had a beginning, and was not eternal, and he believes the same both of other men and other things. Many of our beliefs in regard to religious matters, again, have reference not merely to other men, but to angels also. But hope has for its object only what is good, only what is future, and only what affects the man who entertains the hope. For these rea- sons, then, faith must be distinguished from hope, not merely as a matter of verbal pro- priety, but because they are essentially differ- ent. The fact that we do not see either what we believe or what we hope for, is all that is common to faith and hope. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, for example, faith is defined (and eminent, defenders of the catholic faith have used the definition as a standard) "the evidence of things not seen."5 Although, should any one say that he believes, that is, has grounded his faith, not on words, nor on witnesses, nor on any reasoning whatever, but on the direct evidence of his own senses, he would not be guilty of such an impropriety of speech as to be justly liable to the criticism, ' 'You saw, therefore you did not believe." And hence it does not follow that an object of faith is not an object of sight. But it is better that we should use the word "faith" as the Scriptures have taught us, applying it to those things which are not seen. Concerning hope, again, the apostle says: " Hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it." 6 When, then, we believe that good is about to come, this is nothing else but to hope for it. Now what shall I say of love? Without it, faith profits nothing; and in its absence, hope cannot exist. The Apostle James says: "The devils also believe, and tremble." 7 — that is, they, having neither hope nor love, but be- lieving that what we love and hope for is about to come, are in terror. And so the Apostle Paul approves and commends the " faith that worketh by love;"8 and this cer- tainly cannot exist without hope. Wherefore there is no love without hope, no hope without love, and neither love nor hope without faith.
CHAP. 9. WHAT WE ARE TO BELIEVE. IN REGARD TO NATURE IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE CHRISTIAN TO KNOW MORE THAN THAT THE GOODNESS OF THE CREATOR IS THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS.
When, then, the question is asked what we are to believe in regard to religion, it is not necessary to probe into the nature of things, 5 Heb. xi. 1. 7 Jas. ii. 19.
240 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. XII.
as was done by those whom the Greeks call physici; nor need we be in alarm lest the Christian should be ignorant of the force and number of the elements, — the motion, and order, and eclipses of the heavenly bodies; the form of the heavens; the species and the natures of animals, plants, stones, fountains, rivers, mountains; about chronology and dis- tances; the signs of coming storms; and a thousand other things which those philoso- phers either have found out, or think they have found out. For even these men them- selves, endowed though they are with so much genius, burning with zeal, abounding in leis- ure, tracking some things by the aid of human conjecture, searching into others with the aids of history and experience, have not found out all things; and even their boasted discoveries are oftener mere guesses than certain know- ledge. It is enough for the Christian to be- lieve that the only cause of all created things, whether heavenly or earthly, whether visible or invisible, is the goodness of the Creator, the one true God; and that nothing exists but Himself that does not derive its existence from Him; and that He is the Trinity — to wit, the Father, and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same Father, but one and the same Spirit of Father and Son.
CHAP. IO. THE SUPREMELY GOOD CREATOR MADE ALL THINGS GOOD.
By the Trinity, thus supremely and equally and unchangeably good, all things were cre- ated; and these are not supremely and equally and unchangeably good, but yet they are good, even taken separately. Taken as a whole, however, they are very good, because their ensemble constitutes the universe in all its wonderful order and beauty.
CHAP. II. — WHAT IS CALLED EVIL IN THE UNI- VERSE IS BUT THE ABSENCE OF GOOD.
And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen ac- knowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the ab- sence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the ab- sence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present — namely, the diseases and wounds — go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance, — the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils — that is, privations of the good which we call health — are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.
CHAP. 12. ALL BEINGS WERE MADE GOOD, BUT NOT BEING MADE PERFECTLY GOOD, ARE LIABLE TO CORRUPTION.
All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are themselves good, ' But because they are not, like their Creator, supremely and un- changeably good, their good may be dimin- ished and increased. But for good to be di- minished is an evil, although, however much it may be diminished, it is necessary, if the being is to continue, that some good should remain to constitute the being. For however small or of whatever kind the being may be, the good which makes it a being cannot be destroyed without destroying the being itself. An uncorrupted nature is justly held in es- teem. But if, still further, it be incorrupt- ible, it is undoubtedly considered of still higher value. When it is corrupted, however, its corruption is an evil, because it is de- prived of some sort of good. For if it be de- prived of no good, it receives no injury; but it does receive injury, therefore it is deprived of good. Therefore, so long as a being is in process of corruption, there is in it some good of which it is being deprived; and if a part of the being should remain which cannot be cor- rupted, this will certainly be an incorruptible being, and accordingly the process of corruption will result in the manifestation of this great good. But if it do not cease to be cor- rupted, neither can it cease to possess good of which corruption may deprive it. But if it should be thoroughly and completely con- sumed by corruption, there will then be no good left, because there will be no bein_>. Wherefore corruption can consume the good only by consuming the being. Every being, therefore, is a good; a great good, if it can not be corrupted; a little good, if it can: but in any case, only the foolish or ignorant will deny that it is a good. And if it be wholly Chap. XV.]
