(4) Accordingly the mere presence ot the Word in a human body, the mere fact of the Incarnation, is the essential factor in our restoration (simile of the city and the king, wb. 9. 3, &c., cf Orat. ii. 67, 70). But if so, what was the special need of the Cross? Athanasius felt, as we have already mentioned, the supremacy of the Cross as the purpose of the Saviour’s coming, but he does not in fact give to it the central place in his system of thought which it occupies in his instincts. Man had involved himself in the sentence of death; death must therefore take place to satisfy this sentence (Ovaé. ii. 69; de Incar. 20, 2, 5); the Saviour’s death, then, put an end to death regarded as penal and as symptomatic of man’s ¢@épa (cf. 2b, 21. 1, &c.). It must be confessed that Athanasius does not penetrate to the full meaning of S. Paul. The latter also ascribed a central import to the mere fact of the Incarnation (Rom. vili. 3, wéuas), but primarily in relation to sin (yet see Athan. ¢. Apoll, i. 6); and the destruction of the practical power of sin stands indissolubly correlated (Rom. viii. 1) with the removal of guilt and so with the Righteousness of God realising itself in the propitiation of the blood of Christ (2d. ili. 2t—26).
To Athanasius nature is the central, will a secondary or implied factor in the problem. The aspect of the death of Christ most repeatedly dwelt upon is that in it death spent its force (mAnpwOeions THs eSovgias ev T@® Kuptax® oopari, 20, 8) against human nature, that the ‘corruption’ of mankind might run its full course and be spent in the Lord’s body, and so cease-for the ATHANASIAN THEOLOGY AND MODERN KNOWLEDGE.
Ixxi oe - this Victory over death and the demons the Resurrection is the trophy. His ath 1s therefore to us (2d. 10) the dpy1) ¢wms, we are henceforth df@aproi dua ris dvaordcews (27. 2, 32. 6, cf 34. 1, &c.), and have a portion in the divine nature, are in fact deified i pes 54; ~ ee ne This last thought, which became (Harnack, vol. ti. p. 46) ne i. te y astern theology, goes back through Origen and Hippolytus Ee: 2 Jn the whole, its presentation in Athanasius is more akin to the Asiatic an to the Origenist form of the conception. To Origen, man’s highest destiny could only be the return to his original source and condition: to Irenzeus and the Asiatics, man had been created for a destiny which he had never realised; the interruption in the history of our race introduced by sin was repaired by the Incarnation, which carried back the race to a new head, and so carried it forward to a destiny of which under its original head it was incapable. To Origen the Incarnation was a restoration to, to Irenzeus and to Athanasius (Or. ii. 67), an advance upon, the original state of man. (Pell, pp. 167—177, labours to prove the contrary, but he does not convince.)
This leads us to the important observation that momentous as are to Athanasius the con- sequences of the introduction of sin into the world, he yet makes no such vast difference between the condition of fallen and unfallen men as has commonly been assumed to exist. The latter state was inferior to that of the members of Christ (Oraz. ii. 67, 68), while the immense (c. Gent. 8, de Lncar, 5) consequences of its forfeiture came about only by a gradual course of deterioration (de Lncar. 6. 1, npavi¢ero; observe the tense), and in different degrees in different cases. The only difference of kind between the two conditions is in the universal reign of Death since the (partial) forfeiture of the rod kar’ eixdva xdpis: and even this difference isa subtle one; for man’s existence in Paradise was not one of dpOapoia except prospectively (de Lncar. 3. 4). He enjoyed present happiness, dAvmos dvdduvus duépisvos Con, with promise of dpéapoia in heaven. ‘That is, death would have taken place, but not death as unredeemed mankind know it (cf. de Jucar. 21.1). In other words, man was created not so much in a state of perfection (réActos kriOeis, p. 384) as with a capacity for perfection (and for even more than perfection, p. 385 sg.) and with a destiny to correspond with such capacity. This destination remains in force even after man has failed to correspond to it, and is in fact assigned by Athanasius as the reason why the Incarnation was a necessity on God’s part (de Jncar. 6. 4—7, 10. 3, 13. 2—4, Orat. ii. 66, &c., &c.). Accordingly, while man was created (Orat. il. 59) through the Word, the Word became Flesh that man might receive the yet higher dignity of Sonship3; and while even before the Incarnation some men were de facto pure from sin (Orat. lil. 33) by virtue of the yapis rips kAjoews involved in ‘rd kar’ eixdva’ (see 2b. 10, fin.; Orat. 1. 39 is even stronger, cf. iv. 22), they were yet Oynroi and Oaproi; whereas those in Christ die, no longer kara rv rporépay yeveoww ev ro "Addy, but to live again Aoywbeions ris capKds (Orat. ill, 33, fe., Cf. de Lncar. 21. 1).
