to be informed by the sensible things themselves, and the eye of the mind by the images of those sensible things. Accord- ingly, the more vehement has been either fear or desire, the more distinctly is the eye informed, whether in the case of him who perceives by means of the body that which lies close to him in place, or in the case of him who thinks from the image of the body which is contained in the memory. What then a body in place is to the bodily sense, that the simili- tude of a body in memory is to the eye of the mind; and what the vision of one who looks at a thing is to that appear- ance of the body from which the sense is informed, that the vision of a thinker is to the image of the body established in the memory, from which the eye of the mind is informed; and what the intention of the will is towards a body seen and the vision to be combined with it, in order that a certain unity of three things may therein take place, although their nature is diverse, that the same intention of the will is towards combining the image of the body which is in the memory, and the vision of the thinker, that is, the form which CHAP, v.] THE EXTERNAL TRINITY NOT AN IMAGE OF GOD. 271 the eye of the mind has taken in returning to the memory, in order that here too a certain unity may take place of three things, not now distinguished by diversity of nature, but of one and the same substance; because this whole is within, and the whole is one mind.
Chap. v. — The trinity of the outer man, or of external vision, is not an image of God. The likeness of God is desired even in sins. In external vision the form of the corporeal thing is as it were the parent, vision the offspring; but the will that unites these intimates the Holy Spirit.
8. But as, when the form and species of a body have per- ished, the will cannot recall to it the sense of perceiving; so, when the image which memory bears is blotted out by forget- fulness, the will will be unable to force back the eye of the mind by recollection, so as to be formed thereby. But because the mind has great power to imagine not only things forgotten, but also things that it never perceived, or experienced, either by increasing, or diminishing, or changing, or compounding, after its pleasure, those which have not dropped out of its re- membrance, it often imagines things to be such as either it knows they are not, or does not know that they are. And in this case we have to take care, lest it either speak falsely that it may deceive, or hold an opinion so as to be deceived. And if it avoid these two evils, then imagined phantasms do not hinder it: just as sensible things experienced or retained by memory do not hinder it, if they are neither passionately sought for when pleasant, nor basely shunned when unpleasant. But when the will leaves better things, and greedily wallows in i iaese, then it becomes unclean; and they are so thought of hurtfully, when they are present, and also more hurtfully when they are absent. And he therefore lives badly and degenerately who lives according to the trinity of 'the outer man; because it is the purpose of using things sensible and corporeal, that has begotten also that trinity, which although it imagines within, yet imagines things without. For no one could use those things even well, unless the images of things perceived by the senses were retained in the memory. And unless the will for the greatest part dwells in the higher and interior things, and unless that will itself, which is accommodated either to bodies without, or to ' the images of them within.
272 ON THE TEINITY. [bOOK XL refers whatever it receives in them to a better and truer life, and rests in that end by gazing at which it judges that those things ought to be done; what else do we do, but that which the apostle prohibits us from doing, when he says, " Be not conformed to this world "?^ And therefore that trinity is not an image of God: since it is produced in the mind itself through the bodily sense, from the lowest, that is, the corporeal creature, than which the mind is higher. Yet neither is it altogether dissimilar: for what is there that has not a like- ness of God, in proportion to its kind and measure, seeing that God made all things very good,^ and for no other reason except that He Himself is supremely good? In so far, there- fore, as anything that is, is good, in so far plainly it has still some likeness of the supreme good, at however great a distance; and if a natural likeness, then certainly a right and well-ordered one; but if a faulty likeness, then certainly a debased and perverse one. For even souls in their very sins strive after nothing else but some kind of likeness of God, in a proud and preposterous, and, so to say, slavish liberty. So neither could our first parents have been persuaded to sin unless it had been said, " Ye shall be as gods." ^ No doubt everything in the creatures which is in any way like God, is not also to be called His image; but that alone than which He Himself alone is higher. For that only is in all points copied from Him, between which and Himself no nature is inter- posed.
9. Of that vision then, that is, of the form which is wrought in the sense of him who sees, the form of the bodily thing from which it is wrought, is, as it were, the parent. But it is not a true parent; whence neither is that a true offspring; for it is not altogether born therefrom, since something else is applied to the bodily thing in order that it may be formed from it, namely, the sense of him who sees. And for this reason, to love this, is to be estranged.* Therefore the will which unites both, viz. the quasi-parent and the quasi- child, is more spiritual than either of them. For that * Vid. Retract, c. 15, -wlicre Augustine adds that it is possible to love the bodily species to the praise of the Creator, in which case there is no '* estrangement."
