contradiction is itself a contradiction; so then our assertion that the elements may possibly be compounded under equality of the powers is a contradiction, and hence its opposite, to wit our saying that such is impossible, is true [reduction ad absurdam]. Wherefore the coming forth of the soul, i.e., its combination with body, occurs only after the method of the third division; and it has been already said that what is after the method of the third division is gained from outside: The soul then is got from without--which is what we wished to show.
FOOTNOTES: [10] Mechanical mixture, blending, combination, etc.: compare the Greek mixis, krâsis, and synthesis.
SECTION FOURTH =Specification of the Vegetable (Plant) Powers, and Mention of the Need there is for Each One of Them.= Souled bodies, I mean having souls, if considered from the side of their vegetable powers, are found to have in common the getting of nourishment, and to differ in growth and generation (reproduction of offspring); since, among nourishment-taking beings, there are such as do not grow, for example a living individual that has reached full growth and the period of stand still, or that has declined therefrom through withering. Yet every growing thing gets nourishment. Again, among nutriment-taking beings there are such as do not propagate, as seeds that are not yet harvest-ripe, and an animal that has not yet reached puberty. Nevertheless, every propagating thing has inevitably passed through a preceding stage of nutrition; nor will the state (stage) of propagating ever be deprived of nutrition. Further, we find them, beside having the getting of nourishment in common, to have growth also in common, but to differ in the propagation (of offspring) since there are, among growing things, such as do not beget, as an animal not yet arrived at puberty, and the worm.[11] Nevertheless every begetter has already passed through a period of growth; nor will the state (stage) of begetting be deprived of the power of giving growth [to the young that are being produced]. Hence the vegetable powers are three: 1. the nutritive; 2. the growth promoting; and 3. the propagating. Of these the nutritive is as the starting-point; the propagating as the aim and end; and the growth-promoting as the means binding the end to the starting-place. Indeed the souled body stands in absolute need of these three powers for the following reasons: Whereas the Divine Command came down upon Nature enjoining (imposing) upon her the task of forming a compound living being out of the four elements after such wise fashion as they called for in it; and whereas Nature of herself is unable to originate a souled body at one stroke, but can do so only by promoting its growth little by little;[F] and whereas an individual that is put together after the manner of animal composition is susceptible of being again decomposed and melting away by the natures of its constituents; and whereas a thing composed of opposites will not keep up so protracted a duration and last so long a time as is expected of it--therefore Nature is in want of a power by which she can fabricate a living body by promotion of growth; so she has been supplied by Divine Providence with the growth-giving power; and is in want of a power whereby she can preserve the souled body at an even standard[G] over against the waste which it undergoes in making up for what disintegration wears away from it; so she has been succoured by Divine Providence with the nutritive power; and is in want of a power that shall mould, out of the living natural body, a piece that she shall dwell in, in order that if corruption permeate the body it shall have sought for itself a successor as a substitute, whereby to arrive at the preservation of species; so she has been helped by the Divine Providence with the propagating (generating) power.
And we ought, in this connection, to bear in mind as a certain and true fact that the growth-giving power, although it has been found, from the standpoint that we have mentioned, to be following close upon the nutritive, and the propagating (generating) to be following close upon the growth-imparting (promoting), yet the precedence of the part played by each one of the three, in their undertaking the task of creating the living body and preserving it through their special and peculiar workings, is the other way about; for the first to enthrall the material predisposed to receive life is the generating (procreating, propagating) power, since this power clothes the material at first with the form (prototype) of that which is intended to be realized through the ministry (service) of the growth-promoting and nutritive powers; and as soon as it has achieved in that material a perfect form it delivers over the sway to the growth-promoting power, which assumes it through the ministry (service) of the nutritive power, and imparts to the material--all the time keeping up the form of the material within the due proportions of the [three] dimensions [length, breadth and thickness]--a motion (activity) of growth towards the end striven after by it, the growth-promoting power aforesaid. Then this latter stops; and the nutritive power enthralls the material. Again, the generating (propagating) power is the one served, not the servant; and in comparison with it, the nutritive power is the servant, not the one served. Thus too the growth-promoting power is served in one sense, and serving in an other sense. And the nutritive power, although it does not exist as the one served in the spiritual powers, yet it does sometimes employ the four forces of Nature--to wit, the attracting, the holding, the digesting, and the excreting (repelling). And, even as that which is striven after in the process of form-making is solely the bringing about of the [due] form in matter in the shape (kind, design) proposed, and not at all the bringing about of growth or of nutrition,--only that there is need for the two latter for the sake of realizing the desired form, and not the converse--so also the final aim in the [several] powers is the procreating (propagating) power, to the exclusion of the growth-promoting and of the nutritive. Wherefore, the procreating power is given precedence for a teliological reason.
