of Anaxagoras, in that he alternates cessation and recurrence of motion, for this at least gives us an ordered succession. But even so it is not enough for anyone to assert that this particular succession actually takes place unless he can point out its determining principle*: he must not lay down or claim as an axiom a groundless assumption; on the contrary he must produce some inductive or deductive proof of his assertion. Now the principles alleged by Empedocles do not in themselves deter- mine an alternation of activities, nor is any such alternation included in the essential notion of either, since the action of one (attraction) is to draw together and of the other (repulsion) to thrust apart.’ So that if you are to add an explanation of their alter- nation, you must give instances where such a thing occurs; just as you can show that there is such a thing as ‘attraction’ because you can see men drawn together by it, and in like manner can see ‘repulsion’ at work when men mutually avoid each other, and since this obtains in some cases, you pro- pose to apply it to the universe. But even if you had shown that attraction and repulsion alternate, you would have to explain why each acts over an equal length of time. Nor yet (to take a more general ground) is it sound reasoning to conclude that you have reached a fundamental principle when you have shown that this or that always is, or always occurs, thus and no otherwise. Democritus, it is true, held it to be enough for the establish- ing of determining principles to have shown that this or that has been so in all former times,* and did not feel bound to seek any deeper principle behind what has always been. But this took him right in 5 10 ARISTOTLE πάντων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. καὶ yap τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἀεὶ τὰς γωνίας ἴσας, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἔστι τι τῆς ἀιδιότητος ταύτης ἕτερον αἴτιον: τῶν μέντοι ἀρχῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον αἴτιον, ἀιδίων οὐσῶν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεὶς ἦν χρόνος, οὐδ᾽ ἔσται, ὅτε κίνησις οὐκ ἣν ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.
α The property in question is not regarded as axiomatic but as derived from a truth of higher order in which it is shown to be involved. This is not so with an axiom or first principle, which cannot be proved at all but irresistibly asserts itself as true on its own merits.
CHAPTER II ARGUMENT [Three objections might be made to the doctrine of the pre- vious chapter: (1) No change can be everlasting, sunce every change is between extremes which put a limit to it; (2) A clear beginning of motion is seen in inanimate things which, after being completely at rest, are set in motion; (8) Animals, completely at rest, can initiate motion in them- selves, and why should not the same happen in the universe? (252 Ὁ 7-28). These objections are replied to as follows: (1) Zé is true that a single movement between opposites cannot go on for ever; but that does not exclude the possi- Τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τούτοις οὐ χαλεπὸν λύειν. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε σκοποῦσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μάλιστα κίνησιν εἶναί ποτε μὴ οὖσαν ὅλως, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀΐδιος μεταβολή- μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἅπασα PHYSICS, VIII. 1.-11.
certain cases only, and not in all. For instance the angles of a triangle are always equal to two right angles, but a reason can be assigned for the eternity of this property that lies behind the fact itself. But a first principle can have no such other cause behind it, since principles are eternal on their own merits. Let this suffice to demonstrate that there never was nor will be a time when movement was not or will not be.
CHAPTER II ARGUMENT (continued) bility ¥ any sort of continuous and eternal motion (Ὁ 28- (2) There is no difficulty in the motion of inanimate things being started by an external agent which comes into action. A more serious question is: why some things that are at rest are not always at rest and others that are in motion are not always in motion (a 2-7).
