bent upon them, that they either vehemently detest or vehe- mently desire that only which offends or allures through the flesh, but do not think of their own inward self, nor can be made to do so by admonition; because they do not yet know the signs that express admonition, whereof words are the 352 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XIV.
chief, of which as of other things they are wholly ignorant. And that it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think of oneself, we have shown already in the same book.^ 8. But let us pass by the infantine age, since we cannot question it as to what goes on within itself, while we have ourselves pretty well forgotten it. Let it suffice only for us hence to be certain, that when man has come to be able to think of the nature of his own mind, and to find out what is the truth, he will find it nowhere else but in himself. And he will find, not what he did not know, but that of which he did not think. For what do we know, if we do not know what is in our own mind; when we can know nothing at all of what we do know, unless by the mind?
Chap. vi. — How a hind of trinity exists in the mind thinking of itself. What is the part of thought in this trinity.
The power of thought, however, is so great, that not even the mind itself can, so to say, place itself in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself; and hence it is so far the case, that nothing is in the sight of the mind, except that which is being thought of, that not even the mind itself, whereby we think whatever we do think, can be in its own sight otherwise than by thinking of itself. But in what way it is not in its own sight when it is not thinking of itself, while it can never be without itself, as though itself were one thing, and the sight of itself anothei^, it is not in my power to discover. For this is not unreasonably said of the eye of the body; for the eye itself of the body is fixed in its own. proper place in the body, but its sight extends to things external to itself, and reaches even to the stars. And the eye is not in its own sight, since it does not look at itself, unless by means of a mirror, as is said above;^ a thing that certainly does not happen when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself. Does it then see one part of itself by means of another part of itself, when it looks at itself in thought; as we look at some of our members, which can be in our sight, with other also our members, viz. with our eyes? What can be said or thought more absurd? For by what is the mind removed, except by itself? or where is it jjlaced so as to be in its own sight, except before itself?
CHAP. VL] how the mind THINKS OF ITSELF. 353 Therefore it will not be there, where it was, when it was not in its own sight; because it has been put down in one place, after being taken away from another. But if it migrated in order to be beheld, where will it remain in order to behold? Is it as it were doubled, so as to be in this and in that place at the same time, viz. both where it can behold, and where it can be beheld; that in itself it may be beholding, and before itself beheld? If we ask the truth, it will tell us nothing of the sort, since it is but feigned images of bodily objects of which we think when we think thus; and that the mind is not such, is very certain to the few minds by which the truth on such a subject can be inquired. It remains, therefore, that the be- holding of the mind is something pertaining to its nature, and is recalled to that nature when it thinks of itself, not as though by moving through space, but by an incorporeal conversion; but when it is not thinking of itself, that it is not indeed in its own sight, nor is its own gaze formed from it, but yet that it knows itself, as though it were to itself a remembrance of itself. Like one who is skilled in many branches of learning: the things which he knows are contained in his memory, but nothing thereof is in the sight of his mind except that of which he is thinking; while all the rest are stored up in a kind of secret knowledge, which is called memory. The trinity, then, which we were putting forward, was constituted in this way, that we placed in the memory the object by which the gaze of the thinker was formed, but the conformation itself as if it were the image which is impressed thereby, and love or will as that which combines the two. When the mind, then, beholds itself in thought, it understands and recognises itself; it begets, therefore, this its own understanding and recognition. For an incorporeal thing is beheld when it is understood, and is re- cognised by the understanding of it. Yet certainly the mind does not so beget this knowledge of itself, when it beholds itself as understood by thought, as though it had before been unknown to itself; but it was known to itself, in the way in which things are known, which are contained in the memory but of which one is not thinking; since we say that a man knows letters even when he is thinking of something else, and not of letters. And these two, the begetter and the begotten, are DE TRIN, Z 354 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XIV.
coupled together by love, as by a tbird, which is nothing else than will, seeking or holding fast the enjoyment of something. We held, therefore, that a trinity of the mind is to be intimated also by these three terms, memory, intelligence, will.
9. But since the mind, as we said near the end of the same tenth book, always remembers itself, and always understands and loves itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinguished from those things which are not itself; we must inquire in what way understanding belongs to thought, while the knowledge of each thing that is in the mind, even when one is not thinking of it, is said to belong only to the memory. For if this is so, then the mind had not then these three things, viz. to remember, and to understand, and to love itself; but it only remembered itself, and afterwards, when it began to think of itself, then it understood and loved itself.
Chap. vii. — The tidng is made plain by an example. In what way the matter is handled in order to help the reader.
