The Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philosophy: XI.
THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF AVERROES Printed by Manibhai Mathurbhai Gupta at Hto M Aryafiudharak " Printing Press, Raopura, Baroda, and Published by A. G. Widgery, the College, BaT«.«l.a 1-1-1921 I THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF AVERROES Tractata translated from the Arabic 4$|r Professor of Islamic History, Hyderabad Formerly Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative study of Religions, Baroda.
BAEODA MAY 141935 7 1*6 DEDICATION to Dr. AZIMUDDIN AHMAD Sir, lb was at your feeb that I first learned to appreciate historical and liter- ary research, and the following pages constitute the earliest fruits of that literary labour of mine the impetus for which I am proud to have received from you. I crave your indulgence for my taking the liberty of dedicating the same to your revered name, with the hope that it will not fail to attract the same generous sympathy from you as you have always shown to your pupil, Mohammad Jamil ur Rehmak PREFACE It was as a Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study of Religions at the College, Baroda, that the present work was begun. The subject was taken up in the first place as a parallel study to that contained in a paper in the Indian Philosophical Review, Volume II, July 1918, pp. 24-32 entitled " Maimon- ides and the Attainment of Relioious Truth." But as I proceeded with my investigation I thought it might be b&st to let Averroes speak for himself. For this reason I have here translated certain treatises of Averroes, as edited in the Arabic text by D. H. Muller in " Philo- sophic und Theologie von Averrpes." Munich 1859. I am confident that the book will prove an interesting one and will explain itself to the reader without any introduction on my part. B 1 - ■ 10 PREFACE Though owing to my appointment at Hyderabad I resigned my position at Baroda soon after commencing this work I wish here to express my thanks to Professor Al ban G. Widgery of Baroda for his constant sympathy with and encouragement for my work in and out of the Seminar. He has also kindly accepted the book for inclusion in the Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philo- sophy. I am indebted to him for a complete revision of the manuscript and for the onerous work of seeing the book through the press. I am also indebted to my brother Mutazid Wali ur Rehrnan, e.a. for valuable help in rendering many obscure passages.
Mohammad Jamil ur Rehman Osrnania University, Hyderabad.
CONTENTS I. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of the Relation between Religion and Philosophy.
I a. Appendix: On the Problem of Eternal Knowledge which Averroes has mentioned in his Decisive Discourse.
II. An Exposition of the Methods of Argu- ment concerning the Doctrines of the Faith, and a Determination of Doubts and misleading Innovation brought into the Faith through Interpreta- tions.
1 ,4 DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION OF THE JURATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY/ And after: Praise be to God for all His praiseworthy acts, and blessings on Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the Chosen One and His Apostle. The- purpose of the following treatise is to inquire through sacred Law t whether the* learning of philosophy and other sciences- appertaining thereto is permitted, or called dangerous, or commended by the Law, and if commended, is it only approved or made obligatory.
* A translation of Averroes' Kitab Fasl a'l Maqal w» Taqrir ma bain'a'I Shariata wa'l Hikraati mina'l IttisaL Ed. by D. J. Muller, Philosophic tind Theologie von Averroes, Munich 1859.
f ». e. Shariat. Compare Jewish Torah.
/ I 34 AVERROES We maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to look into creation and to ponder over it in order to be guided to the Creator, — in other words, to look into the meaning of existence. For the knowledge of creation leads to the cogniscance of the Creator, through the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the knowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of the Creator. The Law encourages and exhorts us to observe creation. Thus, it is clear that this is to be taken either as a religious injunction or as something approved by the Law. But the Law urges us to observe creation by means of reason and demands the knowledge thereof through reason. This is evident from different verses of the Quran. For example the Quran says: " Wherefore take example from them, ye who have eyes."1 That is a clear indication of the necessity of using the reasoning faculty, or rather 1. Quran lix, 2.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 15 both reason and religion, in the inter- pretation of things. Again it says: "Or do they not contemplate the king- dom of heaven and earth and the things which God hath created."2 This is a plain exhortation to encourage the use of observation of creation. And remember that one whom God especially distingui- shes in this respect, Abraham, the prophet. For He says: "And this did we show unto Abraham: the kingdom of heaven and earth."3 Further He says: "Do they not consider the camels, how they are created; and the heaven, how it is raised."4 Or still again: "And (who) meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord thou hast not created this in vain."5 There are many other verses on this subject: too numer- ous to be enumerated.
