If we are simply wise according to the Scrip- tures, we are not compelled to dispute against the grace of Christ, and to make statements attempting to show that human nature both re- quires no Physician, — in infants, because it is whole and sound; and in adults, because it is able to suffice for itself in attaining righteousness, if it will. Men no doubt seem to urge acute opin- ions on these points, but it is only word-wisdom,^ by which the cross of Christ is made of none effect. This, however, " is not the wisdom which descendeth from above." * The words which follow in the apostle's statement I am unwilling to quote; for we would rather not be thought to do an injustice to our friends, whose very strong and active minds we should be sorry to see running in a perverse, instead of an upright, course.
CHAP. 7 [VII.] — HE PROCEEDS TO CONFUTE THE WORK OF PELAGIUS; HE REFRAINS AS VET FROM MENTIONING PELAGIUS' NAME.
However ardent, then, is the zeal which the author of the book you have forwarded to me entertains against those who find a defence for their sins in the infirmity of human nature; not less, nay even much greater, should be our eager- ness in preventing all attempts to render the cross of Christ of none effect. Of none effect, however, it is rendered, if it be contended that by any other means than by Christ's own sacra- ment it is possible to attain to righteousness and everlasting life. This is actually done in the book to which I refer — I will not say by its author wittingly, lest I should express the judg- ment that he ought not to be accounted even a ' Rom. ix. 23, * Jas. iiu 15.
3 I Cor. t. 17.
Christian, but, as I rather believe, unconsciously. He has done it, no doubt, with much power; I only wish that the ability he has displayed were sound and less like that which insane persons are accustomed to exhibit.
CHAP. 8. — A DISTINCTION DRAWN BY PELAGIUS BETWEEN THE POSSIBLE AND ACTUAL.
For he first of all makes a distinction: " It is one thing," says he, " to inquire whether a thing can be, which has respect to its possibility only; and another thing, whether or not it is." This dis- tinction, nobody doubts, is true enough; for it follows that whatever is, was able to be; but it does not therefore follow that what is able to be, also is. Our Lord, for instance, raised Lazarus; He unquestionably was able to do so. But inas- much as He did not raise up Judas, 5 must we therefore contend that He was unable to do so? He certainly was able, but He would not. For if He had been willing, He coul^ have effected this too. For the Son quickeneth whomsoever He will.^ Observe, however, what he means by this distinction, true and manifest enough in itself, and what he endeavours to make out of it. " We are treating," says he, " of possibility only; and to pass from this to something else, except in the case of some certain fact, we deem to be a very serious and extraordinary process." This idea he turns over again and again, in many ways and at great length, so that no one would suppose that he was inquiring about any other point than the possibility of not committing sin. Among the many passages in which he treats of this subject, occurs the following: " I once more repeat my position: I say that it is possible for a man to be without sin. What do you say? That it is impossible for a man to be without sin? But I do not say," he adds, " that there is a man without sin; nor do yd\i say, that there is not a man without sin. Our contention is about what is possible, and not possible; not about what is, and is not." He then enumerates certain passages of Scripture,^ which are usually alleged in opposition to them, and insists that they have nothing to do with the question, which is really in dispute, as to the possibility or im- possibility of a man's being without sin. This is what he says: " No man indeed is clean from pollution; and, There is no man that sinneth not; and. There is not a just man upon the earth; and, There is none that doeth good. There are these and similar passages in Scrip- ture," says he, " but they testify to the point of not being, not of not being able; for by testimonies of this sort it is shown what kind of per- 5 Peter Lombard refers to this passage of Augiistin, to show that Goil can do many things which He will not do. See his i Sfni. Disi, 43, last chapter.
* John V. 21.
' Job XIV. 2; I Kings viii. 46; Eccles. vii. 21; Ps. xiv. 1.
124 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. 9.
sons certain men were at such and such a time, not that they were unable to be something else. Whence they are justly found to be blameworthy. If, however, they had been of such a character, simply because they were unable to be anything else, they are free from blame."
