m atkrroes whose duties are the same. This verse means that had there been in the world any other god, but the present one, able to create the world and those in it, so that his relation to it be that of a creat- or, then he must live with God on the Throne. Thus there would be found two existent things of the same kind in a single place. But this is impossible. For when the relation is one, the related must also be one, that is, they cannot be gathered in a single place as they cannot live in it. The relation of God to the Throne is just its opposite: the Throne exists for Him, and not He for the Throne. That is what God has said, " His Throne is extended over heaven and earth, and the preservation of them is no burden unto him.;'28 This is the argument by nature or by Law for prov- ing the unity of God. The difference between the learned and the masses is that the learned know more about the creation of the world, and the purpose 28, Quran 11, 256.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 135 of its different parts, like a single body, than the common people. It is to this that the latter part of the verse refers, u God forbid!*and far, very far, be that which they utter! The seven heavens praise him, and the earth, and all who are therein: neither is there anything which doth not celebrate His praise; but ye understand not their celebration there- of: He is gracious and merciful. '*29 The argument which the Asharites deduce from this verse, calling it the " argu- ment of impossibility,:' is neither in accordance with natural nor legal argu- ments. It is not in accordan e with nature, because what they say is without any proof at all; while it is insufficient by Law, because the common people cannot understand it, not to speak of their being satisfied with it. They say, that if tli ere be two gods, then it s more probable that they would differ. If this were to happen, then there would be one of the following three 136 AVERR0ES cases, there being no fourth alternative. Either the desire of both of them would be accomplished, or the desire of neither would not. They say that it is impos- sible that the desire of neither of them be accomplished, but if it be so then the universe would neither be existent nor non-existent. If the desire of both of them be accomplished, then the uni- verse would be both existent and non- existent at the same time. So there remains no alternative but that the desire of one be accomplished, the other's remaining unfulfilled. So one whose desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and the helpless cannot be a God. The weakness of this argument is that as it is possible to suppose that they differ, it is just as possible to presume that they agree, a fact more becoming to the gods than difference of opinion. If they agree about the creation of the world, they would be like two craftsmen agreed upon making something. If it be so then it must be said that their actions RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 13t help them to work and live in a single place, except that some one may say, that perhaps one would do one thing and the other quite another thing, or per- haps they would work by turns. But this is an objection which cannot be advanced by the masses. But if any sceptic controvertialist were to advance it, he may be told that one who has power to create one thing has power to create the whole. So now again it comes to the same thing, whether they cigree or not, and how can they help each other in work? As to working by turn, it would be a defect in both of them. It is more probable that if there be two gods, there must be two universes. But as the universe is one, its Maker must also be one, for a single work can only be done by one maker. So it is not necessary that we should understand the verse of God, " and some of them had enabled themselves over the other, " as pointing to disagreement alone, but it may be taken as true even 188 AVKRROKS 188 AVKRROKS in the case of argument, for this also leads to the same result as disagreement would do. Here lies the difference be- tween us and the Mutakallimun, about the meaning of this verse, though Abul Maali has said something almost express- ing our own views. By the foregoing you would understand that the argument which the Mutakallimun have deduced from this verse is not the one which it really contains. The impossibility to which their argument leads is not one which should be deduced from the verse in question. The impossibility which is deduced from the argument which they think is contained in the verse, is more than one impossibility, by their dividing it into three parts, while there is no division in the verse itself. So the argument which they use is the one which is known to the logicians as disjunctive syllogism, and is known in their science as definition and division. But the argument contained in the verse is one which is known m logic as hypothetical RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 13$ syllogism, which is quite different from dis- junctive syllogism. Anyone who would look most cursorily into this science would know the difference between the two. Then, again, the impossibility which their argument points out is not that to which the argument of the Book leads. They say that universe will either be neither existent nor non-existent, or it will be existent and non-existent at the same time, or its god would be a help- less and weak god. These are impos- sible forever, b ecause of the impossibility of more than one. The impossibility which the verse re fers to, is not so for ever, for in it it depends upon a certain period of time, that is when the uni- verse is found corrupted at the time of its existence. For he says " If there be any other god but God, " the uni- verse would be found corrupted. Then he has made an exception that it is not corrupted, and hence there must not be more than one God. So now it has become quite clear that this is the met* 140 AVERROES 140 AVERROES hod by which God has invited the people to believe in His existence, and negate the divinity of all but Him. These are the two propositions which are contained in the article of Faith, " There are no gods but He, " So one who thinks over these two proposi- tions, and believes in them by the met- hod which we have pointed out, is a Muslim in reality, with a belief which is truly Islamic. But he whose belief is not based upon these arguments, though he confesses the article, he is a Muslim with the other Muslims, only on account of the similarity of names.
ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES The attributes which the Divine Book has assigned to the Creator and Maker of the universe, are only the perfect forms of those which are found in man, and these are seven in number: Know- ledge, life, power, volition, hearing, seeing and talking.
Now as to knowledge, God in his RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 141 Divine Book has said tho following " Shall he not know all things who has created them? "30 The argument con- tained in this verse is that a created thing always shows, by the arrangement which it possesses, — its different parts being made for the sake of one another for the benefit intended to be derived from that thing, — that its maker is not nature only, but it must have been made by one who has arranged all for the end in view. So he must have a knowledge of it. For instance, when a man looks at a house he knows that the founda- tion was laid for the sake of the walls, and the walls have been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the house must have been built by a man knowing the art of building.
This quality is eternal, for it is not fitting that God should possess it for a time only. But we should not go down deep into this matter, and should not say, like the Mutakallimtin, that He 30. Quran Ixxvii, H, 142 AVERR0JS8 knows tlie created things at the time of their creation, by His eternal knowledge, for then it becomes necessary that the knowledge of the created thing at the time of its non-existence be the same which is absurd, when knowledge is said to be dependent upon the existent things. As an existent thing is sometimes an action, and sometimes only a potentiality, it is necessary that the knowledge of the two existence be different, as its time of being in potentiality is quite different from the time of its being: in action. But this the Law does not explain. On the other hand it main- tains quite an opposite position: that God knows the created thing at the time of its creation, as He has said, V There falleth no leaf, but He knoweth it; neither is there a single grain in the dark parts of the earth; neither a green thing, nor a dry thing, but it is written in the perspicuous book. "31 So it is necessary that we should lay down in 31. Quran yi, &.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 143 Law that He knows a thing before it comes into being; knows a thing when it is, and not when it should have been; and knows when a thing has been de- stroyed at the time of its destruction. This is what the injunctions of the Law establish. It has been so because the masses cannot understand the universe through visible things, except in this way. The Mutakalimun have no argu- ment to advance against it, except that they say that the knowledge which changes with a change in the existent tiling is itself created, while with Gfod nothing created can be attached. They say so because they think that that which cannot be separated from the created thing is itself created. But we have already exposed the fallacy of this argument. So it is established by the rules described, and it should not be said that he knows the creation of the created, and the corruption of the cor- rupted things, neither by cyeated nor by eternal knowledge. This is an in- 144 AVRRROES novation in Islam, cc And is thy Lord forgetful of thee? "32 The attribute of life is quite evident from the attribute of Knowledge. For our observation shows that one of the conditions of knowledge is life. Accord- ing to the Mutakallimun the conditions of an observed object can be applied to the unseen. What they have said about this is quite true.
The attribute of volition needs no proof, because it is one of the conditions of bringing ibrth a thing, that its maker must intend it. Such is also the case with power °. He must possess power.
But to say that He intended created things by eternal intention is innovation in religion, which was not known to the learned in Law, and cannot satisfy the masses who have reached the stage of dogmatics. We should say that He intends making a thing at the time of its creation, but does not intend at the time of its non - existence. So God , Quran xix, 65.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 145 says: " Verily our speech unto anything when we will the same is that we say unto it, Be; and it is."33 For, as we have said, the common people are never compelled to advance the argument that He intends S3 doing a thing by eternal intention, but, as the Mutakallimun have said, that that by which the created things exist, is itself created.