(@) The above slight sketch of the Athanasian doctrine of man’s need of redemption and of the satisfaction of that need brings to light a system free from much that causes many modern thinkers to stumble at the current doctrine of the original state and the religious history of mankind. That mankind did not start upon their development with a perfect nature, but have fought their way up from an undeveloped stage through many lower phases of development; that this development has been infinitely varied and complex, and that sin and its attendant consequences have a pathological aspect which practically is as important as the forensic aspect, are commonplaces of modern thought, resting upon the wider knowledge of our age, and hard to reconcile with the (to us) traditional theological account of these things. The Athanasian account of them leaves room for the results of modern knowledge, or at least does not rudely clash with the instincts of the modern anthropologist. The recovery of the Athanasian point of view is prima facie a gain. At what cost is it obtained? Does its recognition involve us in mere naturalism veiled under religious forms of speech? ‘That was certainly not the mind o Athanasius, nor does his system really lend itself to such a result. ‘To begin with, the divine destiny of man from the first is an essential principle with our writer. Man was made and is still exclusively destined for knowledge of and fellowship with his Creator. Secondly the means, and the only means, to this end is Christ the Incarnate Son of God. In Him the religious argumient of the cosmological explanation of mpwrdrokos is really therefore due to a subtle change in it, by virtue of which it comes into relation with the Soteriological idea,—which is the pivot of 3 The above is strikingly illustrated by the discussion (pp. 381—383) of mpwrdroKos maans KTigews (Col. i. 15). At first sight Ath. appears to contradict himself, explaining mpwrdroxos as he does first solely of the Saviour as /mcarnate, and then of the cosmic and creative tunction of the Word. But closer examination brings out his view of creation itself (p. 383) as an act of Grace, demanding not (as the current Eastern theology held, in common with Arius) the mediation of a subordinate Creator, but an act of absolutely Divine condescension analogous to, and anticipatory of, the Incarnation. The apparently disturbing persistence in the the entire anti-Arian position of Athanasius on this question, —and with the ultimate scheme in which (cf. Rom. vili.) the effects o7 the Incarnation are to embrace the whole creation. Because creation as such involves the promise of adoption, and tends to deification as its goal, the Son is mpwrd7oxos in the region of Grace and of Creation alike.
xxii PROLEGOMENA, CHAPTER IV., § 3.
history of mankind has its centre, and from Him it proceeds upon its new course, or rather is enabled once more to run the course designed for it from the first. How far Athanasius exhausted the significance of this fact may be a question; that he placed the fact itself in the centre is his lasting service to Christian thought. «he (e) ‘The categories of Athanasius in dealing with the question before us are primarily physical, i.e., on the one hand cosmological, on the other pathological. But it is well before leaving the subject to insist that this was not exclusively the case. The purpose of the Incarnation was at once to renew us, and to make known the Father (de Zncarn. 16); or as he elsewhere puts it (2b. 7 ji.), dvaxtica ra dda, bmep ravrav mabeiv, and mept mavtav mperBedoat mpos tov Uarépa. The idea of dpéapoia which so often stands with him for the sazmmum bonum + imparted to us in Christ, involves a moral and spiritual restoration of our nature, not merely the physical supersession of $@épa by abavacia (de Jncarn. 47,51, 52, &c., &c.).
§ 3. Hundamental ideas of God, the World, and Creation.