ENCHIRIDION.
241 consumed by corruption, then the corruption itself must cease to exist, as there is no being- left in which it can dwell.
CHAP. 13. THERE CAN BE NO EVIL WHERE THERE IS NO GOOD; AND AN EVIL MAN IS AN EVIL GOOD.
Accordingly, there is nothing of what we call evil, if there be nothing good. But a good which is wholly without evil is a perfect good. A good, on the other hand, which contains evil is a faulty or imperfect good; and there can be no evil where there is no good. From all this we arrive at the curious result: that since every being, so far as it is a being, is good, when we say that a faulty being is an evil being, we just seem to say that what is good is evil, and that nothing but what is good can be evil, seeing that every being is good, and that no evil can exist ex- cept in a being. Nothing, then, can be evil except something which is good. And al- though this, when stated, seems to be a con- tradiction, yet the strictness of reasoning leaves us no escape from the conclusion. We must, however, beware of incurring the prophetic condemnation: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil: that put darkness for light, and light for darkness: that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bit- ter."1 And yet our Lord says: "An evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil."2 Now, what is an evil man but an evil being? for a man is a being. Now, if a man is a good thing because he is a being, what is an evil man but an evil good? Yet, when we accurately dis- tinguish these two things, we find that it is not because he is a man that he is an evil, or because he is wicked that he is a good; but that he is a good because he is a man, and an evil because he is wicked. Whoever, then, says, " To be a man is an evil," or, "To be wicked is a good," falls under the prophetic denunciation: " Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil! " For he condemns the work of God, which is the man, and praises the defect of man, which is the wick- edness. Therefore every being, even if it be a defective one, in so far as it is a being is good, and in so far as it is defective is evil.
CHAP. 14. GOOD AND EVIL ARE AN EXCEP- TION TO THE RULE THAT CONTRARY ATTRI- BUTES CANNOT BE PREDICATED OF THE SAME SUBJECT. EVIL SPRINGS UP IN WHAT IS GOOD, AND CANNOT EXIST EXCEPT IN WHAT IS GOOD.
Accordingly, in the case of these contraries 1 Isa. v. 20.
2 Luke vi. 45.
which we call good and evil, the rule of the logicians, that two contraries cannot be predi- cated at the same time of the same thing, does not hold. No weather is at the same time dark and bright: no food or drink is at the same time sweet and bitter: no body is at the same time and in the same place black and white: none is at the same time and in the same place deformed and beautiful. And this ru e is found to hold in regard to many, indeed nearly all, contraries, that they can- not exist at the same time in any one thing. But although no one can doubt that good and evil are contraries, not only can they exist at the same time, but evil cannot exist without good, or in anything that is not good. Good, however, can exist without evil. For a man or an angel can exist without being wicked; but nothing can be wicked except a man or an angel: and so far as he is a man or an angel, he is good; so far as he is wicked, he is an evil. And these two contraries are so far co-existent, that if good did not exist in what is evil, neither could evil exist; because cor- ruption could not have either a place to dwell in, or a source to spring from, if there were nothing that could be corrupted; and nothing can be corrupted except what is good, for corruption is nothing else but the destruction of good. From what is good, then, evils arose, and except in what is good they do not exist; nor was there any other source from which any evil nature could arise. For if there were, then, in so far as this was a being, it was certainly a good: and a being which was incorruptible would be a great good; and even one which was corruptible must be to some extent a good, for only by corrupting what was good in it could corruption do it harm.
CHAP. 15. THE PRECEDING ARGUMENT IS IN NO WISE INCONSISTENT WITH THE SAYING OF OUR LORD: " A GOOD TREE CANNOT BRING FORTH EVIL FRUIT."
But when we say that evil springs out of good, let it not be thought that this contra- dicts our Lord's saying: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."3 For, as He who is the Truth says, you cannot gather grapes of thorns,4 because grapes do not grow on thorns. But we see that on good soil both vines and thorns may be grown. And in the same way, just as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit, so an evil will cannot produce good works. But from the nature of man, which is good, may spring either a good or an evil will. And certainly there was at first no source from which an evil will could spring, except 3 Matt. vii. 18.