And through God is fitness to be achieved.
FOOTNOTES: [11] Probably his view was that worms arise out of a germ of moist clay or mud, and are a sort of developed protoplasm. Compare §6 of Ibn Tufayl’s «Hayy b. Yaqzân,» and the Note thereto in the English Translation about field-rats.
[F] The germ of the Doctrine of Evolution as against Instantaneous Creation.
[G] See Ibn Sînâ’s «_Qânûn_,» Section 2, where he says: As to the nutritive power, it is that power which transforms the nutriment into a resemblance with the nourishment-taker, in order that this nutriment may succeed in the stead of what shall be wasted, and attach itself to the taker instead of the waste.--See also «_Kitâb-ul-Najât_,» by Ibn Sînâ.
SECTION FIFTH =Specification of the Animal Powers, and Mention of the Need there is for Each One of Them.= I affirm that every animal is sentient, and hence it moves itself at will, in some sort of motion; and that every animal moves itself in some sort of motion at will, and hence it is sentient; since sensation in what does not move itself at will is wasted and useless, and the lack of it in what does move itself at will is harmful; whereas Nature, owing to that much of Divine Providence as has been joined to her, gives nothing whatever that is either wasted or harmful, nor witholds either the necessary or the useful. Perhaps some one may speak out here and object to us that shellfish are of such as feel (are sentient) and yet do not move themselves at will. This objection, however, will speedily vanish on experiment; for shellfish, although they do not move themselves from their places in a sort of organic (mechanical) locomotion at will, yet they do more or less shrink themselves up and spread out inside of their shells, as I have witnessed with mine own eyes on having tried the experiment more than once, in that I turned the shell over onto its back, so that its position for drawing nourishment became separated from the ground; whereupon it ceased not to struggle until it had again stood in a position that made it easy for it to draw in nourishment from the muddy bottom.
And now that this has become surely certain for us, we shall further say: That whereas Divine Wisdom has decreed that an animal moving itself at will shall be composed of the four elements, and as such animal would not be secure against the evils of mishaps in its successive change of places during locomotion, it has been fitted out with the touching power (sense of touch), so as to flee through it from unfit places, and seek those that are fit. And whereas any such animal’s constitution (make-up) cannot get on without the getting of nourishment; and as its gaining its food is a sort of free will effort; and as some articles of food suit it, and others do not,--it has been fitted out with the tasting power (sense of taste). These two powers (senses) are both useful and necessary in life: the rest are useful, not necessary.
Next after the Tasting, in degree of utmost need for it, comes the Smelling Sense, since odors will point the animal towards suitable articles of nourishment, with a strong indication; nor will the animal be at all able to get on without nourishment, neither will its nourishment be got by it save through self-help. So Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the smelling power unto most animals. The next after the smelling power in usefulness is the Seeing Power: the How and Why of its usefulness, as to the animal, which moves itself at will, is that whereas its betaking itself to certain spots, such as fire-hearths, and away from certain spots, such as mountain peaks and seashores, is such as will lead to its hurt, therefore Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the seeing power unto most animals.
