good. Whence then could there be in it either the knowledge or the thought of good? Did they wish for nothing that was in themselves, and earnestly desire that true good which was without? That will must truly be de- clared worthy of distinguished and great praise by which is earnestly desired the su- preme and true good. Whence then in su- preme evil was this movement of mind most worthy of so great praise? Did they seek it for the sake of injuring it? In the first place, the argument comes to the satne thing. For he who wishes to injure, wishes to de- prive another of some good for the sake of some good of his own. There was therefore in them either a knowledge of good or an opinion of good, which ought by no means to belong to supreme evil. In the'second place, whence had they known, that good placed outside of themselves, which they designed to injure, existed at all. If they had in- tellectually perceived it, what is more excel- lent than such a mind? Is there anything else for which the whole energy of good men is put forth except the knowledge of that su- preme and sincere good? What therefore is now scarcely conceded to a few good and just men, was mere evil, no good assisting, then able to accomplish? But if those souls bore bodies and saw the supreme good with their eyes, what tongues, what hearts, what intellects suffice for lauding and proclaiming those eyes, with which the minds of just men can scarcely be compared? How great good things we find in supreme evil! For if to see God is evil, God is not a good; but God is a good; therefore to see God is good; and I know not what can be compared to this good. Since to see anything is good, whence can it be made out that to be able to see is evil? Therefore whatever in those eyes or in those minds brought it about, that the di- vine essence could be seen by them, brought about a great thing and a good thing most worthy of ineffable praise. But if it was not brought about, but it was such in itself and eternal, it is difficult to find anything better than this evil.
17. Lastly, that these souls may have nothing of these praiseworthy things which by the reasonings of the Manichaeans they are compelled to have, I should have asked, whether God condemns any or no souls. If none, there is no judgment of rewards and punishments, no providence, and the world is administered by chance rather than by rea- son, or rather is not administered at all. For the name administration must not be given to chances. But if it is impious for all those that are bound by any religion to believe, Chap. XIII.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
105 this, it remains eitlier tliat there is condem- nation of some souls, or that there are no sins. But if there are no sins, neither is there any evil. Which if the Manichaeans should say, they would slay their heresy with a single blow. Therefore they and I agree that some souls are condemned by divine law and judgment. But if these souls are good, what is that justice? If evil, are they so by nature, or by will? But by nature souls can in no way be evil. Whence do we teach this. From the above definitions of will and sin. For to speak of souls, and that they are evil, and that they do not sin, is full of madness; but to say that they sin without will, is great craziness, and to hold any one guilty of sin for not doing what he could not do, belongs to the height of iniquity and in- sanity. Wherefore whatever these souls do, if they do it by nature not by will, that is, if they are wanting in a movement of mind free both for doing and not doing, if finally no power of abstaining from their work is conceded to them; v/e cannot hold that the sin is theirs.' But all confess both that evil souls are justly, and souls that have not sinned are unjustly condemned; therefore they confess that those souls are evil that sin. But these, as reason teaches, do not sin. Therefore the extraneous class of evil souls of the Manichceans, whatever it may be, is a non-entity.
18. Let us now look at that good class of souls, which again they exalt to such a de- cree as to say that it is the very substance of '"lod. But how much better it is that each one should recognize his own rank and merit, nor be so puffed up with sacrilegious pride as to believe that as often as he experiences a change in himself it is the substance of that supreme good, which devout reason holds and teaches to be unchangeable! For behold! Mnce it is manifest that souls do not sin in not being such as they cannot be; it follows that these supposititious souls, whatever they may be, do not sin at all, and moreover that they are absolutely non-existent; it remains that since there are sins, they find none to whom to attribute them except the good class of souls and the substance of God. But es- pecially are they pressed by Christian au- tliority; for never have they denied that for- giveness of sins is granted when any one has heen converted to God; never have they said (as they have said of many other passages) ' In his Reirariations, Augustin explains that by nature is to ■•<■ understood the state in which we were created without vice. He transfers the entire argument from the actual condition of man •" the primitive Adaniic condition. It is evident, however, that this .as not his ineanin>; when he combated the Manichaeans. The ijuestionof infant sinfulness arises here also, and is discussed in the usual Anti-Pelagian way. — A. H»N.
