BOETHIUS THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES AND THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII V.C. ET INI.. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII AD Q. AVRELIVM MEMMIVM SYMMACHVM V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. ATQVE PATRICIVM SOCERVJU INVESTIGATAM diutissime quaestionern, quantum nos- trae mentis igniculum lux diuina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam offerendam uobis communicandamque curaui tarn uestri cupidus iudicii 6 quam nostri studiosus inuenti. Qua in re quid mini sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata comnieiido, turn ex ipsa materiae difficultate turn ex eo quod raris id est uobis tantum conloquor, intellegi potest. Neque enim famae iactatione et inanibus uulgi clamoribus THE TRINITY IS ONE GOD NOT THREE GODS A TREATISE BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN TO HIS FATHER-IN-LAW, QUINTUS AURELIUS MEMMIUS SYMMACHUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN I HAVE long pondered this problem with such mind as I have and all the light that God has lent me. Now, having set it forth in logical order and cast it into literary form, I venture to submit it to your judgment, for which I care as much as for the results of my own research. You will readily understand what I feel whenever I try to write down what I think if you consider the difficulty of the topic and the fact that I discuss it only with the few — I may say with no one but yourself. It is indeed no desire for fame or empty popular applause that prompts my 3 BOETHII 10 excitamur; sed si quis est fructus exterior, hie non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Quocumque igitur a uobis deieci oculos, partim ignaua segnities partim callidus liuor occurrit, ut contume- liam uideatur diuinis tractatibus inFogare qui talibus 15 hominum monstris non agnoscenda haec potius quam proculcanda proiecerit. Idcirco stilum breuitate con- traho et ex intimis suinpta philosophiae disciplinis nouorum uerborum significationibus uelo, ut haec mihi tantum uobisque, si quando ad ea conuertitis 20 oculos, conloquantur; ceteros uero ita submouimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiuerint ad ea etiam legenda uideantur indigni. Sane l tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae rationis intuitus ad diuini- tatis ualet celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris quoque 25 artibus idem quasi quidam finis est constitutus, quous- que potest uia rationis accedere. Neque enim medi- cina aegris semper affert salutem; sed nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat omiserit. Idemque in ceteris. At quantum haec difficilior 30 quaestio est, tarn facilior esse debet ad ueniam. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos uenientia fructus extulerint. Ac de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium.
I.
Christianae religionis reuerentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter uniuersalium praecepta regularum, quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, turn 1 sed ne codices optimi.
a Cf. the discussion of human ratio and divine intellegentia in Cons. v. pr. 4 and 5.
4 DE TRINITATE pen; if there be any external reward, we may not look for more warmth in the verdict than the subject itself arouses. For, apart from yourself, wherever I turn my eyes, they fall on either the apathy of the dullard or the jealousy of the shrewd, and a man who casts his thoughts before the common herd — I will not say to consider but to trample under foot, would seem to bring discredit on the study of divinity. So I purposely use brevity and wrap up the ideas I draw from the deep questionings of philosophy in new and unaccustomed words which speak only to you and to myself, that is, if you deign to look at them. The rest of the world I simply disregard: they cannot understand, and therefore do not deserve to read. We should not of course press our inquiry further than man's wit and reason are allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge." In all the liberal arts we see the same limit set beyond which reason may not reach. Medicine, for instance, does not always bring health to the sick, though the doctor will not be to blame if he has left nothing undone which he ought to do. So with the other arts. In the present case the very difficulty of the quest claims a lenient judgment. You must however examine whether the seeds sown in my mind by St. Augustine's writings b have borne fruit. And now let us begin our inquiry.
I.
There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian religion; but that form of faith is valid and only valid which, both on account of the universal character of the rules and doctrines affirm ing its authority, and because the worship in which * e.y. Aug. De Triu.
5 BOETHII 5 propterea, quod eius cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanauit, catholica uel uniuersalis uocatur. Cuius haec de trinitatis imitate sententia est: " Pater," inquiunt, "deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus." Igitur pater filius spiritus sanctus unus non tres dii.
