CHAP. 1 8 [XVII.] — HE DISCOVERS THE REASON OF PELAGIUS' HESITATION SO TO SAY.
For, when wishing to point out why this lies within our own competency, he says: " Because ' Matt. X. zo.
2 See cli. 5.
we are able to turn all these actions into evil." This, then, was the reason why he was afraid to admit that such an action proceeds " bot/i from \ ourselves ami from God," lest it should be ob- jected to him in reply: " If the fact of our doing, speaking, thinking anything good, is owing both to ourselves and to God, because He has endowed us with this ability, then it follows that our doing, thinking, speaking evil things, is due to ourselves and to God, because He has here also endowed us with ability of indifferency; the conclusion from this being — and God for- bid that we should admit any such — that just as God is associated with ourselves in the praise of good actions, so must He share with us the blame of evil actions." For that "capacity" with which He has endowed us makes us capa- ble alike of good actions and of evil ones.
CHAP. 19 [XVIII.] — THE TWO ROOTS OF ACTION, LOVE AND CUPIDITY; AND EACH BRINGS FORTH ITS OWN FRUIT.
Concerning this " capacity," Pelagius thus writes in the first book of his Defence of Free Will: " Now," says he, "we have implanted in us by God a capacity for either part.^ It re- sembles, as I may say, a fruitful and fecund root which yields and produces diversely according to the will of man, and which is capable, at the planter's own choice, of either shedding a beau- tiful bloom of virtues, or of bristling with the thorny thickets of vices." Scarcely heeding what he says, he here makes one and the same root productive both of good and evil fruits, in oppo- sition to gospel truth and apostolic teaching. For the Lord declares that " a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit; " ■♦ and when the Apostle Paul says that covetousness is " the root of all evils," 5 he intimates to us, of course, that love may be regarded as the root of all good things. On the supposition, therefore, that two trees, one good and tlie other corrupt, represent two human beings, a good one and a bad, what else is the good man except one with a good will, that is, a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one with a bad will, that is, a tree with a bad root? The fruits which spring from such roots and trees are deeds, are words, are thoughts, which proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one.
CHAP. 20 [XIX.] — HOW A MAN MAKES A GOOD OR A BAD TREE.
Now a man makes a good tree when he re- ceives the grace of God. For it is not by him- self that he makes himself good instead of evil; but it is of Him, and through Him, and in Him 3 (The technical phrase ii, possibiUtas jtiriiisque partis. — W.J Chap. 23.]
ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST.
225 who is always good. And in order that he may not only be a good tree, but also bear good fruit, it is necessary for him to be assisted by the self-same grace, without which he can do noth- ing good. For God Himself co-operates in the production of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends them by the agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the increase.' A man, however, makes a corrupt tree when he makes himself corrupt, when he falls away from Him who is the un- changing good; for such a declension from Him is the origin of an evil will. Now this decline does not initiate some other corrupt nature, but it corrupts that which has been already created good. When this corruption, however, has been healed, no evil remains; for although nature no doubt had received an injury, yet nature was not itself a blemish.^ CHAP. 21 [XX.] — LOVE THE ROOT OF ALL GOOD THINGS; CUPIDITY, OF ALL EVIL ONES.
The " capacity," then, of which we speak is not (as he supposes) the one identical root both of good things and evil. For the love which is the root of good things is quite different from the cupidity which is the root of evil things — as different, indeed, as virtue is from vice. But without doubt this " capacity " is capable of either root: because a man is not only able to possess love, whereby the tree becomes a good one; but he is likewise able to have cupidity, which makes the tree evil. This human cupidity, however, which is a vice, has for its author man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is indeed that " lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not of the Father, but is of the world." ^ And who can be ignorant of the usage of the Scripture, which under the designation of ^' the world'' is accustomed to describe those who inhabit the world?
CHAP. 2 2 [XXI.] — LOVE IS A GOOD WILL.