(8) The apparently self-originated motion of animals may be caused by changes in the environment or inside the Tue arguments on the other side are not difficult to refute. The chief considerations that might lead one to think it possible for motion to start absolutely de novo, there having been no such thing before, are as follows. (1) It is said that no change can go ARISTOTLE 252" πέφυκεν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι, ὥστε ἀνάγκη πάσης μετα- βολῆς εἶναι πέρας τἀναντία ἐν οἷς γίγνεται, εἰς 3 δὲ “A θ ὃ f 3 cA id ἄπειρον δὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδέν. ἔτι ὁρῶμεν ὅτι δυ- νατὸν κινηθῆναι μήτε κινούμενον μήτε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ μηδεμίαν κίνησιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων 15 ὧν οὔτε μέρος οὐδὲν οὔτε τὸ ὅλον κινούμενον aA ἠρεμοῦν Kivetrat ποτε" προσῆκε δὲ ἢ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι ἢ μηδέποτε, εἴπερ μὴ γίγνεται οὐκ οὖσα. πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων εἶναι φανερόν" οὐδεμιᾶς yap ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνούσης κινήσεως ἐνίοτε ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχάζοντες ὅμως κινούμεθά ποτε, 90 καὶ ἐγγίνεται ἐν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως" κἂν μηδὲν ἔξωθεν κινήσῃ. τοῦτο yap ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων οὐχ ὁρῶμεν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾽ aet τι κινεῖ αὐτὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἕτερον: τὸ δὲ ζῷον αὐτό φαμεν ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἠρεμεῖ ποτε πάμπαν, ἐν ἀκινήτῳ κίνησις av γένοιτο ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔξωθεν. εἰ 5 δ᾽ ἐν ζῴῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ TO πᾶν; εἶ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίγνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ: καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ 1 [κινήσεως EK Prantl: κινήσεως ἐνίοτε cett. Bekker.—C.]
* [Or ‘for sometimes, when we are still and no motion is occurring in us, we none the less move at a given moment: a motion begins in us which has its source in ourselves, though nothing external may set us moving.’ The self- originated motion attributed to living things is described in contrast with the passivity of the manimate in the next sentence.—C.]
> (Diels, Vors.4 55 Β 34 accepts the evidence of the Armenian philosopher David that Democritus spoke of PHYSICS, VIII. τι.
on for ever; for every change must needs be from this to that, so that the extreme opposites in the kind wherein the change occurs constitute a limit that prevents the change extending indefinitely. (2) Further, we see that things which are neither in motion relatively to other things nor experience internal movements within themselves can neverthe- less be set in motion. This is the case with any inanimate object which, being at rest and not in motion as a whole or as to any of its parts, is set moving at some definite moment; whereas it ought either to be eternally in motion or eternally at rest, if motion cannot have a beginning of being. (3) But far more important yet is the belief that in the case of animate beings some such thing is actually in evidence; for (they say) when nothing is moving nithin us, but all is still, we nevertheless find our- selves in motion at a given moment, and sometimes, even though nothing outside us either sets us off, the initiation of motion comes up in us out of our- selves.* Now this we never witness in inanimate things, for it is always something other than and outside themselves that moves them; but we say that a living thing moves itself. And, according to this, if a living thing is ever absolutely at rest, we shall have a motionless thing in which motion is originated by the thing itself and not from without. If this can happen to a living thing, why not to the universe? And if in a lesser cosmos,? why not in a greater, and if in the cosmos, why not in the un- man as a “small world’ or microcosm. G. P. Conger, Theories of Macrocosms and Microcosms, New York (1922) p. 6, casts doubt upon it as unsupported, and cites our passage as the first authentic occurrence of the term, though he recognizes that Aristotle must be quoting somebody.—C. ] 80 3 σι σι ARISTOTLE κόσμῳ, κἂν τῷ ἀπείρῳ, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι A 9 A TO ἄπειρον καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ὅλον. Τούτων δὴ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λεχθέν, τὸ μὴ τὴν ad- τὴν ἀεὶ καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ὀρθῶς λέγεται. τοῦτο μὲν yap ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ μὴ ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἷναι δυνατὸν τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ Kal ἑνὸς Kivnow: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον πότερον τῆς μιᾶς χορδῆς εἷς Kal 6 ad- τὸς φθόγγος, ἢ ἀεὶ ἕτερος, ὁμοίως ἐχούσης καὶ κι- νουμένης. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, ὁποτέρως ποτ᾽ ἔχει, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναί τινα τῷ συνεχῆ εἶναι καὶ ἀΐδιον: δῆλον δ᾽ ἔσται μᾶλλον ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον. To δὲ κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινούμενον οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ἐὰν ὁτὲ μὲν ἦ τὸ κινῆσαν ἔξωθεν, ὁτὲ δὲ μή. τοῦτο μέντοι πῶς ἂν εἴη, ζητητέον---λέγω δὲ ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κινητικοῦ ὄντος ὁτὲ μὲν κινεῖσθαι ὁτὲ δὲ μή: οὐδὲν yap ἄλλ᾽ ἀπορεῖ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἢ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ τὰ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τῶν ὄντων τὰ δὲ κινεῖται. Μάλιστα δ᾽ av δόξειε τὸ τρίτον ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, α [ΤῊς unlimited mass of unordered matter, such as figures in the systems of Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anax- agoras, before the cosmos arises.—C.]