The next after the seeing power in usefulness is the Hearing Power.
The How and Why of its usefulness is that things harmful and things useful may often be recognized as such, through it, by the peculiarity of their sounds and voices; so Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the hearing power unto most animals. Moreover, the use made of this power by the rational (speaking) species of the animal genus almost surpasses the three [--is of all three nearly the highest]. This then is an outline of the How and Why of the uses of the Five Outward (External) Senses.
And whereas trustworthy arrival at a knowledge of the mutually suitable and the mutually repellent will come about only through test (experiment, experience), Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the peculiar participating property (or sense)--I mean the picturing power--unto living beings (animals), in order that they shall through it preserve the forms of things perceived by the senses; and to impart the remembering preserving power, in order that they shall through it preserve the meanings (significances) conceived out of things perceived by the senses; and to impart the imaginative power in order that they shall through it fit up (restore) what shall be wiped out from the memory by a sort of motion; and to impart the conjecturing (surmising) power in order that they shall through it fix upon the sound (true) and the weak (false) of what the imagination extracts, namely to fix upon the true and false thereof with more or less presumption of certainty, until they [the living beings] shall review it in the mind.
As for the How and Why of need for the moving power, it is that whereas the position of the animal is not the same as the position of the plant in its adaptation for attracting such foods as are useful and pushing off such as are harmful and incompatible, but on the contrary as this is brought about for the animal through a sort of earning by self-help, it needs a moving power for the purpose of drawing to itself the useful and driving away the harmful. Wherefore all the powers of the animal are either perceiving or motion-promoting. The motion-promoting is the yearning (desiderative, longing, craving) power: it is either urging on to the search after a chosen object of animal good, and then it is the lusting power; or else it is urging on to the warding off of an object of animal dislike, and then it is the hating power (angry power).
The perceiving power too is either outward (apparent), such as the five senses; or else inward (internal, hidden), such as the picturing, the imaginative, the conjecturing, and the remembering power.
Furthermore, the motion-promoting power does not cause to move save on a peremptory bidding from the conjecturing, through the agency (means) [or by the employment] of the imaginative. Also, the motion-promoting power, in animals other than the speaking (or rational) species, is the aim and end; and this is so, because the motion-causing power is not imparted unto them in order that they shall through it direct aright the workings of sensation and imagination so as to adapt these workings to the attainment of their own good, but on the contrary the power of sensation and of imagination are imparted to the non-speaking irrational animals solely in order to direct aright through them the workings of motion, and to adapt these workings to the good of the animals. Whereas, the speaking rational species of living beings is on the reverse wise; because unto it was imparted the motion-causing power wholly and solely in order that through this power it shall be fitted to set aright the speaking self, i.e., the rational intelligent soul, not the other way about.
Thus then, the motion-promoting power in the irrational animal is, as it were, the prince commander that is served; the five senses, the spies that are sent forth; the perceptive power, the post-master of the prince commander unto whom the spies return; the imagining power, the foot-messenger going to and fro between the post[H][12] and the post-master; the conjecturing power, the prince’s adjutant minister; the remembering power, the closet of state papers.
As for the starry firmament and plants, the feeling power and the imagining power have not been imparted unto them, even though each one of them has a soul and though it has life: the firmament has not these powers, because of its loftiness; plants have them not, because of their abasement in comparison to it.
FOOTNOTES: [H] or wazir, minister.
In treating of the animal powers, he treats first of the fives senses, and then of the animal Powers. These latter he gives in this section three times, and each time varies the order somewhat, thus:-- 1st. Order of mention: a. participating, picturing b. remembering, preserving c. imaginative, restoring d. conjecturing, surmising e. moving 2nd. Order of mention: a. picturing, participating b. imaginative c. conjecturing, surmising d. remembering 3d Order of mention, in the final Allegorical Summing Up: a. motion-promoting b. feeling, sentient, 5 outward senses c. perceptive d. imagining e. conjecturing f. remembering.