Now, it being established that th<> Law makes the observation and considera- tion of creation by reason obligatory — 2. Quran vii, 184. 3. Quran vi, 75.
4. Quran lxxxviii, 17. 5. Quran iii, 176.
16 AVKRROES and consideration is nothing but to make explicit the implicit — this can only be done through reason. Thus we must look into creation with the reason* Moreover, it is obvious that the observa- tion which the Law approves and en- courages must be of the most perfect type, performed with the most perfect kind of reasoning. As the Law empha- sises the knowledge of God and His creation by inference, it is incumbent on any who wish to know God and His whole creation by inference, to learn the kinds of inference, their conditions and that which distinguishes philosophy from dialectic and exhortation from syllog- ism. This is impossible unless one possesses knowledge beforehand of the various kinds of reasoning and learns to distinguish between reasoning and what is not reasoning. This cannot be done except one knows its different parts, that is, the different kinds of premises.
Hence, for a believer in the Law and a follower of it, it is necessary to know BELtGION AND PHILOSOPHY 17 these tilings before he begins to look into creation, for they are like instruments for observation. For, just as a student discovers b}T the study of the law, the necessity of knowledge of legal reason- ing with all its kinds and distinctions, a student will rind out by observing the creation the necessity of metaphysical reasoning. Indeed, he has a greater claim on it than the jurist. For if a jurist argues the necessity of legal reasoning from the saying of God: " Wherefore take example from them O ye who have eyes1,"6 a student of divinity has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf of metaphysical reasoning.
One cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in religion because it did not exist in the early da\vs «»( Islam. For legal reasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later ages, and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also- 6. Quran lix. 2, •i 18 AVERROEg be our attitude towards philosophical reasoning. There is another reason why it should be so, but this is not the proper place to mention it. A large number of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical reasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from religious ordinances. Now, as it is established that the Law makes the consideration of philosophical reasoning and its kinds as necessary as legal reasoning, if none of our predecessors has made an effort to enquire into it, we should begin to do it, and so help them, until the knowledge is complete. For if it is difficult or rather impossible for one person to acquaint himself single- handed with all things which it is necessary to know in legal matters,1 it is still more difficult in the case of philo- sophical reasoning. And, if before us, somebody has enquired into it, we should derive help from what he has said. It is quite immaterial whether that man is Q\\Y go-religionist or not; for the instru- RKLIOIONANi) PHIfcOSOPHI H ment by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain in its usefulness, by its being in the hands of one of our own party, or of a foreigner, if it possesses the attributes of truth. By these latter we mean those Ancients who investigated these things before the advent of Islam.
Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all that they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something wrong; we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this kind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can observe the universe, and consider its gdhetod character. For so long as one does not know its general character one cannot know the cheated, and so long as he does net know the created, bfe can 20 AVER ROES 20 AVER ROES have no knowledge of the Creator. Thus we must begin an inquiry into the universe systematically, such as we have learned from the trend of rational in- ference. It is also evident that this aim is to be attained by the investigation of one part of the universe after another, and that help must be derived from predecessors, as is the case in other sciences. Imagine that the science of geometry and astronomy had become extinct in our day, and a single individual desired to find out by himself the magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their forms, and their distances from one another. Even though he were the most sagacious of men, it would be as im- possible for him as to ascertain the pro- portion of the sun and the eartli and the magnitude of the other stars. It would only be attainable by aid of divine revelation, or something like it. If it be said to him that the sun is a hundred and fifty or sixty times as big as the earthy he would take it to be sheer mad- RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 21 ness on the part of the speaker, though it is ail established fact in the science of astronomy, so that no one learned in that science will have any doubt about it. The science which needs most examples from other sciences is tiiat of Law. For the study of jurisprudence cannot be completed except in a very long time. If a man today would himself learn of all the arguments discovered by the different disputants of diverse sects, in problems which have always excited contentions in all the big cities, except those of Al-Maghrib, he would be a proper object to be laughed at on account of the impossibility of the task, in spite of the existence of every favourable cir- cumstance. This is similar not only in the sciences but also in the arte. For no one is capable of discovering by him- self alone everything which is required. And if this is so in other sciences and arts, how is it possible in the art of arts - philosophy?
