτί, τὸ δὲ φῶς τῇ ὄψει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις, τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον κινοῦν 4 δι πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον ὁ ἀήρ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως 10 ὁμοίως" ἅμα yap TH γεύσει ὁ χυμός. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ TOV ἀψύχων καὶ ἀναισθήτων: ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔσται μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος. Οὐδὲ μὴν τοῦ αὐξανομένου τε καὶ αὔξοντος. αὐξά- νει γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον αὖξον προσγιγνόμενον, ὥστε ἕν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ὅλον: Kal πάλιν φθίνει τὸ φθίνον 16 ἀπογιγνομένου τινὸς τῶν τοῦ φθίνοντος. ἀνάγκη οὖν συνεχὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὖξον Kat τὸ φθίνον, τῶν A ἴω δὲ συνεχῶν οὐδὲν μεταξύ. 245, Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τοῦ κινουμένου Kal τοῦ κινοῦντος πρώτου Kal ἐσχάτου πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον.
* | Literally, ‘for the cause of movement that is proximate with reference to the thing moved is the air (in contact with the sense-organ).’—C. ] > [The process of growth is exhaustively analysed in De gen. et corr. i, 5.—C.]
PHYSICS, VII. τι.
effected by sensible characteristics, it is clear that in all cases of modification one extreme of the modifier is in contact with the other extreme of the modified. For in touch, air is in contact with the source of warmth, and the body in contact with the air. And again, colour is in contact with the light, and the light with the organ of vision. And so too with hearing and smelling, for the air is in contact both with the object that provokes the sensation and the organ that feels the stimulus.* And with taste too, the savour is in contact with the organ of taste. And the principle holds equally with inanimate things that have no senses. The conclusion is that in no case is there anything between the modifier and the modified.
(3) Further, it is true of that which causes and that which experiences growth. For that from which the growth is ultimately derived is so assimilated to the growing body that the whole becomes one. And that which causes shrinkage, again, causes it by some portion of that which shrinks coming away from it. Necessarily, then, that which causes growth or shrinkage must be continuous with that upon which it acts; and if things are continuous there is nothing between them.?
Clearly then nothing intervenes between the corresponding extremes of agent and patient in any kind of passing from this to that.
ARISTOTLE CHAPTER III ARGUMENT [This chapter elaborates the statement made in the last, that change of quality is always effected by sensible charac- teristics and confined to things which can be affected by them, viz. physical bodies qua possessing such characteristics, and the sentient faculty of the soul. It will be shown that certain cases which might be regarded as exceptions are not really such (245 b 3-9).
(1) The shaping of material into a complete form is not a qualitwve modification, as may be seen from the use of language (b 9-246 a 9).
(2) Habits, whether bodily or mental, and the acquisition or loss of them, are not qualitive modifications. An excellence is a perfection of the thing’s nature, a defect a departure from such perfection (a 10-b 2). All excellences are condi- 245b3 Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ἅπαν ἀλλοιοῦται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἐν μόνοις ὑπάρχει τούτοις ὅ ἀλλοίωσις ὅσα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λέγεται πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἔν τε τοῖς σχήμασι. καὶ ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς τούτων λήψεσι καὶ ἀποβολαῖς ἀλλοίωσιν ὑπάρχειν: ἐν οὐδετέροις δ᾽ ἔστιν.
10 Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σχηματιζόμενον ὅταν ᾿ἐπιτελεσθῇ, οὐ λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν, οἷον τὸν ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸν ἢ τὴν πυραμίδα κηρὸν 7 τὴν κλίνην ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παρωνυμιάζοντες τὸ μὲν χαλκοῦν τὸ δὲ κήρινον τὸ δὲ ξύλινον. τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς καὶ ἠλ- * [This meaning of πυραμίς (which I owe to the Oxford translation) might be recognize at De gen. et corr. 334 a 32 ὥσπερ ἐκ κηροῦ γένοιτ' ἂν ἐκ μὲν τουδὶ τοῦ μέρους σφαῖρα (‘ ball,’ PHYSICS, VII. mt.
