the Unmoved (Mover) and the Moved. In the writings of Augustine (354-430) the Aristotelian division is de veloped into a threefold distinction, namely, (i) a Creator who was not created, (2) the created which also creates, and (3) that which has been created but does not create. Scotus Erigena added a fourth distinction (so as to complete the dichotomous scheme), namely, (4) that which neither creates nor has been created (= nothing). Scotus Erigena (ninth century) already maintained that God and the Universe are identical; Nature regarded as a creating totality being the same as God, while Nature regarded as a multiplicity of created things is what is called the world. This mode of thought was developed more fully by Averroes (1126-1198), the chief of the Arabian Aristotelians. 56, 3-11. Cf. Ethics, I. xxix. Schol.
56, 12 ff. Cf. Ethics, I.xxviii. Schol., where the division of Natura naturata into " general " and " particular " is replaced by that into things produced by God " immediately " and " mediately."
CHAPTER IX 57, 2-8. Probably for the reasons stated in lines 7, 8, Un derstanding and Motion are referred to in the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding as res fix& et ceternce. They are also commonly referred to as the u infinite modes." Cf. Letter LXIV.
57, 18, 20. It seems strange that Motion should be de scribed as a " Son of God." But its correspondence or parallelism with Understanding, in Spinoza's scheme, com pelled him to predicate of Motion whatever he affirmed of the Understanding by way of epithets indicating position in the scheme. And to describe Understanding as the " Son of God " was, of course, Biblical — i Cor. i. 24: Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. It was, no doubt, with reference to this Scriptural passage that Spinoza wrote in COMMENTARY 201 COMMENTARY 201 Letter LXXIII.: " I do not think it at all necessary for one's salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but as regards the eternal Son of God, that is, God's eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things, especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus, one must think otherwise. For without this no one can attain to a state of bliss, because it alone shows what is true or false, good or evil."
57,2i. The expression " created...from all eternity" amounts to a denial of " creation" in its usual sense. Spinoza makes this quite clear in Cogitata Metaphysica, II. x.: " Neither was the Son of God created, He was eternal like the Father. When, therefore, we say that the Father had begotten the Son from eternity, we only mean that the Father has always shared His eternity with the Son."
57, 23-27. It is not certain whether this note was written by Spinoza, to whom it refers in the third person as " the author " — quite a unique form in Spinoza's writings. The information conveyed is accurate in so far as Spinoza did occupy himself with, and intended to write on, the most general problems of Physics. We gather this from Letters LIX., LX., LXXXIII. But the note seems quite irrelevant. Apparently it refers to some remark in the text which was subsequently struck out.
58, 6. "Affects." The Dutch is Aandoeningen, which may be a too literal translation of Affectus. The usual ex pression is passien or tochten.
CHAPTER X 59. Entia Rationis and Entia Realia. See note to 28, 6.
59, ii ff. Spinoza's criticism of the terms "good" and " evil " is different in different parts of this Treatise. On p. 51 (lines 4-15) — also in Cog. Metaph. (I. vi.), in the Tract, de Intel. Emend., and in the Ethics (Appendix to Part I.) — the 202 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING criticism turns on the implication of purpose. On the same page (lines i6ff.)— also in Letter XIX. — the criticism turns on the implied comparison of individual things with general ideas. In the passage now under consideration — also in Ethics, IV. Ixv. — the criticism turns on the relative or relational character of the terms " good " and " evil."
59, 28 ff. The concluding paragraph of the chapter looks suspicious. The force of the additional argument is not obvious. Nor is there anything like its trend of ideas elsewhere in Spinoza. Sigwart is accordingly inclined to regard it as an interpolation by a disciple of Spinoza.
SECOND PART PREFACE 63. Cf. Ethics, II., the opening sentences, and propositions x. and xi.