This being so, it becomes us to go 22 AVERR0ES back to the Ancients, and to sec what observations and considerations they have made into the universe, according to the tests of inference. We should consider what they have said in this connection and proved in their books, so that what- ever may be true in them we may accept and, while thanking them, be glad to know it, and whatever be wrong, we should be warned by it, be cautioned, and hold them excused for their mistake.
From what has been said, it may be taken that a search into the books of the Ancients is enjoined by the Law, when their meaning and purpose be the same as that to which the Law exhorts us. Anyone who prevents a man from pondering over these things, that is, a man who has the double quality of natural sagacity and rectitude in the Law. with the merit of learning; and disposition - turns away the people from the door by which the Law invites them to enter into the knowledge of God, and that is the door of observation RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY U which leads to the perfect knowledge of God. Such an action is the extreme limit of ignorance and of remoteness from God.
If, by studying these books, a man has been led astray and gone wrong on account of some natural defect, bad training of the mind, inordinate passion, or the want of a teacher who might explain to him the true significance uf things, by all or some of these causes, we ought not on this account to prevent one fit to study these things from doing so. For such harm is not innate in man, but is only an accident of training.
It is not right that a drug which is medically useful by its nature should be discarded because it may prove harmful by accident. The Prophet told a man whose brother was suffering with diarrhea to treat him with honey. But this only increased the ailment. On his complain- ing, the Prophet said: *' God was right and thy brother's stomach was wrong." We would even say that a man who 21 AVJfilUlOEis 21 AVJfilUlOEis prevents another fit for it; from study- ing the books of philosophy, because certain worthless people have been mis- led by them, is like a man who refused a thirsty man cold and sweet water, till he died, because some people under the same circumstances have been suffocated by it and have died. For death by suffocation through drinking cold water is accidental, while by thirst it is natural and inevitable.
This state of things is not peculiar to this science only, but is common to all. How many jurists there are in whom jurisprudence has become the cause of worldliness and lack of piety? We should say that a large majority of jurists are of this kind, although their science should result in better action than other sciences which only lead to better knowledge.
So for, then, the position is estab- lished. Now, we Muslims firmly believe that our Law is divine and true. This very Law urges us and brings us RELIGION AND JgIlLOs*p&HY 26 that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God, and His creation. This is a fact to which every Muslim will bear testimony by his very nature and temperament. We say this, because temperaments differ in believing: one will believe through philosophy; while another will believe through dogmatic dis- course, just as firmly as the former, as no other method appeals to his nature. There are others who believe by exhor- tation alone, iust as othe* s believe through inferences. For this reason our divine Law invites people by all the three methods, which every man has to satisfy, except those who stubbornly refuse to believe, or those, aecording to whom these divine methods have not been established on account of the wayward- ness of their hearts. This is why the mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world, for his Law comprises all the three, methods leading men towards God. What we say is quite clear from the following saying of God: 26 AVERROES 26 AVERROES " Invite men unto the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation, and dispute with them in the most condes- cending manner/'7 As this Law is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge of God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not contrary to Law, for i truth cannot contradict truth, but veri- fies it and bears testimony to it. And if that is so, and rational observation is directed to the knowledge of any exis- tent objects, then the Law may be found to be silent about it, or concerned with it. In the former case no dispute arises, as it would be equivalent to the absence of its mention in the Law as injunctory, and hence the jurist derives it from legal conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it, either it will agree with that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree with it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, and if it is opposed to the Law, an interpretation is to be 7. Quran xvi., 126.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY *t sought. Interpretation means to eariy the meaning of a word from its original sense to a metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will not conflict with the custom of the Arabian tongue. It is to avoid the naming of an object, by simply mention- ing its like, its cause, its attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the definition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. And if the jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very befitting would it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For the jurist has only his fanciful conjectures to depend upon, while a learned man possesses positive ones..,/* We hold it to bu an established truth that if the Law is apparently opposed to a truth proved by philo- sophy it admits of an interpretation according to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer 28 AVKKfcOES 28 AVKKfcOES cannot mistrust. One who is accustomed to these things divine can experience for himself what we have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual and traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical conclusion will be found to bo opposed to the Law, which when sifted and Investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or almost so, with it.
