ARISTOTLE 251 ἃ σθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ἐστι κἂν εἰ εὐθὺς ἔφη τὸ φέρον 10 φέρεσθαι καὶ διδάσκεσθαι τὸ διδάσκον. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κινεῖται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνωτέρω κινοῦντος τὸ κινούμενον πᾶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ προτέρου τῶν κινοῦντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό ye ἀδύνατον τὸ διδάσκον yap ovpBaives μανθάνειν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ ἔχειν TO δ᾽ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον. ι "Ere δὲ μᾶλλον τούτων ἄλογον, ὅτι συμβαΐνει πᾶν τὸ κινητικὸν κινητόν, εἴπερ ἅπαν ὑπὸ κινου- μένου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον: ἔσται yap κινητὸν ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι πᾶν τὸ ὑγιαστικὸν Kal ὑγιάζον ὑγιαστὸν εἶναι, Kal TO οἰκοδομητικὸν οἰκοδομητόν, 207 εὐθὺς ἢ διὰ πλειόνων (λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ κινητὸν μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου πᾶν τὸ κινητικόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν κινητὸν ἣν κινεῖ τὸ πλησίον ἀλλ ἑτέραν---οἷον τὸ ὑγιαστικὸν μαθητὸν---ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐπαναβαῖνον ἥξει ποτὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον). τὸ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀδύνατον, τὸ δὲ πλασματῶδες: ἄτοπον yap τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ 25 ἀλλοιωτικὸν αὐξητὸν εἶναι.
Οὐκ Apa AVAYKY AEL κινεῖσθαι TO Κινούυμενον [The supposition fates at 256 Ὁ 4 and disproved by the eae dilemma.— PHYSICS, VIII. v.
be to make the series re-entrant into itself, so that we might as well have said at first that what causes local transference must itself be in local transit, and the teacher must himself be in process of being taught what he is teaching. Nay, better say so, for as you go back through the series of antecedent movers you find them all causes of the movement you started from, and the further you go back the more truly causal the cause you have reached. But this co- incidence of teacher and taught, for example, is self-contradictory, for by hypothesis the one has the knowledge and the other has it not.
Further, if everything that is in motion is moved by an agent that is itself in motion,® a conse- quence still more unreasonable will follow, namely that anything capable of causing a change must be capable of suffering change. This is as much as to say that whatever can heal, or is healing, must itself be capable of being healed, and the builder capable of being built. It will be capable of suffering the change either directly or through a chain of inter- mediate links. (By this latter alternative J mean the supposition that whatever can cause change is capable of suffering change, but not the same change as it conveys to its neighbour but a different one—what can heal, let us say, can be taught: but even so the circle of varied kinds of movement must at some point be re-entrant, as already said, and lead back to the same kind of change.) Now the direct connexion is impossible, and the indirect, as well as involving the direct, rests on a purely fantastic con- ception; for how could there be any necessity in an agent that modifies being itself capable of growth?
In conclusion, then, it is false to say that every- ARISTOTLE 251 ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου, Kal τούτου κινουμένου: στήσεται ἄρα. ὥστε HTOL ὑπὸ ἠρεμοῦντος κινήσεται TO κινούμενον πρῶτον, ἢ αὐτὸ éavTo κινήσει. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ ye δέοι σκοπεῖν πότερον αἴτιον κινήσεως καὶ ἀρχὴ TO αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ἢ TO ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινούμενον, 80 ἐκεῖνο πᾶς av θείη: τὸ yap αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὃν αὕτιον ἀεὶ πρότερον τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕτερον καὶ αὐτοῦ 4 ὄντος. “Ὥστε τοῦτο σκεπτέον λαβοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀρχήν, εἴ TL κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὑτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ TO κινούμενον ἅπαν εἶναι διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά: τοῦτο γὰρ δέδεικται πρότερον 257b ev τοῖς καθόλου περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινούμενον συνεχές. ἀδύνατον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν πάντῃ κινεῖν αὐτὸ αὑτό" φέροιτο γὰρ av ὅλον Kat φέροι τὴν αὐτὴν φοράν, ἕν ὃν καὶ ἄτομον τῷ εἴδει, ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ, ὥστε f bd \, Ψ \ oe f Ἁ 5 διδάσκοι ἂν καὶ διδάσκοιτο ἅμα, καὶ ὑγιάζοι καὶ ὑγιάζοιτο τὴν αὐτὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι διώρισται ὅτι κινεῖται TO κινητόν" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ δυνάμει κινούα {Simplicius says this was shown in Book V. (referring perhaps to 228 a 20 ff.), but the proof he quotes is given in Book VI. chap. iv.—C.]