63, 12 ff. This long addition was most probably not meant to be a " note " at all, and seems to be misplaced. See the comment on chapter i. The different parts of this long note may be compared with Spinoza's other utterances as follows: i. Cf. Ethics, II. x.; 3. cf. Ethics, II. i.; 4. cf. Ethics, I. xxx., II. iii. iv.; 6-8. cf. Ethics, II. xiii. (to the end of Lemma i.); 9. cf. Ethics, II. xi.; 10-12. cf. Ethics, II. Lemma iii.-vii.; 13. cf. Ethics, II. xii. xiv.; 14. cf. Ethics, IV. xxxix. 15. This part of the note is not really essential, and is in any case inaccurate. The contrast required is that between union with substances and union with modes; that given is between union with thought and union with exten sion, both of which are substances in the looser sense — that is, " attributes of substance." Probably this part of the note was not written by Spinoza in its present form.
COMMENTARY 203 66, 1-5. According to the reservation here made, God or Substance is no part of the nature of man, because although man could not be, or be conceived without God, yet God could well be, and be conceived without man. Cf. Ethics, II., Definition ii., and prop. x.
CHAPTER I 67. The opening words of this chapter, also the opening and concluding remarks of the Preface (p. 63, lines 6ff., and p. 66, lines $ff.\ lead one to expect an exposition of "the modes of which man consists." What is actually considered in this chapter is the three kinds of knowledge, while "the modes of which man consists " are discussed in the long note to the Preface (pp. 63 ff.) Freudenthal has therefore suggested the following explanation. Originally chapter i. did treat of " the modes of which man consists." But, dis satisfied with that first account, Spinoza wrote a new exposi tion to replace or to supplement it. Owing, however, to some misunderstanding of reference signs the copyist or translator treated the new exposition as a note to the Pre face, omitting at the same time the older account, which Spinoza had probably crossed through, or marked in some way as unsatisfactory. Note f seems to be a feeble attempt on the part of a reader or copyist to reconcile the opening words with the actual contents of the chapter.
67, 7 /. The meaning is clear, namely, the modes to be considered first are the modes of thought, because these are known or experienced more immediately than the modes of extension (i.e., material objects, including human bodies), our knowledge of all modes of extension being, of course, included among the modes of cognition. The language, however, is rather obscure. What is "the consciousness of the knowledge of ourselves "? It has been suggested by Freudenthal that the original Latin may have been, " Incipi- amus ab Us qui primi nobis cogniti sunt, scilicet a quibusdam 204 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING ideis vel a cognitione nostri et delude agamus de rebus qua extra nos sunt," and that " cognitione nostri" was (like so many other expressions in the Treatise) translated twice over by " medegeweten " (translated " consciousness ") and " ken- nisse," and the whole misconstrued. In accordance with this plausible emendation we should read here: "...certain ideas or our knowledge, and then we shall treat of the things which are outside us."
67, ioff. Here we have a threefold classification of the different kinds of knowledge, which is developed into a four fold scheme by subdividing the first kind of knowledge. In chapter ii. the distinction between the two subdivisions of the first kind of knowledge is passed over, while it is empha sised in chapter iv. (76, 17 ff.). In the Tractatus de Intel- lectus Emendatione (pp. 7 ff.) we find the fourfold scheme, while in the Ethics, II. xl. Schol. 2, Spinoza returns to the threefold scheme. The special stress laid on the fourfold scheme in the Tr. de Int. Em. (as Gebhardt has suggested) was probably due to the influence of Bacon. Indeed, the name of the second kind of knowledge (or of the second subdivision of what is here the first kind), namely, perceptio ab experientia vaga, occurs in Bacon's Novum Organum, I. c. In a note in the Tr. de Int. Em. (p. 9) Spinoza promises a fuller account of " experience," and of the methods of "recent empirical philosophers/' The reference is most probably to Bacon, from whose estimate of experience Spinoza differed, maintaining (as against Bacon) that " it is something altogether uncertain,...by means of it the accidents only of natural things are apprehended, and they are never clearly understood without a previous knowledge of their essences " (ibid.).
67, ii. The first kind of knowledge (in the threefold scheme) is here called "belief," but in chapters ii. and iv. (and elsewhere) " opinion." The Latin was probably the same in all cases, namely, opinio. In English also " belief' COMMENTARY 205 is sometimes used for " opinion "; e.g., " I am not sure, but that is my belief " (or " I believe so").