The Athanasian idea of God has been singled out for special recognition in recent times; he has been claimed, and on the whole with justice, as a witness for the immanence of God in the universe in contrast to the insistence in many Christian systems on God’s transcendence or remoteness from all created things. (Fiske, 7dea of God, discussed by Moore in Lux Mundi (ed. 1) pp. 95—102.) The problem was one which Christian thought was decisively com- pelled to face by the Arian controversy (supra, p. xxix. sg.). The Apologists and Alex- andrians had partially succeeded in the problem expressed in the dying words of Plotinus, ‘to bring the God which is within into harmony with the God which is in the universe,’ or rather to reconcile the transcendence with the immanence of God. But their success was only partial: the immanence of the Word had been emphasised, but in contrast with the transcend- ence of the Father. This could not be more than a temporary resting-place for the Christian mind, and Arius forced a solution. That solution was found by Athanasius. The mediatorial work of the Logos is not necessary as though nature could not bear the untempered hand of the Father. The Divine Will is the direct and sole source of all things, and the idea of a medza- torial nature is inconsistent with the true idea of God (pp. 87, 155, 362, comparing carefully p. 383). ‘All things created are capable of sustaining God’s absolute hand. The hand which fashioned Adam now also and ever is fashioning and giving entire consistence to those who come after him.’ The immanence, or intimate presence and unceasing agency of God in nature, does not belong to the Word as distinct from the Father, but to the Father in and through the Word, in a word to God as God (cf. de Decr. 11, where the language of de /nucarn. 17 about the Word is applied to God as such). This is a point which marks an advance upon anything that we find in the earliest writings of Athanasius, and upon the theology of his preceptor Alexander, to whom, amongst other not very clear formulz, the Word is a peoitevousa dicors povoyerns (Thdt. &. £. ii. 4; Alexander cannot distinguish pious from imdoracts or odcia; Father and Son are dv0 axepiora mpaypara, but yet rH troordce dvo pices). Thisis indeed the principal particular in which Athanasius left the modified Origenism of his age, and of his own school, behind. If on the other hand he resembled Anus in drawing a sharper line than had been drawn previously between the one God and the World, it must also be remembered that his God was not the far-off purely transcendent God of Arius, but a God not far from every one of us (Orazt. ii. p. 361 s@.).
That God is beyond all essence tmepéxewa maons ovotas (c. Gent. 2. 2, 40. 2, 35. I yevnris ovotas) is a thought common to Origen and the Platonists, but adopted by Athanasius with a difference, marked by the addition of yevnrjs. That God created all things out of pure bounty of being (¢ Gent. § 2. 2, § 41. 2, de Zncarn. § 3. 3, and note there) is common to Origen and Philo, being taken by the latter from Plato’s Zimaus. ‘The Universe, and especially the human soul, reflects the being of its Author (¢ Gev?. passim). Hence there are two main paths by which man can arrive at the knowledge of God, the book of the Universe (¢. Gevt. 34 jim.), and the contemplation or self-knowledge of the soul itself (72. 33, 34). So far Athanasius is on common ground with the Platonists (cf. Fialon, pp. 270, syg.); but he takes up distinctively Christian ground, firstly, in emphasising the insufficiency of these proofs after sin has clouded the soul’s vision, and, above all, in insisting on the divine Incarnation as the sole remedy for this inability, as the sole means by which man as he is can reach a true knowledge of God, Religion not philosophy is the sphere in which the God of Athanasius is manifest to man.
4 On the subject of § 2, see also Pell. Lehre des h. Athan. and | harmony with the modern Protestant view of the doctrine. It is Shedd ii. pp. 37, $99.) 237; 59g. The former demonstrates’ his full | at least, a tribute to the greatness of Athan. that advocates of all accord with modern Roman Catholic teaching, the latter, his exact | sides are so eager to claim him.
ATHANASIUS AND THE BIBLE. Ixxiii Here, again, Athanasius is ‘ Christo-centric.’ With Origen, Athanasius refuses to allow evil anus antive existence (¢. Gent. § 2, 6, de Incarn. § 4. 5); evil resides in the will only, and is the result of the abuse of its power of free choice (c Gent. 5 and 7). The evil in the Universe - oe the work of demons, who have aggravated the consequences of human sin also ( a " Eee es 4). On the other hand, the evil does not extend beyond the sphere of personal So eche ‘ Bee oe of God (upon which Athanasius insists with remarkable frequency, yin the de Huga and c, Gent. and de Jncarn., also in Vit. Anton.) exercises untiring care over the whole. The problem of suffering and death in the animal creation is not discussed by him; he touches very incidentally, Ovaz. ii. 63, on the deliverance of creation in connection with Rom. viii, r9—2r.