PHYSICS, VIII. v.
thing in motion is moved by something else that is itself moved by something else; and it is true to say that such a series must terminate. Conse- quently its first member must be moved either by an agent which is not in motion at all, or by itself. Now (reserving the alternative of the first mover being itself not in motion) it is obvious enough in itself (though we have carefully established it if it were not) that if anyone had to determine whether the cause and principle of movement is to be found in that which moves itself or in that which is moved by something else, he would declare for the former, on the general principle that a cause which is causative in itself must be prior to that which derivesits causative power from some other cause which is itself also derivatively causative only.
We must, then, start afresh and examine the question: If there is any self-moving agent of motion, how does it move itself and with what kind of motion? Well then, all divisions of a mobile must themselves be divisible without limit; for it has been shown already, in our general treatment of the principles of Physics,* that whatever can, primarily and on its own account, be in motion, must be con- tinuous. Hence it follows (1) that if a thing moves itself it cannot do so integrally in both capacities; for that would amount to saying that, being one and indivisible specifically, it was, in its integrity, both agent and patient of the same identical transference, or both the modifier and the modified in respect of the same modification, so that it might be teacher and taught simultaneously, or agent and patient of the same healing. Moreover, it must by definition be some mobile that is set in motion, and the mobile, ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE 27b μενον, οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ: τὸ δὲ δυνάμει εἰς ἐν- τελέχειαν βαδίζει, ἔστι δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής. τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν, τὸ οἷον θερμαίνει τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ὅλως γεννᾷ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. ὥσθ᾽ dua τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ TO αὐτὸ θερμὸν ἔσται καὶ οὐ θερμόν. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσων τὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸ συνώνυμον. TO μὲν ἄρα κινεῖ TO δὲ κινεῦται τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦντος. Ore δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν᾽ οὕτως ὥσθ᾽ ἑκάτερον ὑφ᾽ ἑκατέρου κινεῖσθαι, ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν. οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐδέν, εἴ ye ἑκάτερον κινήσει ἑκάτερον" TO yap πρότερον αἰτιώτερον τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐχομένου καὶ κινήσει μᾶλλον: διχῶς γὰρ κινεῖν ἦν, τὸ μὲν τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινούμενον αὐτό, TO δ᾽ αὑτῷ: ἐγγύτερον δὲ τὸ 20 πορρώτερον τοῦ κινουμένου τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ τὸ μεταξύ. “ al A ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι εἰ μὴ ὑφ᾽ fe) A / αὑτοῦ: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς dpa ἀντικινεῖ θάτερον. ἔλαβον τοίνυν ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ κινεῖν: ἔσται ἄρα τὸ 1 an 1 [τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν Simplic. 1237. 3 (lemma): αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν EK: αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινεῖν al.—C.]
¢ Cf. Book III. chapters i. and ii. The modéle is capable (i.) of being set in motion (transitional or first actualizing), and (ii.) of completing the movement in question and reaching the goal (complete or final actualizing).
¢ The reservation apparently is to meet such cases as the ‘favourite ‘ man is generated by man and the sun,’ in which a general cause of the conditions under which a specific cause can produce a specific effect 1s sometimes spoken of as pro- ducing that specific effect itself.
@ Which exclusion cannot falsify my conclusion. ΟἿ, PHYSICS, VIII. v.
as such, is potentially, not actually, in motion; and the potential is still only on its way to actuality (movement being an actualizing, though not a com- plete one %), whereas the mover must already be actualized; that which heats, for instance, must already be hot, and, universally, the generator must already be in possession of the characteristics.to be conferred upon the generated.? Thus the ‘ self- heating ᾿ would have to be both hot and not hot at the same time and in the same respect. And so in all other cases in which producer and produced bear the same denomination.* It follows, then, that if anything moves itself, the factor that causes the movement is distinguishable from the factor that is moved.
