20 Now the reasons why we said that all these attributes, which are in Nature, are but one single being, and by no means different things (although we can know them clearly and distinctly the one without the other, and the other without another), are these: 1. Because we have found already before that there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be meant than such a being of which all in all must be predicated. Why? [Because] to a being which has any essence attributes must be referred, and the more 30 essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes also must one ascribe to it, and consequently if a being is infinite then its attributes also must be infinite, and this is just what we call a perfect J being.
2. Because of the unity which we see everywhere in B: an infinite.
WHAT GOD IS 27 Nature. If there were different beings in it t then it would i be impossible for them to unite with one another.
3. Because although, as we have already seen, one substance cannot produce another, and if a substance does not exist it is impossible for it to begin to exist, we see, nevertheless, that in no substance (which we none the less know to exist in Nature), when considered separately, is there any necessity to be real, since existence does not pertain to its separate essence. ft So it must necessarily follow that Nature, which results from no causes, and 10 which we nevertheless know to exist, must necessarily be a perfect being to which existence belongs.
From all that we have so far said it is evident, then, that we posit extension as an attribute of God; and this seems not at all appropriate to a perfect being: for since exten sion is divisible, the perfect being would have to consist of parts, and this is altogether inapplicable to God, because f That is, if there were different substances which were not connected in one only being, then their union would be impossible, because we see clearly that they have nothing at all in common, it 20 is so with thought and extension of which we nevertheless consist.
ft That is, if no substance can be other than real, and yet existence does not follow from its essence, when it is considered by itself, it follows that it is not something independent, but must be something, that is, an attribute, of another thing, namely, the one, only, and universal being. Or thus: All substance is real, and when a substance is considered by itself its existence does not follow from its essence; therefore, no existing substance can be known through itself, but it must belong to something else. That is, when with our understanding we consider " substantial " Thought 30 and ["substantial"] Extension, then we consider them only in their essence and not as existing, that is [we do not consider] that their existence necessarily pertains to their essence. When, however, we prove [of each] that it is an attribute of God, we thereby prove a priori that it exists, and a posteriori (as regards extension alone) [we prove its existence] from the modes which must necessarily have it for their subjectum.
28 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i he is a simple being. Moreover, when extension is divided it is passive, and with God (who is never passive, and cannot be affected by any other being, because he is the first efficient cause of all) this can by no means be the case. To this we reply: (i) that "part" and "whole" are not true or real entities, but only "things of reason," and consequently there are in Nature t neither whole nor parts. (2) A thing composed of different parts must be such that the parts thereof, taken separately, can be conceived and 10 understood one without another. Take, for instance, a clock which is composed of many different wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say, each wheel, cord, &c., can be f In Nature, that is, in " substantial " Extension; for if this were divided its nature and being would be at once annihilated, as it exists only as infinite extension, or, which comes to the same, it exists only as a whole.
But should you say: is there, in extension, no part prior to all its modes? I say, certainly not. But you may say, since there is motion in matter, it must be in some part of matter, for it cannot 20 be in the whole, because this is infinite; and whither shall it be moved, when there is nothing outside it? Therefore it must be in a part.J My answer is: Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest together; and this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in extension. Should you, however, say that there is, then tell me: if you divide the whole of extension then, as regards any part which you cut off from it in thought, can you also separate it in nature from all [other] parts; and supposing this has been done, I ask, what is there between the part cut offtJ and the rest? You must say, a vacuum, or another body, or something 30 of extension itself; there is no fourth possibility. The first will not do, because there is no vacuum, something positive and yet no body; nor the second, because then there would exist a mode, which cannot be, since JJJ extension as extension is without and prior to all modes. Therefore the third; and then there is no part but only the whole of extension.
J B omits this sentence. H B: separated.
HI B: therefore. HI J B: but extension one and indivisible.