10 Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. Eos enini differentia comitatur qui uel augent uel minuunt, ut Arriani qui gradibus meritorum trinitatem uariantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem diducunt. Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem 15 enim nee pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. Trium namque rerum uel quotlibet turn genere turn specie turn numero diuersitas constat; quotiens enim idem dicitur, totiens diuersum etiam praedicatur. Idem uero dicitur tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo '20 quod equus, quia his idem genus ut animal; uel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo; uel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diuersum etiam uel genere uel specie uel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam 25 accidentium uarietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed suis accideiitibus distant; nam uel si ammo cuncta ab his accidentia separemus, tamen locus cunctis diuersus est quern unum fingere nullo modo possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum 30 non obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt.
" The terras differentia, numerus, species, are used expertly, as would be expected of the author of the In Isag. Porph. Commenta. See S. Brandt's edition of that work (in the Vienna Corpus, 1906), s.v. differentia, etc.
6 This method of mental abstraction is employed more elaborately in Tr. iii. (vide infra, p. 44) and in Cons. v. pr. 4, where the notion of divine foreknowledge is abstracted in imagination.
DE TRINITATE they are expressed has spread throughout the world, is called catholic or universal. The belief of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows: the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods. The prin ciple of this union is absence of difference a: differ ence cannot be avoided by those who add to or take from the Unity,, as for instance the Arians, who, by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and convert it to Plurality. For the essence of plurality is otherness; apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. In fact, the difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or number. Difference is the necessary correlative of sameness. Sameness is predicated in three ways: By genus: e.g. a man and a horse, because of their common genus, animal. By species; e.g. Cato and Cicero, because of their common species, man. By number; e.g. Tully and Cicero, because they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by genus, species, and number. Now numerical difference is caused by variety of accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their acci dents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents,6 still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number.
BOETHII II.
Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut Intel- legi atque capi potest dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum uidetur, eruditi est hominis unum quodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare.
Nam cum tres sint speculatiuae partes, naturalis, in motu inabstracta dvuTre^cuperos (considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, 10 habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta), mathe- matica, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), tkeo/ogica, sine motu abstracta 15 atque separabilis (nain dei substantia et materia et motu caret), in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinaliter, in diuinis intellectualiter uersari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginatioiies, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae uere forma 20 neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum formam qua in eo insignita est effigies 6 Cf. the similar division of philosophy in hag. Porph. ed. Brandt, pp. 7 ff.
c Sb. though they may be separated in thought.
8 DE TRINITATE II.
We will now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far as they can be grasped and under stood; for it has been wisely said,a in my opinion, that it is a scholar's duty to formulate his belief about any thing according to its real nature.
Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds6: Physics, Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract or separable (i.e. avvTre^cuperos); for it is concerned with the forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms cannot be separated in reality from their bodies.0 As the bodies are in motion — the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending upwards, forrn_takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it is annexed.
Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be really separated from bodies.
Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion. In Physics, then, we are bound to use scientific, in Mathematics, systematical, in Theology, intellectual concepts; and in Theology we will not let ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will simply apprehend that Form which is pure form and no image, which is very Being and the source of Being. For everything owes its" "being' lu Form. """Thus a statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but on account of the form whereby the likeness of 9 BOETHI1 animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes lion secundum terram 25 quod est eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figu- ram. Terra quoque ipsa non secundum O.TTOIOV vXrjv dicitur, sed secundum siccitatem grauitatemque quae sunt formae. Nihil igitur secundum materiam esse dicitur sed secundum propriam formam. Sed diuina 30 substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt. Vnum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc uel hoc singulari- 35 ter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corpore- que, corpus et anima est, non uel corpus uel anima in partem; igitur non est id quocj est. Quod uero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed taritum est hoc, illud uere est id quod est; et est pulcherrimum fortissimumquc 40 quia nullo nititur. Quocirca hoc uere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma enim est, formae uero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae subiectae accidentibus sunt 45 ut hurnanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim materia subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accia "ATTOLOS v\ri = TO &/j.op4>ov, rb deidh of Aristotle. Cf. afire yap CXij rb elSos (17 /j,ev &TTOIOS, rb dt TTO^TTJS ns) odre t£ CXTjs (Alexander Aphrod. De Anima, 17. 17); el 8t TOVTO, S.TTOIOS dt i) i!i\T), &WOLOV cu> ti-rj crw/xa (id. D« anima libri mantissa, 124. 7).
