the form and mutual position of the atoms. But sup- posing this view jjroveable (which it cannot be wliile we are I. c 18 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.
without data about the constitution of bodies), the difficulty of its application would doubtless be found so great that we must still maintain the existing division between astronomy and chemistry, with the difference that we now regard as natural that division which we should then call artificial. Laplace himself presented his idea only as a philosophic device, incapable of exercising any useful in- fluence over the progress of chemical science. Moreover, supposing this insuperable difficulty overcome, we should be no nearer to scientific unity, since we then should still have to connect the whole of physiological phenomena with the same law, which certainly would not be the least diffi- cult part of the enterprise. Yet, all things considered, the hypothesis we have glanced at would be the most favour- able to the desired unity.
The consideration of all phenomena as referable to a single origin is by no means necessary to the systematic formation of science, any more than to the realization of the great and happy consequences that we anticipate from the positive philosophy. The only necessary unity is that of Method, which is already in great part established. As for the doctrine, it need not be one; it is enough that it should be homogeneous. It is, then, under the double aspect of unity of method and homogeneousness of doctrine that we shall consider the different classes of positive theories in this work. While pursuing the philosophical aim of all science, the lessening of the number of general laws requisite for the explanation of natural phenomena, we shall regard as presumptuous every attemj^t, in all future time, to reduce them rigorously to one.
Having thus endeavoured to determine the spii'it and influence of the Positive Philosophy, and to mark the goal of our labours, we have now to proceed to the exposition of the system; that is, to the determination of the universal, or encyclopaedic order, which must regulate the different classes of natural j^henomena, and consequently the corre- sjionding jDositive sciences.
19 CHAPTER II.
19 CHAPTER II.
VIEW OF THE HIERARCHY OF THE POSITIVE SCIENCES.
IN proceeding to offer a Classificatiou of the Sciences, we must leave on one side all others that have as yet been attempted. Snch scales are those of Bacon and D' Alembert are constructed upon an arbitrary division of Faihireof pro- the faculties of the mind; whereas, our posed classiti- principal faculties are often engaged at the cations, same time in any scientific pursuit. As for other classifica- tions, they have failed, through one fault or another, to command assent: so that there are almost as many schemes as there are individuals to propose them. The failui-e has been so conspicuous, that the best minds feel a prejudice against this kind of enterprise, in any shape.
Now, what is the reason of this? — For one reason, the distribution of the sciences, having become a somewhat discredited task, has of late been undertaken chiefly by persons who have no sound knowledge of any science at all. A more important and less personal reason, however, is, the want of homogeueousness in the different parts of the intellectual system, — some having successively become posi- tive, while others remain theological or metai^hysical. Among such incoherent materials, classification is of course impossible. Every attempt at a distribution has failed from this cause, without the distributor being able to see why; — without his discovering that a radical con- trariety existed between the materials he was endeavouring to combine. The fact was clear enough, if it had but been understood, that the enterprise was premature; and that it was useless to undertake it till our principal scientific conceptions should all have become positive. The preceding chapter seems to show that this indispensable condition may now be considered fulfilled: and thus the time has 20 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.
arrived for laying down a sound and durable system of scientific order.
We may derive encouragement from tbe example set by recent botanists and zoologists, whose philosophical labours have exhibited the true principle of classification; viz. that the classification must proceed from the study of the things to be classified, and must by no means be deter- mined by a priori considerations. The real afiinities and natural connections presented by objects being allowed to determine their order, the classification itself becomes the expression of the most general fact. And thus does the positive method apply to the question of classification itself, as well as to the objects included under it. It follows True principle that the mutual dependence of the sciences, — of classifica- a dependence resulting from that of the corre- tion. sponding phenomena, — must determine the arrangement of the system of human knowledge. Before proceeding to investigate this mutual dependence, we have only to ascertain the real bounds of the classification pro- posed: in other words, to settle what we mean by human knowledge, as the subject of this work.
„,.. The field of human labour is either specula- lioundaries or, ■,.,,i ^, -v our field ""^^^ ^■'' ^^ction: and thus, we are accustomed to divide our knowledge into the theoretical and the practical. It is obvious that, in this inquiry, we have to do only with the theoretical. We are not going to treat of all human notions whatever, but of those funda- mental conceptions of the different orders of phenomena which furnish a solid basis to all combinations, and are not founded on any antecedent intellectual system. In such a study, speculation is our material, and not the application of it, — except where the application may happen to throw back light on its speculative origin. This is probably what Bacon meant by that First Philosophy which lie declared to be an extract from the whole of Science, and which has been so differently and so strangely interpreted by his metaphysical commentators.