4 Matt. vii. 16.
24-2 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. XVII.
the nature of angel or of man, which was good. And our Lord Himself clearly shows this in the very same place where He speaks about the tree and its fruit. For He says: " Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit cor- rupt," ' — clearly enough warning us that evil fruits do not grow on a good tree, nor good fruits on an evil tree; but that nevertheless the ground itself, by which He meant those whom He was then addressing, might grow either kind of trees.
CHAP. 16.— IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO MAN'S HAPPINESS THAT HE SHOULD KNOW THE CAUSES OF PHYSICAL CONVULSIONS; BUT IT IS, THAT HE SHOULD KNOW THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL.
Now, in view of these considerations, when we are pleased with that line of Maro, " Happy the man who has attained to the knowledge of the causes of things," 2 we should not sup- pose that it is necessary to happiness to know the causes of the great physical convulsions, causes which lie hid in the most secret recesses of nature's kingdom, "whence comes the earthquake whose force makes the deep seas to swell and burst their barriers, and again to return upon themselves and settle down."3 But we ought to know the causes of good and evil as far as man may in this life know them, in order to avoid the mistakes and troubles of which this life is so full. For our aim must always be to reach that state of happiness in which no trouble shall distress us, and no error mislead us. If we must know the causes of physical convulsions, there are none which it concerns us more to know than those which affect our own health. But seeing that, in our ignorance of these, we are fain to resort to physicians, it would seem that we might bear with considerable patience our ignorance of the secrets that lie hid in the earth and heavens.
CHAP. 17. THE NATURE OF ERROR. ALL ERROR IS NOT HURTFUL, THOUGH IT IS MAN'S DUTY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO AVOID IT.
For although we ought with the greatest possible care to avoid error, not only in great but even in little things, and although we can- not err except through ignorance, it does not follow that, if a man is ignorant of a thing, he must forthwith fall into error. That is rather the fate of the man who thinks he knows what he does not know. For he accepts what is false as if it were true, and that is the essence 1 Matt. xii. 33.
2 Virgil, GeorgicSy ii. 490.
3 Ibid.
of error. But it is a point of very great impor- tance what the subject is in regard to which a man makes a mistake. For on one and the same subject we rightly prefer an instructed man to an ignorant one, and a man who is not in error to one who is. In the case of different subjects, however, — that is, when one man knows one thing, and another a differ- ent thing, and when what the former knows is useful, and what the latter knows is not so use- ful, or is actually hurtful, — who would not, in regard to the things the latter knows, prefer the ignorance of the former to the knowledge of the latter? For there are points on which ignorance is better than knowledge. And in the same way, it has sometimes been an ad- vantage to depart from the right way, — in travelling, however, not in morals. It has happened to myself to take the wrong road where two ways met, so that I did not pass by the place where an armed band of Donatists lay in wait for me. Yet I arrived at the place whither I was bent, though by a roundabout route; and when I heard of the ambush, I congratulated myself on my mistake, and gave thanks to God for it. Now, who would not rather be the traveller who made a mistake like this, than the highwayman who made no mistake? And hence, perhaps, it is that the prince of poets puts these words into the mouth of a lover in misery:4 " How I am undone, how I have been carried away by an evil error! " for there is an error which is good, as it not merely does no harm, but produces some actual advantage. But when we look more closely into the nature of truth, and consider that to err is just to take the false for the true, and the true for the false, or to hold what is certain as uncertain, and what is uncertain as certain, and that error in the soul is hideous and repulsive just in pro- portion as it appears fair and plausible when we utter it, or assent to it, saying, " Yea, yea; Nay, nay," — surely this life that we live is wretched indeed, if only on this account, that sometimes, in order to preserve it, it is nec- essary to fall into error. God forbid that such should be that other life, where truth it- self is the life of the soul, where no one deceives, and no one is deceived. But here men deceive and are deceived, and they are more to be pitied when they lead others astray than when they are themselves led astray by putting trust in liars. Yet so much does a ra- tional soul shrink from what is false, and so earnestly does it struggle against error, that even those who love to deceive are most un- willing to be deceived. For the liar does not 4 Virgil, Eclog. viii. 41.
Chap. XIX.]
ENCHIRIDION.
243 think that he errs, but that he leads another who trusts him into error. And certainly he does not err in regard to the matter about which he lies, if he himself knows the truth; but he is deceived in this, that he thinks his lie does him no harm, whereas every sin is more hurtful to the sinner than to the sinned against.
CHAP. 18. IT IS NEVER ALLOWABLE TO TELL A LIE; BUT LIES DIFFER VERY MUCH IN GUILT, ACCORDING TO THE INTENTION AND THE SUBJECT.