WHAT GOD IS 29 conceived and understood separately, without the com- i posite whole being necessary thereto. Similarly also in the case of water, which consists of straight oblong particles, each part thereof can be conceived and understood, and can exist without the whole; but extension, being a sub stance, one cannot say of it that it has parts, since it can neither diminish nor increase, and no parts thereof can be understood apart, because by its nature it must be infinite. And that it must be such, follows from this, namely, because if it were not such, but consisted of parts, then it would not icr be infinite by its nature, as it is said to be; and it is impossible to conceive parts in an infinite nature, since by their nature all parts are finite. t Add to this still: if it consisted of different parts then it should be intelligible that supposing some parts thereof to be annihilated, exten- tion might remain all the same, and not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of its parts; this is clearly contradictory in what is infinite by its own nature and can never be, or be conceived, as limited or finite. Further, as regards the parts in Nature, we maintain that 20 division, as has also been said already before, never takes place in substance, but always and only in the mode of substance. Thus, if I want to divide water, I only divide the mode of substance, and not substance itself. And whether this mode is that of water or something else it is always the same.tl Division, then, or passivity, always takes place in the mode; thus when we say that man passes away or is annihilated, then this is understood to apply to man only in so far as he is such a composite being, and a mode of sub stance, and not the substance on which he depends. 30 J B: because all the parts would have to be infinite by their nature.
tt B: when, therefore, I divide water I do not divide the sub stance, but only that mode of the substance, which substance, however variously modified, is always the same.
c 30 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING * Moreover, we have already stated, and we shall repeat it Inter, that outside God there is nothing at all, and that he is an Immanent Cause. Now, passivity, whenever the agent and the patient are different entities, is a palpable imperfec tion, because the patient must necessarily be dependent on that which has caused the passivity from outside; it has, therefore, no place in God, who is perfect, Furthermore, of such an agent who acts in himself it can never be said that he has the imperfection of a patient, because he is not 10 affected by another; such, for instance, is the case with the understanding, which, as the philosophers also assert, is the cause of its ideas, since, however, it is an immanent cause, what right has one to say that it is imperfect, howsoever frequently it is affected by itself? t Lastly, since substance is [the cause] and the origin of all its modes, it may with far greater right be called an agent than a patient. And with these remarks we consider all adequately answered.
It is further objected, that there must necessarily be a first cause which sets body in motion, because when at rest 20 it is impossible for it to set itself in motion. And since it is clearly manifest that rest and motion exist in Nature, these must, they think, necessarily result from an external cause. But it is easy for us to reply to this; for we concede that, if body were a thing existing through itself, and had no other attributes than length, breadth, and depth, then, if it really rested there would be in it no cause whereby to begin to move itself; but we have already stated before that Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated, and this being so, it can be lacking in nothing wherewith to 30 produce all that there is to be produced.
Having so far discussed what God is, we shall say but a word, as it were, about his attributes: that those which are known to us consist of two only, namely, Thought and I B: And although the understanding, as the philosophers say, is a cause of its ideas, yet, since it is an immanent cause, &c.
WHAT GOD IS 31 Extension; for here we speak only of attributes which i might be called the proper attributes of God,! through which we come to know him [as he is] in himself, and not [merely] as he acts [towards things] outside himself. All else, then, that men ascribe to God beyond these two attributes, all that (if it otherwise pertains to him) must be either an " extraneous denomination," such as that he exists through himself, is Eternal, One, Immutable, &c., or, I say, has reference to his activity, such as that he is a cause, predes tines, and rules all things: all which are properties of God, 10 but give us no information as to what he is. But how and in what manner these attributes can nevertheless have a place in God we shall explain in the following chapters. But, for the better understanding of this!! and in further exposition thereof,!!! we have thought it well * and have decided * to add the following arguments consisting of a [Dialogue.]
B: which may truly be called God's attributes.
B: of the foregoing.!!! B: of what we mean to say.
[FIRST] DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNDERSTANDING, LOVE, REASON, AND DESIRE LOVE. I see, Brother, that both my essence and perfection depend on your perfection; and since the perfection of the object which you have conceived is your perfection, while from yours again mine proceeds, so tell me now, I pray you, whether you have conceived such a being as is supremely perfect, not capable of being limited by any other, and in 10 which I also am comprehended.