§. 4. Vehicles of revelation; Scripture, the Church, Tradition.
ae ene aa and unique revelation of God to man is in the Person of the Incarnate Son. Sie § ate t os: Incarnation is not solitary. Before it there was the divine institution of ee = g. He ets, the former a typical anticipation (de Zucarn. 40. 2) of the destined ec Y and along with the latter (7d. 12. 2 and 5) ‘for all the world a holy school of the knowledge rod and the conduct of the soul.’ After it there is the history of the life and teaching of Christ and the writings of His first Disciples, left on record for the instruction ofall ages. Atha- nasius again and again applies to the Scriptures the terms eta and Gedmvevora (e.g. de Decr. 15, de Incarn. 33. 3, &c.; the latter word, which he also applies to his own martyr teachers, is, of course, from 2 Tim. ili. 16). The implications of this as bearing on the literal exactness of Scrip- ture he nowhere draws out. His strongest language (de Decr. ubt supra) is incidental to a con- troversial point: on Ps, li. (liii.) 2, he maintains that ‘there is no hyperbola in Scripture; all is Strictly true,’ but he proceeds on the strength of that principle to allegorise the verse he is discussing. In « Gent. 2, 3, he treats the account of Eden and the Fall as figurative. But in his later writings there is, so far as I know, nothing to match this. In fact, although he always employs the allegorical method, sometimes rather strangely (e.g. Deut. xxviii. 66, in de Incarn. 35, Orat. ii. 19, after Irenzeus, Origen, &c.), we discern, especially in his later writings, a tendency toward a more literal exegesis than was usual in the Alexandrian school. His discussion, e.g., of the sinlessness of Christ (c. Afol. i. 7, 17, ii. 9, 10) contrasts in this respect with that of his master Alexander, who appeals, following Origen’s somewhat startling allegorical application, to Prov. xxx. 19, a text nowhere used by Ath. in this way (Thdt. HE. i. 4). This is doubtless largely due to the pressure of the controversy with the Arians, who certainly had more to gain than their opponents from the prevalent unhistorical methods of exegesis, as we see from the use made by them of 2 Cor. iv. 11 at Nicza, and of Prov. Vili. 22 throughout’. Accordingly Athanasius complains loudly of their exegesis (Zp. Zg. 3—4, cf. Orat. i. 8, 52), and insists (id. i. 54, cf. already de Decr. 14) on the primary necessity of always conscientiously studying the circumstances of time and place, the person addressed, the subject matter, and purpose of the writer, in order not to miss the true sense. This rule is the same as applies (de Sent. Dion. 4) to the interpretation of any writings whatever, and carries with it the strict subordination of the allegorical to the historical sense, contended for by the later school of Antioch, and now accepted by all reasonable Christians (see Kihn in — Wetzer-Hergenrother’s Kirchen-Lex. vol. i. pp. 955—959, who calls the Antiochene exegesis ‘certainly a providential phenomenon;’ also supra, p. xxviii., note 1).
(6) The Canoa of Scripture accepted by Athanasius has long been known from the fragments of the thirty-ninth Festal Letter (Easter, 367). The New Testament Canon com- prises all the books received at the present day, but in the older order, viz., Gospels, Acts, Catholic Epistles, Pauline Epistles (Hebrews expressly included as S. Paul’s between Thess. and Tim.), Apocalypse. The Old Testament canon is remarkable in several ways. ‘The number of books is 22, corresponding to the Alexandrian Jewish reckoning, not to the (probably) older Jewish or Talmudic reckoning of 24 (the rolls of Ruth and Lam. counted separately, and with the Hagiographa), This at once excludes from the Canon proper the so-called ‘Apocrypha,’ with the exception of the additions to Daniel, and of Baruch and ‘the Epistle,’ which are counted as one book with Jeremiah. The latter is also the case with Lamentations, while on the other hand the number of 22 is preserved by the reckoning of Ruth as a separate book from Judges to make up for the exclusion of Esther. This last point is archaic, and brings Athanasius into connection with Melito (171 A.D.), who gives (Eus. /7.#. iv. 26. 14, see also vol. 1, p. 144, note 1, In this series) a Canon which he has obtained by careful enquiry in Palestine. This Canon agrees with that of Athanasius except with regard to the order assigned to ‘ Esdras’ (i.e. Ezra and Nehemiah, 5 Athanasius is not always innocent of the method of which he complains; e.g. when he uses Isa. 1. 11, mAhpns cit, as a proof of the Diviné Perfection.