That love, however, which is a virtue, comes to us from God, not from ourselves, according to the testimony of Scripture, which says: " Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God: for God is love." ■♦ It is on the principle of this love that one can best understand the passage, " Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; " 5 as well as the sen- tence, " And he cannot sin." ^ Because the love according to which we are born of God " doth not behave itself unseemly," and " thinketh no evil." 7 Therefore, whenever a man sins, it is * I Cor. iii. 7.
^ [Here the phraseology contrasts viiiutn natura, with vitiutn Hatura. — \v.\ ' Same verse. ^ i Cor. xiii. 5.
not according to love: but it is according to cupidity that he commits sin; and following such a disposition, he is not born of God. Because, as it has been already stated, " the capacity " of which we speak is capable of either root. When, therefore, the Scripture says, " Love is of God," or still more pointedly, " God is love; " when the Apostle John so very emphatically exclaims, " Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and be, the sons of God! " '^ with what face can this writer, on hearing that " God is love," persist in maintaining his opinion, that we have of God one only of those three,'^ namely, "the capacity;" whereas it is of ourselves that we have " the good will" and "the good action?" As if, indeed, this good will were a different thing from that love which the Scripture so loudly proclaims to have come to us from God, and to have been given to us by the Father, that we might become His children.
CHAP. 23 [xXIL] — PELAGIUS' DOUBLE DE.ALIXG CONCERNING THE GROUND OF THE CONFERRENCE OF GRACE.
Perhaps, however, our own antecedent merits caused this gift to be bestowed upon us; as this writer has already suggested in reference to God's grace, in that work which he addressed to a holy virgin,'" whom he mentions in the letter sent by him to Rome. For, after adducing the testimony of the Apostle James, in which he says, " Submit yourselves unto God; but resist the devil, and he will flee from you," " he goes on to say: " He shows us how we ought to resist the devil, if we submit ourselves indeed to God and by doing His will merit His divine grace, and by the help of the Holy Ghost more easily withstand the evil spirit." Judge, then, how sincere was his condemnation in the Palestine Synod of those persons who say that God's grace is conferred on us according to our merits! Have we any doubt as to his still holding this opinion, and most openly proclaiming it? Well, how could that confession of his before the bishops have been true and real? Had he already written the book in which he most explicitly alleges that grace is bestowed on us according to our deserts — the very position which he without any reser- vation condenmed at that Synod in the East? Let him frankly acknowledge that he once held the opinion, but that he holds it no longer; so should we most frankly rejoice in his im- provement. As it is, however, when, besides other objections, this one was laid to his charge which we are now discussing, he said in reply: " Whether these are the opinions of Coelestius or not, is the concern of those who affirm that 9 See above, ch. 4. " Jas. iv. 7.
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they are. For my own part, indeed, I never en- tertained such views; on the contrary, I anathe- matize every one who does entertain them." ' ' But how could he " never have entertained such views," when he had aheady comj)osed this work? Or how does he still " anathematize ^ everybody who entertains these views," if he afterwards composed this work?
CHAP. 24. — PEL.'^GIUS PLACES FREE WILL AT THE BASIS OF ALL TURNING TO GOD FOR GR.-\CE.
