properly, the distinction between proposition and judgment, for they are only distinguishable in so far as it is assumed that the second form is dominated by the concept, whereas the first is given as free of such domination.
But we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions belonging to either form, because we cannot furnish them without making the proviso that we understand them in the meaning of one or other of the two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal expressions which we adduce or can adduce as proofs are indeterminate and therefore of many meanings. " Love is life " can be the saying of a poet who notes an impres sion with which his soul is agitated and marks it with fervour and solemnity; or it can be, equally, the logical affirmation of some one philo sophizing on the essence of life. " Clear, fresh, and sweet waters," when uttered by Petrarch, is an aesthetic proposition; but the same words become a logical judgment when, for example, they answer the question as to which is the most celebrated love song of Petrarch, or pseudo- logical when applied by a naturalist to the substance water. A word no longer has mean ing, or — what amounts to the same thing — has no definite meaning, when it is abstracted from i THE PURE CONCEPT 113 the circumstances, the implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with which it has been thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless, forget- fulness of this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is a word only on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be restored, has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to the logical nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the whole to which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less equivocal to adduce such poems as / Sepolcri, or the song A Silvia, as documents of aesthetic propositions, and philoso phical treatises (for examples, the Metaphysics or the Analytics] as documents of aesthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should need to add: "poetry considered as poetry," and "philosophy considered as philo sophy," since it is clear that a poem is prose in the soul of him who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul of a writer vibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of com position. Facts do not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when they are interpreted through the medium of philosophy; and then, too, they become mere examples, which aid in fixing the attention upon what is being demonstrated.
ii4 LOGIC PART ii4 LOGIC PART Surpassing of The relation between language and thought, the dualism of thought and conceived as we have conceived it, does not language.
admit the criticism that it creates an insuperable > dualism, though that criticism was justly aimed at those who set the two concepts side by side and parallel with one another. In that case the sole means that remained of obtaining unity was to present language as an acoustic fact and declare thought to be the unique psychic reality, and language the physical side of the psycho- physical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to repeat the blasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and poetry) is nothing but a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent to thought. We have in the two forms, notwith standing their clear distinction, not parallelism and dualism, but an organic relation of connection in distinction, — the first form being implied in the second, the second crystallized into the first,- precisely in conformity with that rhythmica movement of the concepts which we have already discussed. And thus, too, when asked if the prius of Logic be the concept or the judgment, we must reply that the judgment, understood as an aesthetic proposition, is certainly a prius but understood as a logical judgment, it is neither a prius nor a posterius in relation to i THE PURE CONCEPT 115 the concept, since it is the concept itself in its effectuality.
This pure expression of the concept, which is The logical judgment as the logical judgment, constitutes what is called definition. definitive judgment or definition. This, con sidered on its verbal side, or as the synthesis of thought and word, does not give rise to any special logical theory in addition to that which we have already stated, when definition showed itself to be one with distinction or conceptual thought; nor does it give rise to any special aesthetic doctrine, since the general doctrine expounded elsewhere includes this also. The dispute, as to whether the definition be verbal or real, finds its solution in the relation we have just established between thought and words; hence definition is verbal because it is real, and - vice versa. And as to the other meaning of the question, whether, that is to say, definition be nominal or real, conventional or corresponding with the truth, that finds its solution in the distinction between pseudoconcepts and concepts, the first of which, it is clear, are defined only in a nominalist or conventional way, because they are, in fact, nominalist and conventional.