CHAP. 9 [VIII.] — EVEN THEY WHO WERE NOT ABLE TO BE JUSTIFIED ARE CONDEMNED.
See what he has said. I, however, affirm that an infant born in a place where it was not pos- sible for him to be admitted to the baptism of Christ, and being overtaken by death, was placed in such circumstances, that is to say, died with- out the bath of regeneration, because it was not possible for him to be otherwise. He would therefore absolve him, and, in spite of the Lord's sentence, open to him the kingdom of heaven. The apostle, however, does not absoh^e him, when he says: " By one man sin entered into the world, ancf death by sin; by which death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." ' Rightly, therefore, by virtue of that condemna- tion which runs throughout the mass, is he not admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although he was not only not a Christian, but was unable to become one.
CHAP. 10 [iX.] — HE COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED, WHO HAD NOT HEARD OF THE NAME OF CHRIST; RENDERING THE CROSS OF CHRIST OF NONE EFFECT.
But they say: " He is not condemned; because the statement that all sinned in Adam, was not made because of the sin which is derived from one's birth, but because of imitation of him." If, therefore, Adam is said to be the author of all the sins which followed his own, because he was the first sinner of the human race, then how is it that Abel, rather than Christ, is not placed at the head of all the righteous, because he was the first righteous man? But I am not speaking of the case of an infant. I take the instance of a young man, or an old man, who has died in a region where he could not hear of the name of Christ. \\'ell, could such a man have become righteous by nature and free will; or could he not? If they contend that he could, then see what it is to render the cross of Christ of none effect,^ to contend that any man without it, can be justified by the law of nature and the power of his will. VVe may here also say, then is Christ dead in vain,^ forasmuch as all might accomplish so much as this, even if He had never died; and if they should be unrighteous, they would be so because they wished to be, not because they were unable to be righteous. But even ' Rom. V. 12.
* I Cor. i. I.
3 Gal. ii. 21.
though a man could not be justified at all with- out the grace of Christ, he would absolve him, if he dared, in accordance with his words, to the effect that, " if a man were of such a character, because he could not possibly have been of any other, he would be free from all blame."
BY PELAGIUS.
He then starts an objection to his own posi- tion, as if, indeed, another person had raised it, and says: " ' A man,' you will say, ' may pos- sibly be [without sin]; but it is by the grace of God.' " He then at once subjoins the follow- ing, as if in answer to his own suggestion: " I thank you for your kindness, because you are not merely content to withdraw your opposition to my statement, which you just now opposed, or barely to acknowledge it; but you actually go so far as to approve it. For to say, ' A man may possibly, but by this or by that,' is in fact nothing else than not only to assent to its possi- bility, but also to show the mode and condition of its possibility. Nobody, therefore, gives a better assent to the possibility of anything than the man who allows the condition thereof; be- cause, without the thing itself, it is not possible for a condition to be." After this he raises an- other objection against himself: " 'But, you will say, * you here seem to reject the grace of God, inasmuch as you do not even mention it; ' " and he then answers the objection: " Now, is it I that reject grace, who by acknowledging the thing must needs also confess the means by which it may be effected, or you, who by denying the thing do undoubtedly also deny what- ever may be the means through which the thing is accomplished? " He forgot that he was now answering one who does not deny the thing, and whose objection he had just before set forth in these words: " A man may possibly be [without sin]; but it is by the grace of God." How then does that man deny the possibility, in defence of which his opponent earnestly contends, when he makes the admission to that opponent that " the thing is possible, but only by the grace of God? " That, however, after he is dismissed who already acknowledges the essential thing, he still has a question against those who main- tain the impossibility of a man's being without sin, what is it to us? Let him ply his questions against any opponents he pleases, provided he only confesses this, which cannot be denied with- out the most criminal impiety, that without the grace of God a man cannot be without sin. He says, indeed: " Whether he confesses it to be by grace, or by aid, or by mercy, whatever that be by which a man can be without sin, — every one acknowledges the thing itself."