[12] Moreover, the Text seems in Doctor Landauer’s opinion to need an emendation, in this Allegory, which is furnished by the Latin Translation preserved in Florence. According to the text, we get a wholly superfluous intermediary notion, to wit the Post, which disturbs the parallel and similitude of the allegory. Instead of _barîd_, we should read _wazîr_ = Latin, inter vicarium principis. If this is done, the whole passage becomes clearer, and hangs together better. Yet, for all this, the _barîd_ was in those days a highly important branch of the government service: witness, the office of _câheb-ul-barîd_.
SECTION SIXTH =Treating in Detail of the Five Senses, and of How they perceive.= As to the seeing power, philosophers have differed on the question of How they perceive. Thus one set among them asserts that they perceive wholly and solely through a ray that shoots out beyond the eye, and so encounters the sensible objects that are seen. This is Plato’s way.[13] Others assert that the perceiving power itself encounters the sensible objects that are seen, and so perceives them. Still others say that visual perception consists in this:--When the intervening transparent body becomes effectively transparent by light shining upon it, then an impression of the outspread (flattened) individual of such sensible objects as are seen is effected in the cristalline[14] lens of the eye, just such a pictorial impression as is effected in looking-glasses (mirrors); indeed the two effects are so similar that were mirrors possessed of a seeing power they would perceive the form imprinted in them. This is Aristotle’s way; and it is the sound reliable opinion.
That Plato’s view is false, is quite clear. For, were it true that a ray goes out from the seat of sight and encounters sensible objects, then sight would be in no need of light, but would on the contrary perceive in the dark, and would rather illuminate the air on its exit into the dark. Moreover such a ray will not fail of one of two modes: either it will subsist throughout the eye only, in which case Plato’s opinion that it goes forth from the eye is wrong; or else it will subsist throughout a body other than the material of which the eye is composed; for it must inevitably have a vehicle to carry it, seeing that a ray is an accidental quality or mode, and furthermore seeing that that body which is other than the eye will not fail, in its turn, of being, either, _firstly_, sent out from the eye, in which case it will follow as a matter of course that the eye will not see all that is beneath the clear blue of the sky, since one body will not penetrate throughout the whole of another body, unless forsooth it moves the latter away and occupies its place; and even should the disputer plead a vacuum, not only does Plato deny the existence of a vacuum utterly, but also if we accomodatingly yield this point and admit the existence of a vacuum, yet for all this the body that goes forth from the eye will penetrate throughout the body of water, for example, into such of its pores as are empty only, and not into the whole of the water’s bulk; so that even according to this opinion it will necessarily so be that the eye will see only some places of all that is under water;--or else, _secondly_, that body which is other than the eye will not fail of being an intervening body intermediate between the seer and the seen, in which case the light[I] which comes forth from the eye will subsist through it; nevertheless this opinion too is unsound, for the reason that every thing whatsoever is, in proximity to its source, so much the stronger, and in this respect light has not its equal; whence it follows as regards the object seen that, however closely and nearly it approaches to the eye, our perception will then be stronger; and thus if we do away with the intermediary body, the eye will still perceive the object felt by its sense of sight, and thus the intermediary which is the vehicle and carrier of light is no longer needed, save accidentally (by chance); and then too there is no need, in order to see, for an exit of light: this too is a falsehood.
Wherefore Plato’s opinion is worthless.
As for such as hold that the perceiver of the thing seen is the imaginative power itself through the imprinting of the form (image) of the sensible object upon it, these render the absent on the same footing as the present, since in the imaginative power there may exist the image of a sensible object, notwithstanding the absence afterwards of the object that had been so felt: at which time however the living being so preserving that image will not be qualified with sight but with imagination and memory. Furthermore these theorists (opiners) make a greater blunder still, seeing that they render a thing of Nature’s make and composition wholly idle, useless, and unneeded in the operation of visual perception; inasmuch as in their opinion the imaginative power itself meets immediately sensible objects, and thus spares Nature the task of adapting an instrument (organ), to wit the complex eye.