Greater importance attaches to the other dispute, as to whether the definitive judgment be n6 LOGIC PART i"?h*hnn* analysaole mto subject, predicate, and copula, whether, for example, the definition: "the will is the practical form of the spirit," can be resolved in the terms: 'will (subject), practical form of the spirit " (predicate), and " is " (copula). Now, the difference between subject and predicate is here illusory, since predicate means the universal which is predicated of an individual, and here both the so-called subject and the so-called predicate are two universals, and the second, far from being more ample than the first, is the first itself. As to the "is," since the two distinct terms which should be copulated are wanting, ii is not a copula; nor has it even the value of a predicate, as in the case in which it is asserted oi an individual fact that it is, that is to say, that ii has really happened and is existing. The " is,' in the case of the definition, expresses nothing except simply the act of thought which thinks and what is thought is, in so far as it is thought if it were not, it would not be thought; and if it were not thought, it would not be. The concept gives the essence of things, and in the concept essence involves existence. That this proposition has sometimes been contested is due solely to the confusion between the essence, which is exist ence and therefore concept, and the existence THE PURE CONCEPT 117 which is not essence and therefore is representa tion. It is due therefore to the problem to which representations gave rise in this respect, and with which we shall deal further on. Freed from this confusion, the proposition is not contestable, and is the very basis of all logical thought, of which we have to examine the conceivability, or essence, that is, its internal necessity and coherence; and when this has been established, existence has also been established. If the concept of virtue be conceivable, virtue is; if the concept of God be conceivable, God is. To the most perfect con cept the perfection of existence cannot be wanting without being itself non-existent.
Yet it would seem that though the definition Alleged emptiness of affirms both essence and existence, and therefore the definition. the reality of the concept, it is, nevertheless, an empty form; for we have recognized that in every definition subject and predicate are the same, and it is therefore a tautological judgment. Certainly, the definition is tautological, but it is a sublime tautology, altogether different from the emptiness which is usually condemned in that expression. The tautology of the definition means that the concept is equal only to itself and cannot be resolved into another or explained by another. In the definition truth praesentia patet, and if the n8 LOGIC PART Goddess does not reveal herself by her simple presence, it is in vain that the priest will strive to discover her to the multitude by comparing her with what is inferior to her: with sensible things, which are particular manifestations of her. critique of the As in relation to the concept the definition is definition as definition as fixed verbal not to be held distinguishable, so in its expressive or verbal aspect it must not be understood as a formula separate from the basis of the discourse, as though it were the official garb of truth, the only worthy setting for that gem. Such a con ception of its nature has caused pedantry of definition, hatred of and consequent rebellion against definitions. That pedantry, however, like all pedantries, had some good in it; that is to say, it energetically affirmed the need for exactitude; and too frequently the rebellion, denying, like all rebellions, not only the evil but also whatever good there might be in the thing opposed, has, through its hatred of formulae, made exactitude of thought a negligible matter. But definition, taken verbally, is not a formula, a period or part of a book or discourse; it is the whole book or the whole discourse, from the first word to the last, including all that in it may seem accidental or superficial, including even the accent, the warmth, the emphasis, and the gesture THE PURE CONCEPT 119 of the living word, the notes, the parentheses, the full stops, and commas of the writing. Nor can we indicate a special literary form of definition, such as the treatise or system or manual, because the definition or concept is given alike in opuscules and in dialogues, in prose and in verse, in satire and in lyric, in comedy and in tragedy. To define, from the verbal point of view, means to express the concept; and all the expressions of the concept are definitions. This might trouble rhetoricians desirous of devoting a special chapter to the form of scientific treatment; but it does not trouble good sense, which quickly recognizes that the thing is just so, and that an epigram may give that precise and efficacious definition in which the ample scholastic volume of a professor sometimes fails, although full of pretence in this respect.
II THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM, THE SYLLOGISM identity of THE definition not only is not a formula separable definition, and syllogism. or distinguishable from the thread of the discourse, but it cannot even be separated or distinguished from the ratiocinative forms or forms of demon stration, as is implied in the custom of logicians, who make the doctrine of the definition or of the systematic forms, as they usually call them, follow that of the forms of demonstration. They ingenuously imagine that thought, after having had a rough-and-tumble with its 'adversaries, and after having proclaimed, shouted, and finally vindicated its own right, mounts the rostrum and henceforth calm and sure of itself begins to define. But, in reality, to think is to combat continuously without any repose; and at every moment of that battle there is always peace and security; and definition is indistinguishable from demonstration, because it is found at PART THE PURE CONCEPT 121 every instant of the demonstration and coincides with it. Definition and Syllogism are the same thing.