67, 13. The second kind of knowledge, here called "true belief" (on p. 69, line 14, simply "Belief"), is described on p. 74, line 19, as "a strong proof based on reasons." The distinction between " Opinion" and "True Belief" there fore recalls the Platonic (or even pre- Platonic) distinction between £o'?a and £7rt(rr?//Aiy.
"Belief" (or "true belief") seems a strange designation for reasoned or discursive knowledge. Spinoza himself substituted "Reason" afterwards (see, e.g., p. 99, line 16 — " True Belief or Reason "). Joel, however, has pointed out that Crescas employed the term " Belief " in the same sense. The expression " true belief " may have been suggested by the following passage from Maimonides' Guide (I. 1.): " Belief...is the conviction that what is apprehended exists outside the mind exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If in addition we are convinced that the thing cannot be different in any way from what we believe it to be...then the belief is true."
67, 14. Sigwart has pointed out that the distinction between what is here called "clear and distinct concep tion" (or immediate intuition) and "true belief" (or discursive reasoning) is also found in Descartes (especially in the Regiila ad directionem ingenii, which, however, was only published in 1701, and was therefore unknown to Spinoza). But Descartes laid no such stress on the dis tinction, and also conceived it rather differently. Descartes' " immediate intuition " was mathematical in character and referred to the apprehension of the truth of certain proposi tions, especially the cogito ergo sum; Spinoza's "clear and distinct knowledge" is mystical in character, and referred to the apprehension of objects, especially of God.
67, 25 ff. See the first comment on this chapter.
o 206 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING The three foot-notes on this page, and the first three foot notes on p. 68, are most probably marginal notes or sum maries made by some reader of the MS. from which A was copied.
CHAPTER II 69, 22 ff. Cf. Ethics, IV. Appendix, § iii.: "Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are determined by man's power or reason, are always good; the others may be good or evil." Cf. also Ethics, III. iii.
" Passion" (7rd6o$ = passio, affectus, or perturbatio) was used in the time of Spinoza, and even later, in a much wider sense than at present. It denoted not the violent emotions only, but all feelings, sentiments, and desires, as so many ways in which the mind "suffers" or "is affected" by external things.
69,26ff. Cf. Ethics, II. Axiom iii.: "Such modes of thought as love, desire...do not arise unless there is also, in the same individual, an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea may be there even when no other mode of thought is present."
The view that " knowledge is the proximate cause of all the passions" is opposed to the Cartesian view, according to which the passions " are produced, sustained, and strengthened by some movement of the animal spirits" (De Passionibus Animcz, I. 27). Spinoza assigns a purely mental origin to the passions, while Descartes ascribed them in large measure to physiological causes.
CHAPTER III CHAPTER III 70. In his treatment of the passions in this and the following chapters Spinoza follows closely Descartes' order of exposition in hisDe Passionibus Anima, Parts II. and III. (This was already noticed by Boehmer when he published the Outline of the Short Treatise.) The following tables (see opposite) (taken, with slight changes, from Sigwart) will make this clear.
COMMENTARY DESCARTES' DE PASSIONI- BUS ANIM^E SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE PART II.
PART II.
§§69-148. Admiratio Ch. iii. Admiratio Amor Odium ,, vi. Odium (Aversio) Cupiditas ,, vii. Cupiditas Lcetitia Mceror PART III.
,, viii. Existimatio et Contemptus spectus „ 153-156. Generositas et Humi ,,,, Generositas (?), Humilitas litas ,, 157-161. Superbia et Humilitas ,,,, Superbia, Abjectio vitiosa natio „ 1 66. Securitas et Desperatio ,,,, Securitas, Desperatio ,,,, Animi fluctuatio „ 171. Animositas et Audacia ,, „ Intrepiditas et Audacia ,,,, Pusillanimitas, Zelotypia sternatio ,, 177. Consdentice morsus ,, x. Consdentice morsus „ 178-181. Irrisio et Jocus ,, xi. Irrisio et Jocus „ xiv. Desiderium „ 190. Acquiescentia in se ipso ,,,, Pcenitentia ,, xiii. Favor ,,,, Gratitudo et Ingratitudo tudo ,, 195-203. Indignatio et Ira „ xii. Honor et Pudor 208 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING As regards details, there are numerous important dif ferences between Spinoza's and Descartes' views on the passions.
lQ,8ff. Spinoza's account of " surprise" is original. Descartes simply described it as evoked by " things rare and extraordinary," but he did not explain it.