Now if it be asked, how the attribute of Speech be assigned to and proved in God, we would say that it can be ascrib- ed to him on account of the attributes of Knowledge and Power of creation. For speech is nothing more than act on the part of the speaker to show to the one addressed the knowledge which he has, or to disclose to him the know- ledge which is in him. This is one of the actions of the maker. And when that created thing, which is really a creator, man, has power over this faculty, because he knows and is powerful, how befitting it is that it should be found H6 AVERROES in the real Creator. There is another condition for this action, among the things which we can observe, and that is that which must be the means of per- forming it: words. This being so> it becomes necessary that that action should be per- formed by God in the heart of somebody, His chosen servant. It is not necess- ary that it should always be through the medium of words, and so created. But it may happen either through an angel; or through divine inspiration, that is without the medium of words which He may create, but through an act to the hearer, which discloses to him the true nature of the thing meant, or through words which He may create in the ears of him who has been specialised to hear His words. It is to these three methods that the verse of the Quran refers, " It is not fit for a man that God should speak unto him otherwise than by private revelation, or from behind a veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, by His permission, that which RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY H?
He please th/'31 So revelation is the disclosure of the intended secrets to the inspired person without the medium of words which He created, but through an action done on the mind of the one addressed. So God says, "Afterwards He approached the Prophet and drew unto him; until He was at the distance of two bows length from him or yet nearer; and He revealed unto His servant that which He revealed. "35 The speech from! behind the veil is one which is performed through the medium of words. This is^* the real speech, and tha>) is the one-' which God specially bestowed upon Moses, and so He has said, " And God spake unto Moses, discoursing with him.',;™ Now as to his words, " or by sending a messenger to reveal, " this is the third kind mentioned above, that is, through the medium of some ano-els. Sometimes God speaks to the learned men, who are the successors of the prophets, by disclosing arguments to 148 AVERR0ES them. On account of these causes it is true, when the learned men say, that the Quran is the speech of God It has now become clear to you that the Quran, which is the speech of God, is eternal, but the words expressing it are created by him, and are not human. From it are excepted the Quranic words which we commonly use in our speech, that is, these words are our own actions, by the command of God, while the words of the Quran are those created by God, He who does not understand these things by this method, cannot understand this argument and cannot grasp as to how the Quran is the word of God. The alphabets used in the Quran are our own invention, by Ihe command of God. We have to respect them, because of them are formed the words created by God, for the purpose which is not itself created. He who thought of words and not of meaning, that is, did not separate them, said that the Quran was created: while he who thought of the RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 149 meaning which these words express, said the Quran was not created. But the truth lies in the middle of these two extreme views. The Asharites deny that the speaker is the maker of his own speech, for they think that if they admit it, they must also admit that God is the maker of His speech. \gain, when they believe, that the speech can only exist with the speaker, they think, they must also believe, taking in view the two foregoing principles, that God is Himself the creator of His words. In this case He Himself becomes the place of created things. So they assert that God is the maker of speech, but it is an eternal attribute in him, like know- ledge, etc. This is the time of the speech in our mind, but not of the speech which expresses what we have in our mind, that is, the words. As the Mutazilites thought that speech is the action of the speaker, they said that by speech is meant only the words uttered. So they believed that the Quran is isd averroes isd averroes " Created. " Since according to them the word is an action of the speaker, so it is not one of its conditions that it should exist with the speaker. The Asharites on the other hand, insist that it is one of its conditions that it should exist only with the speaker. This is true in both the cases, that is in the case of ideas in our minds, and the words which express them. But in the case of God, it is the ideas which stand with Him, and not the words expressing them. So when the Asharites laid it down as a condition, that the speech be absolutely dependent upon the speaker, they deny that the speaker is the maker of his speech; while on the other hand, the Mutazilites, when they laid it down as a condition that the speaker is the maker of his speech, ignored the existence of ideas in our minds. In this way there is some truth, and some falsehood, in the opinions of both of these sects, as must have become clear by what we have said.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHV M Now we come to the attributes of hearing and seeing. The Law has prov- ed them to be possessed by God by saying tnat hearing and seeing are the two essential qualities for knowing the meaning of things, which cannot be ac- quired by intellect. So a maker must know everything about the object which he is making, it is necessary that he should possess the two senses of hearing and seeing. So He must have these two faculties. All this proves their existence in God, by means of the Law, through the teaching- of the knowledge which is found in him. Moreover, One on whom the name of God and the Adorned is applied must necessarily possess all the senses. For it is useless for man to worship him who cannot know that he is being worshipped, as God has said, " 0 my father, why dost thou worship that which heareth not, neither seeth, nor proflteth thee at all;"37 and, " Do you therefore worship, beside 37. Quran xix, 13.