UNDERSTANDING. I for my part consider Nature only in its totality as infinite, and supremely perfect, but you, if you have any doubts about it, ask Reason, she will tell you.
REASON. To me the truth of the matter is indubitable, for if we would limit Nature then we should, absurdly enough, have to limit it with a mere Nothing; I we avoid this absurdity by stating that it is OneEternal Unity, infinite, omnipotent, &c., that is, that Nature is infinite and that all is contained 20 therein; and the negative of this we call Nothing.
DESIRE. Ah indeed! it is wondrously congruous to sup pose that Unity is in keeping with the Difference which I observe everywhere in Nature. But how? I see that think ing substance has nothing in common with extended sub stance, and that the one limits [not] the other; and if, in addi tion to these substances, you want to posit yet a third one which is perfect in all respects, then look how you involve J A and B continue: moreover under the following attributes, namely, that it is One, Eternal, infinite through itself; we 32 UNDERSTANDING, LOVE, REASON, &c. 33 yourself in manifest contradictions; for if this third one is i placed outside the first two, then it is wanting in all the attributes which belong to those two, but this can never be the case with a whole outside of which there is nothing. Moreover if this being is omnipotent and perfect, then it must be such because it has made itself, and not because another has made it; that, however, which could produce both itself and yet another besides would be even more omnipotent. And lastly, if you call it omniscient then it is necessary that it should know itself; and, at the same time, you must know 10 that the knowledge of oneself alone is less than the know ledge of oneself together with the knowledge of other sub stances. All these are manifest contradictions. I would, therefore, have advised Love to rest content with what I show her, and to look about for no other things.
LOVE. What now, O dishonourable one, have you shown me but what would result in my immediate ruin. For, if I had ever united myself with what you have shown me, then from that moment I should have been persecuted by the two archenemies of the human race, namely, Hatred and 20 Remorse, and sometimes also by Oblivion; and therefore I turn again to Reason only to proceed and stop the mouths of these foes.
REASON. What you say, O Desire, that there are different substances, that, I tell you, is false; for I see clearly that there is but One, which exists through itself, and is a support to all other attributes. And if you will refer to the material and the mental as substances, in relation to the modes which are dependent on them, why then, you must also call them modes in relation to the substance t on which they depend: 3° for they are not conceived by you as existing through them selves. And in the same way that willing, feeling, under standing, loving, &c., are different modes of that which you call a thinking substance, in which you bring together and t A: substances; B: substance.
34 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i unite all these in one, t so I also conclude, from your own proofs, that Both Infinite Extension and Thought together with all other infinite attributes (or, according to your usage, other substances) are only modes of the One, Eternal, Infinite Being, who exists through himself; and from all these we posit, as stated, An Only One or a Unity outside which nothing can be imagined to be. J} DESIRE. Methinks I see a very great confusion in this argu ment of yours; for, it seems you will have it that the whole 10 must be something outside of or apart from its parts, which is truly absurd. For all philosophers are unanimous in saying that " whole " is a second notion, and that it is nothing in Nature apart from human thought. Moreover, as I gather from your example, you confuse whole with cause: for, as I say, the whole only consists of and [exists] through its parts, and so it comes that you represent the thinking power as a thing on which the Understanding, Love, &c., depend. But you cannot call it a Whole, only a Cause of the Effects just named by you.
20 REASON. I see decidedly how you muster all your friends against me, and that, after the method usually adopted by those who oppose the truth, you are designing to achieve by quibbling what you have not been able to accomplish with your fallacious reasoning. But you will not succeed in winning Love to your side by such means. Your assertion, then, is, that the cause (since it is the Originator of the effects) must therefore be outside these. But you say this because you only know of the transeunt and not of the immanent cause, which by no means produces anything outside itself, 30 as is exemplified by the Understanding, which is the cause of its ideas. And that is why I called the understanding % A: all which you bring to one, and make one from all these; B: to which you bring all and make them into one.
