70 AVEUROtiS aggrieving and saddening. This is still enhanced by those, who ascribe them- selves to philosophy, because an injury from a friend is worse than the injury from an enemy. Philosophy is a com- panion and a foster-sister to the Law, Hence an injury from this source is the worst kind of injury, even if we neglect the enmity, hatred, and -animosity which is created between the two, although they are companions by nature and friends in reality. It has also been injured by many ignorant friends who ascribe themselves to it. These are the schisms which exist in Islam. May God set all aright, help all to His love, and bring together their hearts for piety, and erase enmity and hatred by his favour and ^race.
Indeed God has removed much of evil, ignorance and the misleading ways through this strong government, and has led the many to good, especially the people who have walked in the path of scholasticism, and have a liking for the RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 71 knowledge of the Truth. Because it has called the people to the knowledge of God by mediate paths, which are higher than the depressions of the blind fol- lowers: and lower than that of the high- sounding Mutakallimum; and has called the learned to their duty of considering fully the principles of Law.
la.
APPENDIX.
ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE.
May God perpetuate your honour and bless you, and screen you always from the eyes of misfortune. Through your excellent intelligence and good understanding you have learned a great part of all these sciences, till your insight informed you of the doubt which arises concerning the eternal knowledge of God, with its being at the same time concerned with created things. Thus, in the interests of truth, it is now in- cumbent upon us to remove the doubt from your mind, after we have stated it clearly. For one who does not know the problem adequately cannot very well solve the doubt.
The question may be stated thus: If all this universe was in the knowledge of God before its creation, then, was it in His knowledge after its creation as it was before it "came into existence; or was it in His knowledge before its creation quite different from that aft&r its coming into being? If we say that the knowledge of God about it after its creation is quite different from that which it was before its creation, it be- comes necessary for us to admit that the eternal knowledge is changeable; or that when the universe came into exist- ence out of non-existence, then there is an addition to the eternal knowledge; which is impossible. Again, if we say that the knowledge of it was the same in both the conditions, then it wowld be said: Was the created universe the same betore its -coming into existence ras it was after its creation? To this objection it will have to be answered that it was not the same before its creation as it was alter it, otliersvi^u ilio existent mid 74 AVkKRokb 74 AVkKRokb the non-existent thing would be the same. When the opponent has admitted this much, he may be asked whether the real knowledge does not consist in the cognizance of an existent thing as it is. If he says: " Yes/' then accordingly it becomes necessary that when a thing changes in itself the knowledge of it must also change, otherwise it would be a knowledge of something other than the real object. Thus it would then be necessary to admit one of two things: either the eternal knowledge itself will change, or the created things would be unknown to God. And both of these alternatives are impossible with regard to God. This doubt is still further strengthened by the apparent condition of man, that is, the relation of his knowledge about non-existent things by the supposition of their existence and its relation when the thing in question is found. It is self-evident that both kinds of knowledge are different, other- wise God would have been ignorant of MiLtGtON AND PHILOSOPHY 15 its existence at the time he found it. The argument which the Mutakallimun advance to meet this objection does not by any means deliver us from the doubt. They say that God knows the things before their coming into being, as they would be after they come into existence. If they say that no change occurs, they fall into mistake. If on the other hand they admit a change, they may be asked whether this change was known in the eternal knowledge or not. Thus the fipst doubt occurs again. On the whole it is difficult to imagine that the knowledge of a thing before and after its existence can be one and the same.