ὃ (Literally, ‘ This may be said to be an inevitable con- clusion, provided it be possible for the motion of one and the same thing to be not always one and the same motion.’ In Book V. chap. iv. (227 b 21 ff.) a movement was said to be ‘one and the same’ when (1) the thing moved is one and the same individual thing, (2) the motion of a kind that cannot be subdivided into species, and (3) the time unintermittent. The string of an instrument tuned to a constant pitch (ὁμοίως ἐχούσης) and kept continuously in vibration yields an apparently continuous sound. The question Aristotle raises seems to be whether the motion PHYSICS, VIII. 1.
limited?—if ‘the unlimited’? as a whole be sus- ceptible of motion or rest.
Now as to (1), it is perfectly true that no identical and numerically single motion from oppostte to oppo- site can go on for ever. ὃ And this, I take it, would be conclusive if it were shown to be impossible for there to be any one and identical motion of an identi- cal mobile. I mean, the question may arise whether, if a vibrating chord be kept in uniform action between the limits of its vibration, the note produced is to be regarded as one and continuous or as a succession of separate sounds; but whatever answer we give to this question it does not exclude the possibility of there being such a thing as motion, not from opposites to opposites, but continuously identical and so eternal. On this we shall get more light as we pro- ceed.4 As to (2), we need not wonder that things pass from rest to motion when something that was not there before comes from outside to move them; but what we have to ask is whether it is possible for the same mobile, when continuously within the range of the same motor, to pass at a certain time out of a previous state of rest into motion; for he who asserts that it can is concerned with naught else than the question why things at rest are not at rest for ever, and those in motion in motion for ever.
So it seems that the most serious question is the causing such a sound can be regarded as not ‘ one and the same,’ though itmay appear to conform to the above definition. It will be shown in chap. vii. that a vibratory movement is not a single continuous movement.—C. ] ¢ Aristotle has in mind the rotation of a sphere. Cf. chap. viii.
@ [In chap. viii.—C.]
VOL. II U 289 ARISTOTLE 268 4 ὸ ὡς ἐγγιγνομένης οὐκ ἐνούσης πρότερον κινήσεως, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων: ἠρεμοῦν γὰρ πρό- “~ 7 Sant τερον μετὰ ταῦτα βαδίζει, κινήσαντος τῶν ἔξωθεν οὐδενός, ὡς δοκεῖ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἀεί τι κινούμενον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τῶν συμφύτων" τούτου δὲ τῆς κινήσεως οὐκ αὐτὸ TO ζῷον αἴτιον la 15 ἀλλὰ τὸ περιέχον tows. αὐτὸ δέ φαμεν ἕαυτὸ κινεῖν οὐ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ τόπον.
οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, τῷ σώματι πολλὰς ἐγγίγνεσθαι κινήσεις ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος, τούτων δ᾽ ἐνίας τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ τὴν ὄρεξιν κινεῖν, ἐκείνην δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἤδη ζῷον κινεῖν--- 20 ὁποῖον συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς ὕπνους" αἰσθητικῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐνούσης κινήσεως, ἐνούσης μέντοι A an! A τινός, ἐγείρεται τὰ ζῷα πάλιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ φανερὸν ἔσται καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων.
* (The De somno, chap. iii., explains that sleep is caused by ‘ the evaporation attendant on the process of nutrition,’ and that a person awakes when digestion is completed and he is released from the heaviness consequent on taking food.
These are internal processes, not involving the perception of any change in the externa] environment.—C.]
