327 BOETHII " Negare non possum." " Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt iniusta impunitate donati quam iusta ultione puniti." Turn ego: " Ista quidem con- sequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.
75 Sed quaeso," inquam, "te, nullane animarum sup- plicia post defunctuin morte corpus relinquis? " " Et magna quidem/' inquit, "quorum alia poenali acerbitate, alia uero purgatoria dementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de his disserere consilium non est.
80 Id uero hactenus egimus, ut quae indignissima tibi uidebatur malorum potestas earn nullam esse cogno- sceres quosque impunitos querebare, uideres num- quam improbitatis suae carere suppliciis, licentiam quam cito finiri precabaris nee longam esse disceres 85 intelicioremque fore, si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero, si esset aeterna; post haec miseriores esse improbos iniusta impunitate dimissos quam iusta ultione punitos. Cui seriteiitiae consequens est ut turn demum grauioribus suppliciis urgeantur, cum 90 impuniti esse creduntur."
Turn ego: "Cum tuas," inquam, "rationes con- sidero, nihil dici uerius puto. At si ad hominum iudicia reuertar, quis ille est cui haec non oredenda modo sed saltern audienda uideantur? " " Ita est," 96 inquit ilia. " Nequeunt enim oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae ueritatis attollere, similesque auibus sunt quarum intuitum nox inluminat dies caecat. Dum enim non rerum ordinem, sed suos " See discussion of this passage in Boethi-ux, An Essay, H. F. Stewart (1891), pp. 98 ff.
328 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
cannot deny it." " Wherefore the vicious are far more unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished." "This followeth," quoth I, "out of that which hath been concluded before.
But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the_souls after the death of the body.?" "And those great too," quoth she. " Some of which I think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful purgations." But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously punished, when they are thought to go scot-free."
"When 1 consider thy reasons," quoth J, ' think nothing can be said more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that will think them worthy to be believed or so much as heard?" "It is true," quoth she, "for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own 329 BOETHII intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel impunitatem J0 scelerum putant esse felicem. Vide autem quid aeterna lex sanciat. Melioribus animuin confor- maueris,, nihil opus est iudice praemium deferente tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti. Studium ad peiora deflexeris, extra ne quaesieris ultorem. Tu te 1"° ipse in deteriora trusisti, ueluti si uicibus sordidara humum caelumque respicias, cunctis extra cessantibus ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit Quid igitur? Hisne accedamus quos beluis similes HO esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu ipsum etiam se habuisse obliuiseeretur iiituitum nihilque sibi ad humanam perfectionein deesse arbi- traretur, num uidentes eadem caecos putaremus? Nam ne illud quidem adquiescent quod aeque ualidis H5 rationum nititur firmamentis: infeliciores eos esse qui faciant quam qui patiantur iniuriam." " Vellem," inquam, " has ipsas audire rationes." " Omnem," inquit, " improbum num supplicio dignum negas? " " Minime." " Infeliees uero esse qui sint improbi 120 multipliciter liquet." " Ita/' inquam. "Qui igituir supplicio digni sunt miseros esse non dubitas? " " Conuenit," inquam. " Si igitur cognitor," ait, " resideres^ cui supplicium inferendum putares^ eine qui fecisset an qui pertulisset iniuriam?" "Nee 125 ambigo," inquam, " quin perpesso satisfacerem dolore facientis." " Miserior igitur tibi iniuriae inlator quam acceptor esse uideretur." " Consequitur," 330 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
affections, they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. But see what the eternal law estab- lisheth. If thou apply thy mind to the better, thou needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more excellent things. If thou de- clinest to that which is worse, never expect any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate; as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven, setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. But the common sort con- sidereth not these things. What then? Shall we join ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury than they which suffer it." " I would," quoth I, "' hear these reasons." " Deniest thou," quoth she, " that every wicked man deserveth punishment? " " No." " And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?" "Yes," quoth I. " Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are wretched?" "It is true," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that did or that suffered wrong?" "1 doubt not," quoth I, " but that 1 would satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it." "The offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the receiver?" "It followeth, " 331 BOETHII inquam. " Hinc igitur aliis de causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitude suapte natura miseros 130 faciat, apparet inlatam cuilibet iniuriam noil accipien- tis sed inferentis esse miseriam." " Atqui mine," ait, " contra faciunt oratores. Pro his enim qui graue quid acerbumque perpessi sunt miserationem iudicum excitare conantur, cum magis admittentibus 135 iustior miseratio debeatur; quos non ab iratis sed a propitiis potius miserantibusque accusatoribus ad iudicium ueluti aegros ad medicum duci oportebat, ut culpae morbos supplicio resecarent. Quo pacto defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse 140 hominibus mallet, in accusationis habitum uerteretur. Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere uitiorumque sordes poenarum cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent com- pensatioiie adipiscendae probitatis, nee hos cruciatus 145 esse ducerent defensorumque operam repudiarent ac se totos accusatoribus iudicibusque permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis nisi stultissimus oderit? Malos uero odisse ration e caret. Nam si, 150 uti corporum languor, ita uitiositas quidam est quasi morbus animorum, cum aegros corpore minime dignos odio sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi sed miserandi sunt quorum mentes omni lariguore atrocior urget improbitas.
