one thing to a Greek and another to a Latin. Now, just as all these signs affect the mind according to the arrangements of the com- munity in which each man lives, and affect different men's minds differently, because these arrangements are different; and as, further, men did not agree upon them as 543 ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
[Book II.
signs because they were already significant, but on the contrary they are now significant because men have agreed upon them; in the same way also, those signs by which the ruin- ous intercourse with devils is maintained have meaning just in proportion to each man's ob- servations. And this appears quite plainly in the rites of the augurs; for they, both before they observe the omens and after they have completed their observations, take pains not to see the flight or hear the cries of birds, because these omens are of no significance apart from the previous arrangement in the mind of the observer.
CHAP. 25. — IN HUMAN INSTITUTIONS WHICH ARE NOT SUPERSTITIOUS, THERE ARE SOME THINGS SUPERFLUOUS AND SOME CONVENIENT AND NECESSARY.
38. But when all these have been cut away and rooted out of the mind of the Christian, we must then look at human institutions which are not superstitious, that is, such as are not set up in association with devils, but by men in association with one another. For all arrangements that are in force among men, because they have agreed among themselves that they should be in force, are human insti- tutions; and of these, some are matters of superfluity and luxury, some of convenience and necessity. For if those signs which the actors make in dancing were of force by nature, and not by the arrangement and agreement of men, the public crier would not in former times have announced to the people of Carthage, while the pantomime was danc- ing, what it was he meant to express, — a thing still remembered by many old men from whom we have frequently heard it.1 And we may well believe this, because even now, if any one who is unaccustomed to such follies goes into the theatre, unless some one tells him what these movements mean, he will give his whole attention to them in vain. Yet all men aim at a certain degree of like- ness in their choice of signs, that the signs may as far as possible be like the things they signify. But because one thing may resemble another in many ways, such signs are not always of the same significance among men, except when they have mutually agreed upon them.
39. But in regard to pictures and statues, and other works of this kind, which are in- tended as representations of things, nobody makes a mistake, especially if they are exe- cuted by skilled artists, but every one, as soon as he sees the likenesses, recognizes the * See Tylor's Early History of Mankind, pp. 42, 43.
things they are likenesses of. And this whole class are to be reckoned among the superflu- ous devices of men, unless when it is a matter of importance to inquire in regard to any of them, for what reason, where, when, and by whose authority it was made. Finally, the thousands of fables and fictions, in whose lies men take delight, are human devices, and nothing is to be considered more peculiarly man's own and derived from himself than anything that is false and lying. Among the convenient and necessary arrangements of men with men are to be reckoned whatever differences they choose to make in bodily dress and ornament for the purpose of dis- tinguishing sex or rank; and the countless varieties of signs without which human inter- course either could not be carried on at all, or would be carried on at great inconvenience; and the arrangements as to weights and meas- ures, and the stamping and weighing of coins, which are peculiar to each state and people, and other things of the same kind. Now these, if they were not devices of men, would not be different in different nations, and could not be changed among particular nations at the discretion of their respective sovereigns.
40. This whole class of human arrange- ments, which are of convenience for the necessary intercourse of life, the Christian is not by any means to neglect, but on the con- trary should pay a sufficient degree of atten- tion to them, and keep them in memory.
CHAP. 26. WHAT HUMAN CONTRIVANCES WE ARE TO ADOPT, AND WHAT WE ARE TO AVOID.
For certain institutions of men are in a sort of way representations and likenesses of natural objects. And of these, such as have re- lation to fellowship with devils must, as has been said, be utterly rejected and held in detestation; those, on the other hand, which relate to the mutual intercourse of men, are, so far as they are not matters of luxury and superfluity, to be adopted, especially the forms of the letters which are necessary for reading, and the various languages as far as is required — a matter I have spoken of above.2 To this class also belong shorthand charac- ters,3 those who are acquainted with which are called shorthand writers.4 All these are useful, and there is nothing unlawful in learn- ing them, nor do they involve us in supersti- tion, or enervate us by luxury, if they only occupy our minds so far as not to stand in the way of more important objects to which they ought to be subservient.
2 See above, chap. xi.
3 Nota.
4 Notarii.
Chap. XXIX.]
ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
549 CHAP. 27. SOME DEPARTMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE, NOT OF MERE HUMAN INVENTION, AID US IN INTERPRETING SCRIPTURE.
41. But, coming to the next point, we are not to reckon among human institutions those things which men have handed down to us, not as arrangements of their own, but as the result of investigation into the occurrences of the past, and into the arrangements of God's providence. And of these, some pertain to the bodily senses, some to the intellect. Those which are reached by the bodily senses we either believe on testimony, or perceive when they are pointed out to us, or infer from experience.
