If it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery; and also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the case of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does not give heaUh, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be used in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason we find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater part of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a knowledge through it would be better. Again a per- fect knowledge of God requires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the quantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the com- mon people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this, or at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education, learning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting learn- ing, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and giving information 354 AVERROES 354 AVERROES about the conditions of the Day of Judg« ment. When all this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be no doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through the agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about it, " Say, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like it. * This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety and certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered man, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit, who had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with the Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was per- fected in long periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, ''Thou couldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write it with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the divine origin thereof.'^0 Hence God 90. Quran XXIX, 47.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 233 has repeatedly told the people this quality of His prophet. "It is He who hath raised up among the illiterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves, V 91 and, " Those who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet."92 This matter can also be known by another method - that of comparison of this Law with the others. For, if the business of the prophets be the giving of laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who believe in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the teachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which are contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books and religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an unlimited degree. On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called the words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation from the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they contain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it 35<S AVERROES is olear that the Quran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to be called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you could know the past books - the Old and JSJew Testa- ments. But that is not possible because they have been changed to a great extent. Were we to describe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superior- ity of the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day of Judg- ment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would require many volumes with a confession of our o%vn short- comings in dealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has been called the last of the divine dispensations. The Prophet, peace be on him, has said, "Had Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped following me," and the Pro- phet was right, on account of the univer- sal nature of the teachings of the Quran,and its regulations. That is it is able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the human race. So God has said, "say, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 257 "0 men, Verily I am the messenger of God unto you all. ff9f The Prophtt has said, ** I have been sent both to the white and the black nations. " The case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some foods which agree with all, or most of tha peo- ple. Such is the case with religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant for some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was meant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet excels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revela- tion, which makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said infor- ming us of his superiority over other pro- phets, " There is no prophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would have believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my followers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment." All that we have said must have made it 93. Qnian, VII, 156.
17 J58 AVERROES olear to you that the proof of the prophecy of the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of turning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses, or of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the prophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the prophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any means conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,— they not being acts which make a prophet.
Now as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For instance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were to say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that he could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other cured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be only for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it would be outward satisfaction alone, The first is far better.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 259 The only reason by which the common 1 people can be satisfied in this respect is, that one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can certainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of the reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the conditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that there comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has ordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all his fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God distingished him with his revelations.
On the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist, and that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can become a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fib to be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted with regard to the common people. For the doubts and 260 AVERROES 260 AVERROES objections which we have described about* unnatural miracles are not perceived by the masses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends upon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unna tural ones. What we have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the sake of truth.
Problem Third: Of Fate and Predesti- nation. This is one of the most intricate pro- blems of religion. For if you look into the traditional arguments about this problem you will find them contradictory; such also being the case with arguments of reason. The contradiction in the arguments of the first kind is found in the Quran and the Traditions. There are many verses of the Quran, which by their universal nature, teach that all the things are pre- destined, and that man is compelled to do his acts; then there are verses which say that man is free in his acts and not com- pelled in performing them. The following verses tell us that all the things are by compulsion, and are predestined, "Every- REL1CION AXE PHILOSOPHY 261 thing have We created bound by a fixed degree;*' 94 again, "With Him everything is regulated according to a determined measure " 95 Further, He says, " No acci- dent happeneth in the earth, nor in your persons, but the same was entered in the Book verily it is easy with God."96 There may be quoted many other verses on this sub- ject. Now, as to the verses which say that man can acquire deeds by free will, and that things are only possible and not nece- ssary, the following may be quoted: " Or He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck), because of that which their crew have mer- ited; though He pardoneth many things "97 And again, " Whatever misfortune be- falleth you is sent you by God, for that which your hands have deserved.*' 98Fur- ther, He says, "But they who commit evil, equal thereunto." 99 Again, He says, " It shall have the good which it gaineth, and it shall have the evil which it gaineth.",GOand, 94. Quran LI VI 49. 95. Quran XIII, 9.
100. Quran II, 278.
262 AVERROES "And as to Thamud, We directed them, but they loved blindness better than the true- directions. M Ior Sometimes contradiction appears even in a single verse of the Quran. For instance, He sa}^s, u After a misfor- tune hath befallen you ( you had already attained two equal advantages ), do you say, whence cometh this? Answer, This is from yourselves. " I02In the next verse, He says, " And what happenth unto you, on the day whereon the two armies met, was certainly by permission of the Lord. ",03 Of this kind also is the verse, " Whatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God$ and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself; " io4 while the preceeding verse says, M All is from God. " I05 Such is also the case with the Tradi- tions. The Prophet says, "Every child is born in the true religion; his parents after- wards turn him into a Jew or a Christian." On another occasion he said, u The followioi. Quran XLI,i6.