that some corrupter has interpolated this into the divine Scriptures. To whom then are sins attributed? If to those evil souls of the alien class, these also can become good, can possess the kingdom of God with Christ. Which denying, they [the Manichaeans] have no other class except those souls which they maintain are of the substance of God. It remains that they acknowledge that not only these latter also, but these alone sin. But I make no contention about their being alons in sinning; yet they sin. But are they com- pelled to sin by being commingled with evil? If so compelled that there was no power of resisting, they do not sin. If it is in their power to resist, and they voluntarily consent, we are compelled to find out through their [the Manichaean] teaching, why so great good things in supreme evil, why this evil in supreme good, unless it be that neither is that which they bring into suspicion evil, nor is that which they pervert by superstition su- preme good?
CHAP. 13. FROM DELIBERATION ON THE EVIL AND ON THE GOOD PART IT RESULTS THAT TWO CLASSES OF SOULS ARE NOT TO BE HELD TO. A CLASS OF SOULS ENTICING TO SHAMEFUL DEEDS HAVING BEEN CONCEDED, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THESE ARE EVIL BY NATURE, THAT THE OTHERS ARE SUPREME GOOD.
19. But if I had taught, or at any rate had myself learned, that they rave and err regard- ing those two classes of souls, why should I have thenceforth thought them worthy of being heard or consulted about anything? That I might learn hence, that these two kinds of souls are pointed out, which in the course of deliberation assent puts now on the evil side, now on the good? Why is not this rather the sign of one soul which by free will can be borne here and there, swayed hither and thither? For it was my own experience to feel that I am one, considering evil and good and choosing one or the other, but for the most part the one pleases, the other is fitting, placed in the midst of which we fluctuate. Nor is it to be wondered at, for we are now so constituted that through the flesh we can be affected by sensual pleasure, and through the spirit by honorable consid- erations. Am I not therefore compelled to acknowledge two souls? Nay, we can better and with far less difficulty recognize two classes of good things, of which neither is alien from God as its autlior, one soul acted upon from diverse directions, the lower and the higher, or to speak more correctly, the external and the internal. These are the two io6 io6 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. XIV.
classes which a little while ago we considered under the names sensible and intelligible, which we now prefer to call more familiarly carnal and spiritual. But it has been made difificult for us to abstain from carnal things, since our truest bread is spiritual. For with great labor we now eat this bread. For neither without punishment for the sin of trans- gression have we been changed from immor- tal into mortal. So it happens, that when we strive after better things, habit formed by connection with the flesh and our sins in some way begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our way, some foolish persons with most obtuse superstition suspect that there is another kind of souls which is not of God.
20. However even if it be conceded to them that we are enticed to shameful deeds by an- other inferior kind of souls, they do not thence make it evident that those enticing*are evil by nature, or those enticed, supremely good. For it may be, the former of their own will, by striving after what was not^lawful, that is, by sinning, from being good have become evil; and again they may be made good, but in such manner that for a long time they re- main in sin, and by a certain occult suasion traduce to themselves other souls. Then, they may not be absolutely evil, but in their own kind, however inferior, tney may e.xercise their own functions without any sin. But those superior souls to whom justice, the directress of things, has assigned a far more excellent activity, if they should wish to fol- low and to imitate those inferior ones, become evil, not because they imitate evil souls, but because they imitate in an evil way. By the evil souls is done what is proper to them, by the good what is alien to them is striven after. Hence the former remain in their own grade, the latter are plunged into a lower. It is as when men copy after beasts. For the four- footed horse walks beautifully, but if a man on all fours should imitate him, who would think him worthy even of chaff for food? Rightly therefore we generally disapprove of one who imitates, while we approve of him whom he imitates. But we disapprove not because he has not succeeded, but for wish- ing to succeed at all. For in the horse we approve of that to which by as much as we prefer man, by so much are we offended that he copies after inferior creatures. So among men, however well the crier may do in sending forth his voice, would not the senator be insane, if he should do it even more clearly and better than the crier? Take an illustration from the heavenly bodies: The moon when shining is praised, and by its course and its changes is quite pleasing to those that pay attention to such things. But if the sun should wish to imitate it (for we may feign that it has desires of this sort '), who would not be greatly and rightly displeased. From which illustrations I wish it to be understood, that even if there are souls (which meanwhile is left an open question-) devoted to bodily offices not by sin but by nature, and even if they are related to us, however inferior they may be, by some inner alifinity, they should not be esteemed evil simply because we are evil ourselves in following them and in loving corporeal things. For we sin by loving corporeal things, because by justice we are required and by nature we are able to love spiritual things, and when we do this we are, in our kind, the best and the happiest. 3 21. Wherefore what proof does delibera- tion, violently urged in both directions, now prone to sin, now borne on toward right con- duct, furnish, that we are compelled to accept two kinds of souls, the nature of one of which is from God, of the other not; when we are free to conjecture so many other causes of alter- nating states of mind? But that these things are obscure and are to no purpose pried into by blear-eyed minds, whoever is a good judge of things sees. Wherefore those things rather which have been said regarding the will and sin, those things, I say, that supreme justice permits no man using his reason to be ignorant of, those things which if they were taken from us, there is nothing whence the discipline of virtue may begin, nothing whence it may rise from the death of vices, those things I say considered again and again with sufficient clearness and lucidity convince us that the heresy of the Manichaeans is false.