CHAP. 28. — TO WHAT EXTENT HISTORY IS AN AID.
42. Anything, then, that we learn from history about the chronology of past times assists us very much in understanding the Scriptures, even if it be learnt without the pale of the Church as a matter of childish in- struction. For we frequently seek informa- tion about a variety of matters by use of the Olympiads, and the names of the consuls; and ignorance of the consulship in which our Lord was born, and that in which He suffered, has led some into the error of supposing that He was forty-six years of age when He suf- fered, that being the number of years He was told by the Jews the temple (which He took as a symbol of His body) was in building.1 Now we know on the authority of the evan- gelist that He was about thirty years of age when He was baptized;2 but the number of years He lived afterwards, although by put- ting His actions together we can make it out, yet that no shadow of doubt might arise from another source, can be ascertained more clearly and more certainly from a comparison -of profane history with the gospel. It will still be evident, however, that it was not with- out a purpose it was said that the temple was forty and six years in building; so that, as this cannot be referred to our Lord's age, it may be referred to the more secret formation of the body which, for our sakes, the only- begotten Son of God, by whom all things were made, condescended to put on.3 43. As to the utility of history, moreover, passing over the Greeks, what a great ques- tion our own Ambrose has set at rest! For, when the readers and admirers of Plato dared calumniously to assert that our Lord Jesus Christ learnt all those sayings of His, which they are compelled to admire and praise, 1 John ii. 19.
3 See above, chap. xvi.
2 Luke iii. 23.
from the books of Plato — because (they urged) it cannot be denied that Plato lived long before the coming of our Lord! — did not the illustrious bishop, when by his investiga- tions into profane history he had discovered that Plato made a journey into Egypt at the time when Jeremiah the prophet was there,4 show that it is much more likely that Plato was through Jeremiah's means initiated into our literature, so as to be able to teach and write those views of his which are so justly praised? For not even Pythagoras himself, from whose successors these men assert Plato learnt theology, lived at a date prior to the books of that Hebrew race, among whom the worship of one God sprang up, and of whom as concerning the flesh our Lord came. And thus, when we reflect upon the dates, it be- comes much more probable that those phi- losophers learnt whatever they said that was good and true from our literature, than that the Lord Jesus Christ learnt from the writings of Plato, — a thing which it is the height of folly to believe.
44. And even when in the course of an his- torical narrative former institutions of men are described, the history itself is not to be reckoned among human institutions; because things that are past and gone and cannot be undone are to be reckoned as belonging to the course of time, of which God is the author and governor. For it is one thing to tell what has been done, another to show what ought to be done. History narrates what has been done, faithfully and with advantage; but the books of the haruspices, and all writings of the same kind, aim at teaching what ought to be done or observed, using the boldness of an adviser, not the fidelity of a narrator.
CHAP. 29. TO WHAT EXTENT NATURAL SCIENCE IS AN EXEGETICAL AID.
45. There is also a species of narrative re- sembling description, in which not a past but an existing state of things is made known to those who are ignorant of it. To this species belongs all that has been written about the situation of places, and the nature of animals, trees, herbs, stones, and other bodies. And of this species I have treated above, and have shown that this kind of knowledge is service- able in solving the difficulties of Scripture, not that these objects are to be used con- formably to certain signs as nostrums or the instruments of superstition; for that kind of knowledge I have already set aside as distinct from the lawful and free kind now spoken of. For it is one thing to say: If you bruise down 4 Augustin himself corrected this mistake. Retractations, ii. 4.
55o ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
[Book II.
this herb and drink it, it will remove the pam from your stomach; and another to say: If you hang this herb round your neck, it will remove the pain from your stomach. In the former case the wholesome mixture is ap- proved of, in the latter the superstitious charm is condemned; although indeed, where incan- tations and invocations and marks are not used, it is frequently doubtful whether the thing that is tied or fixed in any way to the body to cure it, acts by a natural virtue, in which case it may be freely used; or acts by a sort of charm, in which case it becomes the Christian to avoid it the more carefully, the more efficacious it may seem to be. But when the reason why a thing is of virtue does not appear, the intention with which it is used is of great importance, at least in healing or in tempering bodies, whether in medicine or in agriculture.