This is the statement of the doubt in the briefest terms possible, as we have put it for your sake. A solution of this doubt requires a very long discussion, but here we intend to state a point which might easily solve it. Abu Hamid ( Al Ghazzali ) has also tried to solve this doubt in his work: The RefutcUion of the Philosophers, but his method is by 76 AVEllKOES 76 AVEllKOES no means satisfactory. For he says some* thing to this effect: he thinks the known and the knowledge are not con- nected with each other, so that when a change takes place in the one the other does not change in itself. So it is pos- sible that it may happen in the case of Divine knowledge and the things existent, that is, they may change in themselves wThile God's knowledge may remain the same. For instance a pillar may he on the right hand of Zaid, it may be chang- ed to his left without any change taking place in Zaid himself. But the illustrat- ion is not at all a correct one, for the relation has changed, that is, that which was on the right side is now on the left. That in which no change has taken place is the condition of that relation - Zaid. It being so, and the knowledge is only the relation itself, it is necessary that it should change with a change in the thing known, as the change in the rela- tion of the pillar to Zaid, for it is now on the left after being on the right BRUGION AND PHILOSOPHY 77 The view which might solve this ques- tion is that it should be maintained that the condition of eternal knowledge of existent things is quite other than the created knowledge with regard to them. For the existence of a thing is the cause and means of our knowledge of it, while the eternal knowledge is itself the cause and means of the existent tiling. So if a change takes place in the eternal knowledge after the coming into being of an existent thing, as it does in the created knowledge then it is involved that the former cannot be the cause but only the effect of the existent things. Thus it is necessary that there should be no change in it, as there is in the created knowledge. This mistake always occurs by our taking eternal knowledge to be like the created one, by ail analogy from the seen to the unseen. The error in this analogy has alread}^ been exposed. Just as no change takes place in any agent after the creation of his act - that is, change of kind which was not 78 AVKRROP.s 78 AVKRROP.s found before - so no change in the etern- al knowledge of God after the creation of the thing which was in His knowledge. So this doubt is removed. At the same time it is not necessary for us to say that as there is no change in eternal knowledge, therefore, He does not know an existent at the time of its creation, as it is. But we must believe that He knows not by a created but by His eternal knowledge. For a change in knowledge with a change of the existent thing is a condition of the knowledge which depends upon the existent thing, such a knowledge being created. Thus the relation of the eternal knowledge with the existent things is not the same as that of the created knowledge. It is not that there is no connection between them at all as some philosophers are said to maintain, who as the people think, say, at the time of doubt, that God has no knowledge of particulars at all. But this is not as is commonly sup- posed. Ihey only say that He does not RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 79 know particulars by any created know- ledge, one of the conditions of which is its being created by them, by which it is an effect and not a cause. This is the last of the things about it which must be remembered. For our reason leads us to the fact that God is the Knower of things, all of them emanating from Him. This is so because He is a knower, not because of His existence, nor of His existence in any form, but only because of His being a Knower. God has said " Shall not He know all things who hath created them, since He is the sagacious, the knowing " 22 The arguments also tell us that He knows by a knowledge which may be akin to created knowledge. So it is necessary that there should be some other know- ledge for the existent things - and this is the eternal of God. Moreover, how is it possible to suppose that the Peri' patetic Philosophers think that the etern- al knowledge does not include partieul- p.. tywan hvi 14.
80 AVRUROKS ars, while they say that these are a cause of admonition to us in our dreams, divine revelations, and other kinds of inspiration?
That is what we think about the solution of the problem — a solution in which there is no doubt or suspicion, God is the only helper to right judg- ment, [and leader to truth. Peace be upon you, and blessings of God and His beatitude. God is the best knower of truth: and to Him is the return and the refuge.
II AN EXPOSITION OP THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH, AND A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS AND MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRET ATION§<t And after - Praise be to God, who sets apart anyone whom He will for His knowledge, rendering him tit for understanding His Law and Following His path, informing him of the hidden recesses of His knowledge, the real mean- ing of His inspiration, and the purposie of sending the Apostle to creatures, in spite of what has beoome cleat about the doubt of the doubters among the Prophet's own followers, and changes of meanings introduced by the false among f A translation of Al-Kcuhf*t*n Maithtj it Adittahji Aqai'l il Nill'ih, m Ttirif ma Woqmftktt bi minShubhfl Mmghahwa ' >h, 8* AVERROES his own people. He has disclosed to him that there are interpretations which God and His Apostle have not ordered. May there be the most perfect blessings upon the Trusty of His inspiration, and the Seal of His prophets, and upon his family and relations.
We have already described in the foregoing tractate the conformity of philosophy with the Law, and its other relations. We have said there that the Law is of two kinds: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people is to follow the exoteric law; while the duty of learned men is to follow the esoteric one. So the duty of the common people is to follow the meanings of the Law in their literal sense, leaving aside every interpretation of it. The learned men are not permit- ted to expose their interpretations to the common people, as AH, ( upon whom be peace ) has said, " Tell the people what they can understand. Do you wish to give the li§ to God and His Apostle? n RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY £5 So I thought that in the present book I should examine the exoteric meanings which the Law intends the common peo- ple to follow, and in those, search the real purpose of the Law-giver, ( ort whom be peace ) according to my ability and knowledge. For the people of His Law have been extremely disturbed, so much so that many misguided sects and different divisions, have been produced, every one of winch thinks that it is fol- lowing the best Law, and that he who disagrees is either an innovator or an infidel whose life and property is at stake. All this is directly opposed to the pur- pose of the Law-giver. Its cause lies in the misleading things about the Law which have been put forward.