But (2) that such a case cannot be regarded as one of reciprocal action and passion between the factors concerned may be shown as follows. There would not really be any primary motor at all if each moved the other, for the primacy of causation falls to the agent that is prior to the next most primary and is therefore entitled better than it to be called the source of motion; for we have seen that ‘ causing motion’ may be assigned to an agent in two senses, to wit to the agent that is set in motion by something else or to the one set in motion by itself, and that one further back from the object ultimately moved is nearer to the principle of movement than is an intermedi- ate between it and that object. Moreover, there is no necessity for either moving factor to be put in motion by anything but itself; so it would only be by incidental concomitance that the other moves it in return. I choose then hypothetically to exclude this contingency, and we are left with one element ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE 8561" μὲν κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν ἀντικινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀκίνητόν Bye τι κινεῖν ἀνάγκη ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ κινούμενον, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι. ἔτι ἣν κινεῖ κίνησιν καὶ κινοῦτ᾽ ἄν, ὥστε τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαίνεται. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ πρώτως αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦντος οὔτε ἕν μόριον οὔτε πλείω κινήσει αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον εἰ κινεῦται αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ, ἴω ~ δὶ ᾽ 80 ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινος κινήσεται ἢ ὅλον ὑφ᾽ ὅλου. εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τι μόριον αὐτὸ ὑῴ αὑτοῦ, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρῶτον αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν" χωρισθὲν γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν κινήσει αὐτὸ αὑτό, τὸ δὲ ὅλον οὐκέτι. εἰ δὲ ὅλον ὑφ᾽ ὅλου κινεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς av ταῦτα Kwot αὐτὰ ἕαυτά. ὥστ᾽ εἰ 2588 μὴ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰλήφθω μὴ κινούμενα ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν. Τῆς ὅλης dpa τὸ μὲν κινήσει ἀκίνητον ὄν, TO δὲ κινηθήσεται: μόνως yap οὕτως οἷόν τέ τι avro- 7 κίνητον εἶναι. Eire εἴπερ ἡ ὅλη αὐτὴ αὑτὴν κινεῖ, TO μὲν κινήσει αὐτῆς, TO δὲ κινήσεται. ἡ ἄρα AB ὑφ᾽ ὃ αὑτῆς τε κινήσεται καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς A. ἐπεὶ δὲ κινεῖ TO μὲν κινούμενον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου τὸ δ᾽ ἀκίνητον ὄν, Kal α Cf. Chapter i. > Not receiving heat from the source and passing it on instrumentally or as a mediator to a recipient, but being itself both actually hot so as to heat its neighbour and under * shortage ’ of heat so as to be heated by it. ¢ This paragraph is a supplementary afterthought, the roof being complete and the discussion closed without it. t is an alternative form of (2) just above.
ARISTOTLE ARISTOTLE 258 a κινεῖται TO μὲν κινοῦν TO δὲ οὐθὲν κινοῦν, τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἀκινήτου εἶναι κινοῦντος δέ, καὶ ETL EK κινουμένου μὴ κινοῦντος δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν. ἔστω yap τὸ A κινοῦν μὲν 10 ἀκίνητον δέ, τὸ δὲ Β κινούμενόν te ὑπὸ τοῦ A καὶ κινοῦν τὸ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ I, τοῦτο δὲ κινούμενον μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ B, μὴ κινοῦν δὲ μηδέν (εἶπερ yap Kal διὰ πλειόνων ἥξει ποτὲ εἰς τὸ Τ', ἔστω δι᾽ ἑνὸς μόνου). τὸ δὴ ἅπαν ABI’ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἀφέλω τὸ TV, τὸ μὲν AB κινήσει αὐτὸ ἑαυτό---τὸ μὲν A κινοῦν, τὸ δὲ Β κινούμενον---τὸ δὲ Τ' οὐ ιὸ Κινήσει αὐτὸ ἕαυτό, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως κινήσεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ τὸ yap Β κινεῖ τῷ κινεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου, οὐ τῷ ὑφ αὑτοῦ τινος μέρους. τὸ apa AB μόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ Kiel. ἀνάγκη apa τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἔχειν 20 τὸ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον δὲ Kal TO κινούμενον μηδὲν δὲ κινοῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἁπτόμενα ἤτοι dudw ἀλλήλων ἢ θατέρου θάτερον. εἰ μὲν οὖν συνεχές ἐστι TO ἴων “ / κινοῦν---τὸ yap κινούμενον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συνεχές --δῆλον ὅτι τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ οὐ τῷ αὐτοῦ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλον a κινεῖ αὐτὸ ἕαυτό, κινούμενόν τε καὶ κινοῦν τῷ αὐτοῦ τι εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. οὐ b} “λ -“-Ρ δ᾽ 5A A Ἰλλὰ “ A yap ὅλον κινεῖ οὐδ᾽ ὅλον κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ μὲν α [The argument is more easily followed in a concrete illustration: let A be a man’s soul, B his body, C his clothes.