The syllogism, indeed, is nothing but a connection of concepts and connection of concepts; and although it has thought of the concept.
been disputed as to whether it must be con sidered so, or rather as a connection of logical propositions or judgments, the dispute is at once solved, so far as we are concerned, by observing that precisely because the syllogism is a con nection of concepts, and concepts only exist in verbal forms, that is to say, in propositions or judgments, the syllogism is also a connection of judgments. This serves to reinforce the truth that if the effective presence of the verbal form must always be recognized in the logical fact, it must, on the other hand, be forgotten when Logic is being constructed and the nature of Logic and of the concept is being sought. Now, the connection of the concepts represents nothing new in relation to the thinking of the concept. As has already been seen, to think the concept signifies to think it in its distinctions, to place it in relation with the other concepts and to unify it with them in the unique concept. A concept thought outside its relations is in distinct, that is to say, not thought at all.
122 LOGIC PART 122 LOGIC PART Therefore, the connection of the concepts, or syllogizing, cannot be conceived as a new and more complex logical act. To syllogize and to think are synonymous; although, in the ordinary use of language, the term "to syllogize" throws into special relief the verbal aspect of thinking, and, more exactly, the dynamic character of verbal exposition, which is indeed the very character of this exposition, for it is with difficulty, or only empirically, that it can be distinguished into static and dynamic, definition and demonstration. identity of But if the syllogism be thus identified with of syllogism, the concept itself, it may nevertheless seem that it must be distinguished from the judgment of definition seeing that the syllogism is a form of logical thought, and consequently of verbal expression, quite distinct from and incapable of being confounded with any other: a con nection of three judgments, two of which are called premisses and the third conclusion, closely cemented by the syllogistic force, which is placed in the middle term. This character of triplicity seems ineradicable and peculiar to the syllogism in contrast with the judgment.
Some question, however, must be raised concerning this characteristic because of another THE PURE CONCEPT 123 characteristic universally recognized in the syllogism; namely, that the premisses' are con clusions of other syllogisms, just as the conclusion becomes, in its turn, a premiss. This being so, it might be said with greater truth that the syllogism is to syllogize or to think; and since this is infinite, so the propositions of which it consists are also infinite. On the other hand, there is no judgment which is not a syllogism, since it is clear that he who affirms a judgment affirms it by some reasoning or syllogism, present and active in his spirit, though more or less understood in the words. And are not other propositions understood in the syllogisms which are properly so-called, not only in the forms, which are called abbreviated (immediate in ferences, enthymemes, etc.), but also in all the other forms; since it is admitted that every syllogism, as has just been observed, presupposes other preceding syllogisms, indeed an infinity of others? It will be replied that at the end of the chain there must yet be found the difference between judgment and syllogism, or two first judgments, which are not produced by syllogism, and form the columns, upon which the structure of the first conclusion rests. But such an answer (if it do not imply simply the strange fancy 124 LOGIC PART 124 LOGIC PART that thought has a beginning and therefore also an end in time) will mean that judgment and syllogism are distinct in intrinsic character, which makes the one the necessary condition of the other. Now, this intrinsic distinctive character is precisely what cannot be found, because it does not exist; and if it be not in every link, it is vain to seek it at the beginning of the chain. The middle Certainly, that venatio medii, that ergo, that nature of the unification of tnplicity, are things ot much importconcept.
ance. But whence comes their importance if not from being the expression of the synthetic force of thought, of thought which unifies and dis tinguishes, and distinguishes because it unifies and unifies because it distinguishes? And is triplicity truly tnplicity, one, two, three, arith metically enumerable? But if this be so, how is it that we never succeed in counting those three, resolving each one of them into a series of similar terms, or of other propositions and concepts? Upon attentive consideration we perceive that here, too, the number three is symbolical, and that it does no more than designate the distinction, which unifies or thinks the singular concept in the universal through the particular, or determines the universal THE PURE CONCEPT 125 through the particular, by making it a singular concept, whence it remains perfectly certain that the relation of these three determinations is not numerical. Such a logical operation, not being anything special, but simply logical reason ing itself, is of necessity found also in the judgment.