CHAPTER IIT ARGUMENT (continued) tions determined by some particular relation. (a) Bodily excellences, health, strength, beauty, etc., and the correspond- ing defects are good or bad dispositions with relation to elements in the physical constitution or influences in the environment. A modification of these factors is involved in, but not the same thing as, the formation of an excellence or defect (Ὁ 2-20). (Ὁ) Moral virtues and vices similarly depend on relations to physical pleasures and pains (b 20-247 a 19). (c) Intellectual excellences are not modifications and are not the result of a process of becoming; and even more than moral habits they depend on a particular relation (Ὁ 1-248 a6).
It appears, then, that qualitive modification occurs only in the field of sensible characteristics and in the sentient part of the soul (a 6-9).—C. | Tue following considerations will show us that what- ever suffers qualitive modification is so modified by things perceptible by the senses, and that such modi- fications take place only in such things as can be said to be affected directly and in themselves by things so perceptible. What one would be most inclined to suppose exceptions to this rule are such things as (1) shapes or forms, and (2) habits and their acquisition and loss. But neither of these two classes of things constitutes an exception.
For (1) when any material has been completely shaped or arranged into a structure, we no longer call it by its own name but by a derivative: the statue is not brass but brazen, the candle* not wax but waxen, the bench not wood but wooden. Where- not ‘sphere’), πυραμὶς (‘ candle,’ not ‘ pyramid’) δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου riv6s.—C.. | ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE A X 245b λοιωμένον προσαγορεύομεν: ξηρὸν yap καὶ ὑγρὸν Kat θερμὸν Kat σκληρὸν τὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν καὶ 16 τὸν κηρόν. Kal οὐ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν Kat τὸ θερμὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν, ὁμωνύμως Ξάθα τῷ πάθει a j nv vA bor εἶ f ροσαγορεύοντες τὴν ὕλην. ὥστ᾽ εἶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφὴν οὐ λέγεται TO γεγονὸς ἐν ᾧ ἐστι TO σχῆμα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη Kat τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις λέγεται, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν elev at γενέσεις αὗται ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 5 εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν, ἠλλοιῶσθαι τὸν διέ a\ A 3 » ἈΞ ΧΓ{ ¢ a“ Fan’ ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν yeyevn- μένων" ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον 7ὔ e wo ἀλλοιουμένου τινός (οἷον τῆς ὕλης πυκνουμένης ἢ ld Ἃ 4 a f? μανουμένης ἢ θερμαινομένης ἢ ψυχομένης), οὐ μέντοι τὰ γιγνόμενά ye ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐδ᾽ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν. 10 Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἕξεις οὔθ᾽ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ov? αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις. at μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ at δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἕξεων, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ if οὔτε ἡ κακία ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς tis—érav yap λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε 15 λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον: τότε γὰρ μάλιστα ἔστι TO κατὰ φύσιν (ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος ὅταν α [That is, molten brass can be described as ‘ the liquid,’ PHYSICS, VII. m1.
as, if it is really a qualitive modification that the material has undergone, we still say that the brass or the wax is dry or liquid or hot or hard; and, what is more, we speak of the liquid or hot stuff as brass, giving the same name to the material that we give to the quality. Since, then, having regard to the shape or form, the thing which has been formed cannot be called by the name of the material in which the form has come to exist, whereas having regard to qualitive affections and modifications we do call the thing by the name of the material, it is evident that a process of production of this kind— the shaping of material—is not a qualitive alteration. Again, it would be recognized as absurd to say that a man or a house or anything that comes into exist- ence had come to be by being qualitively modified. Though it may well be that some qualitive modifica- tion of material by thickening or dilating or heating or cooling may be necessary for the production of anything, the things themselves that come into being do not suffer qualitive modification, nor is their genesis such a modification.
(2) Nor are habits,? whether bodily or mental, qualitive modifications. Some habits are excellences, others are defects, and neither excellence nor defect is a modification; but excellence is a kind of perfec- tion, since a thing is said to be perfect when it has acquired its appropriate excellence, for it is then in most complete conformity to its own nature (as a circle becomes perfect in proportion as it becomes and we can say ‘this liquid’ or ‘ this brass’ denoting the same thing.—C. ] > [‘ Habit’ means a comparatively permanent condition, either of body or soul, established by the constant exercise of some function.—C.]