Wherefore the sound theory is that the configurations of things stand out in the transparent ambient--if it be effectively transparent on the shining of a luminant upon it--and hence they do not appear but in a polished body capable of receiving them, such as mirrors and the like; and so too there is in the eye a crystalline lens (or humor) into which the forms (pictures) of things are imprinted, just as their impression into mirrors; and in it, i.e., the lens or the eye, has been fitted up the seeing power; so that, if such forms are imprinted in it, it perceives them. Moreover, the objects of perception belonging in truth and deed to sight are the Colors.
As for the Hearing Power: it hears only sound. And sound is a motion of air that the ear feels on two hard smooth bodies coming quickly close up one to the other, the escaping of the air from between them, its striking the ear, and its moving the air that is kept ready within the instrument (organ) of hearing. Thus, if this inside air move the instrument, and if this instrument’s motion act upon the nerve of hearing, the hearing power (sense, faculty) perceives it in the measure of the strength or weakness of that motion. Indeed hardness is a _conditio sine qua non_; for, in the case of two soft bodies, the air will not escape from them, but will dissipate itself throughout their pores. Smoothness too is just such a condition; because, in the case of rough (unsmooth) bodies, not the whole of the air will escape from between them suddenly and violently, but will be witheld (shut up) in the passages. And rapidity of contact also is a like condition; for if it come about gently and slowly, the air would not escape violently.
The echo too will arise from the rebound of the air escaping from between the two encountering bodies by reason of its hitting (slapping) against another hard, flat or hollow body filled with air, because of the air that is within it hindering the penetration of the escaped air, and the latter’s striking the ear [again] after the first stroke; on the same wise as in the first instance.
As to the Smelling Power; it smells odors on the sniffing in of air that has received its odor from an odoriferous body, as one body receives its warmth from another warm body. Thus, if an animal snuffs up air like this into its nose until such air touches the front of the brain, and alters it to its own odor, the smelling power feels it.
As for Taste, it arises only on the coming to pass of the following change: When the moisture of the tasting instrument (organ)--to wit the tongue--becomes transformed into the juice of the newly-come food; and when the mass of this instrument (organ) has received that juice, the tasting power will perceive what has happened within the instrument.
As for Touch: it will only arise upon the organ’s (instrument’s) receiving the quality of that which is touched, and upon the touching power’s perceiving what has been thus presented (offered) within the organ.
Furthermore, simple sensibles, that are at once primary and as such the bases of all others, are in pairs, of which there are eight; and if we make each into singles, they become sixteen, to wit:-- (a) Touch, four pairs:--1. heat and cold; 2. moisture and dryness; 3.
roughness and smoothness; 4. hardness and softness. The four remaining senses, each having a pair, viz., (b) Smelling, one pair, which is fragrant odour, and fetid stinking odour, (c) Tasting, one pair, viz., sweet and bitter, (d) Hearing, one pair, namely, heavy sound and sharp sound (or dull and shrill), (e) Sight, one pair, to wit, white and black.
All other sensibles are made up from these simples, and are intermediates between some two of them, as for example grey (dusty color) from white and black, lukewarm from hot and cold. Moreover all sensibles are felt wholly and solely through a sort of gathering and sundering, shrinking and spreading; except sounds, which are felt only through sundering. Thus:-- 1. [Warmth is felt through sundering] 2. Cold is felt through gathering 3. Moisture, through spreading 4. Dryness, through shrinking 5. Roughness, through sundering 6. Smoothness, through spreading 7. Hardness, through repelling, which is a sort of gathering and shrinking 8. Softness, through being repelled, which is not devoid of spreading and sundering 9. Sweetness, through spreading, devoid of sundering 10. Bitterness, through sundering and shrinking 11. Fragrant Odor, through spreading, devoid of sundering 12. Stinking Odor, through sundering and shrinking 13. Whiteness, through sundering 14. Blackness, through gathering [15. and 16. Sounds: one pair, as above under “d.”]