CHAPTER III ARGUMENT [With a view to the problem, why some things are now at rest, now in motion, we review all the possibilities: (1) All things always at rest, (2) Ali things always in motion, Ἂ Some things moving, others at rest; in which case either a) the things in motion are always in motion, those at PHYSICS, VIII. 1.-111.
third (3), which asks: If motion never starts de novo in that which was at rest, how are we to under- stand what takes place in animate creatures? For a quiescent animal starts walking when there seems to be nothing outside it to produce the movement. But this is just the mistake. For we observe that motion is always going on in some organ of the living creature, and the movement of such an organ is not determined by the animal itself, but (as I take it) by its environment. For when we say that an animal “moves itself’ we are referring to local movement and nothing else; and it may well be, or rather I would say it must be, that many move- ments within the body are determined by changes in the environment, and some of these movements prompt conceptions or impulses which in their turn stir the whole animal. We can detect this in respect to sleep, for it is at the prompting of some internal motion (that must be there, though it is not a change in any organ of perception) that sleeping animals wake up again.* But here again more light will be shed on the matter in the sequel.?
CHAPTER III ARGUMENT (continued) rest always at rest, or (b) anything can be either moving or at rest, or (c) some things are always moving, some always at rest, others can either move or rest. This last alternative we shall establish (253 a 22-82). (1) To assert all things always at rest contradicts the fundamental assumption of Physics (a 32-b 6). 4 ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) (2) It is held by some physicists that all things are always in motion, though it may not be perceptible. This can be refuted by taking the several kinds of morement separately (8 a) The view that there is nothing that is sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion denies obvious facts and can be refuted on similar grounds (a 3-15).
9 Ἁ “A A “ως 253a22 ᾿Αρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἔσται ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς λεχθείσης ἀπορίας, διὰ Ti ποτε ἔνια τῶν ὄντων ὁτὲ μὲν κινεῖται ὁτὲ δὲ ἠρεμεῖ πάλιν. 2 ᾿Ανάγκη δ᾽ ἤτοι πάντα ἠρεμεῖν ἀεί, ἢ πάντ᾽ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ ἠρεμεῖν: Kal πάλιν τούτων ἦτοι τὰ μὲν κινούμενα κινεῖσθαι ἀεὶ τὰ δ᾽ ἠρεμοῦντα ἠρεμεῖν, ἢ πάντα πεφυκέναι ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν, ἢ TO λοιπὸν ETL καὶ τρίτον" ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητα 80 εἶναι, τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ κινούμενα, τὰ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων μετα- λαμβάνειν. ὅπερ ἡμῖν λεκτέον ἐστίν: τοῦτο yap ἔχει λύσιν τε πάντων τῶν ἀπορουμένων, καὶ τέλος ἡμῖν ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας ἐστίν. To μὲν οὖν πάντ᾽ ἠρεμεῖν, καὶ τούτου ζητεῖν ὄγον ἀφέντας τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀρρωστία τίς ἐστι διανοίας, καὶ περὶ ὅλου τινὸς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ μέρους 86 ἀμφισβήτησις" οὐδὲ μόνον πρὸς τὸν φυσικόν, ἀλλὰ PHYSICS, VIII. x.
ARGUMENT (continued) It appears, then, that at least some things are now in motion, now at rest. It remains to consider whether (8 Ὁ) this is true of all things, or (8 c) only of some, while of the remainder some are always moving, some always at rest. The alternatives are again reviewed, with a view to establishing (8 ὦ) (a 15—b 6).—C.]
Now this very point “—why certain things are some- times in motion and sometimes again at rest—is the hinge on which the whole investigation we are entering upon must turn.
One of three alternatives must necessarily be accepted: either (1) everything is always at rest, or (2) everything is always in motion, or (3) some things are in motion and some at rest. And the last of these alternatives, again, includes three possibilities; either (a) the things that move at all are always moving, and the things that are ever at rest are always at rest, or (6) everything is naturally capable both of motion and rest, or (the onl alternative left), it may be possible (c) that there are some things that never move at all, some that are always in motion, and some that pass from one state to the other; and it is this last hypothesis that we ourselves accept, for this alone solves all the problems, and brings our whole business here to a conclusion.
Well then (1) to adopt the thesis that all things are at rest, and (ruling sense-perception out of court) to attempt to prove it by reasoning, really amounts to paralysing intelligence itself, and this not only on the particular field in question but universally, since it affects not Physics only but, if I may say so, ARISTOTLE 258 πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ὡς εἰπεῖν, Kal πάσας τὰς δόξας, διὰ τὸ κινήσει χρῆσθαι πάσας. ἔτι δ᾽ αἱ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐνστάσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα λόγοις οὐδέν εἰσι πρὸς τὸν μαθη- ματικόν, (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων), οὕτως οὐδὲ δ περὶ τοῦ νῦν ῥηθέντος πρὸς τὸν φυσικόν: ὑπόθεσις γὰρ ὅτι ἡ φύσις ἁ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως.
Σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ φάναι πάντα κινεῖσθαι ψεῦδος μέν, ἧττον δὲ τούτου παρὰ τὴν μέθοδον" ἐτέθη μὲν yap ἡ φύσις ἐν τοῖς,Θυσικοῖς ἀρχή, καθάπερ κινήσεως, καὶ ἠρεμίας, ὅμως δὲ φυσικὸν (μᾶλλον) 10) κίνησις" καί φασί τινες κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ ὃ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ λαν- θάνειν τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν. πρὸς ovs καίπερ οὐ διορίζοντας ποίαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν, ἢ πάσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι. οὔτε γὰρ αὐξάνε- σθαι οὔτε φθίνειν οἷόν τε συνεχῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι καὶ τὸ τὸ μέσον. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅμοιος 6 λόγος τῷ περὶ τοῦ τὸν σταλαγμὸν κατατρίβειν καὶ τὰ ἐκφυόμενα τοὺς 1 [ὅμως Pacius: ὁμοίως codd. The necessary sense can be restored by reading οὐχ ὁμοίως (i.e. ‘in a more special sense’), as suggested in the Oxf. Trans. note, or by inserting μᾶλλον, of. Philop. 825. 21 and 27 (paraphr.) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν κινήσει τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα θεωρεῖται, 883. 24 πλὴν ἐπειδὴ μᾶλλον ἔργον φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως ἡ κίνησις. Simplic. 1195. 35 ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἡ κίνησις οἰκειοτέρα τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον THs ἠρεμίας is compatible with either reading or with ὅμως δὲ φυσικζώτερον ἡ κίνησις.---Ο.} δ (Cf. the definition of ‘ nature ’ in Book II. chap. i., 7 * Rest’ being only the negation of movement in things capable of moving. ¢ [Simplicius 1196. 8 mentions the Heracleiteans (cf.
ARISTOTLE 258b λίθους διαιρεῖν" οὐ yap εἰ τοσόνδε ἐξέωσεν ἢ ἀφεῖλεν 6 σταλαγμός, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ἐν ἡμίσει χρόνῳ πρό- τερον" ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἡ vewAkia, καὶ οἱ σταλαγμοὶ οὗ τοσοιδὲ τοσονδὲ κινοῦσι, τὸ δὲ μέρος αὐτῶν 20 ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ τοσοῦτον. διαιρεῖται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν εἰς πλείω, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐκινήθη χωρίς, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα. φανερὸν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀεί τι ἀπιέναι, ὅτι διαιρεῖται ἡ φθίσις εἰς ἄπειρα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλον ποτὲ ἀπιέναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλ- λοιώσεως ὁποιασοῦν: οὐ γὰρ εἰ μεριστὸν εἰς 25 ἄπειρον TO ἀλλοιούμενον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀθρόα γίγνεται πολλάκις, ὥσπερ ἡ πῆξις. , ὡς ἔτι ὅταν τις νοσήσῃ, ἀνάγκη χρόνον γενέσθαι ἐν ᾧ ὑγιασθήσεται, καὶ μὴ ἐν πέρατι χρόνου μετα- βάλλειν: ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς ὑγίειαν μεταβάλλειν Kat εἰς ἄλλο μηδέν. ὥστε τὸ φάναι συνεχῶς ἀλλοιοῦσθαι 80 λίαν ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν" εἰς τοὐναντίον α (The reference is to Book VII., 250 a 9 ff.: if force A can move B a distance C in time D, it does not follow that half A can move B over half C in any time whatsoever, any more than one of (say) 100 ship-haulers can by himself drag the ship one hundredth part of the distance. The grow- ing root must accumulate just enough pressure to overpower the resisting forces and then it will suddenly ‘dislodge a certain amount’ of rock. So it may take nothing less than a dropping that lasts a certain time to produce the minimum erosion. And if a certain number of drops (like the certain number of ship-haulers) is required to produce a certain amount of erosion, a fraction (μέρος) of that num- ber may not produce a corresponding fraction (τοσοῦτον, cf. Simplic. 1197. 17 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον σταλαγμὸν τὸ τοσοῦτον μέρος ἀφελεῖν ὅσον αὐτός ἐστι τῶν πάντων) of the effect ‘in any period of time’ (i.e. in the corresponding fraction, however PHYSICS, VIII. τι.