46. The knowledge of the stars, again, is not a matter of narration, but of description. Very few of these, however, are mentioned in Scripture. And as the course of the moon, which is regularly employed in reference to celebrating the anniversary of our Lord's passion, is known to most people; so the rising and setting and other movements of the rest of the heavenly bodies are thoroughly known to very few. And this knowledge, al- though in itself it involves no superstition, renders very little, indeed almost no assist- ance, in the interpretation of Holy Scripture, and by engaging the attention unprofitably is a hindrance rather; and as it is closely related to the very pernicious error of the diviners of the fates, it is more convenient and becoming to neglect it. It involves, moreover, in addi- tion to a description of the present state of things, something like a narrative of the past also; because one may go back from the present position and motion of the stars, and trace by rule their past movements. It in- volves also regular anticipations of the future, not in the way of forebodings and omens, but by way of sure calculation; not with the de- sign of drawing any information from them as to our own acts and fates, in the absurd fashion of the getiethliaci, but only as to the motions of the heavenly bodies themselves. For, as the man who computes the moon's age can tell, when he has found out her age to-day, what her age was any number of years ago, or what will be her age any number of years hence, in just the same way men who are skilled in such computations are accus- tomed to answer like questions about every one of the heavenly bodies. And I have stated what my views are about all this knowledge, so far as regards its utility.
CHAP. 30. WHAT THE MECHANICAL ARTS CON- TRIBUTE TO EXEGETICS.
47. Further, as to the remaining arts, whether those by which something is made which, when the effort of the workman is over, remains as a result of his work, as, for ex- ample, a house, a bench, a dish, and other things of that kind; or those which, so to speak, assist God in His operations, as medi- cine, and agriculture, and navigation: or those whose sole result is an action, as danc- ing, and racing, and wrestling; — in all these arts experience teaches us to infer the future from the past. For no man who is skilled in any of these arts moves his limbs in any operation without connecting the memory of the past with the expectation of the future. Now of these arts a very superficial and cursory knowledge is to be acquired, not with a view to practising them (unless some duty compel us, a matter on which I do not touch at present), but with a view to forming a judg- ment about them, that we may not be wholly ignorant of what Scripture means to convey when it employs figures of speech derived from these arts.
CHAP. 31. — USE OF DIALECTICS. OF FALLACIES.
48. There remain those branches of knowl- edge which pertain not to the bodily senses, but to the intellect, among which the science of reasoning and that of number are the chief. The science of reasoning is of very great ser- vice in searching into and unravelling all sorts of questions that come up in Scripture, only in the use of it we must guard against the love of wrangling, and the childish vanity of entrapping an adversary. For there are many of what are called sophisms, inferences in reasoning that are false, and yet so close an imitation of the true, as to deceive not only dull people, but clever men too, when they are not on their guard. For example, one man lays before another with whom he is talking, the proposition, "What I am, you are not." The other assents, for the proposi- tion is in part true, the one man being cun- ning and the other simple. Then the first speaker adds: "lama man; " and when the other has given his assent to this also, the first draws his conclusion: "Then you are not a man." Now of this sort of ensnaring arguments, Scripture, as I judge, expresses detestation in that place where it is said, " There is one that showeth wisdom in words, and is hated;"1 although, indeed, a style of speech which is not intended to entrap, but 1 Qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est. Ecclus. xx.wii. 20.
Chap. XXXIII.]
ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
55r only aims at verbal ornamentation more than is consistent with seriousness of purpose, is also called sophistical.
49. There are also valid processes of rea- soning which lead to false conclusions, by following out to its logical consequences the error of the man with whom one is arguing; and these conclusions are sometimes drawn by a good and learned man, with the object of making the person from whose error these consequences result, feel ashamed of them, and of thus leading him to give up his error, when he finds that if he wishes to retain his old opinion, he must of necessity also hold other opinions which he condemns. For ex- ample, the apostle did not draw true conclu- sions when he said, " Then is Christ not risen," and again, "Then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain;"1 and further on drew other inferences which are all utterly false; for Christ has risen, the preach- ing of those who declared this fact was not in vain, nor was their faith in vain who had be- lieved it. But all these false inferences fol- lowed legitimately from the opinion of those who said that there is no resurrection of the dead. These inferences, then, being re- pudiated as false, it follows that since they would be true if the dead rise not, there will be a resurrection of the dead. As, then, valid conclusions may be drawn not only from true but from false propositions, the laws of valid reasoning may easily be learnt in the schools, outside the pale of the Church. But the truth of propositions must be inquired into in the sacred books of the Church.
CHAP. 32. VALID LOGICAL SEQUENCE IS NOT DEVISED BUT ONLY OBSERVED BY MAN.