It B:...One, Eternal, self-subsisting Being in which all is one and united, and outside which unity nothing can be imagined to be.
UNDERSTANDING, LOVE, REASON, &c. 35 (in so far as, or because, its ideas depend on it J) a cause; and on the other hand, since it consists of its ideas, a whole: so also God is both an Immanent Cause with reference to his works or creatures, and also a whole, considered from the second point of view.
I So in B. A: it depends on its ideas.
i SECOND DIALOGUE BETWEEN ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS RELATING PARTLY TO THE PRECEDING, PARTLY TO THE FOLLOWING SECOND PART ERASMUS. I have heard you say, Theophilus, that God is a cause of all things, and, at the same time, that he can be no other than an Immanent cause. Now, if he is znimmanent cause of all things, how then can you call him a remote I 10 cause? For, that is impossible in the case of an Immanent cause.
THEOPHILUS. When I said that God is a remote t cause, I only said it with reference to the things [which God has produced mediately, and not with reference to those] which God (without any other conditions beyond his mere exist ence) has produced immediately; but on no account did I mean to call him a remote! cause absolutely: as you might also have clearly gathered from my remarks. For, I also said that in some respects we can call him a remote 20 cause.
20 cause.
ERASMUS. I understand now adequately what you want to say; but I note also that you have said, that the effect of the It immanent cause remains united with its cause in such a way that together they constitute a whole. Now, if this is so, then, methinks, God cannot be an immanent cause. For, if he and that which is produced by him together form a whole, then you ascribe to God at one time more essence than at another time. I pray you, remove these doubts for me.
36 ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS 37 THEOPHILUS. If, Erasmus, you want to extricate yourself i from this confusion, then mark well what I am going to tell you now. The essence of a thing does not increase through its union with another thing with which it constitutes a whole; on the contrary, the first remains unchanged. I will give you an illustration, so that you may understand me the better. An image-carver has made from wood various forms after the likeness of the parts of the human body; he takes one of these, which has the form of a human breast, joins it to another, which has the form of a human head, and of 10 these two he makes a whole, which represents the upper part of a human body; would you therefore say that the essence of the head has increased because it has been joined to the breast? That would be erroneous, because it is the same that it was before. For the sake of greater clearness let me give you another illustration, namely, an idea that I have of a triangle, and another resulting from an extension of one of the angles, which extended or extending angle is neces sarily equal to the two interior opposite angles, and so forth. These, I say, have produced a new idea, namely, that the 20 three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles.
This idea is so connected with the first, that it can neither be, nor be conceived without the same.t Mark well now that although the new idea is joined to the preceding one, the essence of the preceding idea does not undergo any change in consequence; on the contrary, it remains without the slightest change. The same you may also observe in every idea which produces love in itself: this love in no way adds to the essence of the idea. But why multiply illustra tions? since you can see it clearly in the subject which I 30 have been illustrating and which we are discussing now. I have distinctly stated that all attributes, which depend on no t A continues: And of all ideas which any one has we make a whole, or (which is the same) a thing of reason, which we call Understanding- 38 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING other cause, and whose definition requires no genus pertain to the essence of God; and since the created things are not competent to establish an attribute, they do not increase the essence of God, however intimately they become united to him. Add to this, that "whole" is but a thing of Reason, and does not differ from the general except in this alone that the general results from various Disconnected individuals, the Whole, from various United individuals; also in this, that the General only comprises parts of the same kind, but the 10 Whole, parts both the same and different in kind. I ERASMUS. So far as this is concerned you have satisfied me. But, in addition to this, you have also said, that the effect of the II inner cause cannot perish so long as its cause lasts; this, I well see, is certainly true, but III if this is so, then how can God be an inner cause of all things, seeing that many things perish? After your previous distinction you will say, that God is really a cause of the effects which he has produced immediately, without any other conditions except his attributes alone; and, that these cannot perish so long as 20 their cause endures; but that you do not call God an inner cause of the effects whose existence does not depend on him imme diately, but which have come into being through some other thing, except in so far as their causes do not operate, and can not operate, without God, nor also outside him^lll and that for this reason also, since they are not produced immediately by God, they can perish. But this does not satisfy me. For I see that you conclude, that the human understanding is immortal, because it is a product which God has pro duced in himself. Now it is impossible that more than the 30 I B:...the general results from various unconnected indi viduals of the same kind; but the whole from various connected individuals different as well as the same in kind.