332 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOFH. IV.
quoth I. " Hence therefore, and for other causes "•rounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not the receiver's but the doer's misery." " But now-a-days,' quoth she, " orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions; whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compassionate accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means the defenders' labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather do their clients some good, they would change their defence into accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it eorneth to pass, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness of the mind. Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal infirmities to be rather worthy of compassion than f of hatred, much more are they to be pitied, and not 1 abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with wicked- ; ness, the greatest malady that may be.
333 BOETHil IV.
Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus Et propria fatum sollicitare manu? Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa Sponte sua uolucres nee remoratur equos. 5 Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt. An distant quia dissidentque mores, Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent Alternisque uolunt perire telis? 10 Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio.
Vis aptam mentis uicem referre?
Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis."
V.
Hie ego: " Video/' inquam, " quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna populari non nihil boni maliue inesse perpendo. Neque enim 5 sapientum quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus, honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere.
Sic enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, cum in contingentes populos regentium 10 quodam modo beatitude transfunditur, cum praesertim career, nex l ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam constituta sunt debeantur. Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant, praemia uir- 1 lex plerique codd.
a Literally, " Men whom serpent, lion, tiger, bear, and boar attack with tooth, yet attack each other with the sword. " 334 CONSOLAT/VHILOSOPH. iv.
IV.
Why should we strive to die so many ways, And slay ourselves with our own hands? If we seek death, she ready stands, She willing comes, her chariot never stays.
Those against whom the wild beasts armed be, Against themselves with weapons rage.* Do they such wars unjustly wage, Because their lives and manners disagree, And so themselves with mutual weapons kill? Alas, but this revenge is small. Wouldst thou give due desert to all?
Love then the good, and pity thou the ill."
V.
" I see," quoth I, " what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country, being rich, re spected, and powerful. For in this manner is the office of wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors' happiness is participated by the people about them; so chiefly because prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marvel why these things are thus turned upside down, and the punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while 335 BOETrm 15 tutum mail rapiant, ueheinenter admiror, quaeque tarn iniustae confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. Minus etenim mirarer, si misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector exaggerat, Qui cum saepe bonis iucunda, 20 malis aspera contraque bonis dura tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a fortuitis casibus differre uideatur? " " Nee mirum," inquit, "si quid ordinis ignorata ratione teinerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis 25 causain tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.
V.
Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit Propinqua summo cardine labi, Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes Mergatque seras aequore flammus, 5 Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus, Legem stupebit aetheris alti. Palleant plenae cornua lunae Infecta metis noctis opacae Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore 10 Confusa Phoebe detegat astra, Commouet gentes publicus error Lassantque crebris pulsibus aera. Nemo miratur flamina Cori Litus frementi tundere fiuctu 15 Nee niuis duram frigore molem Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.
a See Tylor's Primitive Culture, pp. 296 ff. Cf. " carniina uel caelo possunt deducere lunara," Virg. Eel. viii. 69, and Juvenal, Sat. vi. 440 sq. 336 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
evil men obtain the rewards of the good. And 1 desire to know of thee what may seem to be the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less if I thought that all things were disordered by casual events. Now God being the Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He dis- tributeth oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what difference may there seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?" " It is no marvel," quoth she, " if anything be thought temerarious and confused, when we know not the order it hath. But although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.
V.