ARISTOTLE 8464 μάλιστα γένηται κύκλος βέλτιστος") ---ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἔκστασις. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείωμα λέγομεν ἀλλοίωσιν (ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ 20 μὴ τελειοῦται ἡ οἰκία), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ 846» τῶν ἀρετῶν Kat τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων" αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειώσεις αἱ δὲ ἐκστάσεις εἰσίν, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις. Ere δὲ καί φαμεν ἁπάσας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, ὅ οἷον ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν, ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὑτὰ τῶν ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ \ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ / ft κακίας. ἑκάστη “γὰρ ἔστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη εὖ ἢ κακῶς διατίθησι τὸ 10 ἔχον" οἰκεῖα δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ὧν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ πρός τι οὔτε αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλοιώσεις οὔτε αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδ᾽ ὅλως μεταβολὴ οὐδεμία, φανερὸν ὅτι ov? at ἕξεις οὐθ᾽ at τῶν ἕξεων ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἴ [βέλτιστος Par. 1859: καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος al. The sense required is: ‘For this above all is the moment when some- thing that realizes its nature is in existence, as a circle is called ** perfect *’ precisely from the moment when (the process of constructing it ends and) it becomes a circle (realizes its nature).’ The point is that a circle is called perfect when it as a circle, not ‘ when it is a very good circle.’ Cf. the second text 246 b (19) καθάπερ 6 κύκλος τότε μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν, ὅταν μάλιστα κύκλος ἢ. The sense can be obtained by omitting βέλτιστος and so eliminating the suggestion that one circle can be ‘ better’ than another, or the same circle better PHYSICS, VII. 1m.
the best possible circle); and defect is losing and departing from the same. Accordingly just as we do not call the completion of a house a qualitive modification of it (for who would call the coping and tiling of a house a qualitive modification of it, or say that the house had been ‘modified’ by the addition of them instead of ‘ completed ’ ὃ), so is it with excellences and defects and with those who have or acquire them: the former are completions and the other lapses from such, and neither of them modifications.
Again, we say that all the excellences are condi- tions determined by some particular relation. Thus (a) bodily excellences such as health and fitness we ascribe to the mingling of the warm and cold humours in due proportion, in relation either to each other or to the environment. And so too with beauty and strength and all other excellences and defects; each consists in being in a certain condition in relation to something and puts its possessor into favourable or unfavourable dispositions with reference to its peculiar affections, by which I mean those affections which, according to the natural constitution of the thing, tend to promote or to destroy its being. Since, then, relations are neither themselves qualitive modifications nor yet subjects of such modification or of coming-into-being or of any kind of change at all, it is clear that neither are habits such, nor the acquisi- tion or loss of them; though it may be that, just as at one time than at another. An alternative is to read καὶ τότε βέλτιστος: ‘as a circle is called “‘ perfect’? precisely from the moment when it becomes a circle, and then it is at its best’ (having passed out of the imperfect stage of being under construction and ‘attained its excellence ’).—C.]
ἡ ARISTOTLE ἡ ARISTOTLE 846 υ 16 αὐτὰς Kat φθείρεσθαι ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ἀνάγκη ὔ’ὔ 4 A 4 A 2 es Fo (καθάπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν), οἷον θερμῶν A os -" ~ Se Kat ψυχρῶν ἢ ξηρῶν Kat ὑγρῶν ἢ ἐν οἷς tuy- χάνουσιν οὖσαι πρώτοις. περὶ ταῦτα yap ἑκάστη ἔγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκε TO EXOV' ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς 20 ws δεῖ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ,ὕ ἐναντίως ἀπαθές. 247a “Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεων" ἅπασαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, καὶ ¢ ai μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις ai δὲ κακίαι ἐκστάσεις" by φ A > A ow ta 4 A 9 nm / ETL ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθησι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, ἡ δὲ κακία κακῶς. ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὗται ἔσονται 5 ἀλλοιώσεις, οὐδὲ δὴ al ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις αὐτῶν' γίγνεσθαι αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους. ἀλλοιοῦται δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθη- τῶν. ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς, αὗται δ᾽ ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττειν 10 ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι ἢ ἐν TH ἐλπίζειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ πράξει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησίν εἰσιν, ὥσθ᾽ ὑπ αἰσθητοῦ τινος κινεῖσθαι, at δ᾽ ἐν TH μνήμῃ καὶ ἐν TH ἐλπίδι ἀπὸ ταύτης (ἢ yap ota ἔπαθον μεμνὴ- υμένοι ἥδονται ἢ ἐλπίζοντες οἷα μέλλουσιν): ὥστ iid ἀνάγκη πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ τῶν 16 αἰσθητῶν γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἢ λύπης f ἐγγιγνομένης Kat ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνεται PHYSICS, VII. m1.