102. Quarn III, 159. J03. Quran III, 160.
104 Quran IV. 81. 105. Quran IV. 80.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY J63 ing people have been created for hell, and do the deeds of those who are fit for it. These have been created for heaven, and do deeds fit for it. * The first Tradition says that the cause of disbelief is one's own environments; while faith and belief are natural to man. The other Tradition says that wickedness and disbelief are created by God, and man is compelled to follow them.
This condition of things has led Mus- lims to be divided into two groups. The one believed that man's wickedness or virtue is his own acquirement, and that according to these he will be either punish- ed or rewarded. These are the Mutazilit- es. The belief of the other party is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to adopt a mean between these two extreme views. They say that man can do action, but the deeds done, and the power of do- ing it, are both created by God. But this is quite meaningless. For if the deed and *64 XVERROES *64 XVERROES the power of doing it be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the act. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this problem. As we have said there (is another cause of difference of opinion about this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the contradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator of his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things which are not done according to the will of God, or His authority. So there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslim* are agreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled to do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and free- dom. Again, if man is compelled to da certain deeds, then on him has been impo- sed a task which he cannot bear| and when he is made to bear a burden, there is no di- fference between his work and the work of inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 265 no power, neither has the man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have made capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task, such as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his Nizamiyyah, that man is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He has established it upon the impossibi- lity of imposing a task which one cannot tear, in order to avoid the principle former- ly disproved by the Mutazlites, on account of its bein^ unfit by reason. The succeed- ing Asharites have opposed them. Moreover if man had no power in doing a deed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil, and that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring goodness. Tn this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as agriculture etc, would become useless. So also would become useless all those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion of danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine €tc. such a condition is quite contrary to all that is intellegible to man.
^66 AVERROES ^66 AVERROES Now it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction which is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we would say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is not to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by means of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evi~ dent that God has created in us power by which we can perfom deeds which are con- tradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except by the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the removal of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed by the conjunc- tion of both these things at the same time. This being so the deeds attributed to use are done by our intention, and by the fit- ness of the causes which are called the Predestination of God, which He has fur- nished for us from outside. They neithtr complete the works which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause of our intending them - one of the two things. For intention is produced in RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY #7 us by our imagination, or for the verifica- tion of a thing, which in itself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us* For instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention, and move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing which it is better to shun, we leave it without inten- tion. Hence our intentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves. To this the following words of God, refer " Each of them hath angels, mutually su- cceeding each other, before him and behind him- they watch him by the command of God. " Io6 As these outside causes take this course according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never go astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them, and our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on the whole, but by their fitness, so it is necessary that actions too should also be within woll-- defined limits, that is, they be found in a 106. Quran XIII, 12.
268 AVERROES given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary because our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us; and all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes, are themselves limited, and are found in a given quantit}^ only. This relation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes, but also between them and the causes which God has created in our body, and the well-defined order existing between the inner ana outer causes. This is what is meant by Fate and predestina- tion, which is found mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also the " Preserved Tablet. "™7 God's knowledge of these causes, and that which pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one can have a full know- ledge of these things except God, and hence He is the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said, " Say, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden besides 107. Quran LXXXV, 22.
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 26t, God * Io8 A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret things, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing, before it comes into being, And as the arrangement and order of causes bring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be a knowledge of the existence or non - existence of a thing at a certain time. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what things would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised be He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes. This is what is meant by the u keys of the secret," in the follow- ing words of God, " with Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth them besides Himself. " I09 All that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we can acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination and fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by those verses and Traditions 108. Quran YXVII, 67. 109. Quran VI, 59.