CHAP. 14. AGAIN IT IS SHOWN FROM THE UTILITY OF REPENTING THAT SOULS ARE NOT BY NATURE EVIL. SO SURE A DEMON- STRATION IS NOT CONTRADICTED EXCEPT FROM THE HABIT OF ERRING.
22. Like the foregoing considerations is what I shall now say about repenting. For as among all sane people it is agreed, and this the Manichaeans themselves not only confess but also teach, that to repent of sin is useful. Why shall I now, in this matter, collect the testimonies of the divine Scriptures, which I ' Augustin's carefulness to explain that he is only indulging in personification is doubtless due to the fact that with the.Manicha;- ans the sun and the moon were objects of worship. — A. H. N.
2 In his Retractations, Augustin explains that he did not really regard this as an open question, but speaks of it as such only so far as this particular discussion is concerned. He simply declines to enter upon a consideration of it in this connection. — A. H. N.
3 Here also the use of the word " nature " gave Augustin trouble in his later years. He claims in the Ketractations that he uses the word in the sense of " nature that has been healed ' and that " cannot be vitiated," and seeks to show that he did not mean to exclude divine grace. — A. H. N.
Chap. XIV.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
107 are scattered throughout their pages? It is also the voice of nature; notice of this thing has escaped no fool. We should be undone, if this were not deepl)^ imbedded in our nature. Some one may say that he does not sin; but no barbarity will dare to say, that if one sins he should not repent of it. This being the case, I ask to which of the two kinds of souls does repenting pertain? I know indeed that it can pertain neither to him who does ill nor to him who cannot do well. Wherefore, that I may use the words of the Manichseans, if a soul of darkness re- pent of sin, it is not of the substance of su- preme evil, if a soul of light, it is not of the substance of supreme good; that disposition of repenting which is profitable testifies alike that the penitent has done ill, and that he could have done well. How, therefore, is there from me nothing of evil, if I have acted unadvisedly, or how can I rightly repent if I have not so done? Hear the other part. How is there from me nothing of good, if in me there is good will, or how do I rightly re- pent if there is not? Wherefore, either let them deny that there is great utility in re- penting, so that they may be driven not only from the Christian name, but from every even imaginary argument for their views, or let them cease to say and to teach that there are two kinds of souls, one of which has nothing of evil, the other nothing of good; for that whole sect is propped up by this two-headed ' or rather headlong^ variety of souls.
23. And to me indeed it is sufficient thus to know that the Manichaeans err, that I know that sin must be repented of; and yet if now by right of friendship I should accost some one of my friends who still thinks that they are worthy of being listened to, and should say to him: Do you not know that it is useful, when anyone has sinned, to repent? Without hesitation he will swear that he knows. If then I shall have convinced you that Mani- chseism is false, will you not desire anything more? Let him reply what more he can de- sire in this matter. Very well, so far. But when I shall have begun to show the sure and I Bicipiti.
2 Prcecipiti.
necessary arguments which, bound to it with adamantine chains, as the saying is, follow that proposition, and shall have conducted to its conclusion the whole process by which that sect is overthrown, he will deny perhaps that he knows the utility of repenting, which no learned man, no unlearned, is ignorant of, and will rather contend, when we hesitate and deliberate, that two souls in us furnish each its own proper help to the solution of the different parts of the question. O habit of sin! O accompanying penalty of sin! Then you turned me away from the consideration of things so manifest, but you injured me when I did not discern. But now, among my most familiar acquaintances who do not dis- cern, you wound and torment me discerning.