Chap. 15.]
ON NATURE AND GRACE.
125 CH.\P. 1 2 [XI.] — IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT GR.A.CE, WE DO NOT SPEAK OF THAT WHICH RELATES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR NATURE, BUT TO ITS RESTORATION.
I confess to your love, that when I read those words I was filled with a sudden joy, because he did not deny the grace of God by which alone a man can be justified; for it is this which I main- ly detest and dread in discussions of this kind. But when I went on to read the rest, I began to have my suspicions, first of all, from the similes he employs. For he says: " If I were to say, man is able to dispute; a bird is able to fly; a liare is able to run; without mentioning at the same time the instruments by which these acts can be accomplished — that is, the tongue, the wings, and the legs; should I then have denied the conditions of the various offices, when I acknowledged the very offices themselves? " It is at once apparent that he has here instanced such things as are by nature efficient; for the members of the bodily structure which are here mentioned are created with natures of such a kind — the tongue, the wings, the legs. He has not here posited any such thing as we wish to have understood \yj grace, without which no man is justified; for this is a topic which is concerned about the cure, not the constitution, of natural functions. Entertaining, then, some apprehen- sions, I proceeded to read all the rest, and I soon found that my suspicions had not been un- founded.
CHAP. 13 [xn.] — THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW S THREATENINGS FARERS."
PERFECT WAY- But before I proceed further, see what he has said. When treating the question about the dif- ference of sins, and starting as an objection to himself, what certain persons allege, " that some sins are light by their very frequency, their con- stant irruption making it impossible that they should be all of them avoided; " he thereupon denied that it was " proper that they should be censured even as light offences, if they cannot possibly be wholly avoided." He of course does not notice the Scriptures of the New Testament, wherein we learn ' that the intention of the law in its censure is this, that, by reason of the trans- gressions which men commit, they may flee for refuge to the grace of the Lord, who has pity upon them — "the schoolmaster'"' "shutting them up unto the same faith which should after- wards be revealed; " ^ that by it their transgres- sions may be forgiven, and then not again be committed, by God's assisting grace. The road indeed belongs to all who are progressing in it; ' We have read discimus, not dicimus.
^ Gal. iii. 24. 3 Gal. iii. 23.
although it is they who make a good advance that are called " perfect travellers." That, how- ever, is the height of perfection which admits of no addition, when the gual to which men tend has begun to be possessed.
CHAP. 14 [XIII.] REFUTATION OF PELAGIUS.
But the truth is, the question which is pro- posed to him — " Are you even yourself without sin? " — does not really belong to the subject in dispute. What, however, he says, — that " it is rather to be imputed to his own negligence that he is not without sin," is no doubt well spoken; but then he should deem it to be his duty even to pray to God that this faulty negligence get not the dominion over him, — the prayer that a cer- tain man once put up, when he said: " Order my steps according to Thy word, and let not any iniquity have dominion over me,"* — lest, whilst relying on his own diligence as on strength of his own, he should fail to attain to the true right- eousness either by this way, or by that other method in which, no doubt, perfect righteous- ness is to be desired and hoped for.
CHAP. 15 [XIV.] NOT EVERYTHING [OF DOC- TRINAL truth] is WRITIEN IN SCRIPTURE IN so MANY WORDS.