‘Isexiv PROLEGOMENA, CHAPTER IV., § 4.
placed by M. at the end), to ‘the twelve in one book’ (placed by M. after Jer.), and Daniel (placed by M. before Ezekiel). Now, Esther is nowhere mentioned in the N.T., and the Rabbinical discussions as to whether Esther ‘defiled the hands’ (¢.e. was ‘ canonical’) went on to the time of R. Akiba (+135), an older, and even of R. Juda ‘the holy’ (150—210), a younger, contemporary of Melito (see Wildeboer, Oxtstaan van den Kanon, pp. 58, 5g. 65, &Cc.). The latter, therefore, may represent the penultimate stage in the history of the Hebrew canon before its close in the second century, (doubted by Bleek, Zid. 5, § 242, but not unlikely). Here, then, Ath. represents an earlier stage of opinion than Origen (Eus. AZ. vi. 25), who gives the finally fixed Hebrew Canon of his own time, but puts Esther at the end. As to the number of books, Athan. agrees with Josephus, Melito, Origen, and with Jerome, who, however, knows of the other recKoning of 24 (‘nonnulli’ in Pro/. Gaz), Athansius enumerates, as ‘outside the Canon, but appointed by the Fathers to be read by those who newly join us,’ Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Esther, Judith, and Tobit, as well as what is called the Teaching of the Apostles and the Shepherd. In practice, however, he quotes several of the latter as ‘Scripture’ (Wisdom repeatedly so, see index to this vol.); ‘The Shepherd’ is ‘ most profitable,’ and quoted for the Unity of the Creator (and cf. de Decr. 4), but not as ‘Scripture;’ the ‘Didache’ is not used by him unless the Syztagma (vide supra, p. lix.) be his genuine work. He also quotes 1 Esdras for the praise of Truth, and 2 Esdras once, as a ‘prophet.’ ‘ Daniel’ includes Susanna and Bel and the Dragon.
(c) On the sufficiency of Scripture for the establishment of all necessary doctrine Athan- asius insists repeatedly and emphatically (¢. Gent. 1, de Incarn. 5, de Decr. 32, Vit. Ant. 16, &c., &c.); and he follows up precept by example. ‘His works are a continuous appeal to Scripture.’ There is no passage in his writings which recognises tradition as supplementing Scripture, i.e., as sanctioning articles of faith not contained in Scripture. Tradition is recog- nised as authoritative in two ways: (1) Negatively, in the sense that doctrines which are novel are prima facie condemned by the very fact (de Decr. 7, note 2, 2b. 18, Orat. 1. 8, 10, il. 34, 40, de Syn. 3, 6, 7, and Letter 50, § 3); and (2) positively, as furnishing a guide to the sense of Scripture (see references in note on Orat. iii. 58, end of ch. xxix.). In other words, tradition with Athanasius is a formal, not a material, source of doctrine. His language exemplifies the necessity of distinguishing, in the case of strong patristic utterances on the authority of tradition, between different senses of the word. Often it means simply truth conveyed zz Scripture, and in that sense ‘ handed down’ from the first, as for example ¢ Apol.i. 22, ‘the Gospel tradition,’ and Letter 60. 6 (cf. Cypr. Zp. 74. 10, where Scripture is ‘ divinee traditionis caput et origo.’). Moreover, tradition as distinct from Scripture is with Athanasius not a secret unwritten body of teaching handed down orally, but is to be found in the documents of antiquity and the writings of the Fathers, such as those to whom he appeals in de Decr., &c. That ‘ the appeal of Athanasius was to Scripture, that of the Arians to tradition ’ (Gwatkin) is an overstatement, in part supported by the pre-Nicene history of the word épootctor (supra, p. xxxi. sg.). The rejection of this word by the Antiochene Council (in 268-9) is met by Athanasius, de Synod. 43, 599., partly by an appeal to still older witnesses in its favour, parly by the observation (§ 45) that ‘ writing in simplicity [the Fathers] arrived not at accuracy concerning the époovcrov, but spoke of the word as they understood it,’ an argument strangely like that of the Homeeans (Creed of Niké, 2b. § 30) that the Fathers [of /Vicea] adopted the word ‘ in simplicity.’