by roots in its crevices; for if in so much time the ~.
root has made a certain split or the dripping removed a certain portion it does not follow that they had already produced half the effect when half the time had elapsed; rather it is like the case of hauling the ship: it may be that a certain number of drops can produce a definite movement, whereas half of them could not produce it in any length of time.® Thus it is true that the amount removed is capable of multiplex division, but no part of it has been moved separately, but only in conjunction with the rest.? It is clear then that even though a given amount of shrinkage be capable of indefinite subdivision, it does not follow that the actual subtraction has been continuous, for it may all have taken place at once. The case of any kind of modification is similar. For though the entity modified be divisible without limit, it does not follow that the modification itself is so; for it may take place all at once, as in the case of freezing. Again, when a man is sick he must have time in which to recover and he cannot make the change at the limit of some period; and also recovery is a change from sickness to health, and not to something else.* So to suppose modifications to be continuous and unceasing is a too violent departure from the manifest phenomena, since all change must be a receding from one opposite and large that may be, of the time required by dripping at the same rate to cause the erosion),—C. ] ὃ [Compare the argument about the grains of millet, Book VII. chap. v., 250 a 19.—C.]
5 [And, health being a terminus (an ‘ opposite,’ as it is called in the next sentence), when it is reached, the process of becoming healthy—an example of ‘ modification ’—cannot go further.—C.]
ARISTOTLE 2530 yap ἡ ἀλλοίωσις. 6 δὲ λίθος οὔτε σκληρότερος γίγνεται οὔτε μαλακώτερος. κατά τε TO φέρεσθαι θαυμαστὸν εἰ λέληθεν 6 λίθος κάτω φερόμενος ἢ μένων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ γῆ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένουσι μὲν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις 85 τόποις, κινοῦνται δὲ βιαίως ἐκ τούτων" εἴπερ οὖν 2δάε ἔνι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις, ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κατὰ τόπον πάντα κινεῖσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἀεὶ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν, ἐκ τούτων Kal ἄλλων τοιούτων πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις. Ada μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἐνδέχεται ἠρεμεῖν 5 τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δ᾽ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ποτὲ κινεῖ- σθαι μηδέν. λεκτέον δ᾽ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ TOV εἰρημένων πρότερον, Kal ἐπὶ τούτων: ὁρῶμεν yap ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένας τὰς εἰρημένας μεταβολάς: καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅτι μάχεται Tots φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ αὔξησις οὔθ 10 ἡ βίαιος ἔσται κίνησις, εἰ μὴ κινήσεται Tapa φύσιν ἠρεμοῦν πρότερον. γένεσιν οὖν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ φθορὰν οὗτος 6 λόγος. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι yiy- veobat τι καὶ φθείρεσθαι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν" εἰς ὃ μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει, γίγνεται τοῦτο ἢ ἐν τούτῳ, ἐξ * [A change in the specific hardness or softness of (say) a diamond, if it were constantly occurring, ought to be perceptible in a sufficient length of time. The last sentence may mean: it would be strange if we could not perceive whether a stone on the ground were really at rest or moving downwards (with its natural motion) with infinitesimal slow- ness, as the theory asserts.—C. ] PHYSICS, VIII. 11.
an approach to the other. Besides, stones do not grow either harder or softer; nor is it easy to believe we are deceived in thinking that a stone is moving when it is falling but is at rest when it lies upon the earth.* Besides, it is a natural necessity that earth or anything else should rest in the place proper to it and only move out of it under force; so that if some things actually are in the places proper to them, it follows that all things cannot always be in motion. So from these and other considerations one might well be confident that neither are all things always in motion nor are they all always at rest.