4 * The reservation is because if the agent is immaterial it is said to touch the patient but the patient is not said to touch it. Cf. De gen. θὲ corr. 323 a 25 ff.
PHYSICS, VIII. v.
(under the action of another motor) or may not be in motion at all, and since the thing moved may in its turn either be moving something else or moving nothing, the self-mover must embrace a factor that causes motion but is itself unmoved and also a factor that is in motion and that may or may not, as the case may be, convey motion to something else. Let A then be the unmoved mover, B what is moved by A and in its turn moves C, which is moved by B but itself moves nothing. (There may of course be any number of links between B and C, but, as it makes no difference, we suppose one only.) Then ABC taken as a whole group moves itself. But if I take away C out of the group, AB will still move itself, A being the mover and B the moved; but C will neither move itself nor be moved at all. And neither will BC move itself without A, for B can only move anything at all in virtue of being moved by something else, not by any factor it contains in itself. It is then only AB that really moves itself. The self-mover, then, must embrace a motor that cannot itself be a motum, and a motum that need not itself be a motor; and motor and motum must be in contact, either reciprocal or at least in the direction from motor to motum.® If then the motor is con-’ tinuous ὁ (as the motum must necessarily be), obvi- ously the whole self-mover does not move itself in virtue of some self-moving principle that pervades it continuously, but moves itself as a whole that is both suffering and causing motion in virtue of embracing as factors of itself that which causes motion and that which suffers it; for not all of it is motor, nor all of it motum, but A is the motor and ¢ i.e. dimensional, and therefore material.
ARISTOTLE 2584 τὸ A, κινεῖται δὲ τὸ B μόνον: τὸ δὲ Γ΄ ὑπὸ τοῦ A οὐκέτι: ἀδύνατον yap. ᾿Απορίαν δὲ ἔχει, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις ἢ τῆς A (εἰ συνεχὲς τὸ κινοῦν μὲν ἀκίνητον δέ) 7 τῆς Β τῆς κινουμένης" 80 7) λοιπὴ ἄ ἄρα κινήσει τῆς Ay ἢ τῆς Β κινηθήσεται; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρώτως κινουμένη. ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ AB- ἀφαιρεθείσης γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΒ, ἔτι κινήσει ἑαυτὴν ἡ λοιπὴ ΑΒ. ἢ δυνάμει μὲν ἑκάτερον 2580 οὐδὲν κωλύει ἢ θάτερον τὸ κινούμενον διαιρετὸν εἶναι, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον" ἐὰν δὲ διαιρεθῇ, μηκέτι εἶναι ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν διαιρετοῖς δυνάμει πρώτως ἐνεῖναι. Φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ πρώτως 5 κινοῦν ἀκίνητον" εἴτε γὰρ εὐθὺς ἱ ἵσταται τὸ κινού- μενον ὑπό τινος δὲ κινούμενον εἰς ἀκίνητον 70 πρῶτον, εἴτε εἰς κινούμενον μὲν αὐτὸ δ᾽ αὑτὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἷστάν, ἀμφοτέρως συμβαίνει τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν ἐν ἅπασιν εἶναι τοῖς κινουμένοις ἀκίνητον. 256 b 18 * (Kat εὐλόγως δὲ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. τρία 15 yap ἀνάγκη εἶναι,, τό τε κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ. τὸ μὲν οὖμ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη [ 1 [τὸ dé...ἀδύνατον γάρ is omitted ἴῃ ἘΣ. It was un- known to Alexander and absent in most copies known to Simplicius (1245. 2).—C.]
2 {I have followed Themistius (222. 23) in placing this peas here. No further rearrangement of the text, such as Alexander Sea 1224. 26) said some critics desired, is necessary. The conclusion (τοῦτο) which this paragraph describes as having been reached and commends as reason- able—that the first mover must be wemoved—has not even been mentioned at the earlier place, and there is nothing in the preceding context there for τοῦτο to refer to. The paragraph is an afterthought which was somehow inserted in the wrong place, where it interrupts the course of the argument.—C. | PHYSICS, VIII. v.
only B is the motum; for there will be no C in the whole (if it be rightly ‘self-moving’) of which A is the motor: there cannot be.