As to the media (intermediaries) between the feeling powers and the felt forms, they are themselves devoid of the forms of sensibles; otherwise it would not be possible for them to be media, since their own forms--if they had any--would then so engage the apposite power as to divert it from perceiving any other forms. Such voidness or freedom from forms is either voidness wholly and altogether, or else relative voidness through equableness of the forms in the media, such as the equable proportion of the qualities touched in meat, which is a medium between the touching power and the quality touched, although meat is incontestably made up of qualities that are touched, yet notwithstanding this the equableness of the qualities has annihilated the forms in it. Examples of the first division--absolute voidness and freedom from form--are the freedom of air, of water, and of what resembles them among the various media of sight, from color; the freedom of air and of water, both which are the two mediums of smelling, from odor; the freedom of water, which is the medium of tasting, from flavor; and the steadiness of the air, which is the medium of hearing, and its freedom from motion.
Further, each of these powers, to wit the five senses, if actually functionating, perceives only through coming into relation with the object felt, nay rather it only perceives at first so much as has been traced in it of the form of the object felt. Thus, the eye only perceives that form which has imprinted itself in it of the object felt; so also the remainder of the powers (or senses). Again, in the case of strong wearying sensibles, such as a loud noise, a strong smell, a shining and a flashing light, if they are repeated upon the organ (instrument), spoil and dullen it through their overworking it.
Again, each one of the five senses perceives, through the means of its own rightful perception and besides the same, five other things, to wit: 1. shape; 2. number; 3. size; 4. motion; 5. rest (quiet). That sight, touch, and taste perceive them, is evident. As to hearing, it perceives, in accordance (pursuance) with the variety of the number of sounds, the number of the sound-emitting objects; and, through the strength of the sounds, it perceives the size of the two objects that are hitting against each other; and, in accordance with a kind of change and fixedness of the sounds, it perceives motion and rest; and, in accordance with their volume around the sound-emitter, be the latter solid or hollow, it perceives some sorts of shapes. As to smelling, it knows, in accordance with the change of directions whence the odors are emitted and reach it, and through the variety of these odors in their qualities, it knows I say the number of the things smelt; through the measure of abundance of the smells, the size of such things; through the measure of proximity and distance, changeableness and fixedness, it recognizes their motion and their rest; and, in accordance with the sides on which their odor reaches it from one and the same body, it knows their shape. Still, these discriminations are very weak in this power among mankind, owing to the weakness of the power itself in the human race. [For all this, men have not the keen scent that many other animals have, and therefore such discriminations are in men very weak.]
FOOTNOTES: [14] The names of the different parts of the eye are: c. al-ghashâ-al-shabaky = retina, net skin i. qarniyyah = cornea [I] perhaps we ought to read «_the ray_».
SECTION SEVENTH =Dealing in Detail with the inward Senses, (and the Motion-Promoting Powers).= I. Not one of the outward senses unites within itself perception of color, odor, and softness; and yet, we often come upon a body that is yellow, and perceive at once so much about it, namely that it is honey, sweet, nice of smell, and fluid, although we have neither tasted, nor smelt, nor even touched it; whence it is manifest that we possess a power wherein are assembled the perceptions of the four senses, and have thus become summed up in it into one single form; and were it not for this power we should not know that sweetness, for instance, is other than blackness, since the discriminator between two things is he who has known them both. This is the power which is designated as the common-sense, and the picturing (or representing) power. And were it one of the outward apparent senses, its sway (dominion) would limit itself to the state of wakefulness only; whereas ocular observation attests what is quite otherwise; for this power does at times perform its action in both the states of sleep and wakefulness.