M» AVfiKROES God, that which cannot profit you at all, nor can it hurt you?"38 This is the power which has been ascribed to God, and which the Law has commanded the common people to know and nothing else. Of the innovation which this question of attributes has given rise to, one is whether they are the same as Divine Essence or something added to it, that is, whether they are found in the essence itself {Nafsiyyah), or are only applied to it, ( Maanawiyyah ). By Nafsiyyah we mean those attributes which are found in the thing itself, and are not attached to it for the purpose of adding something to the essence, for existence, we say one or eternal. By Maanawiyyah we mean the attributes which are ap- plied to a thing for some purpose which is found in it. The Asharites say that these attributes are only Maanawiy- yah, that is qualities which are only added to the Divine Essence. So they say that' he knows by a knowledge which 38. Quran sxi, 67.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 163 has been added to His essence, and lives by life attached to it and so on. This has compelled them to admit that the Creator has a body, for there must be the quality and the qualified, the bearer and the borne. This is the condition of the body, so they must say that the essence is existent by itself, and the qualities exist through it, or they must say that these attributes are independent of each other, then there must be a number of gods. This is the belief of the Christians, who say that the three personifications are those of Existence, Life and Knowledge. God has said about it the following, " They are cer- tainly infidels, who say, God is the third of the three."39 One of them stands by itself, the others being dependent upon the former. So it becomes necess- ary that there should be essence, existing in itself, and the accidents depending on something else. TJie- place -m^which the essence and thi<^elildetrts-~ar^^h4)d to- 154 AVEBR0ES 154 AVEBR0ES gether must necessarily be a body. Such is also the case with the Mutazilit.es about the question, that the essence and the attributes are one and the same thing. This they think, is for the pri- mary principles of knowledge or may be opposed to them. For they think that according to the primary principles know- ledge must be existent without the one knowing. But knowledge and the one know- ing cannot be the same, except that it may be possible that the two may be very close to each other., just as the father and the son. This teaching is very remote for the understanding of the masses, and to explain it to them in detail is inno- vation, for it would more likely mislead than guide them to the right path. The Mutazilites have no argument to advance in proof of their proposition, for they have none, Such is also the condi- tion of the Mutakallimun in the case ^of denying a body to God. For when they have established it, they are com- pelled to admit the creation of the body, KELIOI0N AND PHILOSOPHY 155 because it is a body. VVe have already said that they have no argument for it. Those who have such are the learned people, the philosophers. It is at this point that the Christians have erred. They believe in the multiplicity of at- tributes that they are essences existing not by the help of another, but by themselves, like the self, (Zat). They also believe that the qualities with these attributes are two in number -knowledge and life. So they say that God is one from the three causes. That He is three they say because He exists, lives and knows. They say that He is one, because He is a collection of all the three qualities. And so there are three religious opinions among them. One party believes that they are all the self (Zat) alone without any number; the other only believes in numbers of quali- ties. This is divided into two parties: one which thinks that they exist by themselves, and the other which makes them exist by something else. All this 166 AVERROE^ is in contrast) with the purpose of the Law.
It being so, it is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge of these things to the common people should tell them as much as the Law orders him to do — and that is only a confession of their existence without entering into details. For it is not possible for the common people to believe and understand them at all. By common people here I mean all those who are unacquainted with the laws of reasoning, though they may or may not know the science of scholastic theology. It is not in the power of scholastic theology to know of these things even when it is said that it is not a science of reasoning but o of dogmatics, for these things can never be clearly understood by dog^ matics alone. So, by now, the extent of these questions which should be disclosed to the common people, and the method adopted for this purpose must have be- come clear to you by what we have said.
KELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 157 OF DIVINE PERFECTION We have already described the way which the Law pursues in teaching the common people the existence of God, the denial of His having any associates, and thereby the knowledge of His attributes, and the extent to which they have been explained in details in it, one after another. It is really an addi- tion to, and deduction from, and change and interpretation of this very limit and extent which has not been productive of good to any and all the people. Now it remains for us to know the method which the Law has adopted in explain- ing to the common people the perfection of God and freedom from all defects, and the length to which it has <K>ne in detailing it, and the cause of restricting its knowledge to them. Then we should mention the methods which it adopts in teaching the people the knowledge of His actions, and the latitude which it has allowed in this respect. Having 158 AVERBOES done so, we shall have accomplished the purpose for which we began this book.