PHYSICS, VII. m1.
with the characteristics or forms we have already spoken of, the formation or destruction of habits may involve the modification of certain factors, (say) the heat or cold or dryness or moisture of the physical elements, or the proper seats of the habits, whatever they may be. For excellence and defect are in every case concerned with influences whereby their pos- sessor is, according to its natural constitution, liable to be modified: the result of excellences is that the thing is either not affected at all by these influences or affected in the right way; the result of defect, that it is affected or else not affected when it ought to be.
The same is true of (6) the moral habits, for they too consist in conditions determined by certain re- lations, and the virtues are perfections of nature, the vices departures from it. Moreover, virtue disposes a man rightly towards the affections peculiar to his own being, and vice evilly. So neither are these qualitive modifications, nor yet is the acquisition or loss of them such; but, all the same, the sensitive faculties of the soul must necessarily suffer modifica- tion before the moral habits can come into existence. And the sensitive faculties can only be affected by objects of sense. For all the moral virtues are con- cerned with bodily pleasures and pains, either in present experience orin memory orinhope. Present pleasure or pain is a matter of sensations, and must therefore be stirred by some sensible object, and the pleasures and pains of memory or hope are dependent upon those of experience (for they accompany the memory of past pleasure or the expectation of pleasure in the future), so that all such pleasure must spring from objects of sense. And since vice and virtue come into being in presence of pleasure and ARISTOTLE 2418 (περὶ ταύτας yap εἰσιν), αἱ δ᾽ ἡδοναὶ Kal at λῦπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀλλοιου- μένου τινὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν. ὥσθ᾽ ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετ᾽ ἀλ- λοιώσεως, αὐταὶ δ᾽ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλοιώσεις.
oa7p ΑΑλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ αἱ τοῦ νοητικοῦ μέρους ἀλλοιώσεις, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῶν γένεσις. πολὺ γὰρ μᾶλλον" τὸ ἐπιστῆμον ἐν τῷ “πρός τί πως ἔχειν λέγομεν' ἔτι δὲ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν γένεσις. 5 τὸ γὰρ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστῆμον οὐδὲν αὐτὸ κινηθὲν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπάρξαι γίγνεται ἐπιστῆμον: ὅταν γὰρ γένηται τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ἐπίσταταί πως τῇ καθόλου τὸ ἐν μέρει. πάλιν δὲ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, εἰ μή τις καὶ τῆς ἀναβλέψεως καὶ τῆς ἀφῆς οἴεται γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ 10 τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὅμοιον τούτοις. a δ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης. γένεσις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοίωσις. τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπ- ίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, ὅλως γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς μεταβολῆς, 1 [μᾶλλον Oxf. Trans.; ef. Simplic. 1074. 15: μάλιστα codd.
παρα, - * [This sentence seems meant to justify the statements (1) that intellectual states are not modifications and (2) that they consist in ‘ being in a certain state in relation to some- thing,’ viz. the object known. The faculty which is capable of knowing is not itself modified (οὐδὲν αὐτὸ κινηθέν) when it comes into the state of knowing, but this occurs by something else (an object) coming into relation with it. The following sentences argue that neither the exercise of knowledge already acquired nor the original acquisition of knowledge is a genesis.—C. ] > [The Greek word for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is etymologi- PHYSICS, VII. 111.
pain (for their concern is all with them), and pleasure and pain are modifications of the sensitive part, it is obvious that virtue and vice can only be lost or gained conditionally on some qualitive modification of the sensitive part having come about. So although the coming into being of virtue and vice is concomitant with qualitive change, they themselves are not such changes.