(3) But neither is it possible (a) that some things are always in motion and other things always at rest, but nothing in motion at one time and at rest at another. We may affirm this on the same grounds on which we have rested in the other cases, for we actually observe certain things passing to and fro between the states of rest and motion. Moreover, to deny that things can pass from motion to rest and from rest to motion is to deny the manifest fact of growth ὃ; and also that of forcible movement, if what was at rest in the place proper to it cannot be set in the motion not proper to it by force. The contention is further incompatible with the genesis and evanishment of things, and it comes near to denying motion®’ altogether, for all motion is universally regarded as, in a sort, a coming-to-be and evanishment, since the goal of movement is a coming to ‘this’ or ‘here,’ and it starts by passing > [Because it is an essential feature of the growth of living things that it stops when full development is reached.—C.] ° (Or * movement’ (change of quality, quantity, or place) as distinct from genesis proper.—C. ]} ARISTOTLE 254200 δὲ μεταβάλλει, φθείρεται, τοῦτο ἢ ἐντεῦθεν. 15 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν κινεῖται, τὰ δ᾽ ἠρεμεῖ ἐνίοτε.
Τὸ δὲ πάντα ἀξιοῦν ὁτὲ μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη συναπτέον πρὸς τοὺς πάλαι λόγους. ἀρχὴν δὲ πάλιν ποιητέον ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν διορισθέντων, τὴν αὐτὴν ἥ ἦνπερ ἠρξάμεθα πρότερον. ἢ “γάρ τοι πάντα ἠρεμεῖ, ἢ πάντα κιψεῖται, ἣ τὰ 20 μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὰ δὲ κινεῖται τῶν ὄντων. καὶ εἰ τὰ 2 σι μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὰ δὲ κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι πάντα ὁτὲ 3 μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι, (ἣ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖν" τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι)" αὐτῶν τὰ δ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντ᾽ ἠρεμεῖν, > εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, εἴπωμεν δὲ καὶ νῦν. εἰ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ φασί τινες εἶναι τὸ ὃν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτι φαίνεταί γε κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ κινεῖσθαι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι δόξα ψευδὴς ἢ ὅλως δόξα, καὶ κίνησις ἔστι, κἀν εἰ φαντασία, κἂν εἰ ὁτὲ μὲν 1 [<j τὰ μὲν,., κινεῖσθαι inserted by Prantl after αὐτῶν, here by te. Oxf. Trans. An alternative would be to insert ἢ τὰ μὲν ἠρεμοῦντα ΠΕ ἀεὶ τὰ δὲ κινούμενα κινεῖσθαι after ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι in 1.21: cf. the statement of this possibility α [Literally, ‘for a thing comes to be that to which it changes (6.9. it becomes a white thing in quality or a large thing in quantity) or (in the case of locomotion) it comes to be in that (place) to which it shifts; and it ceases to be that (quality or quantity) from which 1t changes or (in locomotion) ceases to be in the place it leaves.’ What really comes to Ue or ceases to be is this-thing-with-this-quality (or quantity) * this-thing-in-this-place.’ The phrase φθείρεται τοῦτο Ὅν to mean ‘it ceases to be (of) this (quality etc.).’ Cf. 263 Ὁ 22 ἐφθείρετο λευκόν ‘it ceased to be white,’ as PHYSICS, VIII. m1.
away out of ‘that’ and ‘there.’* Evidently then there are certain things that move after being at rest, and certain things that rest after being in motion.
It is now time to take (b) the assertion that there is nothing that is not sometimes at rest, sometimes in motion, in connexion with the arguments we used a short while ago.2 We must take our start once more from the alternatives set out at the open- ing of the discussion. Either (1) everything is motionless, or (2) everything is in motion, or (3) some things are at rest and some in motion. And if the third alternative is to be accepted, then either (6) everything is sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion, or (a) those at rest are always at rest, those in motion always in motion, or (c) some things are always motionless and some always in motion and some now motionless and now in motion. Now (1) it has already been said that all things cannot be motionless. But let us repeat it here; for even though it be true, as some ¢ say, that the existent is unlimited and motionless, yet our senses at any rate contradict it and assert that many things are in motion; so if false opinion exists (as Melissus and the other Eleatics must admit) or indeed any opinion, then motion also exists; and so it does if imagination the opposite of ἐγίγνετο λευκόν * it began to be white.’ γίγνεται λευκόν has two meanings: (1) * (a) white (thing) comes into existence,’ (2) ‘a thing (already existing) comes to have the quality white.’ Aristotle, straining ordinary usage, Ααν le alte λευκόν Serve as the opposite of (2) as well as 0 “τὶς δ (For πάλαι referring to what has been said only a page or two before cf. 267 Ὁ 13, Pol. 1262 Ὁ 29, 1282 a 15, Aesch.