In our own times, there are four of these sects which are famous. In the first place, there is the sect of the Ashar- ites, and these are the people wTho are commonly taken to be men of Sunna. Then there are Mutazilites, the sects of the Batinites, ( Esoteric ), and the sect $6 AVERKOES $6 AVERKOES of the Bombasts. Every one of these sects has its own peculiar beliefs about God, and has turned many an exoteric word of the Law to interpretations, which they have applied to those beliefs. They think that theirs was the original Law which all the people are asked to follow, and he who deviates from it is either an innovator or an infidel. But when you look into all their views and then examine the purpose of the Law, it would appear that a great part of them are recent opinions and innovating interpretations. Of them I will mention here those indispensable beliefs in the Law, without which Faith does not become complete, and will search, in every one of them, the real purpose of the Law- giver, ( peace be upon him, ) beyond that which has been made the basis of the Law, and its beliefs before the coming into use of incorrect interpretations. I will begin by explaining the intention of the Law - giver as to the beliefs which should be held by the common feEUGlON AND PlriLOSOWiV 87 people about God, and the methods which Ho adopted towards them. All this is contained in the Divine Book. We will begin by an exposition of the methods which leads to the knowledge of the existence of the Creator, for this is the first thing which a student ought to know. But before this, it is necessary that we should mention the opinions of the well - known sects.
The Bombasts hold that the method of obtaining knowledge of. the existence of the Creator is by hearing and not by reason, that is, the belief in His exist- ence, the verification of which is incum- bent upon all men, is enough to be taught by the Law-giver, and believed as an article of Faith, as is the case with his teachings about the condition of the Day of Judgment, and others with which our reason has no power to deal. This is obviously a misleading sect, for it Falls short of the purpose of the Law, as regards the method adopted towards all the people, leading them to 88 AVERROES 88 AVERROES the knowledge of the existence of God, and calling them to the confession of His belief. It is quite evident from many verses of the Divine Book, that in it the people have been called to verify the existence of the Creator by arguments of reason which are mentioned in it. For instance, there are the fol- lowing verses of the Quran, " O men of Mecca, serve your Lord who has created you and those before you,"1 and " Is there any doubt concerning God, the Creator of heaven and earth? "2 and other verses on the subject found there- in. It is not fit for a man to say, that if these arguments had been necessary for believing in God — that is, had his faith been not completed without under- standing them — the Prophet would not have invited anybody to Islam without presenting to him all these arguments, for the Arabs already knew the exist- ence of the Creator, so that God has said, " If thou asketh them who has 1. Quran ii, 19. 2. Quran xiv, 11.
created the heavens and the earth, they will surely answer, God/'3 and hence there was no use giving arguments. It is impossible to find a man so stupid and dull, that he cannot understand the argument* advanced by Law tor the common people, through the Prophet. This is to say the least. If there be found such a man, then it is his duty to believe in God by hearing alone. So much- for the ideas of the Bombasts about the exoterics of the Law.
The Asharites are of opinion that the verification of the existence of God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have adopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by Law, and is not mentioned in the Quran, nor the people invited through it to believe. Their well-known method is founded upon the fact that the uni- verse is a created tbing, which is itself based upon the theory of the composi- tion of atoms, and that the atom is a 3. Quran xxxix, 3D.
