140 " Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit." "Sed deum ueramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus." " Ita," inquam. "Secure igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nee usquam alio sitam esse substantiam.
X.
Hue omnes pariter uenite capti Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis a For the discussion on the nature of good in this poem and the next piece of prose cf. supra, pp. 38 ff.
274 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
behind." "It is manifest that the rest are to be referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, be cause it is esteemed good, and likewise prnver, because that likewise is thought to be good. And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore goodness is the sum and cause of all that ij3_desired. For that which is neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means be sought after. And contrariwise those things which are not good of their own nature, yet, if they seem such, are desired as if they were truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all 'that is sought after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one would ride for his health, lie doth not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and the self-same substance." " I see not how any man can dissent." " But we have showed that God and true blessedness are one and the self-same thing." "It is so," quoth I. "We may then securely con clude that the substance of God consisteth in nothing else but in goodness.
X.<* Come hither, all you that are bound, Whose base and earthly minds are drowned 275 BOETHII Terrenas habitans libido mentes, Haec erit uobis requies laborum, 6 Hie portus placida manens quiete, Hoc patens unum miseris asylum, Non quidquid Tagus aureis harenis Donat aut Hermus rutilante ripa Aut Indus calido propinquus orbi 10 Candidis miscens uirides lapillos, Inlustrent aciem magisque caecos In suas condunt aninios tenebras. Hoc quidquid placet excitatque mentes, Infimis tellus aluit cauernis; 15 Splendor quo regitur uigetque caelum, Vitat obscuras animae ruinas. Hanc quisquis potent notare lucein, Candidos Phoebi radios negabit."
XI, " Assentior/'inquam,"cuncta enirn firmissimis nexa rationibus constant." Turn ilia, " Quanti/' inquit, " aestimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit agnoueris? " " Infinite/' inquam, " si quidem mihi pariter deum 5 quoque qui bonum est continget agnoscere." " Atqui hoc uerissima/' inquit, " ration e patefaciam, maneant modo quae paulo ante conclusa sunt." " Manebunt." " Nonne/' inquit, " monstrauimus ea quae appetuntur pluribus idcirco uera perfectaque bona non esse 10 quoniam a se inuicem discreparent cumque alteri abesset alterum, plenum absolutumque bonum afferre non posse? Turn autem uerum bonum fieri cum in unam ueluti formam atque efficientiam colliguntur, " Literally, " Nor Indus, neighbour of the torrid zone, blending its green and white pebbles."
* Literally, " The light which gives guidance and vigour to the sky shuns the darkness of ruined minds."
276 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
By lust which doth them tie in cruel chains: Here is a seat for men opprest, Here is a port of pleasant rest; Here may a wretch have refuge from his pains. No gold,, which Tagus' sands bestow, Nor which 011 Hermus' banks doth flow, Nor precious stones which scorched Indians get,"* Can clear the sharpness of the mind, But rather make it far more blind, And in the farther depth of darkness set. For this that sets our souls on work Buried in caves of earth doth lurk.
But heaven is guided by another light, Which causeth us to shun the dark,6 And who this light doth truly mark, Must needs deny that Phoebus' beams are bright.'
XI.
" I consent," quoth I, " for all is grounded upon most firm reasons." " But what account wilt thou make," quoth she, "to know what goodness itself is? " " I will esteem it infinitely," quoth I, "because by this means I shall come to know God also, who is nothing else but goodness." " I will conclude this," quoth she, " most certainly, if those things be not denied which I have already proved." "They shall not," quoth I. " Have we not proved," quoth she, " that those things which are desired of many, are not true and perfect goods, because they differ one from another and, being separated, cannot cause complete and absolute goodness, which is only found when they are united as it were into one form and 277 BOETHII ut quae sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, 15 claritas atque iucunditas, nisi uero unum atque idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter expetenda nume- rentur? " " Demonstratum," inquam "nee dubitari ullo modo potest." "Quae igitur cum discrepant minime bona sunt, cum uero unum esse coeperint, 20 bona fiunt; nonne haec ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adeptione contingit?" "Ita," inquam, " uidetur." " Sed omne quod bonum est boni participatione bonum esse concedis an minime? " " Ita est." " Oportet igitur idem esse