ARISTOTLE 254a οὕτως δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἑτέρως" ἡ γὰρ φαντασία 80 καὶ ἡ δόξα κινήσεις τινὲς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν περὶ τούτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ ζητεῖν λόγον ὧν βέλτιον ἔχομεν ἢ λόγου δεῖσθαι, κακῶς κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ TO χεῖρον καὶ TO πιστὸν Kal TO μὴ πιστὸν Kal ἀρχὴν Kal μὴ ἀρχήν. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ τὸ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ 86 κινεῖσθαι τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖν. πρὸς ἅπαντα yap 254b ταῦτα ἱκανὴ μία πίστις" ὁρῶμεν yap ἔνια ὁτὲ μὲν κινούμενα ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἠρεμοῦντα. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁμοίως τὸ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν καὶ τὸ πάντα κι- νεῖσθαι συνεχῶς TH τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ ἠρεμεῖν ἀεί. λοιπὸν οὖν θεωρῆσαι πότερον πάντα ὃ τοιαῦτα οἷα κινεῖσθαι Kal ἠρεμεῖν, ἢ ἔνια μὲν οὕτως, ἔνια δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖ, ἔνια δ᾽ ἀεὶ κινεῖται' τοῦτο yap ce A δεικτέον ἡμῖν.
«2.6. changes or geneses in the mind.
CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT [The first step in the demonstration promised at the end of the last chapter ἐδ now taken by establishing that all motion or change is due to the action of some agent distinguishable from the thing moved or changed. (This point was obscurely demonstrated in Book VII. Chapter i., 241 b 24-242 a 16).
PHYSICS, VIII. 1-1.
PHYSICS, VIII. 1-1.
exists or if opinions change from time to time; for imagination and opinion are held to be move- ments of a kind. But in truth to examine such speculations and to seek proofs of that of which we have too direct assurance to need any proof, is to confound the better and the worse, the credible and the incredible, that which is axiomatic and that which is not. Again it is equally impossible (2) that everything is always in motion, or (3 a) that all things are divided into such as are always in motion and such as are always at rest. For to all these contentions there is the one convincing reply that we can see some things now in motion and now at rest. Thus that all things should be in unbroken motion, or all things in unbroken rest, is just as impossible as that all things should be exhaustively divided between such as are eternally in motion and such as are eternally at rest. It remains then to consider whether (3 6) all things are of a nature to move now and now to be motion- less, or (3 c) whether some things be of this nature, whereas others are eternally motionless and yet others eternally in motion. And it is this last alternative that we are now to demonstrate as the truth.
CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT (continued) We are not concerned with “ accidental’ motion, but only with what moves or is moved per se (254 Ὁ 7-12). Things moved per se can be classified by a cross division ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) as follows: (a) self~moved (i.e. animate beings), (Ὁ) moved by something external (i.e. inanimate things): either of these can be moved (1) naturally or (2) unnaturally. Thus (a) the self-moved animal is moved (1) naturally by a source of motion within itself, but its body can also be moved (2) unnaturally. Also (b) things moved from without can have (2) an unnatural motion, as when earthy things are forced upward. Here it is obvious that motion is caused by something other than the thing moved, and the same truth could be made plain in the case of (a 1) the natural move- ments of self-moving animals (Ὁ 12~88).
This truth is most difficult to see in the remaining case, (b 1) the natural movements of things moved from without, e.g. the movements of the elements to their proper places Such movement is not ἡ self-motion’; for this is proper to animals and could not occur in substances whose nature is continuous and without internal distinctions. Such things must be moved by something other than themselves, which analysis will reveal (a 5-20).
254b7 [Τῶν δὴ κινούντων Kal κινουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτά--- κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν οἷον ὅσα τε τῷ ὑπάρχειν 1ὸ τοῖς κινοῦσιν ἢ κινουμένοις καὶ τὰ KATA μόριον,