70, 28 ff. The concluding part of the note seems to be directed against the view that Surprise is evoked chiefly by what is absolutely new. But the thought is expressed imperfectly.
72, 20 ff. Spinoza's account of Hatred is very different from that of Descartes (op. cit. II. 79).
73, 4 /. The account here given of Desire is reversed in Ethics, III. ix. SchoL, where it is maintained that we do not " desire anything because we think it is good, but, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we...desire it."
CHAPTER IV 74, 9/. In geometry, e.g., we reason that such and such a figure must have such and such properties; but we do not prove thereby that such a figure actually exists.
74, 19 ff. The meaning of " Belief " here (as already remarked) is peculiar. Equally peculiar is the use here made of the term " Knowledge " ( = spiritual intuition), and the way in which " Belief " and " Knowledge " are con trasted. Joel has drawn attention to parallel passages in the writings of Crescas, two of which may be given here. In words very like lines 19-21 Crescas says that " Belief is only the conviction resulting from the necessity of the case that the thing outside the soul is such as it is represented to be in the soul." In contrast to Belief, clear Knowledge is described by Spinoza (in lines 25, 30 /. and elsewhere) as an "immediate union " with and " intellectual enjoyment" of what is thus known. Crescas distinguishes between COMMENTARY 209 Belief and another form of knowledge as follows: " We accept some views from a feeling of (logical) necessity, others with a feeling of joy and gladness. Our Bliss depends, not on Belief, but on the joy which accompanies Knowledge. For...only joy can unite us with God" (The Light of the Lord, II. v. 5, quoted by Joel).
75, 13 /. The assertion referred to is not found in the Treatise. Apparently some part containing such a state ment has been lost.
75, 23 ff. Cf. the comments on I.x. (p. 201 /.). Cf. Ethics, IV., Preface, Def. i. and ii., and Appendix, § v.
76, 6/. Spinoza may be referring to the first chapter of his Cogitata Metaphysica, which is entitled De Ente Reali, Ficto, et Rationis, which was probably written already, though the whole work of which it forms a part was not completed and published till 1663.
76, 26 ff. The new point of view is noteworthy. So far the passions were judged by the kind of knowledge which produced them; we now observe a new criterion, namely, the character of the objects which are loved, &c.
lit 3ff* This brief and somewhat peculiar treatment of " surprise " almost prepares one for its subsequent exclusion from the class of "affects "(or passions) in Ethics, 1 1 1. (Def. iv. of the Affects). It is possible, however, that originally this chapter was followed by one on " Surprise."
CHAPTER V 78. Love, it should be noted, is here distinguished according to the character of its objects, not according to the kind of cognition from which it results, which was the mode of procedure suggested at the beginning of chapter iii. (p. 70). Descartes, it may be remarked, rather disparaged any such distinctions based on the character of the objects loved (De Pass. An. 11.82).
210 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 78, 15 /. "God, or...Truth." C/. p. 103, line 16— God is Truth, Truth is God. Because by "Truth" Spinoza means "the real essence of things as thought" (Martineau).
78, I7/. According to this, love is always "intellectual." Descartes had distinguished between amor intellectualis and amor sensitivus, the latter of which was supposed to be due entirely to physiological causes.
78, 20 ff. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, cap. xvi., Spinoza speaks of it as " a universal law of human nature " that we can only relinquish what we think good in one of the two ways stated here.
79, 8ff. This explanation of love appears to be original; it is not in Descartes.
80,30-32. One would expect "...God alone is a substance..." The Dutch is weezen (essence), weezens (essences), wezen (entity).
81, i$ff. On the "intellectual love of God" (Amor Dei intellectualis) see Ethics, V. xxxii./.
