of God." For we speak to them as averse to truth, unbelieving, criminal, infamous, and, to sum up all in one term — sinners, all of which things are undoubtedly not of God. Therefore what wonder is it, if Christ says to sinners, convicting them of this very thing that they were sinners and did not believe in 3 I Cor. xi. 12.
Him: "Ye are not of God;" and on the other hand, without prejudice to the former statement: "All things were made through Him," and "All things are of God?" For if not to believe Christ, to repudiate Christ's advent, not to accept Christ, was a sure maric | of souls that are not of God; and so it was ' said: " Ye therefore hear not, because ye are not of God;" how would that saying of the apostle be true that occurs in the memorable beginning of the gospel: " He came unto his own things, and his own people did not receive him?"^ Whence his own if they did not receive him; or whence therefore not his own because they did not receive him, unless that sinners by virtue of being men belong to God, but by virtue of being sinners belong to the devil? He who says: "His own people received him not" had reference to nature; but he who says: "Ye are not of God," had reference to will; for the evangelist was com- mending the works of God, Christ was cen- suring the sins of men CHAP. 8. THE MANICH^ANS INQUIRE WHENCE IS EVIL AND BY THIS QUESTION THINK THEY HAVE TRIUMPHED. LET THEM FIRST KNOW, WHICH IS MOST EASY TO DO, THAT NOTH- ING CAN LIVE WITHOUT GOD. CONSUM- MATE EVIL CANNOT BE KNOWN EXCEPT BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONSUMMATE GOOD, WHICH IS GOD.
Here perchance some one may say: Whence are sins themselves, and whence is evil in general? If from man, whence is man? if from an angel, whence is the angel? When it is said, however truly and rightly, that these are from God, it nevertheless seems to those unskillful and possessed of little power to look into recondite matters, that evils and sins are thereby connected, as by a sort of chain, to God. By this question they think themselves triumphant, as if forsooth to ask were to know; — would it were so, for in that case no one would be more knowing than myself. Yet very often in controversy the propounder of a great question, while imper- sonating the great teacher, is himself more ignorant in the matter concerning which he would frighten his opponent, than he whom he would frighten.
These therefore suppose that they are su- perior to tlie common run, because the former ask questions that the latter cannot answer.; If therefore when I most unfortunately was associated with them, not in the position in which I have now for some time been, they had raised these objections when I * John i. II.
Chap. X.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^EANS.
lOI had brought forward this argument, I should have said: I ask that you meanwhile agree with me, which is most easy, that if nothing can shine without God, much less can any- thing live without God. Let us not persist in such monstrous opinions as to maintain that any souls whatsoever have life apart from God. For perchance it may so happen that with me you are ignorant as to this thing, namely whence is evil, let us then learn either simultaneously or in any order, I care not what. For what if knowledge of the perfec- tion of evil is impossible to man without knowledge of the perfection of good? For we should not know darkness if we were always in darkness. But the notion of light does not allow its opposite to be unknown. But the highest good is that than which there is nothing higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can be higher. God therefore is the highest good. Let us therefore together so recognize God, and thus what we seek too hastily will not be hidden from us. Do you suppose then that the knowledge of God is a matter of small account or desert. For what other reward is there for us than life eternal, which is to knovv' God? For God the ^Laster says: "But this is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only and true Ciod, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." ' For the soul, although it is immortal, yet be- cause aversion from the knowledge of God is rightly called its death, when it is converted to God, the reward of eternal life to be at- tained is that knowledge; so that this is, as has been said, eternal life. But no one can be converted to God, except he turn himself away from this world. This for myself I feel to be arduous and exceedingly difficult, whether it is easy to you, God Himself would have seen. I should have been in- clined to think it easy to you, had I not been moved by the fact, that, since the world from which we are commanded to turn away is visible, and the apostle says: "The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are unseen are eternal,"^ you ascribe more [importance to the judgment of these eyes liian to that of the mind, asserting and beilieving as you do that there is no shining •"^ather that does not shine from God, and it there are living souls that do not live Ifrom God. These and like things I should jeither have said to them or considered with imyself, for even then, supplicating God with all my bowels, so to speak, and examining as [attentively as possible the Scriptures, I should 'perchance have been able either to say such ihn xvii. 3.
- 2 Cor.
iv. i3.
things or to think them, so far as was neces- sary for my salvation.
CH.AP. 9. — AUGUSTIN DECEIVED BY FAMILIAR- ITY WITH THE MANICH/EANS, AND BY THE SUCCESSION OF VICTORIES OVER IGNORANT CHRISTIANS REPORTED BY THEM. THE MANl- CH^ANS ARE LIKEVl^ISE EASILY REFUTED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF SIN AND THE WILL.