But here arises a very difficult and very in- tricate question, about which I once wrote a large book, finding it necessary to give it an answer. The question is this: whether at any time it can become the duty of a good man to tell a lie? For some go so far as to con- tend that there are occasions on which it is a good and pious work to commit perjury even, and to say what is false about matters that re- late to the worship of God, and about the very nature of God Himself. To me, however, it seems certain that every lie is a sin, though it makes a great difference with what intention and on what subject one lies. For the sin of the man who tells a lie to help another is not so heinous as that of the man who tells a lie to injure another; and the man who by his lying puts a traveller on the wrong road, does not do so much harm as the man who by false or misleading representations distorts the whole course of a life. No one, of course, is to be condemned as a liar who says what is false, believing it to be true, because such an one does not consciously deceive, but rather is himself deceived. And, on the same prin- ciple, a man is not to be accused of lying, though he may sometimes be open to the charge of rashness, if through carelessness he takes up what is false and holds it as true; but, on the other hand, the man who says what is true, believing it to be false, is, so far as his own consciousness is concerned, a liar. For in saying what he does not believe, he says what to his own conscience is false, even though it should in fact be true; nor is the man in any sense free from lying who with his mouth speaks the truth without knowing it, but in his heart wills to tell a lie. And, there- fore, not looking at the matter spoken of, but solely at the intention of the speaker, the man who unwittingly says what is false, thinking all the time that it is true, is a better man than the one who unwittingly says what is true, but in his conscience intends to deceive. For the former does not think one thing and say another; but the latter, though his statements may be true in fact, has one thought in his heart and another on his lips: and that is the very essence of lying. But when we come to consider truth and falsehood in respect to the subjects spoken of, the point on which one deceives or is deceived becomes a matter of the utmost importance. For although, as far as a man's own conscience is concerned, it is a greater evil to deceive than to be de- ceived, nevertheless it is a far less evil to tell a lie in regard to matters that do not relate to religion, than to be led into error in regard to matters the knowledge and belief of which are essential to the right worship of God. To illustrate this by example: suppose that one man should say of some one who is dead that he is still alive, knowing this to be un- true; and that another man should, being de- ceived, believe that Christ shall at the end of some time (make the time as long as you please) die; would it not be incomparably better to lie like the former, than to be de- ceived like the latter? and would it not be a much less evil to lead some man into the former error, than to be led by any man into the latter?
CHAP. 19. MEN'S ERRORS VARY VERY MUCH IN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EVILS THEY PRO- DUCE; BUT YET EVERY ERROR IS IN ITSELF AN EVIL.
In some things, then, it is a great evil to be deceived; in some it is a small evil; in some no evil at all; and in some it is an act- ual advantage. It is to his grievous injury that a man is deceived when he does not be- lieve what leads to eternal life, or believes what leads to eternal death. It is a small evil for a man to be deceived, when, by taking false- hood for truth, he brings upon himself tem- poral annoyances; for the patience of the be- liever will turn even these to a good use, as when, for example, taking a bad man for a good, he receives injury from him. But one who believes a bad man to be good, and yet suffers no injury, is nothing the worse for be- ing deceived, nor does he fall under the pro- phetic denunciation: " Woe to those who call evil good! " 1 For we are to understand that this is spoken not about evil men, but about the things that make men evil. Hence the man who calls adultery good, falls justly under that prophetic denunciation. But the man who calls the adulterer good, thinking him to be chaste, and not knowing him to be an adulterer, falls into no error in regard to the nature of good and evil, but only makes a mistake as to the secrets of human conduct. He calls 1 Isa. v. 20.
244 1 Isa. v. 20.
244 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chai\ XXI.
the man good on the ground of believing him to be what is undoubtedly good; he calls the adulterer evil, and the pure man good; and he calls this man good, not knowing him to be an adulterer, but believing him to be pure. Further, if by making a mistake one escape death, as I have said above once happened to me,. one even derives some advantage from one's mistake. But when I assert that in cer- tain cases a man may be deceived without any injury to himself, or even with some advan- tage to himself, I do not mean that the mis- take in itself is no evil, or is in any sense a good; I refer only to -the evil that is avoided, or the advantage that is gained, through mak- ing the mistake. For the mistake, considered in itself, is an evil: a great evil if it concern a great matter, a small evil if it concern a small matter, but yet always an evil. For who that is of sound mind can deny that it is an evil to receive what is false as if it were true, and to reject what is true as if it were false, or to hold what is uncertain as certain, and what is certain as uncertain? But it is one thing to think a man good when he is really bad, which is a mistake; it is another thing to suffer no ulterior injury in conse-