Wherefore let us consider more carefully that example which we have adduced, wherein it was shown that not know- ing a thing is different from not thinking of it; and that it may so happen that a man knows something of which he is not thinking, when he is thinking of something else, not of that. When any one, then, who is skilled in two or more branches of knowledge is thinking of one of them, though he is not thinking of the other or others, yet he knows them. But can we rightly say. This musician certainly knows music, but, he does not now understand it, because he is not thinking of it; but he does now. understand geometry, for of that he is now thinking? Such an assertion, as far as appears, is absurd. What, again, if we were to say. This musician cer- tainly knows music, but he does not now love it, while he is not now thinking of it; but he does now love geometry, because of that he is now thinking; — is not this similarly absurd? But we say quite correctly. This person whom you perceive disputing about geometry is also a perfect musician, for he both remembers music, and understands and loves it; but although he both knows and loves it, he is not now thinking of it, since he is thinking of geometry, of which he is disputing. ^ And hence we are warned that we have a CHAP. VII.] WHAT IS IMPLIED IN REMINDING. 355 kind of knowledge of certain things stored np in the recesses of the mind, and that this, when it is thought of, as it were steps forth in public, and is placed as if openly in the sight of the mind; for then the mind itself finds, that it both remem- bers, and understands, and loves itself, even although it was not thinking of itself, when it was thinking of something else. But in the case of that of which we have not thought for a long time, and cannot think of it unless reminded; that, if the phrase is allowable, in some wonderful way I know not how, we do not know that we know. * In short, it is rightly said by him who reminds, to him whom he reminds. You,- know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will find that you know what you had thought you did not know. Books, too, lead to the same result, viz. those that are written upon subjects which the reader under the guidance of reason finds to be true; not those subjects which he believes to be true on the faith of the narrator, as in the case of history; but those which he him- self also finds to be true, either of himself, or in that truth itself which is the light of the mind. ^ But he who cannot contemplate these things, even when reminded, is too deeply buried in the darkness of ignorance, through • great blindness of heart, and too wonderfully needs divine help, to be able to attain to true wisdom.
10. For this reason I have wished to adduce some kind of proof, be it what it might, respecting the act of thinking, such as might serve to show in what way, out of the things con- tained in the memory, the mind's eye is informed in recollect- ing, and some such thing is begotten when a man thinks, as was in him when, before he thought, he remembered; because it is easier to distinguish things that take place at successive times, and Avhere the parent precedes the offspring by an in- terval of time. For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three always are together, and always have been together since they began to be at all, whether they were being thought of or not; the image of this trinity will indeed appear to pertain even to 356 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XIV.
the memory alone; but because in this case a word cannot be without a thought (for we think all that we say, even if it be said by that inner word which belongs to no separate language), this image is rather to be discerned in these three things, viz. memory, intelligence, will. And I mean now by intelligence that by which we understand in thought, that is, when our thought is formed by the finding of those things, which had been at hand to the memory but were not being thought of; and I mean that will, or love, or preference, which combines this offspring and parent, and is in some way common to both. Hence it was that I tried also, viz. in the eleventh book, to lead on the slowness of readers by means of outward sensible things which are seen by the eyes of the flesh; and that I then proceeded to enter with them upon that power of the inner man whereby he reasons of things temporal, defer- ring the consideration of that which dominates as the higher power, by which he contemplates things eternal. And I dis- cussed this in two books, distinguishing the two in the twelfth, the one of them being higher and the other lower, and that the lower ought to be subject to the higher; and in the thirteenth I discussed, with what truth and brevity I could, the office of the lower, in which the wholesome know- ledge of things human is contained, in order that we may so act in this temporal life as to attain that which is eternal; since, indeed, I have cursorily included in a single book a subject so manifold and copious, and one so well known by the many and great arguments of many and great men, while manifesting that a trinity exists also in it, but not yet one that can be called an image of God.
Chap. viii. — The trinity which is the image of God is noio to he sought in the noblest part of the mind.
11. But we have come now to that argument in which we have undertaken to consider the noblest part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing better. But the mind must first be considered as it is in itself.
CHAP. VIII.] A TRINITY WHICH IS ALSO AN IMAGE OF GOD. 357 before it becomes partaker of God; and His image must be found in it. For, as we have said, although worn out and defaced by losing the participation of God, yet the image of God still remains.-^ For it is His image in this very point, that it is capable of Him, and can be partaker of Him; which so great good is only made possible by its being His image. Well, then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but now at last an image of God. The memory does not receive from without that which it is to hold; nor does the understanding find without that which it is to regard, as the eye of the body does; nor has wiU joined these two from without, as it joins the form of the bodily object and that which is thence wrought in the sight of the beholder; nor has thought, in being turned to it, found an image of a thing seen without, which has been somehow seized and laid up in the memory, whence the gaze of him that recollects has been formed, wiU as a third joining the two: as we showed to take place in those trinities which were discovered in things corporeal, or which were somehow drawn within from bodily objects by the bodily sense; of all which we have discoursed in the eleventh book.^ Nor, again, as it took place, or appeared to do so, when we went on further to discuss that knowledge, which had its place now in the workings of the inner man, and which was to be distinguished from wisdom; of which knowledge the subject-matter was, as it were, adventitious to the mind, and either was brought thither by historical information, — as deeds and words, which are performed in time and pass away, or which again are estab- lished in the nature of things in their own times and places, — or arises in the man himself not being there before, whether on the information of others, or by his own thinking, — as faith, which we commended at length in the thirteenth book, or as the virtues, by which, if they are true, one so lives well in this mor- tality, as to live blessedly in that immortality which God pro- mises. These and other things of the kind have their proper order in time, and in that order we discerned more easily a trinity of memory, sight, and love. For some of such things anticipate the knowledge of learners. For they are knowable 58 ON THE TRINITY. [bOOK XIV.