CHAP. 15. HE PRAYS FOR HIS FRIENDS WHOM HE HAS HAD AS ASSOCIATES IN ERROR.
24. Give heed to these things, I beseech you, dearly beloved. Your dispositions I have well known. If you now concede to me the mind and the reason of any sort of man, these things are far more certain than the thino^s that we seemed to learn or rather were compelled to believe. Great God, God om- nipotent, God of supreme goodness, whose rio^ht it is to be believed and known to be in- violable and unchangeable. Trinal Unity, whom the Catholic Church worships, as one who have experienced in myself Thy mercy, I supplicate Thee, that Thou wilt not permit those with whom from boyhood I have lived most harmoniously in every relation to dis- sent from me in Thy worship. I see how it was especially to be expected in this place that I should either even then have defended the Catholic Scriptures attacked by the Mani- chaeans, if as I say, I had been cautious; or I should now show that they can be defended. But in other volumes God will aid my pur- pose, for the moderate length of this, as I suppose, already asks to be spared. ^ 3 This purpose Augustin accomplished in several works. See especially Contra Adiinuiituni, and Contra Paustum Alani- chceum. On Augustin's defense of the Old Testament Scriptures, see Mozley's Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, last chapter. — A. H. N.
ST. AUGUSTIN: ACTS OR DISPUTATION AGAINST FORTUNATUS THE MANICH^AN [ACTA SEU DISPUTATIO CONTRA FORTUNATUM MANICH^UM].
A.D. 392.
TRANSLATED BY PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION, IN TORONTO BAPTIST (theological) COLLEGE, TORONTO, CANADA.
CONTENTS OF ACTS OR DISPUTATION AGAINST FOKTUNATUS THE MANICH.4^AN.
DISPUTATION OF THE FIRST DAY p. 113.
Augustin and Fortunatus are at variance with reference to the subject for discussion, the former having proposed to dispute about doctrine, the latter preferring to vindicate his party through the testimony of Augustin from the slanderous accusations that are current among the Catholics.
Fortunatus makes a confession of his faith, in which he confesses to believe" that God is incorruptible, lucid, unapproachable, intenible, impassible; and expresses his adherence to a doctrine of the Trinity somewhat like that held by Orthodox Christians. Augustin shows that the Manichaean God is subject to necessity, corruptible, violable, liable to suffering, etc., and presses upon Fortunatus the question. Why God sent a portion of his substance to combat the race of darkness, and so to become involved in corruption and misery?
Fortunatus attempts, without success, to show the consistency of his confession of faith with the Manichsean view of two eternally existing antagonistic principles, and the conflict between the two resulting in the mingling of good and evil in the present order of things by quoting freely from the Christian Scriptures. Knowing the deceitfulness of Fortunatus in his use of Scripture, Augustin insists that the discussion be conducted on rational grounds. The audience take sides with Augustin. and raise a clamor that results in the suspension of the discussion, and after they have expressed horror at Fortunatus' assertion that the Word of God is fettered in the race of darkness, the meeting is closed.
DISPUTATION OF THE SECOND DAY p. 119.
j Fortunatus reiterates his Dualism, and yet denies that he teaches the corruptibility of God. Augustin states the Catholic view of the relation of evil to God, insisting that sin is a matter of free will on the part of man.
Augustin continues to press the question. Why God when he can in no way suffer injury sent the soul hither? Fortunatus at last confesses that he is at a loss what to say, and expresses an intention to re-investigate the entire question, with the help of Augustin. Augustin expresses his thawks to God for so happy an ending of the discussion.
f ACTS OR DISPUTATION AGAINST FORTUNATUS, THE MANICH^AN, [ACTA SEU DISPUTATIO CONTRA FORTUNATUM MANICH.-EUM.] A.D. 392.'
DISPUTATION OF THE FIRST DAY.
ON THE FIFTH OF SEPTEMBER, THE MOST RENOWNED MEN ARCADIUS AUGUSTUS (THE SECOND time) and RUFINUS being CONSULS, A DISPUTATION AGAINST FORTUNATUS, AN ELDER OF THE MANICH^ANS, WAS HELD IN THE CITY OF HIPPO REGIUS, IN THE BATHS OF SOSSIUS, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PEOPLE.