But perhaps he may meet us with this re- joinder, that in the sentence before us he spoke of our " meriting the divine grace by doing the will of God," in the sense that grace is added to those who believe and lead godly lives, whereby they may boldly withstand the tempter; whereas their very first reception of grace was, that they might do the will of God. Lest, then, he make such a rejoinder, consider some other words of his on this subject: " The man," says he, " who hastens to the Lord, and desires to be directed ,by Him, that is, who makes his own will depend upon God's, who moreover cleaves so closely to the Lord as to become (as the apostle says) •' one spirit ' with Him,^ does all this by noth- ing else than by his freedom of will." Observe Jiow great a result he has here stated to be ac- complished only by our freedom of will; and how, in fact, he supposes us to cleave to God without the help of God: for such is the force of his words, " by nothing else than by his own freedom of will." So that, after we have cleaved to the Lord without His help, we even then, because of such adhesion of our own, deserve .to be assisted, [.xxiii.] For he goes on to say: "Whosoever makes a right use of this" (that as, righdy uses his freedom of will), "docs so entirely surrender himself to God, and does so completely mortify his own will, that he is able to say with the apostle, ' Nevertheless it is already not I tliat live, but Christ liveth in me; ' ^ and ' He placeth his heart in the hand of God, so that He turneth it whithersoever He willeth.'"-* Great indeed is the help of the grace of God, so that He turns our heart in whatever direction He pleases. But according to this writer's fool- ish opinion, however great the help may be, we deserve it all at the moment when, without any assistance beyond the liberty of our will, we hasten to the Lord, desire His guidance and direction, suspend our own will entirely on His, and by close adherence to Him become one spirit with Him. Now all these vast courses of goodness we (according to him) accomplish, forsooth, simply by the freedom of our own free will; and by reason of such antecedent merits we so secure His grace, that He turns our heart ■ See the De Gestis Pelagii, ch. 30 [xiv.J. ^ I Cor. vi. 17. 5 G.il. ii 20.
* Prov. xxi. I.
which way soever He pleases. Well, now, how is thai grace which is not gratuitously conterred? How can it be grace, if it is given in payment of a debt? How can that be true which the apostle says, " It is not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man shoukl boast; " 5 and again, " If it is of grace, then is it no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace:'"" how, I repeat, can this be true, if such meritorious works precede as to procure for us tiie bestowal of grace? Surely, under the circumstances, there can be no gratui- tous gift, but only the recompense of a due reward. Is it the case, then, that in order- to find their way to the help of God, men run to God without God's help? And in order that we may receive God's help while cleaving to Him, do we without His help cleave to God? What greater gift, or even what similar gift, could grace itself bestow upon any man, if he has already without grace been able to make him- self one spirit with the Lord by no other power than that of his own free will?
CHAP. 25 [XXIV.] — GOD RV HIS WONDERFULl POWER WORKS IN OUR HEARTS GOOD DISPOSI- TIONS OF OUR WILL.
Now I want him to tell us whether that king] of As.syria,7 whose holy wife Esther " abhorred] his bed," ^ whilst sitting upon the throne of his] kingdom, and clothed in all his glorious apparel;! adorned all over with gold and precious stones,' and dreadful in his majesty, when he raised his face, which was inflamed with anger, in the midst of his splendour, and beheld her, with the glare of a wild bull in the fierceness of his indigna- tion; and the queen was afraid, and her colour changed as she fainted, and she bowed herself upon the head of the maid that went before her;'' — I want hun to tell us whether this king had yet " hastened to the Lord, and had desired to be directed by Him, and had subordinated his own will to His, and had, by cleaving fast to God, become one spirit with Him, simply by the force of his own free will." Had he surrendered himself wholly to God, and entirely mortified his own will, and placed his heart in the hand of God? I suppose that anybody who should think this of the king, in the state he was then in, would be not foolish only, but even mad. And yet God converted him, and turned his indignation into gentleness. Who, however, can fail to see how much greater a task it is to change and turn wrath completely into gentleness, than to bend the heart to something, when it is not 7 The reading " Assyn'us" is replaced in some editions by the more suitable word "Assuerns."
8 This " exsecrabatiir cubile " seems to refer to Estiier's words in her prayer, AifKvaao'iai xoir-qv -TresiT. ',r'.ji', " I abhor the couch of the uncircumcised" (Esth. iv., Septiiagint).
9 Esth V. 1.
Chap. 27.]
ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST.
227 preoccupied with either affection, but is indif- ferently poised between the two? Let them therefore read and understand, observe and acknowledge, that it is not by law and teaching uttering their lessons from without, but by a secret, wonderful, and ineffable power operating within, that God works in men's hearts not only revelations of the truth, but also good disposi- tions of the will.