There can be no doubt that Man's study of nature must furnish the only basis of his action upon nature; for it is only by knowing the laws of phenomena, and thus being able to foresee them, that we can, in active life, set them THE VALUE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. 21 to modify one another for our advantage. Our direct natural power over everything about us is extremely weak, and altogether disproportioned to our needs. Whenever we effect anything great it is through a knowledge of natural laws, by which we can set one agent to work upon another, — even very weak modifying elements producing a change in the results of a large aggregate of causes. The relation of science to art may be summed up in a brief expression: From Science comes Prevision: from Prevision comes Action.
We must not, however, fall into the error of our time, of regarding Science chiefly as a basis of Art. However great may be the services rendered to Industry by science, how- ever true may be the saying that Knowledge is Power, we must never forget that the sciences have a higher destina- tion still; — and not only higher but more direct; — that of satisfying the craving of our understanding to know the laws of phenomena. To feel how deep and urgent this need is, we have only to consider for a moment the physio- logical effects of consternation, and to remember that the most terrible sensation we are capable of, is that which we experience when aiiy phenomenon seems to arise in violation of the familiar laws of nature. This need of disposing facts in a comprehensible order (which is the proper object of all scientific theories) is so inherent in our organization, that if we could not satisfy it by positive conceptions, we must inevitably return to those theological and metaphy- sical explanations which had their origin in this very fact of human nature.— It is this original tendency which acts as a preservative, in the minds of men of science, against the narrowness and incompleteness which the practical habits of our age are apt to produce. It is through this that we are able to maintain just and noble ideas of the importance and destination of the sciences; and if it were not thus, the human understanding would soon, as Con- dorcet has observed, come to a stand, even as to the practical applications for the sake of which higher things had been sacrificed; for, if the arts flow from science, the neglect of science must destroy the consequent arts. Some of the most important arts are derived from speculations pvu'sued 22 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY, duriBg long ages with a purely scientific intention. For instance, the ancient Greek geometers delighted themselves with beautiful sj^eculations on Conic Sections; those specu- lations wrought, after a long series of generations, the renovation of astronomy; and out of this has the art of navigation attained a perfection which it never could have reached otherwise than through the speculative labours of Archimedes and Apollonius: so that, to iise Condorcet's illustration, " the sailor who is preserved from shipwreck by the exact observation of the longitude, owes his life to a theory conceived two thousand years before by men of genius who had in view simply geometrical speculations."
Our business, it is clear, is with theoretical researches, letting alone their practical application altogether. Though we may conceive of a course of study which should unite the generalities of speculation and application, the time is not come for it. To say nothing of its vast extent, it would require preliminary achievements which have not yet been attempted. We must first be in possession of appropriate Special concejjtions, formed according to scien- tific theories; and for these we have yet to wait. Mean- time, an intermediate class is rising up, whose particular destination is to organize the relations of theory and prac- tice; such as the engineers, who do not labour in the advancement of science, but who study it in its existing state, to apply it to practical purposes. Such classes are furnishing us with the elements of a future body of doc- trine on the theories of the different arts. Already, Monge, in his view of descriptive geometry, has given us a general theory of the arts of construction. But we have as yet only a few scattered instances of this nature. The time will come when out of such results, a dejjartment of Positive philosophy may arise: but it will be in a distant future. If we remember that several sciences are implicated in every important art, — that, for instance, a true theory of Agriculture requires a combination of physiological, chemi- cal, mechanical, and even astronomical and mathematical science, — it will be evident that true theories of the arts must wait for a large and equable develo])ment of these constituent sciences.
One more preliminary remark occurs, before we finish the THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCIENCES. 23 prescription of our limits, — the ascertainment of our field of inquiry. We must distinguish between the two classes of Natural science; — the abstract or general, Abstract which have for their object the discovery of science, the laws which regulate phenomena in all conceivable cases: and the concrete, particu- Concrete lar, or descriptive, which are sometimes called science.
Natural sciences in a restricted sense, whose function it is to apply these laws to the actual history of existing beings. The first are fundamental; and oiir business is with them alone, as the second are derived, and however important, not rising into the rank of our subjects of contemplation. We shall treat of physiology, but not of botany and zoology, which are derived from it. We shall treat of chemisti-y, but not of mineralogy, which is secondary to it. We may say of Concrete Physics, as these secondary sciences are called, the same thing that we said of theories of the arts, — that they require a preliminai'y knowledge of several sciences, and an advance of those sciences not yet achieved; so that, if there were no other reason, we must leave these secondary classes alone. At a future time Concrete Physics will have made progress, according to the development of Abstract Physics, and will afford a mass of less incoherent materials than those which it now presents. At present, too few of the students of these secondary sciences appear to be even aware that a due acquaintance with the primary sciences is requisite to all successful prosecution of their own.