270 AVERROES which are apparently contradictory. When their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The ex- istent things from our volition are complet- ed by two things our intention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referr- ed to only by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a good ans- wer, and here reason is in perfect agree- ment with religion, but it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there are creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the Muslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that whatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can be answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can be understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator but God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 271 be called creators, except speaking figur- atively. Their existence also depends upon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves their existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after their actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when causes come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there been no divine protection they could not have existed for the least moment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that ; a man who makes any of the causes to be £0-existent with God is like a man who makes the pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says that the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He mtans that writing is a word which may 'be applied to both, but in reality they have no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no difference between Ihem. Such is also the case with the word Creator, when applied to God and the ■Causes. We say that in this illustration there are doubts. It should have been 272 AVERROEb 272 AVERROEb clearly shown, whether the scribe was the Creator of the essence ( Jawhar ) of pen, a preserver of it, as long as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after it is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the pen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences ( Jawahir ) of everything which come into contact with its causes, which are so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no creator but God - a reason which agrees with our feel- ings, reason and religion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which produce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that which God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that which surround the uni- verse from outside. This is quite clear in the movement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the moon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it is on this arrange- ment and order which God has put in their movements that our existence and that of RELIGION' AND PHILOSOPHY 273 all other things depends. So even if we imagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other position, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them, »11 the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so because of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the things which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects of the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the case with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the greater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number, or all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not been those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating them that could not exist even for a single moment a'ter birth. But we say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of the animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement of the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not even for a 18 274 AVERROES twinkling of the eye. So praised be the " Sagacious, the Knowing. " II0 God has called our attention to this fact in His book, " And He hath subjected the night and the day to your service^ and the sun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His Command; "IXI again, " Say, what think ye, if God should cover you with perpetual nignt, until the day of Resurrection; " II2 and again, " Of His mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the one, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance, by your industry; in the other; IJ3 and, " And He obligeth whatever is in heaven or on earth to serve you. " IX* Further He says, " He likewise compelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their courses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your service. " XI5 There may be _^ ■ mrno. Quran LXVII, 14.
in. Quran LXVII, 14. 112, Quran XVI, if, 113. Quran XXVIH, 71. 114. Quran XVIII. 73.
115. Quran XLV, 12. 116. Quran XIV, 37 RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 275 quoted many other verses on the subject. Had there been any wisdom in their exist- ence by which God has favoured us, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to be grateful to Him.
The second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things produced out of it are of two kinds: essences and subs- tances; and movements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences and substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect the accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For instance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real creator of the child, and the life in it- Such is also the case with agriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed scattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So there is no creator but God, while created things are but essences, To this refer the words of God. " O men, a parable is propounded unto you, therefore, hearken unto it. Verily 'the idols which ye invoke, besides God, *76 AVERROES *76 AVERROES can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for the purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn the same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned." ll7 This is wher« the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said, "I give life and kill. * II8 When Abraham saw that he could understand it, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, " Verily, God bringeth the sun from the east; do thou bring it from the west."
On the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be understood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in Tradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not apply to the created things by any near or far-fet- ched metaphor, for the meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God has said, "God created you, and that which ye know."118 It should be known 117. Quran, XXII, 72.
118. " Hast thou notr considered him who disputed with Abraham concerning his Lord, because God had given him RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 277 that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of them, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is the knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the know- ledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing which is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must alsays be understood by a reference to the seen. So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for every action there is in actor. It being so, the agreement of the Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect, if we understand by' it the denial of the existence of an agent in the visible world. For from the existence of the the Kingdom? When Abraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and kill. Abra- • harn said, verily God bringeth the sun from the east do thou bring it from the wett; whereupon the infidel was con- founded; for God directeth not the ungodly ^people.' Quran, .II:26o 278 AVERROES 278 AVERROES agent in ii, we have brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world, it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His command and will, It is also evident that we can per- form our own deeds, and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the middle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling and che movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling of hand and voluntary movement, which thay would call acquired. So their is no difference between them, except in there n-raes, which never effect RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 279 the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.
Fourth Problem:-Divine Justice and Inju- sitce. The Ashariteshave expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and religion; about this problem They have explained it in a way in which religion has not, but have adopted quite an oppo- site method. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions, so when a man's action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been imposed asa divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in *&o AVERROES *&o AVERROES itself be called good or bad is simply into- lerable. Justice is known as good, and injus- tice as bad. So according to them, poly- theism is in itself neither injustice nor evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied injustice to himself. He says "God hath borne witness that there is no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom profess the same, who executeth righteousness; and "Thy God is not unjust towards His ser- vants; " and again, "Verily God will not deal unjustly with men in any respect; b«rt men deal unjustly with their own souls " It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many a verse of the Quran, "That He leads as well as misleads the people!" He says, "God causeth to err whom He RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 281 pleaseth, and directeth whom He pleaseth;" and, "If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction." We would say that these verses cannot be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently contradict them-the verseo in which God denies injustice to himself. For instance, He says, "Heliketh not ingratitude (Kufr) in His servant." So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity, that God has not misled the people and has nob caused them to err will be clear to you from the following verses: *' Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy face towards true religion, the Quran, III, 16 Quran, XLI, 46 Quran, X, 45 Quran, XIV, 4 Quran, XXXII, U Quran, XXXIX, 9 282 AVERROES