The remaining categories are not predicable o nor yet of created things.6 For place is predicated 6 i e according to their substance.
19 BOETHII homine uel de deo praedicari potest, de homine ut in foro, de deo ut ubique, sed ita ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur de qua dicitur. Non enim ita homo dicitur esse in foro quern ad modum 50 esse albus uel longus iiec quasi circumfusus et deter- minatus proprietate aliqua qua designari secundum se possit, sed tantum quo sit illud aliis infonnatum rebus per hanc praedicationem ostenditur.
De deo uero non ita, nam quod ubique est ita dici 55 uidetur non quod in omni sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed quod omnis ei locus adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco. " Quando " uero eodem 60 praedicatur modo, ut de homine heri uenit, de deo semper est. Hie quoque non quasi esse aliquid dicitur illud ipsum de quo hesternus dicitur aduentus, sed quid ei secundum tempus accesserit praedicatur. Quod uero de deo dicitur " semper est," uiium 85 quidem significat, quasi omni praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit. Quod de caelo et de ceteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum philosoplios dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam "semper" praesentis est in 70 eo temporis tantumque inter nostrarum rerum prae- sens, quod est nunc, interest ac diuinarum, quod nostrum "nunc" quasi currens tempus facit et sempi- ternitatem, diuinum. uero "nunc" permanens neque mouens sese atque consistens aeternitatem facit; cui 75 nomini si adicias " semper," facies eius quod est nunc 20 DE TRINITATE of man or of God —;i man is in the market-place; God is everywhere — but in neither case is the predicate identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the market" is quite a different thing from saving "he is white or long," or, so to speak, encom passed and determined by some property which en ables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of place simply declares how far his substance is given a particular setting amid other things.
It is otherwise, of course, with God. "He is everywhere " does not mean that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all — but that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same with the category of time, as, " A man came yesterday; God is ever." Here again the predicate of "coming yesterday" denotes not something sub stantial, but something happening in terms of time. But the expression "God is ever" denotes a single Present, summing up His continual presence in all the past, in all the present — however that term be used — and in all the future. Philoso phers say that "ever" may be applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as applied to God it has a different meaning. He is ever, because "ever" is with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference between "now," which is our present, and the divine present. Our present connotes changing time and sempiternity; God's present, abiding, unmoved, and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add semper to eternity and you get the constant, incessant and 21 BOETHII 21 BOETHII iugem indefessumque ac per hoc perpetuum cursum quod est sempiternitas.
Rursus habere uel facere eodem modo; dicimus enim "uestitus currit " de homine, de deo "cuncta 80 possidens regit." Rursus de eo nihil quod est esse de utrisque dictum est, sed haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur omniaque haec quodain modo referuntur ad aliud. Cuius praedicationis differen- tiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est uel 85 deus refertur ad substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo uel deus; qui iustus est refertur ad qualitatern qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus, qui magnus ad quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus. Nam in ceteris praedicationibus nihil tale est. Qui enim 90 dicit esse aliquem in foro uel ubique, refert quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi,, sed non quo aliquid est uelut iustitia iustus. Item cum dico "currit" uel "regit" uel "mine est" uel "semper est/' refertur quidem uel ad facere uel ad tempus — si tamen 95 interim diuinum illud semper tempus dici potest — sed non quo aliquo aliquid est uelut magnitudine magnum. Nam situm passionemque requiri in deo non oportet, neque enim sunt.
lamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum?
100 Quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant aliae uero quasi circumstantias rei quodque ilia quidem1 ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, ilia uero ut 1 quidem vulg.; quae codd. opt.
a The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. De Ciu. Dei, xi. 6, xii. 1C; but Boethius's use of sempiternitas, as well as his word-building, seem to be peculiar to himself. Claudianus Mamertus, speaking of applying the categories to God, uses sempiternitas as Boethius uses aeternitas. Cf. De Stain Animae i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms inter changeably, e.g. Asclep. 29-31. On Boethius's distinction 22 DE TRINITATE thereby perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity."