6 This is Realism. Cf. " Sed si rerum ueritatem atque integritatem perpendas, non est dubium quin uerae sint. Nam cum res omnes quae uerae sunt sine his quinque (i.e. genus species differentia propria accidentia) esse non possint, has ipsas quinque res uere intellectas esse non dubites." Isag., Porph. ed. pr. i. (M. P.L. Ixiv. col. 19, Brandt, pp. 26 ff.). The two passages show that Boethius is definitely committed to the Realistic position, although in 10 DE TRINITATE a living thing is impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the Dearth which is its matter, but because of its 'fovmj Likewise earth is not earth by reason of unqualified matter/ but by reason of drvness and weight, which are forms, ho nothing is said to be because it has matter, but because it 1ms a'distnTcti^form. But the Divine Substance is Form without matter, and is therefor* One and is its own essence. But other things are not simply their own essences/ for each thing has its bein«- from the things of which it is composed, that is, from its parts. It is This and That, i.e. it fc the totality of its parts in conjunction; it is not 1ms or That taken apart. Earthly man, for instance smce lie consists of soul and body, is soul and body, not soul or body, separately; therefore he is not his own essence That on the other hand which does not consist of This and That, but is only This, is really its owiTessence, and is altogether beautiful and stable because it is not grounded in anything. Wherefore that is truly One in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its own essence. Nor can it become the substrate of anything, tor it is pure FoSnTanaTpure iTorms caifriot be substrates.6 For if humanity, like other forms, is a substrate tor accidents, it does not receive accidents through the fact that it exists, but through the fact that matter is subjected to it. Humanity appears indeed appropriate the accident which in reality belongs tc his Comment, in Porphyr. a se translatum he holds the sc^ between Plato and Aristotle, •• quorum diiudicare sententias aptura esse non duxi » (cp. Haureau llvt. de la P^osophie scolastique, i. 120). As a fact in the Commit. «*!o,f>h he merely postpones the question, which in the J)e inn. he settles. Boethius was ridiculed in the Middle Ages for his caution.
BOETHII dens, ipsa hoc suscipere uidetur humanitas. Forma uero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum 50 nee uero inesse materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae uenerunt quae sunt in materia et corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in corporibus aunt abutimur formas uocantes, dum imagines sint.
55 Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in materia constitutae. Nulla igitur in eo diuersitas, iiulla ex diuersitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitude atque idcirco nee numerus.
III.
Deus uero a deo nullo differt, ne uel accidentibus uel substantialibus difFerentiis in subiecto positis dis tent. Vbi uero nulla est differentia, nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nee numerus; igitur unitas tantum. 5 Nam quod tertio repetitur deus, cum pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae sunt, si aduertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum. Illic enim unitatum repetitio numerum 10 facit. In eo an tern numero qui in rebus numerabili- bus constat, repetitio unitatum atque pluralitas minime facit numerabilium rerum numerosam diuersitatem. Numerus enim duplex est, unus quidem quo numera- mus, alter uero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat.
15 Etenim unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus. 12 DE TRINITATE the matter underlying the conception Humanity. But Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a reflexion. For from those forms which are outside matter come the forms which are in matter and produce bodies. We misname the entities that reside in bodies when we call them forms; they are mere images; they only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter. In Him, then, is no differ ence, no plurality arising out of difference, no multi plicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number.