II. Furthermore, there is in animals a power which sets up such forms as have assembled in the common-sense, discriminates between them, and differentiates them, without the forms themselves disappearing from the common-sense. And this power is undoubtedly other than the aforesaid picturing power; since in the latter there are none but true (real) forms that have been acquired (obtained) from sense; whereas in this power the case may be otherwise, and it may imagine and picture wrongly and falsely, and what it had not received after such a [wrong and false] pattern (shape) from any one of the senses. This power is the one named imagination.
Further, there is in animals a power that passes judgment, upon such or such a thing that it is so or not so, decisively, and through which the animal flees away from shunned evil and seeks chosen good. It is also evident that this power is other than the imaginative, since this last imagines (pictures to itself) the sun, in accordance with what it has got from the apposite sense, to be of the size of its disc; whereas the matter stands in this power quite otherwise. So too the lion finds his prey from far off of the size of a small bird, yet its form and size in no way perplex him, but he makes for it. It is also evident that this power is other than the imaginative, and this because the imaginative power performs its manifold deeds without belief and conviction on its part that matters are in accordance with its imagining. This power is what is named the conjecturing or the surmising faculty (or judgment).
III. Further, there is in living beings a power that preserves the purports (or thoughts and conceptions) of what the senses had perceived, such as, for instance, that the wolf is an enemy; the child, a darling next of kin. Wherefore, so much at least if not more is evident, that this power is other than the common-sense (or picturing), inasmuch as in the latter there are no forms but such as it has gained from the senses; whereas, again, the senses did not feel the wolf’s enmity, nor the child’s love, but alone the wolf’s image, and the child’s bodily shape; and as to love and fierceness, it is the mind’s eye alone that has got them, and then stored them up in this power. It is also clear that this power is other than the imaginative power, for the reason that this last does at times imagine what is other than that which the mind’s eye has deemed right, found true, and has derived from the senses; whereas the former power, i.e., the one here dealt with, imagines none other than what the mind’s eye has deemed right, has found true, and has derived from the senses.
This power is also other than the conjecturing (surmising) power, for the reason that this last does not preserve what some other has deemed to be true, but it of its own self deems to be true, whilst the power here treated of does not itself pass judgment of truth or falsehood, but only preserves what another has deemed to be true. This power is called memory, the preserving or keeping faculty.
Again, the imaginative power is called by this name--imagination--if the conjecturing (or surmising) power alone use it: and if the speaking (rational) power use it, it is called the thinking (cogitative) power.
The heart is the source (spring) of all these powers (faculties), in Aristotle’s opinion; yet the sway over them is in different organs (instruments). Thus the sway over the outward (apparent) senses is in their known organs; whereas the sway over the picturing (representing common-sense) power is in the anterior hollow (ventricle) of the brain; the sway over the imaginative, in the middle hollow thereof; the sway over the remembering, in the posterior hollow thereof; and the sway over the conjecturing, throughout all the brain, but above all in the compartment of the imaginative within the brain [or, throughout the whole of the brain, but more especially alongside of the imaginative thereof]. And in so far as these hollows (ventricles) suffer harm and hurt, so will the manifold workings of these powers suffer also; for were they, (the powers,) standing independently, that is to say subsisting in themselves, and efficient independently, that is to say putting forth their workings of themselves, they would not need, for their proper and peculiar actions, any sort of instrument or organ: in this wise one recognizes that these powers do not subsist in themselves, but that the undying power is the Speaking (Reasoning) Soul, as we shall hereafter set forth; yet for all this, the soul does maybe at times seek out for itself after a fashion (so to speak) the purest quintessences of the kernels of these powers, and cause them to exist of themselves, the setting forth of which shall, D.v., soon follow.
* * * * * The following is the terminology of the five inward senses: 1. Common-Sense = hiss mushtarak, mutaçawwirah.
2. Vis formans, imaginatio = khayâl, muçawwirah, fantasia, takhayyul, mutakhayyilah.