A possible objection at this point is that even Pretended non-definitive if the unity of judgment and syllogism can be logical judgments.
held to be demonstrated as regards definitions and syllogisms which are the basis of definitions, yet it has not been demonstrated for the other forms of syllogisms and logical judgments, which are not definitive. But if these judgments and syllogisms be logical, they cannot fail to be definitive, or to have for their content affirmations of concepts. " All men are mortal " is a definition of the concept of man, whose mortality is verbally emphasized or his immortality denied. It is without doubt an incomplete definition, because it is torn from the web of thoughts and of speech of which it formed part; and this web will also always be incomplete or capable of infinite completion by means of new affirmations and new negations. But in its incompleteness it is at the same time also complete, because it affirms a concept of reality, of life and death, i26 LOGIC PART i26 LOGIC PART of finite and infinite, of spirituality and of its forms, and so on; these are all presupposed determinations, and therefore existing and operating in the concepts of man and mortality. "Caius is a man" (which is the second premiss of the syllogism traditionally adduced as an example) is certainly not a definition (though it presupposes and contains many definitions) precisely for the reason that it is not a pure logical judgment. Hence it happens that the conclusion itself: "therefore Caius is mortal," is more than a pure logical conclusion, since it also contains a historical element, the person of Caius. But we shall speak further on of these individual or historical judgments; and then we shall also see in what relation they stand to the universal or pure logical judgments, and if it be truly possible to distinguish between them, otherwise than for the sake of convenience. The distinction is in any case convenient and does no harm at this point; and therefore for didactic reasons we allow it to stand; indeed we make use of it. The syllogism Just as in the case of definitions, so also in the as fixed verbal..
form, its use case ot the syllogism, it is to be noted that the and abuse.
verbal expression does not consist of an obligatory formula, but assumes the most varied forms, THE PURE CONCEPT 127 apparently very remote from syllogizing as commonly understood. The abuse of the syllo gism as a formula continued for centuries, notably in mediaeval Scholasticism, and notwithstanding the rebellion of the Renaissance, it has persisted among many philosophical schools, its last con spicuous manifestation being the didactic elabora tion of the Leibnitzian philosophy, or Wolffianism. Certain of Wolffs demonstrations have remained famous, such as that concerning the construction of windows, contained in his Manual of Architecture. Here, having first of all established the theorem: " A window must be large enough for two persons to lean against it, side by side," he developed it in this way: "Demonstration. It is customary to lean against a window with another person in order to look out. But the architect must serve the interests of his employer in everything. Therefore he must make the window large enough for two persons to be able to be there side by No more such syllogistic pedantries have been seen in our times, but (as has been already remarked in reference to pedantry of definition) contempt for the formula has too often resulted in contempt even for the correctness of the reasoning. So 1 Mentioned in Hegel, Wiss. d. LogitP, iii. 370 n.
128 LOGIC PART that it has sometimes been necessary to advise a bracing bath of scholasticism, and it has been observed and lamented of certain new civilizations (for example, of Russian culture, or of the Japanese people, who are so little addicted to mathematics), that they have not had a scholastic period, like that of the West, so general with them is the habit of incorrect, loose, and passionately impulsive and fantastic reasoning. Certainly the formula, the exercise of disputation in forma, the logica scholastic a utens has its merits; and we must know how to have recourse to it when it is advantageous to do so, and to express thought in the brief and perspicuous formulae of the syllogism, of the sorites, or of the dilemma. From this point of view the new methods of mathematical Logic or Logistic, upon which some are now working, and even the logical machines which have been constructed, would help; they would help — if they helped. For the point is just this: when formulae, methods of demonstration, machines and the like, are recommended, ex pedients and instruments of practical or economic use are thereby proposed; and these cannot make good their existence otherwise than by getting themselves accepted for the utility — the saving of time and space, and so of fatigue, which they i. THE PURE CONCEPT 129 effect. Like all technical inventions, those pro ducts must be brought to the market; and the market alone decides upon their value and assigns to them their price. At the present time, it seems that logistic methods have no value and price, save for certain narrow circles of people, who amuse themselves with them in their own way and so pass the time.