But two things especially, which easily lay hold upon that unwary age, urged me through wonderful circuits. One of these was familiarity, suddenly, by a certain false semblance of goodness, wrapped many times around my neck as a certain sinuous chain. The other was, that I was almost always nox- iously victorious in arguing with ignorant Christians who yet eagerly attempted, each as he could, to defend their faith. ^ By which frequent success the ardor of youth was kindled, and by its own impulse rashly verged upon the great evil of stubbornness. For this kind of wrangling, after I had be- come an auditor among them, whatever I was able to do either by my own genius, such as it was, or by reading the works of others, I most gladly devoted to them alone. Accord- ingly from their speeches ardor in disputa- tions was daily increased, from success in disputations love for them [the Manichseans]. Whence it resulted that whatever they said, as if affected by certain strange disorders, I approved of as true, not because I knew it to be true, but because I wished it to be. So it came about that, however slowly and cau- tiously, yet for a long time I followed men that preferred a sleek straw to a living soul.
12. So be it, I was not able at that time to distinguish and discern sensible from intelligible things, carnal forsooth from spir- itual. It did not belong to age, nor to dis- cipline, nor even to any habit, nor, finally, to any deserts; for it is a matter of no small joy and felicitation: had I not thus been able at length even to grasp that which in the judg- ment of all men nature itself by the laws of the most High God has established?
CHAP. 10. — SIN IS ONLY FROM THE WILL. HIS OWN LIFE AND WILL BEST KNOWN TO EACH INDIVIDUAL. WHAT WILL IS.
For let any men whatever, if only no mad- ness has broken them loose from the common 3 Nothing is more certain than that Christianity has suffered more at thu hands of injudicious and i.^norant defenders than from Its most astute and determined foes. Little attention would be paid to the blatant infidels of the present day were it not for the interest aroused and sustained by weak attempts to refute their arguments. And as the youthful, ardent Augustin was encour- aged and confirmed in his errors by the inability of his opponents, so I02 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. X.
sense of the human race, bring whatever zeal they like for judging, whatever ignorance, nay whatever slowness of mind, I should like to find out what they would have replied to me had I asked, whether a man would seem to them to have sinned by whose hand while he was asleep another should have written some- thing disgraceful? Who doubts that they would have denied that it is a sin, and liave exclaimed against it so vehemently that they might perchance have been enraged that I should have thought them proper objects of such a question? Of whom reconciled and restored to equanimity, as best I could do it, I should have begged that they would not take it amiss if 1 asked them another thing just as manifest, just as completely withm the knowledge of all. Then I should have asked, if some stronger person had done some evil thing by the hand of one not sleeping but conscious, yet with the rest of his members bound and in constraint, whether because he knew it, though absolutely unwilling, he should be held guilty of any sin? And here all marvelling that I should ask such ques- tions, would reply without hesitation, that he had absolutely not sinned at all. Why so? Because whoever has done anything evil by means of one unconscious or unable to resist, the latter can by no means be justly con- demned. And precisely why this is so, if I should inquire of the human nature in these men, I should easily bring out the desired answer, by asking in this manner: Suppose that the sleeper already knew what the other would do with his hand, and of purpose afore- thought, having drunk so much as would prevent his being awakened, should go to sleep, in order to deceive some one with an oath. Would any amount of sleep suffice to prove his innocence? What else than a guilty man would one pronounce him? But if he has also willingly been bound that he may deceive some one by this pretext, in what re- spect then would those chains profit as a means of relieving him of sin? Although bound by these he was really not able to re- sist, as in the other case the sleeper was ab- solutely ignorant of what he was then doing. Is there therefore any possibility of doubting that both should be judged to have sinned? Which things having been conceded, I should have argued, that sin is indeed nowhere but in the will,' since this consideration also are errors confirmed at the present day. The philosophical defence of Christianity is a matter of the utmost delicacy, and should be undertaken with fear and trembling.— A. H. N.
' The Pelagians used this statement with considerable effect in their polemics against its author. In his Retractations Augustin has this to say by way of explanation: " The Pelagians may think that this was said in their interest, or. account of young children whose sin which is remitted to them in baptism they deny on the would have helped me, that justice holds guilty' those sinning by evil will alone, al- though they may have been unable to accom- plish what they willed.
13. For who could have said that, in ad- ducing these considerations, I was dwelling upon obscure and recondite things, where on account of the fewness of those able to un- derstand, either fraud or suspicion of ostenta- tion is accustomed to arise? Let that distinc- tion between intelligible and sensible things withdraw for a little: let me not be found fault with for following up slow minds with the stimuli of subtle disputations. Permit me to know that I live, permit me to know that I will to live. If in this the human race agrees, as our life is known to us, so also is our will. Nor when we become possessed of this knowledge, is there any occasion to fear lest any one should convince us that we may be deceived; for no one can be deceived as to whether he does not live, or wishes nothing. I do not think that I have adduced anything obscure, and my concern is rather lest some should find fault with me for dwelling on things that are too manifest. But let us ccn- sider the bearing of these things.