Nor are (c) the states of the intellectual part quali- tive modifications, nor do.they ever come into exist- ence in the primary and strict sense. For it is even more true of the state of knowing than it is of the moral virtues that it is a condition determined by a particular relation; and it is further evident that these intellectual states have no proper genesis. % For that which knows potentially comes to know actually, not in virtue of any motion of its own, but because something not itself is now newly presented to it; when the particular is presented to it, it gets such knowledge as it can have of the particular by means of knowledge of the universal. And again the enjoy- ment and actualizing of knowledge is not the result of a process of coming-into-being, unless you choose to say the same of every act of seeing or touching and consider the actualizing of knowing as analogous to such. Nor is the original acquisition of knowledge a process of becoming or a modification. For it is when the understanding has come to rest ὃ at its goal that we are said to know and possess a truth, and there is no process of becoming leading to the terminal pause, nor indeed to any kind of change, as has alcally connected with ‘coming to a stand’ (στῆναι). Cf. Plato, oy 96 B, Cratylus 437 a, Aristot. Post. Anal. 100 a 1 ff.
ARISTOTLE 247 b καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μεθύειν ἢ καθεύδειν ἢ, νοσεῖν εἰς τἀναντία 16 μεταστῇ τις Ov φαμεν ἐ ἐπιστήμονα γεγονέναι πάλιν (xaérou ἀδύνατος ἦν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι πρότε- ρον), οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ὅταν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἕξιν. τῷ γὰρ καθίστασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ταραχῆς φρόνιμόν τι γίγνεται καὶ ἐπιστῆμον (διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία οὔτε μανθάνειν δύναται οὔτε κατὰ 2488 τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις" πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις). καθίσταται δὲ καὶ ἡρεμίζεται πρὸς ἔνια μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, πρὸς ἔνια δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων, ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ὃ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὅταν νήφων γένηται καὶ ς ἐγερθῇ. ανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ᾽ οὐδενὶ πλὴν κατὰ ER EP IRS stand | (ἠρἐπησιε) was defined as a movement. _é ἡ Cf. Plato, Timaeus 44 4 ΐ.---Ο, ΕΣ implied point of this sentence describing the acquisition of the state of knowledge is that 1t is not a process of quauieiye modification (it has already been shown that it CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT In this chapter the question is discussed: what conditions must be satisfied.f two changes are to be ‘comparable,’ i.e. such that they can be called equal to, or greater or less than, one another? Special consideration is given to the two kinds PHYSICS, VII. 11.-1v.
ready been shown.* Again, just as we do not say that a man has come to have knowledge again when he emerges from drunkenness or sleep or disease (although it is true that his power of realizing the knowledge has been suspended), so likewise we should not say that when he originally acquires the state he is “ coming to be’ possessed of knowledge. For the condition of understanding or knowing results from the soul coming to a state of stillness out of the turbulence natural to it (this is why children cannot acquire knowledge or pass judgements as to things of sense as grown men can, for their bodies are in a state of great turbulence and instability °). And the soul is quieted and stilled, in some respects by nature herself in her normal course, in other respects by external influences; and in either case it is only a qualitive modification of certain bodily organs that is involved,¢ as in the case of the recovered power of employing and exercising the intellect, when a man becomes sober or wakes from sleep.
It is clear, then, that qualitive modification and susceptibility to it are proper to things perceptible by the senses and to the sensitive factor in the soul, and occur in naught else, save by implication with these.
is not a genesis), though it involves a modification of bodily organs.—C. | CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT (continued) of local motion, viz. (a) rotation, destgnated as ‘ circular’ (i.e. ‘angular ’) motion, and (Ὁ) ‘ translation,’ designated as ‘rectulinear’ motion. The two kinds of ‘local distance’ corresponding to these two kinds of motion are (a) circular ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) (angular) distance—measured on a circular scale in angular degrees—and (b) rectilinear distance—measured on a recti- linear scale in degrees of length. The discussion is very obscure and is * dialectical,’ that is to say, the final answer is reached by putting forward a series of tentative suggestions, showing why each of them is inadequate, and so gradually collecting a definition of the conditions required.
lst suggestion: that every change is comparable with every other. If (as would then be the case) changes in every sphere could be reduced to a common measure (it would then be possible to turn round, to go straight on, and to change in quality with equal velocity)*: and if ‘ moving with equal velocity ’ means covering an equal stretch in an equal tume, wt would follow not only that an angle and a length, but also a stretch of qualitive change, could be equal to one another. But this is not so, and therefore all kinds of change are not comparable (248 a 10-18).