CHAPTER VI 82, 3/. This definition of Hatred is restricted on the next page (lines 8^.) so as to exclude the inanimate and the irresponsible from its objects. On p. 72 (lines 2O/.) we had yet another account, from a different point of view. In Ethics, III. (xiii. Schol., also Def. vii. at the end of the Book) Hatred is defined even more widely than here, namely, as "sorrow with the accompanying idea of its external cause"; while in IV. xlv. Schol. it is restricted again so as to exclude all but human beings from its objects.
83, i6ff. Here things which are the "accidental" causes of injury are excluded from among the objects of " aver sion"; in Ethics, III. Def. ix. of the Affects, aversion is defined as "sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object as the accidental cause of the sorrow."
83, 20^. Here "sorrow" is described as an effect of hatred, &c.; in the above definitions (from the Ethics) COMMENTARY 211 hatred and aversion are described as species of sorrow. We thus seem to have here an identification of causa proxima with genus proximum. Cf. p. 199.
83, 21. Anger is accordingly denned in Ethics, III. Def. xxxvi., as "the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate."
83, 24. Envy is defined in Ethics, III. Def. xxiii., as " hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person, and is glad when some evil befalls him."
84, 5/. Cf. Ethics, IV. xviii. Schol. (" Homini igitur nihil homine utilius"), xxxv. Corol. i., and xxxvii.
84, i6ff. Cf. Ethics. IV. xlv.
CHAPTER VII 85. "Joy and Sorrow" are used in a very wide sense, almost as the equivalents of " Pleasure and Pain." They play a more important role in the Ethics than they do here.
85, 8. " The same causes" — that is, the idea that a certain thing is good.
85, 12 /. The definition here given of Sorrow is the same as that of Grief, on p. 99, lines 5 /. In the Ethics (III. Def. iii. of the Affects) Sorrow (Tristitia) is defined as " man's transition from greater to lesser perfection." Descartes had defined it as the effect of a present evil.
85, 17 ff. Cf. Ethics, IV. xli., where Spinoza says that Joy is in itself good, and Sorrow evil, because Joy increases the body's power of action, while Sorrow diminishes it.
86, 2 /. Cf. Tract, de Int. Em. (p. 5), where Spinoza says that strife, hatred, sorrow, jealousy, and other evil passions arise from the love of the transient only, " but love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with unmixed joy." Cf. Ethics, V. xx.
86, 7. Reminiscent of Psalm xvi. n: In thy presence is fulness of joy, In thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.
212 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING CHAPTER VIII 87,7-9. In the Ethics (III. Def. Aff. xxi. xxii.) Existi- matio and Despectus are conceived so as to contain an element of bias. Existimatio (over-esteem) " consists in think ing too highly of some one in consequence of our love for him; Despectus " consists in thinking too little of some one in consequence of our hatred against him."
87, 10. " Self-respect." The Dutch is Edelmoedigheid, which generally means "noble bearing" or " generosity." Generositas, however, is defined in Ethics, III. lix. Schol., as " the desire by which from the dictates of reason alone each person endeavours to help other people and to join them to himself in friendship." This is very unlike what is described here.
87, 18. "Conceit" (Verwaantheid) = Superbia (Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxviii.), " undue self-esteem prompted by self- love."
87, 20. " Culpable humility " (strafbare nedrigheid) = ? Abjectio, which is defined in Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxix., as " thinking too little of oneself, through sorrow."
88, 6 ff. In the Ethics (IV. liii.) Spinoza says that " Humility is not a virtue," because the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do. More over, Humility is a species of sorrow, and sorrow is always bad. Apparently the good side of " true humility " has been joined to " self-respect " to constitute acquiescentia in se ipso, the contentment resulting from a just estimate of one's powers.