14. Sinning therefore takes place only by exercise of will. ]kit our will is very well known to us; for neither should I know that I will, if I did not know what will itself is. Accordingly, it is thus defined: will is a movement of mind, no one compelling, either ground that they do not yet use the power of will. As if indeed the sin, which we say they derive originally from Adam, that is, that they are implicated in his guilt and on this account are held obnox- ious to punishment, could ever be otherwise than in will, by which will it was committed when the transgression of the divine precept was accomplished. Our statement, that ' there is never sin but in will,' may be thought false for the reason that the apostle says: ' If what I will not this I do, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." For this sin is to such an extent involun- tary, that he says: ' What I will not this I do.' How, therefore, is there never sin but in the will? Hut this sin concerning which the apostle has spoken is called sin, because by sin it wasdone, and it is the penalty of sin; since this is said concerning carnal concupi- scence, which he discloses in what follows saying: ' I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish that which is good, is not." (Rom. vii. 16-18). Since the perfection of good is, that not even the concupiscence of sin should be in man, to which indeed when one lives well the will does not consent; nevertheless man does not accomplish the good because as'yet concupiscence is in him, to which the will is antago- nistic, the guilt of which concupiscence is loosed by baptism, but the infirmity remains, against which until it is healed every be- liever who advances well most earnestly struggles. But sin, which is never but in will, mu.st especially be knownas that which is fol- lowed by just condemnation. For this through one man entered into the world; although that sin also by which consent is yielded to concupiscence is not committed but by will. Wherefore also in another place I have said: ' Not therefore except by will is sm committed.' "—.\. H. N.
On this matter Augustin's still earlier treatise De Libera Ar- hitrii\ and his interesting Ketractatioiis on the s^me, should be compared. The reader of these earlier treatises in comparison with 1 the A nti- Pelagian treatises can hardly fail to recognize a marked change of base on Augustin's part. liis efforts to show the con-: sistency of his earlier with his later modes of thought are to be ' pronounced only partially successful. The fact is, that in the Anti-Manichaean time he went too far in maintaining the absolute freedom of the will and the impossibility of sin apart from per- sonal will in the sinner; while in the Anti-Pelagian time fie \'en- tured too near to the fatalism that he so earnestly combated in the ."ilanichaeans. — A. H. N.
Chap. XI.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH.EANS.
103 for not losing or for obtaining something.' Why therefore could not I have so defined it then? Was it difficult to see that one unwill- ing is contrary to one willing, just as the left hand is contrary to the right, not as black to white? For the same thing cannot be at the same time black and white. But whoever is placed between two men is on the left hand with reference to one, on the right with reference to the other. One ma.i is both on the right hand and on the left hand at the same time, but by no means both to the one man. So indeed one mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it cannot be at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and the same thing. For when any one unwillingly does anything; if you ask him whether he wished to do it, he says that he did not. Likewise if you ask whether he wished not to do it, he replies that he did. So you will find him un- willing with reference to doing, willing with reference to not doing, that is to say, one mind at the same time having both attitudes, but each referring to different things. Why do I say this? Because if we should again ask wherefore though unwilling he does this, he will say that he is compelled. For every one also who does a thing unwillingly is com- pelled, and every one who is compelled, if he does a thing, does it only unwillingly. It follows that he that is willing is free from compulsion, even if any one thinks himself compelled. And in this manner every one who willingly does a thing is not compelled, and whoever is not compelled, either does it willingly or not at all. Since nature itself proclaim.s these things in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the boy even to the old man, from literary sport even to the throne of the wise, why then • This dictum also Augustin thought it needful to explain: "This was said that by this definition a willing person might be distinguished from ime not willing, and so the intention might be referred to those who tirst in Paradise were the origin of evil to the human race, by sinning no one compelling, that is by sinning with free will, because also knowingly they sinned against the iMiinand, and the tempters persuaded, did not compel, that this lould be done. For he who ignorantly sinned may not incongru- ously be said to have sinned unwillingly, although not knowing what he did, yet willingly he did it. So not even the sin of such a one could be without will, which will assuredly, as it has been de- fined, was a ' movement of the mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something.' For he was not com- pelled to do what if he had been unwilling he would not have done. Because he willed, therefore he did it, even if he did not sin be- cause he willed, being ignorant that what he did is sin. So not evin such a sin could be without will, but by will of deed not by will ot sin, which deed was yet sin; for this deed is what ought not to have taken place. Hut whoever knowingly sins, if he can without sin resist the one compelling him to sin, yet resists not, assuredly sins willingly. For he who can resist is not compelled to yield. lUit he who cannot by good will resist cogent covetousness, and therefore does what is contrary to the precepts of righteousness, this now is sin in the sen.se of being the penalty of sin. VVhere- "re it is most true that sin cannot be apart from will."