But supposing A, the unmoved motor, to be con- tinuous, it may be asked: “If we subtract some- thing from A or from the motum B, will the remainder of A continue to act as motor or the remainder of B tobe moved? For if so, AB will not be the primary self-mover, since if you subtract something from it the remainder will still move itself.’’ The answer is that either motor and motum alike or motum only may well be divisible potentially (qua dimensional) so long as they are indivisible in their actuality (qua entities); for it may be that if divided they would lose the capacities on which the self-moving relation is based. So there is no reason why the primary self-moving characteristic should not inhere in potentially divisible entities.
It is evident, then, from all that we have said that the primary motor is not itself a movable; for the thing in motion under some agent other than itself can always trace back its motion either to a primary unmoved mover or to an agent that is indeed moving but can itself initiate its movement or arrest it,? and either way alike the primary motor of anything that is in motion is found to be unmoved.
Now this conclusion is only what we should have expected; for in the three links of mover, instrument of motion, object moved, the last must experience @ [Simplicius (1245. 5) thinks that, if this last remark is genuine, it means that AB constitutes a complete self-moving system. The addition of a C would be superfluous, for B may or may not have a C to move (238 a 8).—C.]
VOL. II Z 337 20 25 ARISTOTLE μὲν κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἀνάγκη" TO δ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι (συμμεταβάλλει γὰρ τοῦτο ~,ἷ Ca ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ TH κινουμένῳ ὄν" δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπον κινούντων, ἅπτεσθαι “γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη μέχρι τινός), τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οὕτως ὥστ᾽ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκίνητον. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἔσχατον, ὃ κινεῖσθαι μὲν δύναται, κινήσεως δὲ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὃ κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπ ἄλλου δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ, εὔλογον---ἶνα μὴ avay- Kalov εἴπωμεν---καὶ TO τρίτον εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ov. διὸ καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν Νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων Kat ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν ποιεῖ εἶναι: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὧν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγὴς wv.)
α 'This ἔσχατον is to be taken simply as ‘ the last of a connected series "in this case the series of divine and immaterial motors, animate self-moving organisms, inanimate mobilia.
» [Anaxagoras, frag. 12, so describes Nous, except that he does‘not say that it is incapable of motion.—C. ] CHAPTER VI INTRODUCTORY NOTE The primal cause of all motion is itself motionless. The primal motion (directly caused by it) is rotation; all other motions are derivative and vary in complexity according to their mode of derivation. Thus there is: 1. Uniform motion caused by an agent (A) which is itself motionless.
2. Regular, but not uniform, motion caused by an agent (B) which is itself moving with a uniform motion.
3. More complex motion caused by an agent (C) which is itself moving with a regular, but not uniform, motion.
PHYSICS, VIII. v.—vz.
motion but need not cause it; the middle term must be in motion itself as well as causing motion in some- thing else (for it accompanies the changes of the thing it moves and keeps pace with it—patently so in the case of local movement where the instrument and the load must remain in (partial) contact somewhere); and so if the first term (which by hypothesis causes motion) is to be distinguished from an instrument, it cannot also be itself in motion. And since we find as the last term of the series? entities (in- animate objects, to wit) capable of being moved but not of initiating motion, and other entities (lhving organisms, to wit) including in themselves a factor capable of initiating motion and also one capable of being moved, does not analogy suggest—not to say insist—that there is a third order of entities capable of initiating motion but incapable of being moved? So Anaxagoras® did well to say that ‘Intelligence’ was unaffected (by the material universe) and free from admixture, since he regarded it as the principle of movement, and it could only be so if itself motionless, and could only control it if itself unmingled with it.
CHAPTER VI INTRODUCTORY NOTE (continued) 4, Still more complex motion caused by various com- binations of the above (for the same subject can move with more than one motion. See 259 b 80).