88, 32. Scepticism had a certain vogue in the time of Spinoza, and rationalist philosophies were often confounded with it. Hence philosophers like Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza felt it necessary to break a lance with Scepticism so as to make it clear that they were no Sceptics. In the Tract, delnt. Em. (p. 14) Spinoza remarks of the Sceptics: "They COMMENTARY 213 COMMENTARY 213 say that they know nothing; and they say that even this, namely, that they know nothing, they also do not know; nor can they say even that much absolutely: for they are afraid to admit that they exist, seeing that they know nothing; they should really be dumb, lest perchance they suggest something that may savour of truth...They must consequently be regarded as automata, altogether devoid of mind." Further on (p. 24) he dismisses such Scepticism as " belonging to an inquiry on obstinacy " rather than to an inquiry on Method.
89. 10 /. Namely, that God is the highest and worthiest object of our esteem, as of our love (p. 81, line 13 ff.).
CHAPTER IX 90, 12 ff. The way in which Spinoza here divides the passions appears to be original.
90, 27. In Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xii., Hope is defined as ft an inconstant joy arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we have some doubt." Cf. also Ethics, III. xviii. Schol. 2.
91, 2. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xiii.: " Fear [metus, nottimor] is a wavering sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we have some doubt." Cf. III. xviii. Schol. 2.
91, 3 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xiv.: "Confidence is joy arising from the idea of something future or past concern ing which all cause for doubt has been removed."
91, 8/. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xv.: " Despair is sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed."
91, 23 ff. "Vacillation of mind " is treated from a different point of view in the Ethics (III. xvii. Schol., xxxi.), where it is described as the result of loving and hating the same thing at once, or (Aff. Def. xlii.) from a choice of evils.
214 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 91, 27 ff. Ethics, III. li. Schol.: " I will call that man brave (intrepidum) who despises an evil which I usually fear." Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xl.: " Boldness (Audacia) is a desire by which one is incited to do something perilous which his fellows fear to attempt." The Dutch terms are moed (line 27), kloekmoedigheid (line 28), and dapper heid (line 29).
91, 30 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxxiii.: " Emulation consists in feeling a desire for something because we imagine that others have the same desire."
91,33 ff. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xli.: " Pusillanimity [or Cowardice] is attributed to one whose desire [to do some thing] is checked by the fear (timor) of a danger which his fellows are not afraid to face."
92, i. Ethics, III. li. Schol.; " The man who fears an evil which I usually despise will appear timid " (timidus).
92, 2. "Jalousie" is given in the MSS. as the (French) equivalent for "Belgzucht"\ apparently the translator was not sure how to translate zelotypia. According to Ethics, III. xxxv. Schol., Jealousy is "a vacillation of mind arising from a feeling of both love and hatred [for a certain object], accompanied by the idea of another person who is hated [because he has supplanted us]."
92, 8ff. On Hope, Fear, and their effects, see Ethics, IV. xlvii. Ixiii.; on Confidence and Despair, Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xv.
93, 10. " Boldness." The Dutch is " Stoutheid."
CHAPTER X 94, 5 ff. Remorse (Knaging) is conceived somewhat dif ferently in the Ethics (III. Aff. Def. xvii.), where it (Con- scientice morsus) is defined as " sorrow accompanied by the idea of something past which happened unexpectedly " (? contrary to expectations). This is Disappointment rather than Remorse. Verrassing (rashness, line 5) usually means surprise.
COMMENTARY 215 94, 7 /. Repentance (Berouw). In Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxvii., Pcenitentia is defined as " sorrow accompanied by the idea of something done, which we believe that we did by a free decision of the mind."
94, i&ff. The definitions of "Remorse" and " Repent ance " given here (in the Short Treatise) are the same as those given by Descartes (De Pass. An. III. 177, 191). But Spinoza's estimate of them is altogether opposed to that of Descartes, who considers remorse " useful " as tending to make people more cautious in future, and repentance as "most useful" because leading to an improvement in conduct. In Ethics, IV. liv. Schol., Spinoza makes a note worthy concession. " If men impotent in mind...were ashamed of nothing, and feared nothing, how could they be united or restrained? The mob inspires fear when it feels none. No wonder, therefore, that the Prophets, who were concerned about the welfare, not of the few, but of the com munity, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so greatly. And indeed those who are subject to these feelings can be led much more easily than others, so as to live eventually by the guidance of Reason, that is, to be free, and live the life of the blessed."
CHAPTER XI