90 AVE LI fro Eb created thing, and that other bodies are created out of it. The method which they adopt for the exposition of the creation of an atom, which they call al-Jauharat ul Faridah (sole Essence), is a misleading one even for man}' religious men in the business of controversy, not to speak of the common people. And despite this it is a method devoid of philosophy, and does not lead to a belief in the existence of the Creator. For if we suppose the universe is a created thing, it becomes necessary, as they say, that its Creator must also be a "Created" object. But a doubt presents itself about the existence of this created thing, which is not in the power of scholastic theology to solve. And that is this, that we can take this thing to be neither eternal nor created. For if we take it as created, then it must require another created thing; and this another, and so on to infinity. This is impossible. On the other hand, if we take Him as eternal, then it is necessary that his RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 9l action in connection with the result must also be eternal. In this way the results also become eternal. It is necessary for a created thing that its existence be dependent upon a created action. Their hypothesis can only be proved if they admit that a created action can be per- formed by an eternal agent. For the result of the action might be dependent on the action of the agent. But they do not admit it, for according to their principles what is coeval with created things is itself created. Moreover, if the a^ent sometimes acts and at other times remains inactive, it is necessary, that there be a condition better applicable in one state of things than in the other. Then about this condition the same question will rise, and so it will go on till infinity. And what the Mutakallimun say in answer to this objection that the created action is the result of eternal intention, does not relieve us of our doubt or satisfy our mind. For inten- tion without action is dependent UDO 92 AVERR0ES 92 AVERR0ES the act, and if the act is a created thing, then it is necessary that the intent- ion in connection with it must also be a created thing. It makes no difference whether we take the intention as eternal or created, rising before the action or with it. So we may take it as we like. All the same it is necessary for them to admit either of the three things about the universe — either a created action, with a created intention or a created action and air eternal intention, or an eternal action with an eternal intention. But a created thing is impossible from an eternal action without any expedient, even if we admit for their sake, that it comes into existence by eternal action; and putting intention itself or the action, connected with the act is a thing which cannot be understood. This is supposing an act without an agent, with a result, without any intention. Intention is a condition of the action and not the action itself. Also it is necessary that this eternal intention, should be connected RELIGION AND PJHLOBOPH* 93 with non-existence of a created thing, for a period of time which is indefinite. So if a created thing be non- existence for an unknown period of time, then it does not become connected with the intention at the time of its creation, except after the completion of a time of which there is no limit, and that which has no limit has no end. So it be- comes necessary that the intention should never take the form of action, or a time without limit should come to an end, which is impossible. This is the argu- ment of the Mutakallimun, on which they rely in proving that the revolutions of the heavens are created. Moreover, it is necessary that to the intention which precedes the object, and is connected with it, at a certain time, there should be created in it at the time of creation of the object a determination for doing so. For the determination for the creat- ion of an object cannot bo found before that time, because if at the time of action there be found no additional 94 AVERBOES 94 AVERBOES quality in the agent, than that he had at the time of intention, then action from him at that time would not be quite as necessary from him as inactiv- ity. We may go on in this way, find- ing all the obscure and intricate doubts, from which, not to speak of the common people, even clever men, learned in scholastic theology, in philosophy, cannot escape. So if the common people be burdened with a knowledge of these things, it would be an unbearable problem for them.
Then again the methods adopted by the Asharites in proving the creation of the universe are defective for all classes of men. The common people, by their very nature, cannot understand them, and they are at the same time in no way reasonable. So they are neither fit for the learned, nor for the masses. We warn our readers of them and say: The methods which they adopt are of two kinds. One of them, the more famous of the two and upon which a IlELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 95 majority of them relies, is based upon three premises, from which they derive the proof for the creation of the universe. They are: ( 1 ) that essences cannot be separated from accidents, that is, they cannot be devoid of them; ( 2 ) that the accidents are created things: ( 3 ) that that which cannot be separat- ed from a created thing is itself created, that is, that which cannot be severed from the created thing is itself created. Now, if by the first premise which says that the essences cannot be separated from the accidents, they mean the bodies which stand by themselves, then the premise is correct. But if by essence they mean the particle which cannot be divided, which they call Sole Essence, then there is doubt about it,, which is not easy to solve. For the existence of an indivisible essence is not well estab- lished in itself, and about it there are many opposite and highly contradictory opinions, and it is noi in the power, of plastic theology to bring truth out 96 AVERR0ES 96 AVERR0ES of them. That is the business of philo- sophers who are very few in number. The arguments which Asharites use are for the most part exhortative. For their famous argument on this is that they say that our first knowledge about a thing is, for instance, that an elephant is bigger than an ant, for it is ac- cepted that the former has more par- ticles in it than the latter. If it be so, then it is made up of particles and is not a compact whole in itself. So when the body is destroyed it changes into particles, and when composed it is composed of them. But this is wrong. For they have taken a divisible quantity as a continuous one, and then thought tliat that which is applicable to the divisible is also ap- plicable to the continuous. This is true about numbers, that is, we say that a certain number is more than the other, by its containing more particles in it, that is, more units. But it cannot be true of a continuous quanta RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 91 ty, of which wo say that it is bigger or greater. In this way everything may be enumerated without any reference to its bulk at all. And the science of mathematics becomes the science of number only. It is well-known that every bulk can be considered with re- gard to line, surface and volume. More- over, a continuous quantity it is pos- sible to cut in the middle and thus get two parts. But this is impossible in the units of number, nay, it is opposed to it. Then, again, the body and other particles of a continuous quantity are capable of being divided. But every- thing divisible is either divided into other divisible quantities, or into indi- visible ones. If it is divided into indi- visible ones then we have found parti- cles which cannot be divided. And if it is divided into other divisible parts, then again the question arises whether these can be divided into divisible or indivisible parts. So if it can be divid- ed a limitless number of times, there 7 98 AVRRROES would be limitless particles in a limited thing. But it is one of the primary principles of knowledge that particles in a limited thing are limited.