unum atque bonum simili 25 ratione concedas; eadem namque substantia est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus." " Negare," inquam, "nequeo." " Nostine igitur," inquit, " omne quod est tarn diu manere atque sub- sistere quam diu sit unum, sed interire atque dissolui 30 pariter atque unum destiterit? " " Quonam modo? " " Vt in animalibus," inquit, " cum in unum coeunt ac permanent anima corpusque, id animal uocatur; cum uero haec unitas utriusque separatione dissol- uitur, interire nee iam esse animal liquet. Ipsum 35 quoque corpus cum in una forma membrorum con- iunctione permanet, humana uisitur species; at si distributae segregataeque partes corporis distraxerint unitatem, desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoque modo percurrenti cetera procul dubio patebit subsistere 40 unumquodque, dum unum est, cum uero unum esse desinit, interire." " Consideranti,'' inquam, "mihi plura minime aliud uidetur." " Estne igitur," inquit, " quod in quantum naturaliter agat relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad interitum corruptionemque 45 desideret? " "Si animalia," inquam, " considerem 278 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
causality, that the same may be sufficiency, power, respect, fame, and pleasure? And except they be all one and the same thing, that they have nothing worth the desiring? " " It hath been proved," quoth I, "neither can it be any way doubted of." " Those things, then, which, when they differ, are not good and when they are one, become good, are they not made good by obtaining unity?" "So methink," quoth I. " But dost thou grant that all that is good is good by partaking goodness? " " It is so." "Thou must grant then likewise that unity and goodness are the same. For those things have the same substance, which naturally have not diverse effects." " I cannot deny it," quoth I. " Knowest thou then/' quoth she, "that everything that is doth so long remain and subsist as it is one, and perisheth and is dissolved so soon as it ceaseth to be one?" "How?" "As in living creatures," (moth she, " so long as the body and soul remain united, the living creature remaineth. But when this unity is dissolved by their separation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is no longer a living creature The body also itself, so long as it remaineth in one form by the conjunction of the parts, ap- peareth the likeness of a man. But if the members of the body, being separated and sundered, have lost their unity, it is no longer the same. And in like manner it will be manifest to him that will descend to other particulars, that everything continueth so long as it is one, and perisheth when it loseth unity." " Considering more particulars, I find it to be no otherwise." "Is there anything," quoth she, " that in the course of nature, leaving the desire of being, seeketh to come to destruction and corruption? " "If," quoth 1, "I consider living creatures which 279 BOETHII quae habent aliquam uolendi nolendique naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra cogentibus abiciant manendi intentionem et ad interitum sponte festinent. Omne namque animal tueri salutem laborat, mortem 50 uero perniciemque deuitat. Sed quid de herbis arboribusque, quid de inanimatis omnino consentiam rebus prorsus dubito."
" Atqui non est quod de hoc quoque possis ambi- gere, cum herbas atque arbores intuearis primum sibi 55 conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earum natura queat cito exarescere atque interire non possint. Nam aliae quidem campis aliae montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes, aliae saxis haerent, aliarum fecundae sunt steriles harenae, quas si in alia 60 quispiam loca transferre conetur, arescant. Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit et ne, dum manere possuntj intereant, elaborat. Quid quod omnes uelut in terras ore demerso trahunt alimenta radicibus ac per medullas robur corticemque diffundunt? Quid 65 quod mollissimum quidque, sicuti medulla est, in- teriore semper sede reconditur, extra uero quadam ligni firmitate, ultimus autem cortex aduersum caeli intemperiem quasi mali patiens defensor opponitur? lam uero quanta est naturae diligentia, ut cuncta 70 semine multiplicato propagentur! Quae omnia non modo ad tempus manendi uerum generatim quoque quasi in perpetuum permanendi ueluti quasdam machinas esse quis nesciat? Ea etiam quae inani- mata esse creduntur nonne quod suum est quaeque 75 simili ratione desiderant? Cur enim flammas quidem sursum leuitas uehit, terras uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod haec singulis loca motionesque 280 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
have any nature to will and nill, I find nothing that without extern compulsion forsake the intention to remain, and of their own accord hasten to destruction. For every living creature laboureth to preserve his health^ and escheweth death and detriment. But what I should think of herbs, and trees, and of all things without life, 1 am altogether doubtful."