Certain erroneous doctrines take their origin Erroneous separation of from the undue separation of demonstration and truth and reason of truth definition, conspicuously that particular error which in the pure places a difference of degree between truth and reason of truth, and consequently admits that a truth can be known without its reason being known. But a truth, of which the reason is not known, is not even truth; or it is truth only in preparation and in hypothesis. We hear much about the intuition with which men of genius are equipped, and which enables them to go straight to the truth, even when they are not capable of demonstrating it. But this intuition, when it is not that truth in preparation, or that orientation towards a truth still quite hypothetical, must of necessity be thought and thus also be demonstration of truth; it must be truth and also reason of truth; thought and reasoning performed no doubt with lightning rapidity, which is expressed in brief propositions K I3O LOGIC PART and needs going over again and rethinking, in order that it may afford a more ample and, from the didactic point of view, a more persuasive, exposition; but it is always thought and reasoning. Things are still worse, when not only is a diversity of degree admitted, but the complete in difference of demonstration to truth is proclaimed, so that many or infinite possible demonstrations of one identical truth would be possible. If by this it were meant merely that one identical truth, or one identical concept, can assume infinite verbal or expressive forms, and if demonstration were understood as " exposition " or " expression," there would be nothing to object. But if by demonstration be meant something truly logical, that which is properly called by that name in Logic, this thesis leads directly to the negation of truth, making the demonstration of truth, or truth itself, an illusion, a sophistical appearance created simply to persuade. Those acquainted with courts of law know that very often when a magistrate has made his decision and pronounced sentence he deputes to a younger colleague the task of " reasoning " it, or of providing an appear ance of reasoning to what is indeed not a logical product, but simply the voluntas of a certain provision. But though this procedure be intel- THE PURE CONCEPT 131 ligible and useful when it occurs in the field of practice and of law, it cannot be admitted in the theoretical field, where it would be the ruin of thought and indirectly of the will itself.
Naturally, all that has been said as to the Difference between truth definition and the syllogism has reference to and reason of truth in the the true and proper concept, or the pure con- cept. In the case of pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter, definition is a simple command (a nominalist definition), and demon stration has no place, save for those of its elements that are derived from the pure con cept: given the definitions, the reasoning must logically proceed in a determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts, then, definitions are separate from demonstrations: the first do not spring from the second and are not all one with them; the second presuppose the first and do not produce them. Of these definitions infinite demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality none is possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and when a demonstra tion is given, this is done only pro forma; it is a deception, to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical reasoning employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that the definitions employed in those demonstrations 132 LOGIC PARTI 132 LOGIC PARTI seem to be obtained by means of an act of faith in the irrational; and here faith signifies, not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a virtue of necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such. — For the rest, \ pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the verbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various ways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be called the literary form of logical char acter. The style of the Civil Code, which aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal style of laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like barbaric times the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of the word, concepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way that it is vain to seek there for distinction among them.
Ill CRITIQUE OF FORMALIST LOGIC FROM the fact that in the verbal form all dis- intrinsic impossibility tinctions (pure concepts, and empirical and of formal Logic.
abstract concepts, distinct concepts and opposite concepts) are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all identities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration, appear differenti ated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce the impossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an analysis of the verbal form. The condemnation of all formal Logic is thus pro nounced.
This Logic has been variously called Aristo- its nature. telian, peripatetic, scholastic, after its authors and historical representatives; syllogistic, from the doctrine that forms its principal content; formal, from its pretensions to philosophic purity; empirical, by those who tried to drive it back to its place; and although this last name is correct, it would be better to call it formal, 134 LOGIC PART