The heavens consist of a nest of concentric spheres whose several axes are inclined at various angles to the Prime axis (that of the outermost); they and their motions are all eternal. The proper motion of each, viz. uniform ARISTOTLE INTRODUCTORY NOTE (continued) rotation about its own axis, belongs to class 1, and this is the only motion of the outermost sphere; that of each of the others is compounded of motions belonging to 1, and 2 or 3: the two latter being derived from one (or more) of the spheres above it. The sun, moon, and the various planets (each of which is fixed on the equator of its proper sphere) move therefore with various degrees of ARGUMENT [We have seen that the primary agent of motion must be unmoved. The next point ἐδ that, if there is to be eternal and constant motion, there must be at least one eternal primary unmoved mover. That is all we need to establish, whether or not there is a plurality of such agents (258 b10-16).
It might be alleged that the souls of animals are unmoved sources of motion and that they exist at one time and not at another and so are not eternal. But even so there must be some eternal agent to account for the perpetual process of coming into being and perishing and for the fact that souls exist at some times and not at others (b 16-259 a 6).
Is there only one such eternal agent, or more than one? The view that there is only one is to be preferred on grounds of the economy of nature, and because a single constant motion requires a single agent (a 6-20).
This conclusion can be supported by a review of the results already reached with regard to the principles of motion and 258b10 ᾿Επεὶ δὲ δεῖ κίνησιν ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, ἀνάγκη elvai τι ἀίδιον ὃ πρῶτον κινεῖ, εἴτε ἕν εἴτε πλείω, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀΐδιον εἶναι τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινούντων δέ, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν νῦν λόγον" ὅτι δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί α The allusion is to the belief, attributed to the Platonists, PHYSICS, VIII. vz.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE (continued) complexity. Thus it is easy to see that variable, contrary, and intermittent changes, including genesis and extinc- tion in terrestrial things, may be caused by the influence of the ‘ stars.’
Cf. De caelo ii. 6, 8, 10, and 12, and Sir Th. Heath’s Avistarchus of Samos, pp. 193 sqq.
ARGUMENT (continued) a closer analysis of the self-motion ascribed to the souls of animals. The only kind of ἡ self-motion’ animals can be supposed to have is local movement, and strictly this is originated by external causes and therefore cannot be un- ceasingly maintained. Also the animal’s soul moves itself only in the incidental sense that the body carries it from place to place. To cause continuous motion we need an agent that cannot be moved even incidentally (a 20-b 31).
It follows further that what is primarily and directly moved by such an agent—namely the heaven—must be eternal and possess a constant motion, whereas the heavenly bodies, which impart motion to earthly things, have compound and therefore variable motions (Ὁ 31-260 a 10).
We can now see why there is constant motion of that which is directly moved by the first unmoved agent, and also intermittent motion derived from variable agents We have shown that motion must be eternal and can never cease; so there must be some prime mover, whether singular or plural, that is eternal and not itself movable. The contention that all unmoved movers are eternal? is not to our present purpose, but the following considerations will show that there that every ‘ soul,’ 7.¢. the vital principle of every living thing, is immortal, [Plato, Phaedrus 245 c.—C.]
ARISTOTLE 2580 τί TO ἀκίνητον μὲν αὐτὸ πάσης ἐκτὸς μεταβολῆς Kal ἁπλῶς καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινητικὸν δ᾽ ἑτέρου, δῆλον ὧδε σκοποῦσιν. Ἔστω δ᾽, εἴ τις βούλεται, ἐπί τινων ἐνδεχόμενον wor elval ποτε καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνευ γενέσεως Kal φθορᾶς (τάχα yap ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι ἀμερὲς ὁτὲ μὲν ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν 40 ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ εἶναι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον). καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινητικῶν δ᾽ > ἢ id Ἁ A cy e δὲ \ κυ > ὃ ᾽ὔ 4 ἐνίας ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνδεχέσθω Kal τοῦτο. ἀλλ᾽ ov τι πάσας ye δυνατόν: δῆλον yap ws αἴτιόν TL τοῖς αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσίν ἐστι TOD ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι, ὁτὲ δὲ μή. TO μὲν yap αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ a5 Κινοῦν ἅπαν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη μέγεθος, εἰ μηδὲν κινεῖται ἀμερές" TO δὲ κινοῦν οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τοῦ δὴ τὰ μὲν γίγνεσθαι τὰ δὲ φθείρεσθαι, Kat τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι συνεχῶς, οὐδὲν αἴτιον τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν μὴ ἀεὶ δ᾽ ὄντων, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τῶν ἀεὶ μὲν ταδὶ κινούντων, TOV" δ᾽ ἕτερα. τοῦ yap 80 ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχοῦς οὔτε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον οὔτε ͵7ὔ A πάντα" TO μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἐξ avay- 1 [τῶν Simplic. 1252. 26, Oxf. Trans.: τούτων codd.—C.]