(2) Connected with the function and authority of tradition is that of the Church. On the essential idea of the Church there is little or nothing of definite statement. The term ‘ Catholic Church’ is of course commonly used, both of the Church as a whole, and of the orthodox body in this or that place. The unity of the Church is emphatically dwelt on in the opening of the encyclical written in the name of Alexander (zz/r., p. 69 and supr., p. xvi.) as the reason for communicating the deposition of Arius at Alexandria to the Church at large. ‘The joyful mother of children’ (4x. in Ps. cxiil. g) is interpreted of the Gentile Church, ‘ made to keep house,’ dre roy Kuptov évoxov éxovoa, joyful ‘because her children are saved through faith in Christ,’ whereas those of the ‘synagogue’ are drwdcia mapadedoueva: the ‘strong city’ adds meptoxjs and ‘Edom’ of Ps. lx. 11 are likewise interpreted of the Church as gathered from all nations; similarly the Ethiopians of Ps. Ixxxvii, 4 (where the de Tit. pss. gives a quite different and more allegorical sense, referring the verse to baptism). The full perfection of the Church is referred by Athanasius not to the (even ideal) Church on earth but to the Church in heaven. The kingdom of God’ (Matt. vi. 33) is explained as ‘the enjoyment of the good things of the * The idea of a mysterious unwritten tradition is a legacy i aypahos is adopted by Clement and Origen, and 5 ‘of Gnosticism to the Church, Irenzus, in order to meet the, ' i Eamee Galo 1 \ C C ee latter to Eusebius, and to the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil de SZ. S. Gnostic appeal to a supposed unwritten Apostolic tradition, con- | 27, applies it only to practical details), Epiphanius, and later fronts it with the consistency of the public and normal teaching | writers. Details in Harnack ii. 90, note, cf. Salmon, Infallibility of the Churches everywhere, of which the Roman Church is a con- | Lect. ix. On the somewhat different subject of the ‘ Disciplina venient microcosm or compendium. The idea of a mapddocis | Arcani,’ see Herzog-Plitt, s.v. ‘ Arkan-Disciplin’; ATHANASIUS ON THE CHURCH: COUNCILS. Ixxv future, namely the contemplation and knowledge cf God so far as man’s soul is capable of it,’ while the city of Ps, Ixxxvil. 1—3 is } do ‘Tepovoadny in the ade Titulis, but in the Expositio the Church glorified by ‘the indwelling of the Only-begotten.’ In all this we miss any decisive utterance as to the doctrinal authority of the Church except in so far as the recognition of such authority is involved in what has been cited above in favour of tradition. It may be said that the conditions which lead the mind to throw upon the Church the weight of responsibility for what is believed were absent in the case of Athanasius as indeed in the earlier Greek Church generally, But Athanasius was far from undervaluing the evidence of the Church’s tradition. ‘The organ by which the tradition of the Church does its work is the teaching function of her officers, especially of the Episcopate (de Syn. 3, &c.). But to provide against erroneous teaching on the part of bishops, as well as to provide for the due administration of matters affecting the Church generally, and for ecclesiastical legislation, some authority beyond that of the individual bishop is necessary. This necessity is met, in the Church as conceived by Athanasius, in two ways, firstly by Councils, secondly in the pre-eminent authority of certain sees which exercise some sort of jurisdiction over their neighbours. Neither of these resources of Church organisation meets us, in Athanasius, in a completely organised shape. A word must be said about each separately, then about their correlation.