So we say that the knowledge of things known as perfection and holiness are found in many verses of the Quran, the most clear and definite of them being the following, "There is nothing like Him, and it is He who heareth and seeth;"i0 and, "Shall God, therefore, Who createth, be as he who createth not."41 The second verse is an argument for the verse " there is nothing like Him/' For it is one of the character- istics of the dispositions of all the people to think that the Creator must either be unlike the things which He has created, or having qualities which may be different from these which He has given to the created; otherwise he who is himself created cannot be a Creator.
• When we have admitted that the created cannot be the creator then it becomes incumbent upon us to say that the qualities of the created should either BELIG10N AND PHILOSOPHY 159 be not found in the Creator, or found in Him in some different way than they are in the created. We say, "in some different way," because we have proved the divine qualities to be those which are found in the noblest of God's creatures, man, as knowledge, life, power, volition and so on. This is the meaning- of the Tradition of the Prophet, " God created Adam after His own image." So it has been established that the Law has denied the similarity between the Creator and the created with fitting arguments. The denial of similarity is of two kinds, first, that there may not be found in the Creator many qualities of the created; and secondly; there may be found in him the qualities of the created in so perfect and excellent a form as could not be imagined. Of these two kinds it should be seen which one the Law has explained, and about which it is reticent. We would also try to find out the cause for this reticence. We would say that the qualities of 160 AVERROES 160 AVERROES the created which have been denied by Law as pertaining to God are those which show some defects; for example, death, as God says, "And do ye not trust in him who liveth, and dieth not,"42 or sleep and things which lead to negligence and carelessness, as regards senses and the protection of the existent things, as He says, "Neither slumber nor sleep seizeth Him."43 Of such qualities are error and forgetfulness, as God has said, M The knowledge thereof is with my Lord, in the book of His decrees: my Lord erreth not, neither doth He forget."44 A knowledge of those qualities the existence of which has been denied in God is one of the necessary things of common education and is why the Law has been very explicit about them. It only warns us not to meddle with those things which are far from the primary principles of knowledge, because it knows the small limits of human knowledge, as God has 42. Quran xxv, 60. 43. Quran ii, 256. 44. Quran xx, 54, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 161 said in many different verses of the Quran, <: But the greater part of men do not understand." For example He says, "Verily the creation of heaven and earth is more considerable, than the creation of man; but the greater part of men do not understand,"45 and f The institution of God to which He has created mankind disposed; there is no change in what God hath created. This is the right religion; but the greater part of men know it not."46 Now it may be said, what is the proof — that is, tli e proof advanced by the Law — of the fact that these defects are not found in God. We would say that it is apparent from the universe itself. It is quite safe. No confusion or corruption overtakes it. Had the Creator been subject to negligence, carelessness, error or ibrgetfulness the whole of the uni- verse would have been destroyed. God has made this clear in many verses of the Quran. He says, " Verily God 45. tyiraii xxxv, 39. 46, Quran U 162 AVERROBS sustaineth the heaven and the earth, lest they fail: and if they should fail, none could support the same besides him; "47 and, " The preservation of both is not burden unto him. He is the high, the mighty."48 If our opinion be asked about the anthropomorphic attributes of God, whether the Law has denied them as attributes to the Creator or is only silent about them, we would say, that it is evident that the Law is quite silent about them, and their mention in it is quite near to their denial altogether. It has come to be so because the Quran in many verses speaks of His hands and face, and these verses are taken as showing physical attributes which the Creator has bestowed upon the created, just as He has given him the qualities of power, volition and so on — qualities which are common between the Creator and created, except that they are more perfect in the former. On account of 47. Quran 48, Quran ii, 25G« KELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 183 this many Muslims believed that; the Creator has a body different from all other bodies. Such is the case with the Hanbalites and their many followers. But in my opinion we should follow the path of the Law; and this should neither deny nor try to prove them, and when- ever asked by the common people to do so, we should answer with words of God, " There is nothing like him; and it is He who hearetli and seeth,"49 in this way preventing them from question- ing. It is so because of three reasons. It is neither near to the first', nor to the second, nor to the third grade. This would be quite clear to yon from the method adopted by the Mutakallimun. They.say that the proof of the fact that He is not a body is that it has been proved that all bodies are created things. If they are asked to point out the met- hod of proving the latter proposition, they adopt the method, which we have already pointed out, concerning the creat- 49. Quran xlii, 9.
164 AVERKOES