also before they are known, and beget in the learner a know- ledge of themselves. And they either exist in their own proper places, or have happened in time past; although things that are past do not themselves exist, but only certain signs of them as past, the sight or hearing of which makes it known that they have been and have passed away. And these signs are either situate in the places themselves, as e.g. monuments of the dead or the like; or exist in written books worthy of credit, as is all history that is of weight and approved authority; or are in the minds of those who already know them; since what is already known to them is knowable certainly to others also, whose knowledge it has anticipated, and who are able to know it on the information of those who do know it. And all these things, both when they are learned, produce a certain kind of trinity, viz. by their own proper species, which was knowable also before it was known, and by the application to this of the knowledge of the learner, which then begins to exist when he learns them, and by will as a third which combines both; and when they are known, yet another trinity is produced in the recollecting of them, and this now inwardly in the mind itself, from those images which, when they were learned, w^ere impressed upon the memory, and from the in- forming of the thought when the look has been turned upon these by recollection, and from tlie will which as a third com- bines these two. But those things which arise in the mind, not having been there before, as faith and other things of that kind, although they appear to be adventitious, since they are implanted by teaching, yet are not situate without or trans- acted without, as are those things which are believed; but began to be altogether within in the mind itself. For faith is not that which is believed, but that by which it is believed; and the former is believed, the latter seen. Nevertheless, because it began to be in the mind, which was a mind also before these things began to be in it, it seems to be somewhat adventitious, and will be reckoned among things past, when sight shall have succeeded, and itself shall have ceased to be. And it makes now by its presence, retained as it is, and be- held, and loved, a different trinity from that which it will then make by means of some trace of itself, which in passing CHAP. IX.] DO THE VIRTUES EXIST IN THE LIFE TO COME? 359 it will have left in the memory: as has been already said above.
Chap. ix. — Whether justice and the other virtues cease to exist in the future life.
12. There is, however, some question raised, whether the virtues likewise by which one lives well in this present mor- tality, seeing that they themselves begin also to be in the mind, which was a mind none the less when it existed before without them, cease also to exist at that time when they have brought us to things eternal. For some have thought that they will cease, and in the case of three — prudence, fortitude, temperance — such an assertion seems to have something in it; but justice is immortal, and will rather then be made perfect in us than cease to be. Yet Tullius, the great author of eloquence, when arguing in the dialogue Hortensius, says of all four: " If we were allowed, when we migrated from this life, to live for ever in the islands of the blessed, as fables tell, what need were there of eloquence when there would be no trials, or what need, indeed, of the very virtues themselves? For we should not need fortitude when nothing of either toil or danger was proposed to us; nor justice, when there was nothing of anybody else's to be coveted; nor temperance, to govern lusts that would not exist; nor, indeed, should we need prudence, when there was no choice offered between good and evil. We should be blessed, therefore, solely by learning and Imowing nature, by which alone also the life of the gods is praiseworthy. And hence we may perceive that everything else is a matter of necessity, but this is one of free choice." This great orator, then, when proclaiming the excellence of philosophy, going over again all that he had learned from philosophers, and excellently and pleasantly explaining it, has affirmed all four virtues to be necessary in this life only, which we see to be full of troubles and mistakes; but not one of them when we shall have migrated from this life, if we are permitted to live there where is a blessed life; but that blessed souls are blessed only in learning and knowing, i.e. in the contemplation of nature, than which nothing is better and more lovable. It is that nature which created and appointed all other natures. And if it belongs to justice to be 360 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XIV.
subject to the government of this Nature, then justice is cer- tainly immortal; nor will it cease to be in that blessedness, but will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater. Perhaps, too, the other three virtues — prudence although no longer with any risk of error, and fortitude without the vexation of bearing evils, and temperance without the thwarting of lust — will exist in that blessedness: so that it may be the part of prudence to prefer or equal no good thing to God; and of fortitude, to cleave to Him most sted- fastly; and of temperance, to be pleased by no harmful defect. But that which justice is now concerned with in helping the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treachery, and fortitude in bearing troubles patiently, and temperance in con- trolKng evil pleasures, will not exist there, where there will be no evil at all. And hence those acts of the virtues which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred, will be reckoned among things past; and they make now a different trinity, whilst we hold, look at, and love them as present, from that which they will then make, when we shaU. discover them not to be, but to have been, by certain traces of