We have now considered.
First, that science being composed of speculative know- ledge and of practical knowledge, we have to deal only with the first; and Second, that theoretical knowledge, or science properly so called, being divided into general and particular, or abstract and concrete science, we have again to deal only with the first.
Being thus in possession of our proper subject, duly prescribed, we may proceed to the ascertainment of the true order of the fundamental sciences.
The classification of the sciences is not so easy a matter as it may appear. However elLificSion. natural it may be, it will always involve 24 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.
something, if not arbitrary, at least artificial; and in so far, it will always involve imperfection. It is impossible to fulfil, quite rigorously, the object of presenting the sciences iu their natural connection, and according to their mutual dependence, so as to avoid the smallest danger of being in- volved in a vicious circle. It is easy to show why. Historical and Every science may be exhibited under two dogmatic methods or procedures, the Historical and methods. ^i^q Dogmatic. These are wholly distinct from each other, and any other method can be nothing but some combination of these two. By the first method know- ledge is presented in the same order in which it was actu- ally obtained by the human mind, together with the way iu which it was obtained. By the second, the system of ideas is presented as it might be conceived of at this day, by a mind which, duly prepared and placed at the right l>oint of view, should begin to reconstitute the science as a whole. A new science must be pursued historically, the only thing to be done being to study in chronological order the different works which have contributed to the progress of the science. But when such materials have become re- cast to form a general system, to meet the demand for a moi*e natural logical order, it is because the science is too far advanced for the historical order to be practicable or suitable. The more discoveries are made, the greater be- comes the labour of the historical method of study, and the more effectual the dogmatic, because the new conceptions bring forward the earlier ones in a fresh light. Thus, the education of an ancient geometer consisted simply in the study, in their due order, of the very small number of original treatises then existing on the dilferent parts of geometry. The writings of Archimedes and Apollonius were, in fact, about all. On the contrary, a modern geometer comnronly finishes his education without having read a single original work dating further back than the most recent discoveries, which cannot be known by any other means. Thus the Dogmatic Method is for ever superseding the Historical, as we advance to a higher j^osition in science. If every mind had to pass through all the stages that every predecessor iu the study had gone through, it is clear that, however easy it is to learn rather than invent, it would be impossible HISTORICAL AND DOGMA'lIC METHODS OF STUDY. 25 to effect the purpose of education, — to place the student on the vantage-ground gained by the labours of all the men who have gone before. By the dogmatic method this is done, even though the living student may have only an ordinary intellect, and the dead may have been men of lofty genius. By the dogmatic method, therefore, must every advanced science be attained, with so much of the historical combined with it as is rendered necessary by discoveries too recent to be studied elsewhere than in their own records. The only objection to the preference of the Dogmatic method is that it does not show how the science was attained; but a moment's reflection will show that this is the case also with the Historical method. To pursue a science histori- cally is quite a different thing from learning the history of its progress. This last pertains to the study of human history, as we shall see when we reach the final division of this work. It is true that a science cannot l)e completely understood without a knowledge of how it arose; and again, a dogmatic knowledge of any science is necessary to an un- derstanding of its history; and therefore we shall notice, in treating of the fundamental sciences, the incidents of their origin, when distinct and illustrative; and we shall use their history, in a scientific sense, in our treatment of Social Physics; but the historical study, important, even essential, as it is, remains entirely distinct from the 2)roper dogmatic study of science. These considerations, in this place, tend to define more precisely the spirit of our course of inquiry, while they more exactly determine the conditions imder which we may hope to succeed in the construction of a true scale of the aggregate fundamental sciences. Great con- fusion would arise from any attempt to adhere strictly to historical order in our exposition of the sciences, for they have not all advanced at the same rate; and we must be for ever borrowing from each some fact to illustrate another, without regard to priority of origin. Thus, it is clear that, in the system of the sciences, astronomy must come before physics, properly so called: and yet, several branches of physics, above all, optics, are indispensable to the complete exposition of astronomy. Minor defects, if inevitable, can- not invalidate a classification which, on the whole, fulfils the principal conditions of the case. They belong to what 26 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.
is essentially artificial in our division of intellectual labour. In the main, however, our classification agrees with the history of science; the more general and simple sciences actually occurrring first and advancing best in human his- tory, and being followed by the more complex and restricted, though all wei'e, since the earliest times, enlarging simul- taneously.
A simple mathematical illustration will precisely represent the difficulty of the question we have to resolve, while it will sum up the preliminary considerations we have just concluded.