Who knows not how the stars near to the poles do slide, And how Bootes his slow wain doth guide, And whv he sets so late, and doth so early rise, May wonder at the courses of the skies. If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight, Infested with the darkness of the night, And stars from which all grace she with her bright ness took, Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look, A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pass, And they with many strokes beat upon brass.0 None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow. Nor why hot Phoebus' beams dissolve the snow. M 337 BOETHII Hie enim causas cernere promptum est, Illic latentes pectora turbant.
Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas 20 Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus, Cedat inscitiae nubilus error, Cessent profecto mira uideri."
VI " Ita est," inquam; " sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas euoluere uelatasque caligine explicare rationes, quaeso uti quae hinc decernas, quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, 5 edisseras." Turn ilia paulisper arridens: "Ad rem me," inquit, " omnium quaesitu maximam uocas, cui uix exhaust! quicquam satis sit. Talis namque materia est ut una dubitatione succisa innumerabiles aliae uelut hydrae capita succrescant, nee ullus fuerit 10 modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim de prouidentiae simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de cognitione ac prae- destinatione diuina, de arbitrii libertate quaeri solet, quae quant! oneris sint ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam 15 haec quoque te nosse quaedam medicinae tuae portio est, quamquam angusto limite temporis saepti tamen aliquid delibare l conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum nexas sibi ordine 20 contexo rationes." " Vt libet," inquam.
1 deliberare codd.; delibare coni. Pulmannus. 338 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
These easy are to know, the other hidden lie, And therefore more our hearts they terrify.
All strange events which time to light more seldom brings, And the vain people count as sudden things, If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free, No longer would by us admired be."
VI.
VI.
"It is true," quoth I, " but since it is thy pro fession to explicate the causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered with dark ness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all others." Then she smiling a little said: "Thou invitest me to a matter which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind. For in this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simjThcity_of Provi dence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of G.odjj_ knowledge- and predestination^ and of free will_;_ which how weighty they are, thou thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few arguments." "As it pleaseth thee," quoth I.
BOETHII BOETHII Tune uelut ab alio orsa principio ita disseruit: " Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo mouetur modo, causas, ordinem, formas ex diuinae mentis 25 stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis arce compositamultiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur; cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum 30 a ueteribus appellatum est. Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque uim mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa ilia diuina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit; fatum uero inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio per 35 quam prouidentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis infinita complectitur; fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac temporibus dis- tributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in 40 diuinae mentis adunata prospectum prouidentia sit, eadem uei'o adunatio digesta atque explicata tem poribus fatum uocetur. Quae licet diuersa sint, alterum tamen pendet ex altero. Ordo namque fatalis ex prouidentiae simplicitate procedit. Sicut 45 enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet operis effectum, et quod simpliciter prae- sentarieque prospexerat, per temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa 50 quae disposuit multipliciter ac temporaliter adminis- trat. Siue igitur famulantibus quibusdam proui- 34-0 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
Then taking as it were a new beginning,, she discoursed in this manner: " The generation of all 'things, and all the proceedings of mutable natures, laud whatsoever is moved in any sort, take their 'causes, order, and forms from the stability of the i Divine mind. This, placed in the castle of its own simplicity, hath determined manifold ways for doing things; which ways being considered in the purity of God's understanding, are named Providence, but being referred to those things which He moveth and disposeth, they are by_tlie_anc[ents called Fate. The diversity of which will easily appear if we~weTgh the force of both. For Providence is the very_Divine reason itsdf, seated in the highest Prince, which disposeth all things. But Fate is a disposition inby which Providence ~ _ comiecteth all thin<rs_jn their due ordg7 Fo ProviHence embraceth all things togetherTthough diverse, though infinite; but Fate putteth every particular thing into motion being distributed by places, forms, and time; so that this unfolding of temporal order being united into the foresight of God's mind is Providence, and the same uniting, being digested and unfolded in time, is called Fate. Which although they be diverse yet the qnedependeth on the other. For fatal order pro- ceedeth from the simplicity of JProvidence. For as a workman conceiving the form of anything in his mind taketh his work in ha?id, and executeth by order of time that which he had simply and in a moment foreseen, so God by His Providence dis poseth whatsoever is to be done with simplicity and stability, and by Fate effecteth by manifold ways and in the order of time those very things which He disposeth. Wherefore, whether Fate be exercised 341 BOETHII dentiae diuinis spiritibus fatum exercetur seu anima seu tota inseruiente riatura seu caelestibus siderum motibus seu angelica uirtute seu daemonura uaria 55 sollertia seu aliquibus horum seu omnibus fatalis series texitur, illud certe manifestum est immobilem simplicemque gerendarum formam rerum esse proui- dentiam, fatum uero eorum quae diuina simplicitas gereiida disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem 60 temporalem. Quo fit ut omnia quae fato subsunt prouidentiae quoque subiecta sint cui ipsum etiam subiacet fatum, quaedam uero quae sub prouidentia locata surit fati seriem superent. Ea uero sunt quae primae propinqua diuinitati stabiliter fixa fatalis 65 ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Nam ut orbium circa eundem cardinem sese uertentium qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis accedit cetero- rumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam circa quern uersentur exsistit, extimus uero maiore ambitu 70 rotatus quanto a puncti media indiuiduitate discedit tanto amplioribus spatiis explicatur, si quid uero illi se medio conectat et societ, in simplicitatem cogitur diffundique ac diffluere cessat, simili ratione quod longius a prima mente discedit maioribus fati nexibus 75 implicatur ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est quanto ilium rerum cardinem uicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit firmitati, motu carens fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod 80 gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series mobilis ad proui- 342 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV^.