CHAP. 26 [XXV.] — THE PELAGIAN GRACE OF " CA- PACITY " EXPLODED. THE SCRIPTURE TEACHES THE NEED OP' GOD'S HELP IN DOING, SPEAK- ING, AND THINKING, ALIKE.
Let Pelagius, therefore, cease at last to de- ceive both himself and others by his disputa- tions against the grace of God. It is not on account of only one of these three ' — that is to say, of the *' capacity " of a good will and work — that the grace of God towards us ought to be proclaimed; but also on account of the good "will" and " work " themselves. This "capa- city," indeed, according to his definition, avails for both directions; and yet our sins must not also be attributed to God in consequence, as our good actions, according to his view, are attributed to Him owing to the same capacity. It is not only, therefore, on this account that the help of God's grace is maintained, because it assists our natural capacity. He must cease to say, "That we are able to do, say, think any good, is from Him who has given us this ability, and who also assists this ability; whereas that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thouglit, proceeds from our own selves." He must, I repeat, cease to say this. For God has not only given us the ability and aids it, but He further works in us " to will and to do." - It is not because we do not will, or do not do, that we will and do nothing good, but because we are without His help. How can he say, " That we are able to do good is of God, but that we actually do it is of our- selves," when the apostle tells us that he " prays to God " in behalf of those to whom he was writing, " that they should do no evil, but that they should do that which is good?"^ His words are not, " We pray that ye be able to do nothing evil \ " but, " that ye do no evil." Neither does he say, " that ye be able to do good; " but, " that ye do good." Forasmuch as it is written, " As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God,"'* it follows that, in order that they may do that which is good, they must be led by Him who is good. How can Pelagius say, " That we are able to make a good use of speech comes from God; but that we do actually make this good use of speech proceeds from ourselves," when the Lord declares, " It is the Spirit of your ; Father which speaketh in you "? s He does not say, " It is not you who have given to your- selves the power of speaking well; " but His words are, " It is not ye that speak." 5 Nor does He say, " It is the Spirit of your Father which givefh, or lia/h ghr/i, you the poiuer to speak well; " but He says, " which speaketh in you." He does not allude to the motion ^ of " the capacity," but He asserts the effect of the co- operation. How can this arrogant asserter of free will say, " That we are able to think a good thought comes from God, but that we actually think a good thought proceeds from ourselves "? He has his answer from the humble preacher of grace, who says, " Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of Ciod." ^ Observe he does not say, " to be able to think anything; " but, " to think anything."
CHAP. 27 [XXVI.] WHAT TRUE GRACE IS, AND WHEREFORE GIVEN. MERITS DO NOT PRECEDE GRACE.
Now even Pelagius should frankly confess that this grace is plainly set forth in the inspired Scriptures; nor should he with shameless effront- ery hide the fact that he has too long opposed it, but admit it with salutary regret; so that the holy Church may cease to be harassed by his stubborn persistence, and rather rejoice in his sincere conversion. Let him distinguish between knowledge and love, as they ought to be dis- tinguished; because " knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth." '^ And then knowledge no longer puffeth up when love builds up. And inasmuch as each is the gift of God (although one IS less, and the other greater), he must not extol our righteousness above the praise which is due to Him who justifies us, in such a way as to assign to the lesser of these two gifts the help of divine grace, and to claim the greater one for the human will. And should he consent that we receive love from the grace of God, he must not suppose that any merits of our own preceded our reception of the gift. For what merits could we possibly have had at the time when we loved not God? In order, indeed, that we might receive that love whereby we might lo\e, we were loved while as )et we hatl no love ourselves. This the Apostle John most expressly declares: " Not that we loved God," says he, " but that He loved us; '"^ and again, " We love Him, because He first loved us." '° Most excellently and truly spoken! For we could not have wherewithal to love Him, unless we received it from Him in His first loving us.
■ See above, ch. 4. ^ Rom. viii. 14.
2 Phil. ii. 13. 3 See 2 Cor. xiii. 7.
* See ch 15 al the end. 9 I John iv. 10.