(a) Synods. Synods asa part of the machinery of the Church grew up spontaneously. The meeting of the ‘ Apostles and Elders’ at Jerusalem (Acts xv.) exemplifies the only way in which a practical resolution on a matter affecting a number of persons with independent tights can possibly be arrived at, viz., by mutual discussion and agreement. Long before the age of Athanasius it had been recognised in the Church that the bishops were the persons exclusively entitled to represent their flocks for such a purpose; in other words, Councils of bishops had come to constitute the legislative and judicial body in the Church (Eus. V.C. i. 51). Both of these functions, and especially the latter, involved the further prerogative of judging of doctrine, asin the case of Paul of Samosata. But the whole system had grown up out of occasional emergencies, and no recognised laws existed to define the extent of conciliar authority, or the relations between one Council and another should their decisions conflict. Not even the area covered by the jurisdiction of a given Council was defined (Cam. Wic. 5). We see a Synod at Arles deciding a case affecting Africa, and reviewing the decision of a previous Synod at Rome; a Council at Tyre trying the case of a bishop of Alexandria; a Council at Sardica in the West deposing bishops in the East, and restoring those whom Eastern Synods had deposed; we find Acacius and his fellows deposed at Seleucia, then in a few weeks deposing their deposers at Constantinople; Meletius appointed and deposed by the same Synod at Antioch in 361, and in the following year resuming his see without question. All is chaos. The extent to which a Synod succeeds in enforcing its decisions depends on the extent to which it obtains de facto recognition. The canons of the Council of Antioch (341) are accepted as Church law, while its creeds are condemned as Arian (de Syn. 22—25).: We look in vain for any statement of principle on the part of Athanasius to reduce this confusion to order. The classical passage in his writings is the letter he has preserved from Julius of Rome to the Eastern bishops (Afo/. c. Ar. 20—35). The Easterns insist strongly on the authority of Councils, in the interests of their deposition of Athanasius, &e., at Tyre. Julius can only reply by invoking an old-established custom of the Church, ratified, he a a Nicza (Can. 5?), that the decisions of one Council may be revised by another; pees which leads to no finality. The Sardican canons of three years later drew up, for ju te el only, a system of procedure, devolving on Julius (or possibly on the Roman bishop on the ae being) the duty of deciding, upon the initiative of the parties nee the case: a deposed bishop a new trial of the case was desirable, and permitting him to — e part in ae new trial by his deputies. But Se en ie to any such procedure, nor to the i ion. (Compare above, pp. xli1., xlvi.).
ee recnrerot ie ie law fae to the authority of Synods applies to ene well as to local Councils. ‘The conception of a general Council did not give rise to Nae: rs ice versa (see above, p. xvii.) The precedent for great Councils had already been se neck (268-9) and Arles (314); the latter in fact seems to be indirectly called by S. Augustine plenarium universe ecclesia conciium; but the widely eres ae ie the Nicene Council, and the impressive circumstances under which it met, pasar Meas i ie first a recognised character of its own. Again and again (de Decr. 4, 27, Orat.\. 7, Lp. Besta & &e) Athanasius presses the Arians with their rejection of the decision of a ‘aaa Council, contrasting it (eg. de Sy. 21) with the numerous and indecisive Coun- PROLEGOMENA, CHAPTER IV.,, § 4.
Ixxvi cils held by them. He protests (Zp. Ze. 5, Tom. ad Ant., &c.) against the idea that any new creed is necessary or to be desired in addition to the Nicene. But in doing so, he does not suggest by a syllable that the Council was formally and a frzori infallible, independently of the character of its decision as faithfully corresponding to the tradition of the Apostles. Its authority is secondary to that of Scripture (de Syn. 6, sub. fin.), and its scriptural character is its justification (¢.). In short, Mr. Gwatkin speaks within the mark when he disclaims for Athan. any mechanical theory? of conciliar infallibility. To admit this candidly is not to depreciate, but to acknowledge, the value of the great Synod of Nica; and to acknowledge it, not on the technical grounds of later ecclesiastical law, but on grounds which are those of Athanasius himself. (On the general subject see D.C.A. 475—484, and Hatch, BZ. vii.)