« [Aristotle has in view the objection that the souls of animals are unmoved causes of motion, but exist only for a time (though thev may not undergo any process of coming into being or perishing) and consequently are not eternal. That may beso; but none the less there must be some eternal unmoved mover.—C. } > [Because, as shown in Book VI. chapter iv., anything that undergoes a process of change must be divisible into parts.—C. ] PHYSICS, VIII. vz.
must be something that is not itself susceptible of any movement in the way of external change, either primarily or incidentally, while it is capable of causing movement in something else.
Let us grant (if anyone chooses to urge it) that there may conceivably be things which sometimes are and sometimes are not, without any process of becoming or perishing® (indeed if anything that has no parts exists at one time and not at another, it may be a necessary conclusion that it does so without undergoing any process of change ὃ). Further, let us grant the possibility that some of the principles that cause motion but are not them- selves susceptible of movement belong to this class of things that now are and now are not. But in no case can this be true of all such principles; for it is evident that the coming and going of these inter- mittently present and not present self-movers must have some cause. For anything which moves itself must have magnitude gua mobile (for nothing that cannot be divided can be made to move), but nothing that we have said shows that a cause of motion as such must have magnitude. Accordingly the (prime) cause of the continual genesis and dissolution of the things that come into being and pass out of it cannot be found in any of the unmoved movers whose own existence is not eternal, nor in any group of causes some of which produce motion in certain things and others in certain other things. Neither (as is obvious) can any one of such be the cause of the everlasting and uninterrupted process, nor can the whole sum of them; for that the process should be everlasting and uninterrupted is an eternal necessity, whereas the whole sum runs back without limit (so that we never ARISTOTLE 2598 Κηῆς, τὰ δὲ πάντα ἄπειρα, καὶ οὐχ ἅμα πάντα ὄντα. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἔνιαι ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινουσῶν δέ, Kat πολλὰ τῶν αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινούντων φθείρεται τὰ δ᾽ ἐπι- iverat, Kal τόδε μὲν ἀκίνητον ὃν τόδε κινεῖ, ἕτερον δὲ τοδί, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔστι τι ὃ περιέχει, καὶ τοῦτο παρ᾽ ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ Kal τῆς συνεχοῦς μεταβολῆς" Kat τοῦτο μὲν τούτοις, ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτια κινήσεως. Hizep οὖν ἀΐδιος ἡ κίνησις, ἀΐδιον Kal τὸ κινοῦν ἔσται πρῶτον, εἶ ἕν" εἰ δὲ πλείω, πλείω τὰ ἀΐδια. ἕν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλὰ καὶ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα 10 δεῖ νομίζειν. τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ συμβαινόντων, ἀεὶ 1 on A a a τὰ πεπερασμένα μᾶλλον ληπτέον: ἐν yap τοῖς φύσει δεῖ TO πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ ἕν, ὃ πρῶτον τῶν ἀκινήτων ἀΐδιον ὃν ἔσται ἀρχὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις κινήσεως. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ἕν καὶ ἀΐδιον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν. δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἀεί, ἀνάγκη συνεχῆ εἶναι" Kal yap TO ἀεὶ συνεχές, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφεξῆς οὐ συνεχές. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε συνεχής, * If (were such a thing possible) they were individually eternal, and formed a group without limit in number, it might be another matter. But, on the hypothesis we are examining, they form an unlimited succession, each rising out of its predecessor.
» (That the limited is (objectively) etter than the unlimited was a Pythagorean doctrine, and indeed a characteristically Greek conviction. Simplicius (1254. 20) refers to 188 a 18, where Empedocles’ assumption of a small number of limited elements was praised as ‘ better’ than the Atomists’ and PHYSICS, VIII. νι.
come to a prime cause at all) and is not coexistent but successive.? Itis clear, then, that though certain unmoved principles of motion may come and go any number of times, and many self-moving things may perish to be succeeded by others, one unmoving principle moving this mobile and another that, never- theless there must be something which embraces them all and is distinct from any one of them, and is the cause of the others coming and going and of the continual change. This something, then, is what causes the movement of the first set of moving things, and they pass it on to the others.