50. And yet the validity of logical se- quences is not a thing devised by men, but is observed and noted by them that they may be able to learn and teach it; for it exists eternally in the reason of things, and has its origin with God. For as the man who nar- rates the order of events does not himself create that order; and as he who describes the situations of places, or the natures of ani- mals, or roots, or minerals, does not describe arrangements of man; and as he who points out the stars and their movements does not point out anything that he himself or any other man has ordained; — in the same way, he who says, " When the consequent is false, the antecedent must also be false," says what is most true; but he does not himself make it so, he only points out that it is so. And it is upon this rule that the reasoning I have quoted from the Apostle Paul proceeds. For the antecedent is, "There is no resurrection of the dead," — the position taken up by those whose error the apostle wished to overthrow. Next, from this antecedent, the assertion, viz., that there is no resurrection of the dead, the necessary consequence is, "Then Christ is not risen." But this consequence is false, for Christ has risen; therefore the antecedent is also false. But the antecedent is, that there is no resurrection of the dead. We conclude, therefore, that there is a resurrec- tion of the dead. Now all this is briefly ex- pressed thus: If there is no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen; but Christ is risen, therefore there is a resurrection of the dead. This rule, then, that when the consequent is removed, the antecedent must also be removed, is not made by man, but only pointed out by him. And this rule has reference to the validity of the reasoning, not to the truth of the statements.
CHAP. 33. FALSE INFERENCES MAY BE DRAWN FROM VALID REASONINGS, AND VICE VERSA.
51. In this passage, however, where the argument is about the resurrection, both the law of the inference is valid, and the conclu- sion arrived at is true. But in the case of false conclusions, too, there is a validity of inference in some such way as the following. Let us suppose some man to have admitted: If a snail is an animal, it has a voice. This being admitted, then, when it has been proved that the snail has no voice, it follows (since when the consequent is proved false, the an- tecedent is also false) that the snail is not an animal. Now this conclusion is false, but it is a true and valid inference from the false admission. Thus, the truth of a statement stands on its own merits; the validity of an inference depends on the statement or the admission of the man with whom one is argu- ing. And thus, as I said above, a false in- ference may be drawn by a valid process of reasoning, in order that he whose error we wish to correct may be sorry that he has ad- mitted the antecedent, when he sees that its logical consequences are utterly untenable. And hence it is easy to understand that as the inferences may be valid where the opinions are false, so the inferences may be unsound where the opinions are true. For example, suppose that a man propounds the statement, "If this man is just, he is good," and we admit its truth. Then he adds, " But he is not just;" and when we admit this too, he draws the conclusion, " Therefore he is not good." Now although every one of these 552 ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.
statements may be true, still the principle of the inference is unsound. For it is not true that, as when the consequent is proved false the antecedent is also false, so when the an- tecedent is proved false the consequent is false. For the statement is true, " If he is an orator, he is a man." But if we add, " He is not an orator," the consequence does not follow, " He is not a man."
CHAP. 34. IT IS ONE THING TO KNOW THE LAWS OF INFERENCE, ANOTHER TO KNOW THE TRUTH OF OPINIONS.
52. Therefore it is one thing to know the *aws of inference, and another to know the truth of opinions. In the former case we learn what is consequent, what is inconse- quent, and what is incompatible. An exam- ple of a consequent is, " If he is an orator, he is a man; " of an inconsequent, " If he is a man, he is an orator; " of an incompatible, "If he is a man, he is a quadruped." In these instances we judge of the connection. In regard to the truth of opinions, however, we must consider propositions as they stand by themselves, and not in their connection with one another; but when propositions that we are not sure about are joined by a valid inference to propositions that are true and certain, they themselves, too, necessarily be- come certain. Now some, when they have ascertained the validity of the inference, plume themselves as if this involved also the truth of the propositions. Many, again, who hold the true opinions have an unfounded contempt for themselves, because they are ignorant of the laws of inference; whereas the man who knows that there is a resurrection of the dead is assuredly better than the man who only knows that it follows that if there is no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen.
CHAP. 35. THE SCIENCE OF DEFINITION IS NOT FALSE, THOUGH IT MAY BE APPLIED TO FAL- SITIES.
53. Again, the science of definition, of di- vision, and of partition, although it is fre- quently applied to falsities, is not itself false, nor framed by man's device, but is evolved from the reason of things. For although poets have applied it to their fictions, and false philosophers, or even heretics — that is, false Christians — to their erroneous doctrines, that is no reason why it should be false, for example, that neither in definition, nor in di- vision, nor in partition, is anything to be in- cluded that does not pertain to the matter in hand, nor anything to be omitted that does.