2nd suggestion: that the motions of all things which are ‘moving’ in the same sense of the word are comparable. But f all local motions were comparable then again all locat ‘ distances’ would be so, and an angle could be equal to a length (a 18—b 6).
3rd suggestion > that motions are comparable when the same term (e.g. quick’) can be applred unequivocally to both of them. But even a term like *‘ much’ or ‘ double’ which « This lnk in the argument is omitted m the text, but it must be understood 1n order for the next step to follow.
£48 a 10 πορήσειε δ᾽ av τις πότερόν ἐστι κίνησις πᾶσα πάσῃ συμβλητὴ ἢ ov. εἰ δή ἐστι πᾶσα συμβλητὴ καὶ ὁμοταχὲς TO ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἴσον κινούμενον, ἔσται περιφερής τις ton εὐθείᾳ, καὶ μείζων δὴ καὶ ἐλάττων. ἔτι ἀλλοίωσις καὶ φορά tis ἴση, ὅταν 15 ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ τὸ μὲν ἀλλοιωθῇ τὸ δ᾽ ἐνεχθῇ. ἔσται PHYSICS, VII. rv.
ARGUMENT (continued) admits of no equivocality in itself may yet have an ambiguous meaning when applied to subjects with different natures (e.g. water and air); for the ambiguity in its meaning is in this case inherent in the subject, not in the term itself (Ὁ 6-21).
This brings us to the Ath suggestion: that it is the nature of the subject to which it is applied which makes aterm ambiguous. But rf it lay only there, attributes themselves would never be equivocal It appears, then, that if two things are to be comparable with respect to any attribute, the attribute must be un- ambiguous, and this involves (not only that it must be mani- Sested in a specific subject such as a surface but also) that it must itself be specific, e.g. ‘white,’ not merely ‘a colour’ Only changes of the same kind can have equal velocities. Changes are not only differentiated according to whether they are qualitive, quantitive, or local, but according to sub- divisions of these classes.
If the velocities of two qualitive changes are to be equal it is not only necessary for a like affection to change wn the same degree but also for it to affect an equal amount of a like subject in each case (a 8-- 19).
Analogous problems present themselves with respect to generation and perishing (Ὁ 19-26).
Tue question may be raised whether every kind of motion or change is comparable with every other. If so, and if two things moving with equal velocities move each as far as the other in the same time, then it will follow that a circular distance may be equal to a rectilinear distance, or greater or smaller. Again, we shall have a modification and a local motion equal to each other when the modification of one thing and the motion of another from place to place occupy the same time. This means that VOL. II R 94.
ARISTOTLE 248adoa ἴσον πάθος μήκει" ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ᾽ dpa ὅταν ἐν ἴσῳ ἴσον κινηθῇ, τότε ἰσοταχές, ἴσον δὲ οὐκ ἔστι πάθος μήκει; ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοίωσις φορᾷ ton, οὐδὲ ἐλάττων: ὥστε οὐ πᾶσα συμ- / βλητή. πὶ δὲ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τῆς εὐθείας πῶς συμ- / 90 βήσεται; ἄτοπόν τε yap εἰ μὴ ἔστι κύκλῳ ὁμοίως τουτὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας ἀλλ᾽ 2.Ἃλ > / aN lan aN / Ψ 3 εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη ἢ θᾶττον ἢ βραδύτερον, ὥσπερ εἰ κάταντες, τὸ δ᾽ ἄναντες. ἔτι οὐδὲ διαφέρει οὐδὲν τῷ λόγῳ, εἴ τις φήσειεν ἀνάγκην εἶναι θᾶττον εὐθὺς ἢ βραδύτερον κινεῖσθαι: ἔσται yap μείζων 95 καὶ ἐλάττων ἡ περιφερὴς τῆς εὐθείας, ὥστε καὶ ion. εἰ yap ev TH A χρόνῳ τὸ μὲν τὴν Β διῆλθε δάβυτὸ δὲ τὴν I, μείζων ἂν εἴη ἡ Β τῆς T- οὕτω γὰρ τὸ θᾶττον ἐλέγετο. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ ἐν ἐλάττονι 1 [οὐδὲ διαφέρει οὐδὲν two mss. of First Text, Prantl: οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὐδ᾽ ἐν (οὐδ᾽ ἐν om. ΕἾ, Second Text, Bekker.—C.]