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And what good could we possibly do if we pos- sessed no love? Or how could we help doing good if we have love? For although God's commandment appears sometimes to be kept by those who do not love Him, but only fear Him; yet where there is no love, no good work is imputed, nor is there any good work, rightly so called; because " whatsoever is not of faith is sin," ' and " faith worketh by love." ^ Hence also that grace of God, whereby " His love is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us," 3 must be so confessed by the man who would make a true confession, as to show his undoubting belief that notliing whatever in the way of goodness pertaining to godliness and real holiness can be accomplished without it. Not after the fashion of him who cleyly enough shows us what he thinks of it when he says, that " grace is bestowed in order that what God commands may be the more easily fulfilled; " which of course means, that even without grace God's commandments may, although less easily, yet actually, be accomplished.
CHAP. 28 [XXVII.] — PELAGIUS TEACHES TH.AT SATAN MA\ BE RESISTED WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE GRACE OF GOD.
In the book which he addressed to a certain holy virgin, there is a passage which I have already mentioned,'' wherein he plainly indicates what he holds on this subject; for he speaks of our *' deserving the grace of God, and by the help of the Holy Ghost ffiore easily resisting the evil spirit." Now why did he insert the phrase "more easily"? AV'as not the sense already complete: " And by the help of the Holy Ghost resisting the evil spirit "? But who can fail to perceive what an injury he has done by this insertion? He wants it, of course, to be supposed, that so great are the powers of our nature, which he is in such a hurry to exalt, that even without the assistance of the Holy Ghost the evil spirit can be resisted — less easily it may be, but still in a certain measure.
CHAP. 29 [XXVIII.] — WHEN HE SPEAKS OF GOD'S HELP, HE MEANS IT ONLY TO HELP US DO WHAT WITHOUT IT WE STILL COULD DO.
Again, in the first book of his Defence of the Freedom of the Will, he says: " But while we have within us a free will so strong and so sted- fast against sinning, which our Maker has im- planted in human nature generally, still, by His unspeakable goodness, we are further defended by His own daily help." AVhat need is there of such help, if free will is so strong and so sted- * Quoted above, ch. 23 [xxii], from the Epistolci ad Demetri- adem.
fast against sinning? But here, as before, he would have it understood that the purpose of the alleged assistance is, that that may be more easily accomplished by grace which he neverthe- less supposes may be effected, less easily, no doubt, but yet actually, without grace.
CHAP. 30 [XXIX.] WHAT PELAGIUS THINKS IS NEEDFUL FOR EASE OF PERFOR.MANCE IS REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE.
In like manner, in another passage of the same book, he says: " In order that men may more easily accomplish by grace that which they are commanded to do by free will." Now, ex- punge the phrase " more easily'' and you leave not only a full, but also a sound sense, if it be regarded as meaning simply this: "That men may accomplish through grace what they are commanded to do by free will." The addition of the words " more easily," however, tacitly suggests the possibility of accomplishing good works even without the grace of God. But such a meaning is disallowed by Him who says, " Without me ye can do nothing." 5 CHAP. 31 [XXX.J — PELAGIUS AND CCELESTIUS NOWHERE REALLY ACKNOWLEDGE GR.ACE.
Let him amend all this, that if human infirm- ity has erred in subjects so i)rofound, he may not add to the error diabolical deception and wilfulness, either by denying what he has really believed, or by maintaining what he has rashly believed, after he has once discovered, on recol- lecting the light of truth, that he ought never to have so believed. As for that grace, indeed, by which we are justified, — in other words, whereby " the love of Ciod is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us," ^ — I have nowhere, in those writings of Pelagius and Coelestius which I have had the opportunity of reading, found them acknowledging it as it ought to be acknowledged. In no passage at all have I observed them recognising " the chil- dren of the promise," concerning whom the apostle thus speaks: " They which are children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seed." ^ For that which God promises we do not ourselves bring about by our own choice or natural power, but He Himself effects it by grace.
CHAP. 32. WHY THE PELAGIANS DEEMED PRAYERS