It IS needless to say that such reasoning would not have an- swered Augustin"s purpose in writing against the Manichaeans. A. H. N, I should I not have seen that in the definition of will should be put, " no one compelling,'' : which now as if with greater experience most : cautiously I have done. But if this is every- where manifest, and promptly occurs to all not by instruction but by nature, what is there left that seems obscure, unless perchance it be concealed from some one, that when we wish for something, we will, and our mind is moved ' towards it, and we either have it or do not have it, and if we have it we will to retain it, if we have it not, to acquire it.'' Wherefore every- one who wills, wills either not to lose something or to obtain it. Hence if all these things are clearer than day, as they are, nor are they given to my conception alone, but by the liberality of truth itself to the whole human race, why could I not have said even at that time: Will is a movement of the mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtainmg something?
CHAP. II. — WHAT SIN IS.
Some one will say: What assistance would I this have furnished you against the Mani- chaeans? Wait a moment; permit me first also to define sin, which, every mind reads divinely written in itself, cannot exist apart from will. Sin therefore is the will to retain and follow after what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain.'' Although if it be not free, it is not will. But I have preferred to define more roughly than pre- cisely. Should I not also have carefully examined those obscure books, whence I might have learned that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who either wills what justice does not prohibit him from willing, or does not do what he is not able to do? Do not shepherds on mountains, poets in theatres, unlearned in social intercourse, learned in libraries, masters in schools, priests in conse- crated places, and the human race throughout the whole world, sing out these things? But if no one is worthy of blame and condemna- tion, who either does not act against the pro- hibition of justice, or who does not do what he cannot do, yet every sin is blameworthy and condemnable, who doubts then that it is sin, when willing is unjust, and not willing is free. And hence that definition is both true and easy to understand, and not only now but then also could have been spoken by me: Sin is the will of retaining or of obtaining, what justice forbids, and whence it is free to ab- stain?
• _ 2 Here also Augustin guards himself in his Retractations: " The definition is true, in.ismuch as that is defined which is only sin, and not also that which is the penalty of sin." — A. H. N.
I04 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. XII.
CHAP, 12. — FROM THE DEFINITIONS GIVEN OF SIN AND WILL, HE OVERTHROWS THE EN- TIRE HERESY OF THE MANICH.^ANS. LIKE- WISE FROM THE JUST CONDEMNATION OF EVIL SOULS IT FOLLOWS THAT THEY ARE EVIL NOT BY NATURE BUT BY WILL. THAT SOULS ARE GOOD BY NATURE, TO WHICH THE PARDON OF SINS IS GRANTED.
i6. Come now, let us see in what respect these things would have aided us. Much every way, so that I should have desired nothing more; for they end the whole cause; for wlioever consulting in the inner mind, where they are more pronounced and assured, the secrets of his own conscience, and the di- vine laws absolutely imposed upon nature, grants that these two definitions of will and sin are true, condemns without any hesitation by the fewest and the briefest, but plainly the most invincible reasons, the vvhole heresy of the Manichaeans. Which can be thus con- sidered. They say that there are two kinds of souls, the one good, which is in such a way from God, that it is said not to have been made by Him out of any material or out of nothing, but to have proceeded as a certain part from the very substance itself of God; the other evil, which they believe and strive to get others to believe pertains to God in no way whatever; and so they maintain that the one is the perfection of good, but the other the perfection of evil, and that these two classes were at one time distinct but are now commingled. The character and the cause of this commingling I had not yet heard; but nevertheless I could have inquired whether that evil kind of souls, before it was mingled with the good, had any will. For if not, it was without sin and innocent, and so by no means evil.' But if evil in such a way, that though without will, as fire, yet if it should touch the good it would violate and corrupt it; how impious it is to believe that the nature of evil is powerful enough to change any part of God, and that the Highest Good is cor- ruptible and violable! But if the will was present, assuredly there was present, no one compelling, a movement of the mind either towards not losing something or obtaining something. But this something was either good, or was thought to be good, for not otherwise could it be earnestly desired. But in supreme evil, before the commingling which they maintain, there never was any I In his Retractations, Augiistin replies to the Pelagian denial of the sinfulness of infants, in support of which thev had quoted the above sentence. " 'J'hey [infants] are held guilty not by pro- priety of will but by origin. For what is every earthly man in ori- gin but Adam?" The will of the whole human race was m Adam, and when Adam sinned the whole race voluntarily sinned, seems to be his meaning. — A. H. N.