hindered by foreknowledge, because.they suppose that foreknowledge is not the cause _of_any necessity in things to come. For fetchest thou any proof for the necessity of future tilings from any other principle, but only from this, that those things which are foreknown cannot choose but happen? Where fore if foreknowledge imposeth no necessity upon future events, which thou didst grant not long before, why should voluntary actions be tied to any certain success? For example's sake, that thou mayest see what will follow, let us suppose that there were no providence or foresight at all. Would those things which proceed from free-will be com pelled to any necessity by this means? " " No." " Again, let us grant it to be, but that it imposeth no necessity" upon anything; no doubt the same freedom of will will remain whole and absolute.
But thou wilt say, even though foreknowledge be not a necessity for things to happen, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily come to pass. Wherefore now, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the ev§.1itsJ2C_/y]'lire things would have been necessary. For all signs only show what is, but cause not that which they design. And consequently it must first be proved* that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appear that foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity. For otherwise, if there be no necessity, neither can foreknowledge be the sign of that which is not. Besides it is manifest that every firm proof must be drawn from intrinsical and necessary causes and not from signs and other far fetched 'arguments. But how is it possible those things should not happen which are foreseen to be to come? As though we did believe that those things will not be which providence hath foreknown 385 BOETHII euentura credamus ac non illud potius arbitremur, 45 licet eueniant, nihil tamen ut euenirent sui natura necessitatis habuisse; quod hinc facile perpendas licebit. Plura etenim dum fiunt subiecta oculis intuemur, ut ea quae in quadrigis moderandis atque flectendis facere spectantur aurigae atque ad hunc 50 modum cetera. Num igitur quidquani illorum ita fieri necessitas ulla compellit?" " Minime. Frustra enim esset artis effectus, si omnia coacta mouerentur." " Quae igitur cum fiunt carent exsistendi necessitate, eadem prius quam fiant sine necessitate futura sunt.
55 Quare sunt quaedam euentura quorum exitus ab omni necessitate sit absolutus. Nam illud quidem nullum arbitror esse dicturum, quod quae nunc fiunt, prius quam fierent, euentura non fuerint. Haec igitur etiam praecognita liberos habent eueritus.
60 Nam sicut scientia praesentium rerum nihil his quae fiunt, ita praescientia futurorum nihil his quae uentura sunt necessitatis importat. Sed hoc, inquis, ipsum dubitatur, an earum rerum quae necessarios exitus non habent ulla possit esse praenotio. Dis- 65 sonare etenim uidentur putasque si praeuideantur consequi necessitate™, si necessitas desit minime praesciri nihilque scientia comprehend! posse nisi certum; quod si quae incerti sunt exitus ea quasi certa prouidentur, opinionis id esse caliginem non 70 scientiae ueritatem. Aliter enim ac sese res habeat arbitrari ab integritate scientiae credis esse diuersum. Cuius erroris causa est, quod omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum taiitum ui atque natura cognosci aestimat quae sciuntur; quod totum contra est 386 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.
and do not rather judge that although they happen, yet by their own nature they had no necessity of beingj which thou mayest easily gather hence. For we see many things with our eyes while they are in doing, as those things which the coachmen do while they drive and turn their coaches and in like manner other things. Now doth necessity compel anv of these things to be done in this sort? " " No. For in vain should art labour if all things were moved by compulsion." "Wherefore, as these things qvp_without necessity.wheiLJhey are in doing, so likewise they are to conic without necessity before they be done. And consequently there are some things to come.whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say that those things which are done now were not to come before they were done. Where_&re_thes.e.t.hiDgs even being jbrfir seen come freely to effect. For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledge in things to come. But thou wilt say: This is the question, whether there can be any foreknowledge of those things whose events are not necessary. For these things seem opposite, and thou thinkest that, if future things be foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there be no necessity, that they that are not fore known, and that nothing can be perfectly known unless it be certain. Hut if uncertain events be foreseen as certain, it is manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be far from the integrity of knowledge to judge otherwise than the thing is. The cause of which error is because thou thinkest that all that is known is known only by the force and nature of the things themselves, which is al- 387 BOETHII 75 Ornne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. Narn ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo^ eandem corporis rotunditatem aliter uisus aliter tactus agnoscit. Ille eminus manens totum simul 80 iactis radiis intuetur; hie uero cohaerens orbi atque coniunctus cii'ca ipsum motus ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur. Sensus enim figuram in 85 subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio uero solam sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam quae singulari- bus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit. In- tellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa QQ namque uniuersitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur.
In quo illud maxime considerandum est: nam superior comprehendendi uis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit.
QJ. Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species imaginatio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam, sed intellegentia quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat, sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli 00 alii nota esse poterat, comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et imaginationis figuram et material e sensi- bile cognoscit nee ratione utens nee imaginatione nee sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens. Ratio quoque cum quid 388 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.
together otherwise. For all that is known is not comprehended according to the force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of them which know it. For to explicate it with a brief example: the sight and the feeling do diversely discern the same roundness of a die The sight standing aloof beholdeth it altogether by his beams; but the feeling united and joined to the orb, being moved about the compass of it, comprehendeth the round ness by parts. Likewise sense, imagination, reason and understanding do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject, the imagination discerneth it alone with out matter, reason passeth beyond this also and considereth universally the species or kind which is in particulars. The eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compass of the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple form in itself.