α [This is the correct solution in the case of changes of different kinds; but it does not suffice to solve the difficulty about two movements of the same kind (e.g. circular and rectilinear locomotion) being incomparable.—C.]
ὃ [Or, ‘ But how will this conclusion (that the two move- ments are incomparable) result in the case of the circle and the straight line? For itis absurd that one thing should not be able to move on a circular track at the same rate (cf. Simplic. 1083. 31 ὁμοίως καὶ ἰσοταχῶς) as another on a rectilinear one, if we take that as at once implying that it must be going either faster or slower than the other—as if one were going uphill, the other down.’ The point of the last sentence is the am- biguity of ‘ not of equal velocity.” This may mean: (1) that, “while the two velocities are comparable, one is greater or less tharmthampil sie baking that sense, it is absurd to say PHYSICS, VII. rv.
a qualitive affection will be equal to a distance in space: which is impossible. However (in order to escape this difficulty) shall we say that, while two things are indeed of equal velocity when they move over equal stretches or intervals in a given time, the stretch covered by a qualitive change is not ‘equal’ to the stretch (length) covered by a local movement? Hence a qualitive modification (though it may occupy the same time, is not ‘of equal velocity’ with, and so) is not ‘equal’ to a local motion, nor is it less (or greater); and consequently not every kind of change or movement is com- parable with every other.
ὃ How is it, then, with the circular and the recti- linear distance? It would be monstrous to maintain that one thing could not be moving on a rectilinear track and another on a circular one in the same sense, namely that of local motion, just as in the case of up and down and so forth. And the first impression is that if so, one may be swifter or slower than the other; just as in the case of motion up and down. And it makes no difference in principle whether we say swifter or slower or equal; for if swifter or slower, then the circular distance will be greater or less than the rectilinear, and whenever that relation exists it implies the possibility of equality between the two. For if in the time A the swifter mobile (B) moves through an are 8, and the slower (C) a straight line ὃ, one would say that 8 was greater than ὁ, for having a higher velocity means travelling a great distance in the same time. Therefore the swifter mobile (B) our lwo movements could not be of equal velocity. Or (2) that the two velocities are not equal (or less or greater) because not comparable at all. This is actually the case in our instance, as will appear later.—C.]
5 10 15 ARISTOTLE ἴσον, θᾶττον" wor ἔσται τι μέρος τοῦ A ἐν ᾧ τ Β τοῦ κύκλου τὸ ἴσον δίεισι, καὶ τὸ Τ' ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Α τὴν Γ΄. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι συμβλητά, ovpBaiver τὸ ἄρτι ῥηθέν, ἴσην εὐθεῖαν εἶναι κύκλῳ. ἀλλ’ ov συμβλητά: οὐδ᾽ dpa ai κινήσεις. Αλλ᾽ ὅσα μὴ ὁμώνυμα, πάντα συμβλητά. οἷον La τί οὐ συμβλητόν, πότερον ὀξύτερον τὸ γραφεῖον Ἢ ὃ οἶνος ἢ ἡ νήτη; ὅτι ὁμώνυμα, od συμβλητά: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ νήτη TH παρανήτῃ συμβλητόν, ὅτι ταὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ ὀξὺ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν. ἄρ᾽ οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ ταχὺ ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖ; πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι ἧττον ἐν ἀλλοιώσει Kat φορᾷ. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο οὐκ ἀληθές, ὡς εἰ μὴ ὁμώνυμα συμβλητά: τὸ γὰρ πολὺ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει ἐν ὕδατι καὶ ἀέρι, Kal οὐ συμβλητά" εἰ δὲ μή, TO ye διπλάσιον ταὐτὸ (δύο yap πρὸς ἕν), Kal οὐ συμβλητά. ἢ Kal ἐπὶ τούτων ὃ αὐτὸς 1 [Simplic. 1086. 20 records two variants (‘with the same meaning’): ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα μὴ συνώνυμα, ἅπαντα ἀσυμβλητά (Mss. collated by Shute): ἀλλ᾽ apd γε ὅσα μὴ ὁμώνυμα ἅπαντα συμβλητά (‘transferred here by some from the other α (Or, we cannot speak of an amount of water being ‘twice as much as a given amount of air.’ The two sub- stances have properties, other than volume, which make them not comparable.—C.]