Ill, Ill, Now God differs from God in no respect, for there cannot be divine essences distinguished either by accidents or by substantial differences belonging to a substrate. But where there is no difference, there is no sort of plurality and accordingly no number; here, therefore, is unity alone. For whereas we say God thrice when we name the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, these three unities do not produce a plurality of number in their own essences, if we think of what we count instead of what we count with. For in the case of abstract number a repeti tion of single items does produce plurality; but in the case of concrete number the repetition and plural use of single items does not by any means produce numerical difference in the objects counted. There are as a fact two kinds of number. There is the number with which we count (abstract) and the number inherent in the things counted (concrete). " One is a thing — the thing counted. Unity is 13 BOETHII Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines uel lapides; dualitas nihil, sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines uel duo lapides fiunt. Et in ceteris eodem modo. Ergo in numero quo numeramus repetitio unitatum 20 facit pluralitatem; in rerum uero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio, uel si de eodem dicam "gladius unus mucro unus ensis unus." Potest enim unus tot uocabulis gladius agnosci; haec enim unitatum iteratio potius est non nume- 25 ratio, uelut si ita dicamus "ensis mucro gladius," repetitio quaedani est eiusdem non numeratio diuer- sorum, uelut si dicam "sol sol sol," non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno totiens praedicauerim.
Non igitur si de patre ac filio et spiritu sancto 30 tertio praedicatur deus, idcirco trina praedicatio numerum facit. Hoc enim illis ut dictum est imminet qui inter eos distantiam faciunt meritorum. Catholicis uero nihil in differentia constituentibus ipsamque formam ut est esse ponentibus neque aliud 35 esse quam est ipsum quod est opinantibus recte repetitio de eodem quam enurneratio diuersi uidetur esse cum dicitur "deus pater deus filius deus spiritus sanctus atque haec trinitas unus deus," uelut " ensis atque mucro unus gladius," uelut " sol sol sol 40 unus sol."
40 unus sol."
Sed hoc interim ad earn dictum sit significationem demonstrationemque qua ostenditur non omnem uni tatum repetitionem numerum pluralitatemque per- ficere. Non uero ita dicitur " pater ac filius et spiritus 46 sanctus" quasi multiuocum quiddam; nam mucro et a e.g. if I say " one, one, one," I enounce three unities.
* The same words are used to illustrate the same matter in the Comment, in Arist. irepi tpMyelas, 2nd ed. (Meiser) 56. 19.
14 DE TRINITATE that by which oneness is denoted. Again "two" belongs to the class of things as men or stones; but not so duality; duality is merely that whereby two ' men or two stones are denoted; and so on. There fore a repetition of unities a produces plurality when it is a question of abstract, but not when it is a question of concrete things, as, for example, if I say of one and the same thing, "one sword, one brand, one blade." b It is easy to see that each of these names denotes a sword; * I am not numbering unities but simply repeating one thing, and in saying "sword, brand, blade," I reiterate the one thing and do not enumerate several different things any more than I produce three suns instead of merely mentioning one thing thrice when 1 say " Sun, Sun, Sun."
So then if God be predicated thrice of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the threefold predication does not result in plural number. The risk of that, as has been said, attends only on those who distinguish Them according to merit. But Catholic Christians, allowing no difference of merit in God, assuming Him to be Pure Form and believing Him to be nothing else than His own essence, rightly regard the statement " the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and this Trinity is one God," not as an enumeration of different things but as a reiteration of one and the same thing, like the state ment, "blade and brand are one sword" or "sun, sun, and sun are one sun."
Let this be enough for the present to establish my meaning and to show that not every repetition of units produces number and plurality. Still in saying "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," we are ^ not using synonymous terms. "Brand and blade" are the BOETHI1 ensis et ipse est et idem, pater uero ac filius et spiritus sanctus idem equidem est, non uero ipse. In qua re paulisper considerandum est. Requirentibus enim: "Ipse est pater qui filius?" " Minime," inquiunt.
50 Rursus: "Idem alter qui alter?" Negatur. Non est igitur inter eos in re omni indifferentia; quare subintrat numerus quern ex subiectorum diuersitate confici superius explanatum est. De qua re breuiter considerabimus, si prius illud, quem ad modum de 65 deo unum quodque praedicatur, praemiserimus.
IV.