I. AuGUSTiN said: I now regard as error what formerly I regarded as truth. I desire to hear from you who are present whether my supposition is correct. First of all I re- gard it as the height of error to believe that Almighty God, in whom is our one hope, is in any part either violable, or contaminable, or corruptible. This I know your heresy affirms, not indeed in the words that I now use; for when you are questioned you confess that God is incorruptible, and absolutely in- violable, and incontaminable; but when you begin to expound the rest of your system, we are compelled to declare Him corruptible, penetrable, contaminable. For you say that ' This Disputatioti seems to have occurred shortly after the writing of the preceding treatise. It appears from the. Retracta- tions that Fortunatus had Hved for a considerable time at Hippo, and had secured so large a number of followers that it was a delight to him to dwell there. The Disputation is supposed to be a ver- liatim report of what Augustin and Fortunatus said during a two days' discussion. The subject is the origm of evil. Augustin maintains that evil, so far as man is concerned, has arisen from a free e.xercise of the will on man's part; Fortunatus, on the other hand, maintams that the nature of evil is co-eternal with (Jod. Fortunatus shows considerable knowledge of the New Testament, but no remarkable dialectic powers. Heappearsat great disad- vantage beside his great antagoni.st. In fact, he i.s far from saying the best that can be said in favor of dualism. We may say that he was fairly vanquished in the argument, and at the close con- fessed himself at a loss what to say, and expressed an intention of more carefully t.xamining the problems discu.ssed, in view of what Augustin had.said. Augustin is more guarded in this treatise than in tlie preceding in his statements about free will. He found Utile occasion here, therefore, to retract or explain. Fortunatus often expresses himself vaguely and obscurely. If some sentences are difficult to understand in the translation, they will be found equally so in the Latin.— A. H. N.
another race of darkness, whatever it may be, has rebelled against the kingdom of God; but that Almighty God, when He saw what ruin and desolation threatened his domains, unless he should make some opposition to the adverse race and resist it, sent this virtue, from whose commingling with evil and the race of darkness the world was framed. Hence it is that here good souls labor, serve, err, are corrupted: that they may see the need of a liberator, who should purge them from error, loose them from this commingling with evil, and liberate them from servitude. I think it impious to believe that Almighty God ever feared any adverse race, or was under necessity to precipitate us into afflic- tions.
F'oRTUNATUS said: Because I know that you have been in our midst, that is, have lived as an adherent among the Manicha^ans, these are the principles of our faith. The matter now to be considered is our mode of living, the falsely alleged crimes for which we are maltreated. Therefore let the good men present hear from you whether these things with which we are charged and which we have thrown in our teeth are true or false. For from your instruction, and from your exposi- tion and explanation, they will have been able more correct information about our to gain to gain 114 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
mode of life, if it shall have been set forth by you.
2. AuGUSTiN said: I was among you, but faith and morals are different questions. I proposed to discuss faith. But if those present prefer to hear about morals, I do not decline that question.
FoRTUNATUS Said: I. wish first to purge my- self in your conscience in which we are pol- luted, by the testimony of a competent man, (who even now is competent for me), and in view of the future examination of Christ, the just judge, whether he saw in us, or himself practiced by imitation, the things that are now thrown in our teeth?
3. AuGUSTiN said: You call me to some- thing else, when I had proposed to discuss faith, but concerning your morals only those who are your Elect can fully know. But you know that I was not your Elect, but an Audi- tor. Hence though I was present at your prayer meetings,' as you have asked (whether separately among yourselves you have any prayer meetings, God alone and yourselves can know); yet in your prayer meetings where I have been present I have seen nothing shameful take place; but only that the faith that I afterwards learned and approved is denounced, and that you perform your ser- vices facing the sun. Besides this I found out nothing new in your meetings, but who- ever raises any question of morals against you, raises it against your Elect. But what you who are Elect do among yourselves, I have no means of knowing. For I have often heard from you that you receive the Eucha- rist. But since the time of receiving it was concealed from me, how could I know what you receive?^ So keep the question about morals, if you please, for discussion among your Elect, if it can be discussed. You gave me a faith that I to-day disapprove. This I proposed to discuss. Let a response be made to my proposition.