" But there is no cause why thou shouldst doubt of this, if thou considerest first that herbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their nature, where, so much as their constitution permitteth, they cannot soon wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other upon hills, some in fenny, other in stony places, and the barren sands are fertile for some, which if thou wouldst transplant into other places they die. But nature giveth every one that which is fitting, and striveth to keep them from decaying so long as they can remain. What should I tell thee, if all of them, thrusting as it were their lips into the ground, draw nourishment by their roots, and convey substance and bark by the inward pith? What, that always the softest, as the pith, is placed within, and is covered without by the strength of the wood, and last of all the bark is exposed to the weather, as being best able to bear it off? And how great is the diligence of nature that all things may continue by the multiplication of seed; all which who knoweth not to be, as it were, certain engines, not only to remain for a time, but succes sively in a manner to endure for ever? Those things also which are thought to be without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which appertaineth to their own good? For why doth levity lift up flames, or heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are K2 281 BOETHII conueniunt? Porro autem quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque conseruat, sicuti ea quae sunt 80 inimica corrumpunt. lam uero quae dura sunt ut lapides, adhaerent tenacissime partibus suis et ne facile dissoluantur I'esistunt. Quae uero liquentia ut aer atque aqua, facile quidem diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus a quibus sunt abscisa relabuntur, 85 ignis uero omnem refugit sectionem. Neque nunc nos de uoluntariis ariimae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus, quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes; nam ne in 90 animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animae uolun- tatibus, uerum ex naturae principiis uenit. Nam saepe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura re- formidat uoluntas amplectitur, contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi 95 opus, quod natura semper appetit, interdum coercet uoluntas. Adeo haec sui caritas non ex animali motione sed ex naturali intentione procedit. Dedit enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc uel maximam manendi causam ut quoad possunt naturaliter manere 100 desiderent; quare nihil est quod ullo modo queas dubitare cuncta quae sunt appetere naturaliter con- stantiam permanendi, deuitare perniciem."
" Confiteor," inquam, " nunc me indubitato cernere quae dudum incerta uidebantur." "Quod autem/' 105 inquit, "subsistere ac permanere petit, id unum esse desiderat; hoc enim sublato ne esse quidem cui- quam permanebit." "Verum est," inquain. " Omnia igitur," inquit, " unum desiderant." Consensi. "Sed 282 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
convenient for them? And that which is agree able to everything coiiserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid tilings, as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten, without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do. For even in living creatures the love of life proceedeth not from the will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many times embraced) death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention. For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of continu ance, that they naturally desire to continue so longas they may, wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew corruption."
" I confess," quoth I, "that 1 now see undoubtedly that which before seemed very doubtful." "Now that," quoth she, "which desireth to continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away, being itself cannot remain." "It is true," quoth I. "All things then," quoth she, "desire unity." I granted it to be so. "But we have 283 BOETHII unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum." 110 " Ita quidem." " Cuncta igitur bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas licet: ipsum bonum esse quod desideretur ab omnibus." "Nihil/' inquarn, "uerius excogitari potest. Nam uel ad nihil unum cuncta referuntur et uno ueluti uertice destituta sine rectore 115 fluitabunt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit omnium summum bonorum." Et ilia: "Nimium/' inquit, "o alumne laetor, ipsam enim mediae ueritatis notam mente fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod ignorare te paulo ante dicebas." 120 "Quid?" inquam. " Quis esset," inquit, "rerum omnium finis. Is est enim pi'ofecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus, quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse fateamur.
XI.
XI.
Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum Cupitque nullis ille deuiis falli, In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus Longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus 5 Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur Suis retrusum possidere thesauris. Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes Lucebit ipso perspicacius Phoebo. Non omne namque mente depulit lumen 10 Obliuiosam corpus inuehens molem.
Haeret profecto semen introrsum ueri Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina. 284 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
showed that unity is the same as goodness." "You have indeed." " All things then desire goodness, (^ which thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which Js desired. of _all_ things." "There can be ' nothing imagined more true. For either all things have reference to no one principle and, being destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any ruler: or if there be anything to which all things hasten, that must be the chiefest of all goods." "I rejoice greatly O scholar," quoth she, " for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very mark of verity. But in this thou hast discovered that which a little before thou saidest thou wert ignorant of." " What is that? " quoth I. " What the end of all things is," quoth she. " For certainly it is that which is desired of all things, which since we have concluded to be goodness, we must also confess that goodness is the end of all things.
XI.
He that would seek the truth with thoughts profound And would not stray in ways that are not right, He to himself must turn his inward sight.
And guide his motions in a circled round, Teaching his mind that ever she design Herself in her own treasures to possess: So that which late lay hidden in cloudiness More bright and clear than Phoebus' beams shall shine.
Flesh hath not quenched all the spirit's light, Though this oblivion's lump holds her opprest. Some seed of truth remaineth in our breast, Which skilful learning eas'ly doth excite.
285 BOETHII Nam cur rogati sponte recta cerisetis, Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde? 15 Quod si Platonis Musa personal uerum, Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur."
XII.