CHAP. VI.] WHAT IS THE END OF THE WILL IN VISION. 273 bodily thing whicli is discerned/ is not spiritual at all. But the vision which comes into existence in the sense, has some- thing spiritual mingled with it, since it cannot come into exis- tence without the soul. But it is not wholly spiritual; since that which is formed is a sense of the body. Therefore the will which unites both, is confessedly more spiritual, as I have said; and so it begins to intimate, as it were, the person of the Spirit in that trinity. But it belongs more to the sense that is formed, than to the bodily thing whence it is formed. For the sense and will of an animate being belongs to the soul, not to the stone or other bodily thing that is seen. It does not therefore proceed from that bodily thing as from a parent; yet neither does it proceed from that other as it were offspring, namely, the vision and form that is in the sense. For the will existed before the vision came to pass, which will applied the sense that was to be formed to the bodily thing that was to be discerned; but it was not yet satisfied. For how could that which was not yet seen satisfy? And satisfaction means a will that rests content. And, therefore, we can neither call the will the quasi-offspring of vision, since it existed before vision; nor the quasi-parent, since that vision was not formed and expressed from the will, but from the bodily thing that was seen.
Chap. vi. — Of what kind we are to reckon the rest and end of the will in vision.
10. Perhaps we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the will, only with respect to this one object [that is, the bodily thing that is to be seen]. For it will not therefore will nothing else, because it sees something which it was willing. It is not therefore the will itself of man altogether, of which the end is nothing else than blessedness; but the will pro- visionally directed to this one object, which has as its end in seeing nothing but vision, whether it refer the thing seen to any other thing or not. For if it does not refer the vision to anything further, but willed only to see it, there can be no question made about showing that the end of the will is the vision; for it is manifest. But if it does refer it to anything further, then certainly it does will something else, and it will not be now a will to see; or if to see, not one to see the par- DE TRIN. s 274 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XL ticular thing. Just as if any one wished to see the scar, that from thence he might learn that there had been a wound; or wished to see the window, that through the window he might see the passers-by: all these and other such acts of will have their own proper ends, which are referred to the end of that will, by which we will to live blessedly, and to attain to that life which is not referred to anything else, but suffices of itself to him who loves it. The will then to see, has as its end vision; and the will to see this particular thing, has as its end the vision of this particular thing. Therefore the will to see the scar, desires its own end, that is, the vision of the scar, and does not reach beyond it; for the will to prove that there had been a wound, is a distinct will, although dependent upon that, of which the end also is to prove that there had been a w^ound. And the will to see the window, has as its end the vision of the window; for that is another and further will which depends upon it, viz. to see the passers-by through the window, of which also the end is the vision of the passers-by. But all the several wills that are bound to each other, are at once right, if that one is good, to which all are referred; and if that is bad, then all are bad. And so the connected series of right wills is a sort of road which consists as it were of certain steps, whereby to ascend to blessedness; but the en- tanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a bond by which he will be bound who thus acts, so as to be cast into outer darkness.^ Blessed therefore are they who in act and character sing the song of the steps;^ and woe to those that draw sin, as it were a long rope.^ And it is just the same to speak of the will being in repose, which we call its end, if it is still referred to something further, as if we should say that the foot is at rest in walking, when it is placed there, whence yet another foot may be planted in the direction of the man's steps. But if something so satisfies, that the will acquiesces in it with a certain delight; it is nevertheless not yet that to which the man ultimately tends; but this too is referred to something further, so as to be regarded not as the native country of a citizen, but as a place of refreshment, or even of stopping, for a traveller.
CHAP, til] a trinity IN THE MEMORY. 275 Chap. vii. — There is another trinity in the memory of him who thinks over again what he has seen.