•That is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of the Law are not to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation. But they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted. For example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse of Equalisation8 and on the Tradition of 8. " It is he who hath created you whatsoever is on earth, and that set His mind to the creation of heaven and formed it into seven heavena; he knoweth all thing.'" Quran ii. 29. For an interpretation of this see Eaji's Tdj'dri Knhir vol. I. p. 211) ct seiq. Cairo. 1307. A. H. and Tabari'a Cow mciUii.r// vol. Ij p. H<"> et seq. Cairo 1902 A. D.
RFXlGTON AND PHILOSOPHY 29 Descent,9 while the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of these-exoteric and esoteric-because of the differences of human nature and minds in verifying a thing. The existence, of an opposed esoteric meaning is in order to call the attention of the learned to find out a comprehensive interpreta- tion. To this the following verse of the Quran refers: " It is he who hath sent down unto thee the book, wherein are some verses clear to be understood — they are the foundation of the book — and others are parabolical. But they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is parabolical therein; out of love of schism, and a desire of the interpretation thereof; yei none knowvth the interpretation thereof except God. But they who are well grounded in 9. "■ Verily God oomei down every, night to the earth ' ( Nihfcvah ft Obaribil Hadith by Iba Athir vol. IV. p. 188 Cairo 1311 A. II., ) Koran Interpretation toe the above and Qustatain'fl Commentary on Bukari, vol. IX ». 178. Cairo. 1307 \. II.
3* AYHRROks knowledge say: We believe therein, the whole is from our Lord, and none will consider except the prudent."10 Here it may be objected that in the Law thdre are things which all Muslims have agreed to take esoterically, while there are others on which they have agreed to 'put an interpretation, while there are some about which they dis- agree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the interpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise? We would say that if the agreement is posi- tive there is no need to apply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. For this very reason Abu Hamid (Al Ghaz- zali) and Abu Ma'ali and other learned doctors have ordained that a man does not become an unbeliever by forsaking the common agreement and applying the principle of interpretation in such things. T* will certainlv be agreed that complete earth. ^ug Q| OD}njon js nofc possible in formed it., • ii. 29. Forslca* questions, in the manner in vol. I. p. 24d^ r— ■mciUarij vol.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 31 which it is possible to establish it in practical things. For it is not possible to establish unanimity of opinion at any time, unless we confine ourselves to a small period and know perfectly all the learned doctors living in it, that is, their personalities, their number and their views about any question to be quoted to us directly from them without a break in the chain. With all this we should know for certain that the doctors living at that time are agreed that there is no distinction of exoteric and esoteric mean- ings in the Law, that the knowledge of no proposition should be concealed from anybody, and that the method of teaching the Law should be the same with all men. But we know that a large number of people in the early days of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric meanings of the Law, and thought that the esoteric meanings should not be dis- closed to an ignorant person who cannot understand them, For example, Bukhari has related on the authority of Ali that S2 AVEBROES S2 AVEBROES ho said " Talk to men what they can understand. Do you intend to give the lie to God and His Apostle? " There are many Traditions to the same effect related from other people. So, how is it possible to conceive of any consensus of opinion coining down to us in meta- physical questions when we definitely know that in every age there Have been doctors who take the Law to contain things the real significance of which should not be disclosed to all men? But in practical affairs it is quite different. For all persons are of opinion that they should be revealed to all men alike. In these things unanimity of opinion can be easily obtained if the proposition is published, and no disagreement is re- ported. That may be sufficient to obtain unanimity of opinion in practical things as distinct from the sciences.