That, too, which is said to him, " that it is no- where written in so many words, A man can be without sin," he easily refutes thus: " That the question here is not in what precise words each doctrinal statement is made." It is perhaps not without reason that, while in several passages of Scripture we may find it said that men are with- out excuse, it is nowhere found that any man is described as being without sin, except Him only, of whom it is plainly said, that " He knew no sin." 5 Similarly, we read in the passage where the subject is concerning priests: " He was in all points tempted like as we are, only without sin,"^ — meaning, of course, in that flesh which bore the likeness of sinful flesh, although it was not sinful flesh; a likeness, indeed, which it would not have borne if it had not been in every other respect the same as sinful flesh. How, however, we are to understand this: " Whoso- ever is born of God doth not commit sin; neither can he sin, for his seed remaineth in him; " ^ while the Apostle John himself, as if he had not been born of God, or else were address- ing men who had not been born of God, lays down this position: " If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us," ** — I have already explained, with such care as I was able, in those books which I wrote to Marcellinus on this very subject.'^ It seems, 9 See the De Peccat. Meritis et Reinissione, ii. 8-10.
126 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. i6.
moreover, to me to be an interpretation worthy of acceptance to regard the clause of the above quoted passage: " Neither can he sin," as if it meant: He ought not to commit sin. For who could be so foolish as to say that sin ought to be committed, when, in fact, sin is sin, for no other reason than that it ought not to be committed?
CHAP. 16 [XV.] — PELAGIUS CORRUPTS A PASSAGE OF THE APOSTLE JAMES BY ADDING A NOTE OF INTERROG.^TION.
Now that passage, in which the Apostle James says: " But the tongue can no man tame," ' does not appear to me to be capable of the in- terpretation which he would put upon it, when he expounds it, " as if it were written by way of reproach; as much as to say: Can no man, then, tame the tongue? As if in a reproachful tone, which would say: You are able to tame wild beasts; cannot you tame the tongue? As if it were an easier thing to tame the tongue than to subjugate wild beasts." I do not think that this is the meaning of the passage. For, if he had meant such an opinion as this to be en- tertained of the facility of taming the tongue, there would have followed in the sequel of the passage a comparison of that member with the! beasts. As it is, however, it simply goes on to! say: " The tongue is an unruly evil, full of deadly poison," ' — such, of course, as is more noxious than that of beasts and creeping things. For while the one destroys the flesh, the other kills the soul. For, " The mouth that belieth slayeth the soul."^ It is not, therefore, as if this is an easier achievement than the taming of beasts that St. James pronounced the statement before us, or would have others utter it; but he rather aims at showing what a great evil in man his tongue is — so great, indeed, that it cannot be tamed by any man, although even beasts are tameable by human beings. And he said this, not with a view to our permitting, through our neglect, the continuance of so great an evil to ourselves, but in order that we might be induced to request the help of divine grace for the tam- ing of the tongue. For he does not say: " None can tame the tongue; " but " No man; " in or- der that, when it is tamed, we may acknowledge it to be effected by the mercy of God, the help of God, the grace of God. The soul, therefore, | should endeavour to tame the tongue, and while endeavouring should pray for assistance; the tongue, too, should beg for the taming of the tongue, — He being the tamer who said to His disciples: " It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." ^ Thus, we are warned by the precept to do this, — namely, to make the attempt, and, failing » Jas. iil. 8.
2 Wisd. i. II.
3 Matt. X. 20.
in our own strength, to pray for the help of God.
CHAP. 1 7 [XVI.] — EXPLANATION OF THIS TEXT CONTINUED.
Accordingly, after emphatically describing the evil of the tongue — saying, among other things: "My brethren, these things ought not so to be"* — he at once, after finishing some remarks which arose out of his subject, goes on to add this advice, showing by what help those things would not happen, which (as he said) ought not: '•' Who is a wise man and endowed with knowledge among you? Let him show out of a good conversation his works with meekness of wisdom. But if ye have bitter envying and strife in your hearts, glory not and lie not against the truth. This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, de\'ilish. For where there is envying and strife, there is confu- sion and every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gen- tle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hy- pocrisy." 5 This is the wisdom which tames the tongue; it descends from above, and springs from no human heart. Will any one, then, dare to divorce it from the grace of God, and with most arrogant vanity place it in the power of man? Why should I pray to God that it be accorded me, if it may be had of man? Ought we not to object to this prayer lest injury be done to free will which is self-sufficient in the possibility of nature for discharging all the duties of righteousness? We ought, then, to object also to the Apostle James himself, who admonishes us in these words: " If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him; but let him ask in faith, nothing doubting." ^ This is the faith to which the commandments drive us, in order that the law may prescribe our duty and faith accomplish it. 7 For through the tongue, which no man can tame, but only the wisdom which comes down from above, "in many things we all of us offend." ** For this truth also the same apostle pronounced in no other sense than that in which he afterwards declares: " The tongue no man can tame." ' CHAP. 1 8 [XVII.] — WHO MAY BE SAID TO BE IN THE FLESH.