We propose to classify the fundamental sciences. They are six, as we shall soon see. We cannot make them less; and most scientific men would reckon them as more. Six objects admit of 720 different dispositions, or, in populai" language, changes. Thus we have to choose the one right order (and there can be but one right) out of 720 possible ones. Very few of these have ever been proposed; yet we might venture to say that there is probably not one in favour of which some plausible reason might not be assigned; for Ave see the wildest divergences among the schemes which have been proposed, — the sciences which are placed by some at the head of the scale being sent by others to the further extremity. Our problem is, then, to find the one rational order, among a host of possible systems. True principle Now we must remember that we have to of classifica- look for the principle of classification in the t'ion. comparison of the different orders of phenomena, through which science discovers the laws which are her object. What we have to determine is the real de- pendence of scientific studies. Now, this dependence can result only from that of the corresponding phenomena. All observable ]>henomena may be included within a very few natural categories, so arranged as that the study of each category may be grounded on the principal laws of the preceding, and serve as the basis of the next ensuing. This order is determined by the degree of simplicity, GeneraUty. <^>r. what comes to the same thing, of gene- rality of their phenomena. Hence results Dependence. their successive dependence, and the greater or lesser facility for being studied.
FU>DAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION. 2^ It is clear, a priori, that the most simple phenomena must be the most general; for whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is of course the most disengaged from the incidents of particular cases. We must begin then with the study of the most general or simple pheno- mena, going on successively to the more particular or com- plex. This must be the most methodical way, for this order of generality or simplicity fixes the degree of facility in the study of phenomena, while it detennines the neces- sary connection of the sciences by the successive depen- dence of their phenomena. It is worthy of remark in this j^lace that the most general and simple phenomena are the furthest removed from Man's ordinary sphere, and must thereby be studied in a calmer and more rational frame of mind than those in which he is more nearly implicated; and this constitutes a new ground for the corresponding sciences being developed more rapidly.
We have now obtained our rule. Next we j^roceed to our classification.
We ai'e first struck by the clear division of Inor<jcanic ami all natural phenomena into two classes — of Organic phe- inorganic and of organic bodies. The orga- n"i»ena. nized are evidently, in fact, more complex and less general than the inorganic, and depend upon them, instead of being depended on by them. Therefore it is that physio- logical study should begin with inorganic phenomena; since the organic include all the qualities belonging to them, with a special order added, viz. the vital phenomena, which belong to organization. We have not to investigate the nature of either; for the positive philosophy does not inquire into natures. Whether their nature be supposed different or the same, it is evidently necessary to separate the two studies of inorganic matter and of living bodies. Our classification will stand through any future decision as to the way in which living bodies are to be regarded; for, on any supposition, the general laws of inorganic physics must be established before we can proceed with success to the examination of a dependent class of phenomena.
Each of these great halves of natural t t philosophy has subdivisions, inorganic phy- sics must, in accordance with our rule of generality and the 28 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY.
order of dependence of phenomena, be divided into two ,., ^ sections — of celestial and terrestrial phenomena. Thus we have Astronomy, geometri- cal and mechanical, and Terrestrial Physics. The neces- sity of this division is exactly the same as in the former case.
Astronomical phenomena are the most general, simple, aud abstract of all; and therefore the study of natural philosoj^hy must clearly begin with them. They are them- selves independent, while the laws to which they are subject influence all others whatsoever. The general eifects of gravitation preponderate, in all terrestrial phenomena, over all effects which may be peculiar to them, and modify the original ones. It follows that the analysis of the simplest terrestrial phenomenon, not only chemical, but even purely mechanical, presents a greater complication than the most compound astronomical phenomeuon. The most difficult astronomical question involves less intricacy than the sinaple movement of even a solid body, when the determin- iug circumstances are to be computed. Thus we see that we must separate these two studies and proceed to the second only through the first, from which it is derived.
In the same manner, we find a natural division of Terres- trial Physics into two, according as we regard bodies in their mechanical or their chemical character. 2. 1 hysics. Hence we have Physics, properly so called, 3 Chemistrv. ''^^^ Chemistry. Again, the second class must be studied through the first. Chemi- cal phenomena are more complicated than mechanical, and depend upon them, without influencing them in return. Every one knows that all chemical action is first submitted to the influence of weight, heat, electricity, etc., and pre- sents moreover something which modifies all these. Thus, while it follows Physics, it presents itself as a distinct science.
Such are the divisions of the sciences relating to in- TT Orpa-vto organic matter. An analogous division arises in the other half of Natural Philosophy — the science of organized bodies.
Here we find ourselves j^resented with two orders of phenomena; those which relate to the individual, and ORGANIC PHYSICS. 29