Turn ego: " Platoni," inquam, " uehementer as- sentior, nam me horum iam secundo commemoras, primum quod memoriam corporea contagione, dehinc cum maeroris mole pressus amisi." Turn ilia: "Si 5 priora," inquit, " concessa respicias, ne illud quidem longius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus es." "Quid?" inquam. " Quibus," ait ilia, " gubernaculis mundus regatur." " Memini," inquam, "me inscitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed 10 quid afferas, licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero." " Mundum," inquit, " hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas." " Ne nunc quidem arbitror," inquam, " nee umquam dubi tandum putabo quibusque in hoc rationibus accedam 15 breuiter exponam. Mundus hie ex tarn diuersis contrariisque partibus in unam formam minime con- uenisset, nisi unus esset qui tarn diuersa coniungeret. Coniuncta uero naturarum ipsa diuersitas inuicem discors dissociaret atque diuelleret, nisi unus esset 20 qui quod nexuit contineret. Non tarn uero certus naturae ordo procederet nee tarn dispositos motus locis, temporibus, efficientia, spatiis, qualitatibus a For Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence cf. Meno 81-8P, and Phaedo 72-76.
286 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. Ill tor being askt how can we answer true Unless that grace within our hearts did dwell? If Plato's heavenly muse the truth us tell, We learning things remember them anew." a XII.
Then I said that I did very well like of Plato's doctrine, for thou dost bring- these things to my remembrance now the second time, first, because I lost their memory by the contagion of my body, and after when I was oppressed with the burden of grief. "If," quoth she, "thou reflectest upon that which heretofore hath been granted, thou wilt not be far from remembering that which in the begin ning thou confessedst thyself to be ignorant of." "What?" quoth I. "By what government," quoth she, "the world is ruled." "I remember," quoth I, " that I did confess my ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to hear it more plainly from thyself." "Thou thoughtest a little before that it was not to be doubted that this world is governed by God." " Neither do I think now," quoth I, "neither will I ever think, that it is to be doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons which move me to think so. This world could never have been compacted of so many divers and contrary parts, unless there were One that doth unite these so different things; and this disagreeing diversity of natures being united would separate and divide this concord, unless there were One that holdeth together that which He united. Neither would the course of nature continue so certain, nor would the different parts hold so well-ordered motions in due places, times, causality, spaces and qualities, 287 BOETHII explicarent, nisi unus esset qui has mutationum uarietates manens ipse disponeret. Hoc quidquid 25 est quo condita manent atque agitantur, usitato cunctis uocabulo deum nomino."
Turn ilia: " Cum haec," inquit, " ita sentias, paruam mihi restare operam puto ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes reuisas. Sed quae proposui- 30 mus intueamur. Nonne in beatitudine sufficientiam numerauimus deumque beatitudinem ipsam esse con- sensimus? " "Itaquidem." " Et ad mundum igitur," inquit, " regendum nullis extrinsecus adminiculis iii- digebit; alioquin si quo egeat, plenam sufficientiam 35 non habebit." "Id," inquam, "ita est necessarium." " Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit." " Negari," inquam, "nequit." " Atqui deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est." " Memini," inquam. " Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit, si quidem per se regit omnia 40 quern bonum esse consensimus et hie est ueluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum quo mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur." " Vehe- menter assentior," inquam, " et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione prospexi." " Credo;" 45 inquit, " iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet." "Quid?" inquam. "Cum deus/' inquit, " omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur eademque omnia sicuti docui ad bonum 60 naturali intentione festinent, num dubitari potest quin uoluntaria regantur seque ad disponentis nutum 0 Vide supra, Tr. iv. (pp. 56 if.). 288 CONSOLAT. FHILOSOPH. III.
unless there were One who, Himself remaining quiet, disposeth and ordereth this variety of motions. This, whatsoever it be, by which things created continue and are moved., I call God, a name which all men use." a "Since," quoth she, " thou art of this mind, I think with little labour thou mayest be capable of felicity, and return to thy country in safety. But let us consider what we proposed. Have we not placed sufficiency in happiness, and granted that God is blessedness itself?" "Yes truly." "Wherefore," quoth she, " He will need no outward helps to govern the world, otherwise, if He needed anything, He had not full sufficiency." "That," quoth I, " must necessarily be so." " Wherefore He disposeth all things by Himself." " No doubt He doth," quoth I. " But it hath been proved that God is goodness itself." " I remember it very well," quoth I. "Then He disposeth all things by goodness: since He governeth all things by Himself, whom we have granted to be goodness. And this is as it were the helm and rudder by which the frame of the world is kept steadfast and uncorrupted." "I most willingly agree," quoth I, " and I foresaw a little before, though only with a slender guess, that thou wouldst conclude this." "I believe thee," quoth she, " for now I suppose thou lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth. But that which I shall say is no less manifest." "What?" quoth I. "Since that God is deservedly thought to govern all things with the helm of goodness, and all these things likewise, as I have showed, hasten to goodness with their natural contention, can there be any doubt made but that they are governed willingly, and that they frame themselves of their own accord to their