by the subordination of certain Divine spirits to Providence,, or this fatal web be woven by a soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all of these, that certainly is manifest that Providence is an immoveable \ and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a moveable connexion and temporal \ order of those things which the Divine7 ^ujlieity ^ hath disposed to bejione. So that all that is under ' Fate is also subject to Providence, to which also. Fate itself obeyeth. But some things which are placed under Providence are above the course of Fate. And they are those things which nigh to the first Divinity, being stable and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility. For as of orbs which turn about the same centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the midst, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without it, about which they are turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater compass, by how much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which is joined and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and ceaseth to spread and flow abroad, in like manner that which departeth farthest from the first mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of Fate, and everything is so much the freer from Fate, by how much it draweth nigh to the hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the stability of the Sovereign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also the necessity of Fate. Wherefore in what sort discourse of reason is compared to pure understanding, that which is produced to that which is, time to eternity, a circle to the centre, such is 343 BOETHII dentiae stabilem simplicitatem. Ea series caelum ac sidera mouet, elementa in se inuicem temperat et alterna commutatione transformat; eadem nascentia 85 occidentiaque omnia per similes fetuum seminumque renouat progressus. Haec actus etiam fortunasque hominumindissolubilicausarurn conexione constringit,, quae cum ab immobilis prouidentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsas quoque immutabiles esse necesse est. 90 Ita enim res optime reguntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum ordinem promat. Hie uero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras propria incommutabilitate coerceat. Quo fit ut tametsi uobis hunc ordinem minime con- 95 siderare ualentibus confusa omnia perturbataque uideantur, nihilo minus tamen suus modus ad boiium dirigens cuncta disponat. Nihil est enim quod mali causa ne ab ipsis quidem improbis fiat; quos, ut uberrime demonstratum est, bonum quaerentes prauus 100 error auertit, nedum ordo de summi boni cardine proficiscens a suo quoquam deflectat exordio.
Quae ueroj inquies, potest ulla iiiiquior esse con- fusio, quam ut bonis turn aduersa turn prospera, malis etiam turn optata turn odiosa contingant? Num 105 igitur ea mentis integritate homines degunt, ut quos probos improbosue censueruiit eos quoque uti existi- mant esse necesse sit? Atqui in hoc hominum indicia depugnant, et quos alii praemio alii supplicio dignos arbitrantur. Sed concedamus ut aliquis possit bonos 344 CONSOLAT. PH1LOSOPH. IV.
the course of moveable Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence. That course moveth the heaven and stars, tempereth the elements one with another, and transformeth them by mutual changing. The same reneweth all rising and dying things by like pro ceeding of fruits and seeds. This comprehendeth also the actions and fortunes of men by an unloosable connexion of causes, which since it proceeds from the principles _qf unmovable Providence, the causes also must needs be immutable. For in this manner things are best governed, if the simplicity which remaineth in the Divine mind produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order restraineth with its own immutability things otherwise mutable, and which would have a confused course. Whereof it ensueth that though all things seem confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider this order, notwithstanding all things are disposed by their own proper measure directing them to good. For there is nothing which is done for the love of evil, even by the wicked themselves: whom, as hath been abundantly proved, lewd error carrieth away while they are seeking after that which is good, so far is it that order proceeding from the hinge of the Sovereign Goodness should avert any from his first beginning.