Among the obscure doubts which can be attributed to the Asharites is the question whether if an atom is brought into being, this is different from creation itself, for it is one of the accidents? When the created thing exists the act of creation is nonexist- ent for according to their principles, the accidents cannot be separated from their essences. So this has compelled them to regard creation as pertaining to the existent things and not for it. Then they may be asked; if creation implies the non-existence of a thing, with what is the act of the agent con- nected, for, according to them, there is no mean between existence and non- existence.. If this be so, and, according to them, the action of the agent is connected neither with non existence, nor with that which is and nevertheles RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHV 99 brings about an existence, it must be connected with a middle substance. This doubt has compelled the Mutazi* lites to say that there is a substance, even in nonexistence, which they call Matter or First Element. They should admit that that which is nonexistent can be made existent by action. Both of these sects must also admit the existence of a void. These are questions, which as you see, cannot be solved by dogmatics. Thus, it is clear that such a method cannot be made a basis of the knowledge of God, especially for the masses. We will shortly describe a clearer method of knowing God.
Now as to the second premise, according to which it is said that all the accidents are created things: — This is a premise concerning which there are doubts, and its meaning is as hidden as the soul in a body. For we have observed many bodies to be created and such is also the case with some accidents. So there is no difference in transferring 100 AVERROES 100 AVERROES an observed object to the invisible, in both the cases. For if it is necessary, with regard to accidents, to apply what applies of the visible things to the invisible, that is, if we should suppose a thing which we have not seen, so created, by the analogy of that which we have observed, then we should also apply it to the essences. Thus we can become quite careless of proving the creation of accidents, as distinct from that of essences. The creation of the accidents of the heavenly bodies is extremely doubtful to the observer just as there is doubt in their essential creation. For the creation of their ac- cidents is never perceived. So it is neces- sary that we should clearly observe them. This is the method which surely and certainly leads pious people to the know- ledge of God. This is the method of the chosen men, and that with which God has particularly blessed the prophet Abraham^S^tsJ^^^^d thus did We!»W^ kingdom RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 101 of heaven and earth, that he might be- come of those who firmly belie ve."5 For the whole doubt concerns the heavenly bodies themselves. Many controversial- ists have stopped here and believed that these are so many gods.
Again, time is one of the accidents, the creation of which it is impossible to imagine, for it is necessary that the non-existence of a thing be preceded by time. But in this case it cannot be imagined that the non-existence of a thing can be preceded by itself, except by accepting time as existent. So also it is difficult to ima- gine the creation of the space in which the universe is, for every existent thing- occupies a former space. For if it is a void, as is the opinion of those who think that the void itself is space, its creation also, if we suppose it to be creat- ed, must been have preceded by another void. And if the space be a tangible body, as is the opinion of another group, then it should be contained in another 5. Quran vi, 76.
102 AVfcRROtiS body, which would require another, and so on without limit. These are all obscure problems and the arguments which are brought to disprove the etern- ity of the accidents, are necessary for one who believes in the eternity of those accidents which can be perceived; that is, one who asserts that not all the accidents are' created. For they say that the accidents which can be perceived by the senses are created things. If they are not created., then they will move from one place to another, or will be latent in the place in which they are to appear, before they make their appearance. Then they disprove both of these arguments, and think that they have established that all the accidents are created things. But it has become apparent from what they have said, that the apparently created portions of the accidents are created, not those whose creation is not apparent, nor those in whose case there is doubt, such as the accidents which are in th<i heavenly HELlGIONgAND PHILOSOPHY 103 bodies, in their movement, in their shape, etc., etc. So their arguments about the creation of all accidents, can be inter- preted by the analogy of the visible to the invisible. This is an exhortative argument, except in the suggestion of reasonable arguments which depend here on the certainty of the similarity of the character of the visible and the invisible.
The third premise which says, that that which cannot be separated from a created thing is itself created, is equivo- cal, for it can be understood in two ways: the thing which cannot be sepa- rated from the class of created things, but can be removed from its units; and that which cannot b<> separated from any one of the things in question, as if one were to say, " That which cannot be separated from this blackness in ques- tion. " The second meaning is the cor- rect one, that is it cannot be separated from a certain accident, which is created, for it is absolutely necessary that it l0* AVERROEB