There is a passage which nobody could place against these texts with the similar purpose of showing the impossibility of not sinning: "The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed 7 Ut lex imperet et fides impetret. ^ Jas. iii. 2.
Chap. 21.]
ON NATURE AND GRACE.
127 can be; so then they that are in the flesh cannot please God;"' for he here mentions the wisdom of the flesh, not the wisdom which cometh from above: moreover, it is manifest, that in this pas- sage, by the phrase, " being in the flesh," are signified, not those who have not yet quitted the body, but those who live according to the flesh. The tiuestion, however, we are discussing does not lie in this point. But what I want to hear from him, if I can, is about those who live according to the Spirit, and who on this account are not, in a certain sense, in the flesh, even while they still live here, — whether they, by God's grace, live according to the Spirit, or are sufficient for themselves, natural capability having been be- stowed on them when they were created, and their own proper will besides. Whereas the fulfilling of the law is nothing else than love; ^ and God's love is shed abroad in our hearts, not by our own selves, but by the Holy Ghost which is given to us.^ CHAP. 19. — SINS OF IGNORANCE; TO WHOM WISDOM IS GIVEN BY GOD ON THEIR REQUESTING IT.
He further treats of sins of ignorance, and says that "a man ought to be very careful to avoid ignorance; and that ignorance is blame- worthy for this reason, because it is, through his own neglect that a man is ignorant of that which he certainly must have known if he had only applied diligence; " whereas he prefers disputing all things rather than to pray, and say: " Give me understanding, that I may learn Thy com- mandments." * It is, indeed, one thing to have taken no pains to know what sins of negligence were apparently expiated even through divers sacrifices of the law; it is another thing to wish to understand, to be unable, and then to act contrary to the law, through not understanding what it would have done. We are accordingly enjoined to ask of God wisdom, " who giveth to all men liberally; " s that is, of course, to all men who ask in such a manner, and to such an extent, as so great a matter requires in earnest- ness of petition.
CHAP. 20 [xvin.] — WHAT PRAYER PELAGIUS WOULD ADMIT TO BE NECESSARY.
He confesses that " sins which have been com- mitted do notwithstanding require to be divinely expiated, and that the Lord must be entreated I because of them," — that is, for the purpose, ofj course, of obtaining pardon; " because that which has been done cannot," it is his own admission, " be undone," by that " power of nature and will of man " which he talks about so much. From this necessity, therefore, it fol- lows that a man must pray to be forgiven. That 3 Rom. V. 5, a man, however, requires to be helped not to sin, he has nowhere admitted; I read no such admission in this passage; he keeps a strange silence on this subject altogether; although the Lord's Prayer enjoins upon us the necessity of praying both that our debts may be remitted to us, and that we may not be led into tempta- tion, — the one petition entreating that past offences may be atoned for; the other, that future ones may be avoided. Now, although this is never done unless our will be assistant, yet our will alone is not enough to secure its being done; the prayer, therefore, which is offered up to God for this result is neither super- fluous nor offensive to the Lord. For what is more foolish than to pray that you may do that which you have it in your own power to do.
CHAP. 21 [XIX.] — PELAGIUS DENIES THAT HUMAN NATURE HAS BEEN DEPRAVED OR COi^RUPTED BY SIN.