It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "God rules, possessing all things." Here again nothing substantial is asserted of either subject; in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "God" refer to the substance in virtue of which the subject is — man or God. The term "just" refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz. just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which He is something, viz. great. No other cate gory save substance, quality, and quantity refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place, which is not a category of the sub stance, like "just" in virtue of justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make reference to activity or time — if indeed God's "ever" can be described as time — but not to a category of substance, like "great " in virtue of greatness.
Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and passivity in God, for they simply are not to be found in Him.
Have I now made clear the difference between the categoi'ies? Some denote the reality of a thing; others its accidental circumstances; the former declare that a thing is something; the latter say between time and eternity see Cons. v. pr. 6, and Rand, / er dfm B. zugeschr. Trakt. de fide, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in Theol. Littzff., 1902, p. 147.
23 BOETHII non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Ilia igitur, quae aliquid esse designant, 105 secunduni rem praedicationes uocentur. Quae cum de rebus subiectis dicuntur, uocantur accidentia se- cundum rem; cum uero de deo qui subiectus non est, secunduni substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur.
V.
Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu 5 constare perspiciuntur. Age enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris et dominum; at non etiani si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album, sed 10 interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata peril nimirum album. At in domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato 15 deperit seruo, constat non earn per se domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.
Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod a Dominus and seruus are similarly used as illustration, In Cat. (Migne, P.L. Ixiv. 217).
6 i.e. which is external to the master.
c i.e. which is external to the whitened thing. 24 DE TRINITATE nothing about its being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something external. Those cate gories which describe a thing in terms of its substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to God, who is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of substance.
V.
V.
Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing remarks have been prelimin ary; for qualities which obviously arise from the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and slave a are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are predicates of sub stance. If you suppress the term slave,6 you simul taneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,0 though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the substance of master, but is an adventitious augmenta tion arising from the possession of slaves.
It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases, decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it is applied. The B2 25 BOETHII 20 est esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere, nee semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod 25 ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me est minime uero ex sese.
30 Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque aliud ut dictum est difte- 35 runt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest, quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, persona- 40 rum. Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis quidem ei est productio filii, 45 relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogi- temus processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritual sanctum; hos, quoniam in- 26 DE TRINITATE category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condi tion of relativity, and that not necessarily to something else,, but sometimes to the subject itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again, if 1 come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me, and not in the least on the essence of his being.
Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way. Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have said, have no other difference but that of rela tion, and if relation is not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject, but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very sub stance; however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be spatially different, since 27 BOETHII 27 BOETHII corporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero 50 pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.
Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et 55 in rebus numerabilibus repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem. Trium igitur idonee constituta est unitas.
VI.
Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea secundum se ipsum est prae- dicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, 5 seruata uero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel omnino eius quae se cundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur sub- stantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trini- tatem; atque ideo sola singillatim profei-untur atque 10 separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem pater qui filius non est nee idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tameii deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane scien- 15 dum est non semper talem esse relatiuam praedi- cationem, ut semper ad difFerens praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; difFerunt enira. Nam omne aequale aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem idem est; et similis 20 est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id 28 DE TR1NITATE They are incorporeal. But since the Father is God, the Son is God., and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the Three is suitably established.
VI.
VI.
But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a predication referring to one substance is a predication without relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same God, the same in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be predicated of sub stance. One must riot forget that predicates of relativity do not always involve relation to some thing other than the subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different. For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is a relation of identicals.
29 BOETHII 29 BOETHII quod est idem. Quod si id in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed 25 simplici intellectu erigi et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.
Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii exspectat subtilitas quae- stionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime, 30 uestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitu- lante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde uenit effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas 35 nequiuit ascendere, quantum inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.
a Cf. Cons. v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the passage " quare in illius summae intelleg-entiae acumen si possumus erigamur."
30 DE TRINITATE A relation of this kind is not to be found in created things, but that is because of the difference which we know attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of God let imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be known. n I have now finished the investigation which I pro posed. The exactness of my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will pro nounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, God helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits, Avhatever is lost through rny infirmity must be made good by my intention.
ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHI1 V.C. ET INT.. EXCONS. OBD. PATRICII VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS ET SPIRITVS SANCTVS DE DIVINITATE SVBSTAN- TIALITKR PRAEDICENTVR QVAERO an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuini- tate substantialiter praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est 5 ab ipsis catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur in- terrogem, an qui dicitur pater substantia sit, respon- detur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo dubitauerit. Sed cum rursus 10 colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur sub stantia trium nee separari ullo modo aut disiungi 32 ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSUI.S, PATHICIAX TO JOHN THE DEACON WHETHER FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT MAY HE SUBSTANTIALLY PREDICATED OF THE DIVINITY THK question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be predicated of the Divinity sub stantially or otherwise. And I think that the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is ad mittedly the surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made 33 BOETHII potest nee uelut partibus in unum coniuncta est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaecumque igitur de diuina 15 substantia praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse com- munia; idque signi erit quae sint quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc rnodo dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singu- lariter praedicabuntur. Hoc modo si dicimus: " Pater 20 deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus deus est/' pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter praedicari.
Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus 25 sanctus ueritas est; pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incom- mutabilitate de iustitia de omnipotentia ac de ceteris 30 omnibus quae tarn de singulis quam de omnibus singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substan tialiter dici. Vnde apparet ea quae cum in singulis separatirn dici conuenit nee tarnen in omnibus dici queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; 35 qui uero iste sit, posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmittit ad filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantial e nomen hoc inditum; nam si substantiate esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iustitia ut ipsa quoque substantia, 40 de ceteris diceretur.
Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo, sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non est 34 VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS up of various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything, therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right be predicated substantially of the Divinity.
Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is truth, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth. If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice, Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons singly and collectively are plainly substantial predi cates. Hence it appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all Three is not a sub stantial predicate, but of another kind — of what kind I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it would be affirmed of the other Persons.
Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the other predicates which I have already mentioned. The 35 BOETHII idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus 45 patrem ac filium ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substaritialiter dici sed alio quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est; nam et pater alicuius 50 pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trmitas quidem substantia liter de deo praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac spiritus sanctus non est) nee trinitas filius nee trinitas spiritus sanctus 55 secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum plural itate consistit, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.
Quod si personae diuisae sunt, substantia uero indiuisa sit, necesse est quod uocabulum ex personis 60 originem capit id ad substaiitiam non pertinere; at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit, trinitas igitur non pertinet ad substantiam. Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est 65 ad aliquid. Deus uero ueritas iustitia bonitas omni- potentia substantia inmutabilitas uirtus sapieiitia et quicquid hniusmodi excogitari potest substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur. Haec si se recte et ex fide habent, ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte 70 diuersus es, diligentius intuere quae dicta sunt et fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge.
" i.e. personaliter (loh. Scottus ad loc.).
* i.e. sed personaliter (loh. Scottus ad loc.}.
"Vide supra, Introduction, p. xii.
36 VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS Spirit too is not the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial manner, but otherwise.* For if each term were predi cated substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially b predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity — since He who is Father is not Son and Holy Spirit — nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.
Now if the Persons are separate, while the Sub stance is undivided, it must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially pre dicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth, Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable substantially to divinity.
If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm me. But if you are in any point of 'another opinion, examine carefully what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.0 37 ITEM EIVSDEM AD EVNDEM QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE IN EO QVOD SINT BONAE SINT CVM NON SINT SVBSTANTIALIA BONA POSTVLAS, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque 5 eo dicis esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus no turn itev buiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo quam cuiquam 10 participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque patitur esse seiuiictum.1 Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia turn id habent commodi, quod 1 seiunct. Rand; coniunct. codd. opt.; disiunct. vulg. Vallinus.
a Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six Enneades or groups of nine.
6 Cf. discussion on the nature of good in Cons. iii. m. 10 and pr. 11 (infra, pp. 274 if.).
38 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING ABSOLUTE GOODS You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure question in my Hebdomads a con- ceniing the manner in which substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute goods.6 You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness with what eager ness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess I like to expound my Hebdomads to myself, and would rather bury my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks 39 BOETHII cum his soils qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur 15 in mathematica fieri solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.