11. But yet again, take the case of another trinity, more inward indeed than that which is in things sensible, and in the senses, but which is yet conceived from thence; while now it is no longer the sense of the body that is informed from the body, but the eye of the mind that is informed from the memory, since the species of the body which we perceived from without has inhered in the memory itself And that species, which is in the memory, we call the quasi-parent of that which is wrought in the phantasy of one who thinks. For it was in the memory also, before we thought it, just as the body was in place also before we perceived it, in order that vision might take place. But when it is thought, then from that form which the memory retains, there is copied in the eye of the mind of him who thinks, and by remembrance is formed, that species, which is the quasi- offspring of that which the memory retains. But neither is the one a true parent, nor the other a true offspring. For the sight of the mind which is formed from memory when we think anything by recollec- tion, does not proceed from that species which we remember as seen; since we could not indeed have remembered those things, unless we had seen them; yet the eye of the mind, which is formed by the recollection, existed also before we saw the body that we remember; and therefore how much more before we committed it to memory? Although therefore the form which is wrought in the eye of the mind of him who remembers, is wrought from that form which is in the memory; yet the eye of the mind itself does not exist from thence, but existed before it. And it follows, that if the one is not a true parent, neither is the other a true offspring. But both that quasi-parent and that quasi -offspring insinuate something, whence the inner and truer things may appear more practi- cally and more certainly.
12. Further, it is more difficult to discern clearly, whether the will which combines the vision to the memory is not either the parent or the offspring of some one of them; and the likeness and equality of the same nature and substance cause this difficulty of distinguishing. For it is not possible y 276 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI.
to do in this case, as with the sense that is formed, which is easily discerned from the sensible body without, and again the will from both, on account of the difference of nature which is mutually in all three, and of which we have treated suffi- ciently above. Tor although this trinity, of which we at pre- sent speak, is introduced into the mind from without; yet it is transacted within, and there is no part of it without the nature of the mind itself. In what way, then, can it be de- monstrated that the will is neither the quasi-parent, nor the quasi-offspring, either of the corporeal likeness which is con- tained in the memory, or of that which is copied thence in recollecting; when it so unites both in the act of thinking, as that they appear singly as one, and cannot be discerned except by reason? It is then first to be considered that there cannot be any will to remember, unless we retain in the recesses of the memory either the whole, or some part, of that thing which we wish to remember. For the very will to remember cannot arise in the case of a thing which we have forgotten altogether and absolutely; since we have already remembered that the thing which we wish to remember is, or has been, in our memory. For example, if I wish to remember what I supped on yesterday, either I have already remembered that I did sup, or if not yet this, at least I have remembered some- thing about that time itself, if nothing else; at all events, I have remembered yesterday, and that part of yesterday in which people usually sup, and what supping is. For if I had not remembered anything at all of this kind, I could not wish to remember what I supped on yesterday. Whence we may perceive that the will of remembering proceeds, indeed, from those things which are retained in the memory, with the addi- tion also of those which, by the act of discerning, are copied thence through recollection; that is, from the combination of something which we have remembered, and of the vision which was thence wrought, when w^e remembered, in the mind's eye of him who thinks. But the will itself which unites both requires also some other thing, which is, as it were, close at hand, and adjacent to him who remembers. There are, then, as many trinities of this kind as there are remembrances; because there is no one of them wherein there are not these three CHAP. VIII.] THOUGHT MORE VAEIED THAN MEMORY. 277 things, viz. that which was stored up in the memory also be- fore it was thought, and that which takes place in the thought when this is discerned, and the will that unites both, and from both and itself as a third, completes one single thing. Or is it rather that we so recognise some one trinity in this kind as that we are to speak generally, of whatever corporeal species lie hidden in the memory, as of a single unity, and again of the general vision of the mind which remembers and thinks such things, as of a single unity, to the combination of which two there is to be joined as a third the will that combines them, that this whole may be a certain unity made up from three?
Chap. viii. — Different modes of thinhinri.
But since the eye of the mind cannot look at all things together, in one glance, which the memory retains, these trini- ties of thought alternate in a series of withdrawals and succes- sions, and so that trinity becomes most innumerably numerous; and yet not infinite, if it pass not beyond the number of things stored up in the memory. "For, although we begin to reckon from the earliest perception which any one has of material things through any bodily sense, and even take in also those things which he has forgotten, yet the number would undoubtedly be certain and determined, although innumerable. For we not only call infinite things innumerable, but also those, which, although finite, exceed any one's power of reckoning.