HI B: this, I see, is not true, because if...llll B: without and outside him.
ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS 39 attributes of God should have been necessary in order to i produce such an understanding; for, in order to be a being of such supreme perfection, it must have been created from eternity, just like all other things which depend imme diately on God. And I have heard you say so, if I am not mistaken. And this being so, how will you reconcile J this without leaving over any difficulties?
THEOPHILUS. It is true, Erasmus, that the things (for the existence of which no other thing is required, except the attributes of God) which have been created immediately by 10 him have been created from eternity. It is to be remarked, however, that although in order that a thing may exist there is required a special modification and tt a thing beside the attributes of God, for all that, God does not cease to be able to produce a thing immediately. For, of the necessary things which are required to bring things Jtt into existence, some are there in order that they should produce the thing, and others in order that the thing should be capable of being produced. For example, I want to have light in a certain room; I kindle a light, and this lights up the room through 20 itself; or I open a window [shutter], now this act of opening does not itself give light, but still it brings it about that the light can enter the room.Jttt Likewise in order to set a body in motion another body is required that shall have all the motion that is to pass from it to the other. But in order to produce in us an idea of God there is no need for another special thing that shall have what is to be produced in us, but only such a body in Nature whose idea is neces sary in order to represent God immediately. This you t B: explain. 30 II B: of. HI B: a thing.
tilt B: I kindle this [light], or I open a window, whereupon the room becomes light; now the act of kindling, or of opening the room does not produce the light, but prepares the way for the light to be able to light up the room, or to enter it.
4o GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i could also have gathered from my remarks: for I said that God is only known through himself, and not through something else. However, I tell you this, that so long as we have not such a clear idea of God as shall unite us with him in such a way that it will not let us love any thing beside him, we cannot truly say that we are united with God, so as to depend immediately on him. If there is still anything that you may have to ask, leave it for another time; just now circumstances require me to attend to other 10 matters. Farewell.
ERASMUS. Nothing at present, but I shall ponder what you have just told me till the next opportunity. God be with you.
CHAPTER III i THAT GOD IS A CAUSE OF ALL THINGS WE shall now begin to consider those attributes [of God] which we called Propria.'f And, first of all, how God *'s a cause of all things.
Now, we have already said above that one substance can not produce another; and that God is a being of whom all attributes are predicated; whence it clearly follows that all other things can by no means be, or be understood, apart from or outside him. Wherefore we may say with all 10 reason that God is a cause of all things.
As it is usual to divide the efficient cause in eight divisions, let me, then, inquire how and in what sense God is a cause.
First, then, we say that he is an emanative or productive cause of his works; and, in so far as there is activity, an active or operating cause, which we regard as one and the same, because they involve each other.
Secondly, he is an immanent, and not a transeunt cause, since all that he produces is within himself, and not outside 20 him, because there is nothing outside him.
Thirdly, God is a free cause, and not a natural cause, as we shall make clear and manifest when we come to consider whether God can omit to do what he does, and then it will also be explained wherein true freedom consists.
t The [attributes] following are called Propria, because they are only Adjectives, which cannot be understood without their Substan tives. That is to say, without them God would indeed be no God, but still it is not they that constitute God; for they reveal nothing of the character of a Substance, through which alone God exists. 30 42 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i Fourthly, God is a cause through himself, and not by accident; this will become more evident from the discussion on Predestination.