Decem omnino praedicamenta traduntur quae de rebus omnibus uniuersaliter praedicantur, id est sub stantia, qualitas, quantitas, ad aliquid, ubi, quando, habere, situm esse, facere, pati. Haec igitur talia 5 sunt qualia subiecta permiserint; nam pars eorum in reliquarum rerum praedicatione substantia est, pars in accidentium numero est. At haec cum quis in diuinam uerterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur quae praedicari possunt. Ad aliquid uero omnino 10 non potest praedicari, nam substantia in illo non est uere substantia sed ultra substantiam; item qualitas et cetera quae uenire queunt. Quorum ut amplior fiat intellectus exempla subdenda sunt.
Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem 15 significare uidemur, sed earn quae sit ultra sub stantiam; cum uero " iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non accidentem, sed earn quae sit substantia sed 16 DE Till NIT ATE same and identical, but "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," though the same, are not identical. This point deserves a moment's consideration. When they ask, "Is the Father the same as the Son?" Catholics answer "No." "Is the One the same as the Other?' The answer is in the negative. There is not, there fore, complete indifference between Them; and so number does come in— number which we explained was the result of diversity of substrates. We will briefly debate this point when we have done examin ing how particular predicates can be applied to God.
IV.
IV.
There are in all ten categories which can be uni versally predicated of things, namely, Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time, Condition, Situation, Activity, Passivity. Their meaning is determined by the contingent subject; for some of them denote substance in making predication ot other things, others belong to the class of acci dents. But when these categories are applied God thev change their meaning entirely. Relation, for instance cannot be predicated at all ot God; for substance in Him is not really substantial but super substantial. So with quality and the other possible attributes, of which we must add examples for the sake of clearness.
When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, " He is just," we mention a quality, not an accidental quality-rather a substantial and, B BOETHII ultra substantiam. Neque enim aliud est quod est, aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse deo quod 20 iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus uel maximus," quantitatem quidem significare uidemur, sed earn quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno. De forma enim eius superius monstratum 25 est quoniam is sit forma et unum uere nee ulla pluralitas. Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse faciant quod dicitur, diuise quidem in ceteris, in deo uero coniuncte atque copulate hoc modo: nam cum dicimus " substantia " (ut homo uel 30 deus), ita dicitur quasi illud de quo praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia homo uel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non integre ipsum homo est ac per hoc nee substantia; quod enim est, aliis debet quae non sunt homo. Deus uero hoc ipsum deus est; 85 nihil enim aliud est nisi quod est, ac per hoc ipsum deus est. Rursus " iustus," quod est qualitas, ita dicitur quasi ipse hoc sit de quo praedicatur, id est si dicamus "homo iustus uel deus iustus," ipsum hominem uel deum iustos esse proponimus; sed 40 differt, quod homo alter alter iustus, deus uero idem ipsum est quod est iustum. "Magnus" etiam homo uel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus uel deus magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus uero ipsum magnus exsistit. Reliqua uero neque de 45 deo neque de ceteris praedicantur. Nam ubi uel de a Gilbert de la Porree in his commentary on the De Trin. makes Boethius's meaning clear. "Quod igitur in illo substantiam nominamus, non est subiectionis ratione quod dicitur, sed ultra omnem quae accidentibus est subiecta substantiam est essentia, absque omnibus quae possunt accidere solitaria omnino." (Migne, P.L. Ixiv. 1283). Cf. Aug. De Trin. vii. 10.
18 DE TRINITATF.
in fact, a supersubstantial quality.* For God is not one thing because He is, and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God are one and the same. So when we say, " He is great or the greatest/' we seem to predicate quantity, but it is a quantity similar to this substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to be great and to be God are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The categories \ve have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to which they are applied the character which they express; in created things they express divided being, in God, conjoined and united being — in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or God, it seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance itself, as man or God is sub stance. But there is a difference: since a man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man. But God is simply and entirely God, for He is nothing else than what He is, and therefore is, through simple existence, God.
Again we apply just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that is, if we say "a just man or just God," we assert that man or God is just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is another thing. But God is justice itself. So a man or God is said to be great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that God is substantially great. But man is merely great; God is greatness.