13. But we can hence perceive a little more clearly that what the memory stores up and retains is a different thing from that which is thence copied in the thought of the man who remembers, although, when both are combined together, they appear to be one and the same; because we can only remember just as many species of bodies as we have actually perceived, and so great, and such as we have actually per- ceived; for the mind imbibes them into the memory from the bodily sense; whereas the things seen in thought, although drawn from those things which are in the memory, yet are multiplied and varied innumerably, and altogether without end. For I remember, no doubt, but one sun, because, accord- ing to the fact, I have seen but one; but if I please, I think of two, or three, or as many as I will; but the sight of my mind, when I think of many, is formed from the same memory 278 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI.
by whicli I remember one. And I remember it just as large as I saw it. For if I remember it as larger or smaller than I saw it, tben I no longer remember what I saw, and so I do not remember it. But because I remember it, I remember it as large as I saw it; yet I think of it as greater or as less according to my will. And I remember it as I saw it; but I think of it as running its course as I will, and as standing still where I will, and as coming whence I will, and whither I will. For it is in my power to think of it as square, although I remember it as round; and again, of what colour I please, although I have never seen, and therefore do not remember, a green sun; and as the sun, so all other things. But owing to the corporeal and sensible nature of these forms of things, the mind falls into error when it imagines them to exist with- out, in the same mode in which it thinks them within, either when they have already ceased to exist without, but are still retained in the memory, or when in any other way also, that which we remember is formed in the mind, not by faithful recollection, but after the variations of thought.
14. Although it very often happens that we believe also a true narrative, told us by others, of things which the narrators have themselves perceived by their senses. And in this case, when we think the things narrated to us, as we hear them, the eye of the mind does not seem to be turned back to the memory, in order to bring up visions in our thoughts; for we do not think these things from our own recollection, but upon the narration of another; and that trinity does not here seem to come to its completion, which is made when the spe- cies lying hid in the memory, and the vision of the man that remembers, are combined by will as a third. For I do not think that which lay hid in my memory, but that which I hear, when anything is narrated to me. I am not speaking of the words themselves of the speaker, lest any one should think that I have gone off to that other trinity, which is transacted without, in sensible things, or in the senses; but I am think- ing of those species of material things, which the narrator signifies to me by words and sounds; which species certainly I think of not by remembering, but by hearing. But if we consider the matter more carefully, even in this case, the limit CHAP. VIII.] HOW WE EEMEMBER WHAT WE ARE TOLD. 279 of the memory is not overstepped. For I could not even understand the narrator, if I did not remember generically the individual things of which he speaks, even although I then hear them for the first time as connected together in one tale. For he who^, for instance, describes to me some mountain stripped of timber, and clothed with olive trees, describes it to me who remember the species both of mountains, and of timber, and of olive trees; and if I had forgotten these, I should not know at all of what he was speaking, and therefore could not think that description. And so it comes to pass, that every one who thinks things corporeal, whether he himself imagine anything, or hear, or read, either a narrative of things past, or a foretelling of things future, has recourse to his memory, and finds there the limit and measure of all the forms at which he gazes in his thought. For no one can think at all, either a colour or a form of body, which he never saw, or a sound which he never heard, or a flavour which he never y tasted, or a scent which he never smelt, or any touch of a cor- poreal thing which he never felt. But if no one thinks any- thing corporeal except what he has perceived, because no one remembers anything corporeal except what he has perceived, then, as is the limit of perceiving in bodies, so is the limit of thinking in the memory. For the sense receives the species from that body which we perceive, and the memory from the sense; but the eye of the mind of the thinker, from the memory.
15. Further, as the will applies the sense to the body, so it applies the memory to the sense, and the eye of the mind of the thinker to the memory. But that which harmonizes those things and unites them, itself also disjoins and separates them, that is, the will. But it separates the bodily senses from the bodies that are to be perceived, by movement of the body, either to hinder our perceiving the thing, or that we may cease to perceive it: as when we avert our eyes from that which we are unwilling to see, or shut them; so, again, the ears from sounds, or the nostrils from smells. So also we turn away from tastes, either by shutting the mouth, or by casting the thing out of the mouth. In touch, also, we either remove the bodily thing, that we may not touch what we do not wish, or 280 ON THE TlilNITY. [BOOK XI.