If it be maintained that one docs not become an unbeliever bv ignoring consensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible in it, what shall RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 33 we »ay of such Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr ( Al Farabi ) and Ibn Sina ( Avicenna )? For Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) has charged them with posi- tive infidelity in his book: The Refuta- tion of the Philosophers, in regard to three things: The eternity of the world; God's ignorance of particulars; and the interpretation concerning the resurrection of bodies and the state of the Day of Judgment. To this we should reply that from what he has said it is not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity. For in his book Al Tafriqah hairial Islami w'al Zindiqah he has explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of opinion is doubtful. More- over we have definitely pointed out that it is not possible to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters, especially wlieii there are many people of the early times who have held that there are inter- pretations which should not be disclosed to all but only to those who are fit for a 34 AVERR0ES 34 AVERR0ES them and those are men who are u well grounded in knowledge"11 a divine in- junction which cannot be overlooked. For if such people do not know the interpretation in these matters they will have no special criterion of truth for their faith, which the common people have not, while God has described them as believing in Him. This kind of faith is always produced by the acceptance of the arguments, and that is not possible without a knowledge of interpretation. Otherwise, even the common people believe in the words of God without any philosophy whatever. The faith which the Quran has especially ascribed to the learned must be a faith streng- thened with full arguments, which can- not be without a knowledge of the canons of interpretation. For God has said that the Law admits of interpretation which is its real significance, and this is what is established by arguments. Yet though this is so, it is impossible to establish 11, Qumn iii, 5, ftELIUlOtf AND PHItOSOPtn & any well grounded consensus of (.pinion in the interpretations which God has ascribed to the learned men. That is quite evident to anyone with insight. But with this we see that Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) has made a mistake in ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers the opinion that God has no knowledge of particulars. They are only of opinion that the knowledge of God about parti- culars is quite different from ours. For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing. Such knowledge is produced by the existence of a tiling, and changes with changes in the thing. On the other hand the knowledge of God is the cause of an existent thing. Thus one who compares these two kinds of know- ledge ascribes the same characteristics to two quite different things — and that is extreme ignorance. When applied both to eternal and to transitory thin-, word knowledge is used only in a fashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially different, For 36 AYERR0E 36 AYERR0E instance the word Jalal is applied both to great and small; and sarim to light and darkness. We have no definition which can embrace both these kinds of knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimun of our times have thought. We have treated this question separately, at the request of some of our friends.
How can it be supposed that the Peripatetic Philosophers say that God has no knowledge of particulars when they are of opinion that man is sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through visions, and that he gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great and powerful Director, who directs everything? These philosophers are not only of opinion that God has no know- ledge of details such as we have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universale.. For all known mii versa Is with us are also the effect of the exist- ence of a thing, while God's knowledge is quite other than this. From these arguments it is concluded that God's ltlvl-lUION AND PHILOSOPHY W knowledge is far higher than that it should be called universal or particular.
There is therefore no difference of opinion concerning the proposition, that is, whether they are called infidel or not.
As to the eternal or transitory nature of the world: I think that in this matter the difference of opinion between the Asharite Mutakallimuu and the Ancient Philosophers is for the most part a verbal difference, at least so far as the opinion of some of the Ancients is concerned. For they are agreed on the fact that there are three kinds of creation — the two extremes and a medial one. They again agree oil the nomen- clature of the two extremes, but they disagree as to the medial one. As to the one extreme, it has come into exist- ence from something other than itself, or from anything else — that is from a generative cause or matter — while time existed before it All those, things whose existence is perceived by the senses, as water, animals, vegetation, etc., are iu* 38 AVKHUOK.s eluded in this. All Ancient and Ashar- ite philosophers are agreed in denomi- nating this creation Originated.
The other extreme is that which came into existence from nothing, not out of anything, and time did not precede? it. The two parties are agreed in call- ing this Eternal. This extreme can be reached by logic. This is God, the Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all.
The medial kind of creation is that which has neither been made from nothing, "matter," nor has time preceded it, but it has been created bv some generative cause. In this is included the whole world. Again they all agree on the existence of all the three cate- gories of the universe. The Mutakal- limun admit, or they ought to admit, that before the universe there was no time, for according to them time is contemporaneous with motion and body. They are also agreed with the Ancients that future time and creation have no end, but they differ as to past time and RELIG10K AND PHILOSOPHY 39 Its creation. The Mutakallimun are of opinion that it had a beginning.
This is the belief of Plato and his disciples, while Aristotle mid his fol- lowers are of opinion that it had no beginning, just as the future has no end. It is clear that the last mentioned kind of creation resembles both the originated and the eternal creation. So one who thinks that in the past creation there are more characteristics of the eternal than the originated takes it to be eternal and vice versa. But in reality it is neither truly originated nor eternal. For the originated creation is necessarily subject to destruction while the eternal is without a eause. There are some, for example, Plato and his followers, who have called it infinitely originated, for according to them time has no end. There is not, here so great a difference about the universe, for it to be made the basis of a charge of infidelity. In fact, they should not be so charged at all, for opinions which are worthy of It) AVKRROES