In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superior force of comprehending embraceth the inferior; but the inferior can by no means attain to the superior; for the sense hath no force out of matter, neither doth the imagination conceive universal species, nor is reason capable of the simple form, but the understanding, as it were looking downward, having conceived that form, discerneth of all things which are under it, but in that sort in which it apprehendeth that form which can be known by none of the other. For it knoweth the universality of reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense, neither using reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were formally beholding all things with that one twinkling of the mind. Likewise reason, when it considereth any 389 BOETHII 105 uniuersale respicit, nee imaginatione nee sensibus utens imaginabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita definiuit: homo est animal bipes rationale. Quae cum uniuersalis iiotio sit, turn imaginabilem sensi- 110 bilemque esse rem nullus ignorat, quod ilia non imaginatione uel sensu sed in rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque tametsi ex sensibus uisendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente sensibilia quaeque conlustrat non 115 sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iudicandi. Videsne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta sua potius facultate quam eorum quae cognoscuntur utantur? Neque id iniuria; nam cum omne indicium iudicantis actus exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non ex 120 aliena sed ex propria potestate perficiat.
IV.
Quondam porticus attulit Obscuros nimium senes Qui sensus et imagines E corporibus extimis 5 Credant mentibus imprimi, Vt quondam celeri stilo Mos est aequore paginae, Quae nullas habeat notas, Pressas figere litteras.
10 Sed mens si propriis uigens Nihil motibus explicat, Sed tantum patiens iacet Notis subdita corporum a The Porch, i.e. the Painted Porch (oroi troidXr]) at Athens, the great hall adorned with frescoes of the battle 390 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.
universality, comprehendeth both imagination and sensible things without the use of either imagination or senses. For she defineth the universality of her conceit thus: Man is a reasonable, two-footed, living creature, which being an universal knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable con ceiving and not by imagination or sense. Imagina tion also, although it began by the senses of seeing and forming figures, yet when sense is absent it beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how all these in knowing do rather use their own force and faculty than the force of those things which are known? Nor undeservedly; for since all judgment is the act of him whojudgeth, it is necessary that every one should perfect his operation by his own power and not by the force of any other.
IV.
Cloudy old prophets of the Porch « once taught. That sense and shape presented to the thought From outward objects their impression take, As when upon a paper smooth and plain On which as yet no marks of ink have lain We with a nimble pen do letters make. But if our minds to nothing can apply Their proper motions, but do patient lie Subject to forms which do from bodies flow, of Marathon, which served as lecture-room to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect.
391 BOETHII Cassasque in speculi uicem 15 Rerum reddit imagines, Vnde haec sic animis uiget Cernens omnia notio?
Quae uis singula perspicit Aut quae cognita diuidit? 20 Quae diuisa recolligit A Item unique legens iter Nunc summis caput inserit, Nunc decedit in infima, Turn sese referens sibi 25 Veris falsa redarguit?
Haec est efficiens magis Longe causa potentior Quam quae materiae niodo Impressas patitur notas. 30 Praecedit tamen excitans Ac uires animi mouens Viuo in corpora passio.
Cum uel lux oculos ferit Vel uox auribus instrepit, 35 Tuni mentis uigor excitus Quas intus species tenet Ad motus similes uocans Notis applicat ex tens Introrsumque reconditis 40 Formis miscet imagines.
V.
Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamuis afficiant instrumenta sensuum forinsecus obiectac qualitates 0 Cf. Quin potius noscas rerum simulacra uagari Multa modis multis nulla ui cassaque sensu. " But rather you are to know that idols of things wander 392 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V As a glass renders empty a shapes of things, Who then can show from whence that motion springs By force of which the mind all things doth know? Or by what skill are several things espied? And being known what power doth them divide, And thus divided doth again unite, And with a various journey oft aspires To highest things, and oft again retires To basest, nothing being out of sight, And when she back unto herself doth move, Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reprove?
This vigour needs must be an active cause, And with more powerful forces must be deckt, Than that which from those forms, that do reflect From outward matter, all her virtue draws. And yet in living bodies passion's might Doth go before, whose office is to incite, And the first motions in the mind to make. As when the light unto our eyes appears, Or some loud voice is sounded in our ears, Then dotli the strength of the dull mind awake Those phantasies which she retains within; She stirreth up such notions to begin, Whose objects with their natures best agree, And thus applying them to outward things, She joins the external shapes which thence she brings With forms which in herself included be.
V.
And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objects do move the organs of sense, about manv in number in many ways, of no force, powerless to excite sense."— Luc-r. iv. 127, 128 (trans. Munro).
393 BOETHII animique agentis uigorem passio corporis antecedat quae in se actum mentis prouocet excitetque interim 5 quiescentes intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non passione insignitur, sed ex sua ui subiectam corpori iudicat passionem^ quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus 10 sequuntur, sed actum suae mentis expediunt? Hac itaque ratione multiplices cognitiones diuersis ac differentibus cessere substantiis. Sensus enim solus cunctis aiiis cognitionibus destitutus immobilibus animantibus cessit quales sunt conchae maris quaeque 15 alia saxis haereritia nutriuritur, imagiiiatio uero mobilibus beluis quibus iam inesse fugiendi appe- tendiue aliquis uidetur affectus, ratio uero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia sola diuini. Quo fit ut ea notitia ceteris praestet quae suapte 20 natura non modo proprium sed ceterarum quoque notitiarum subiecta cognoscit. Quid igitur, si ratio cination! sensus imaginatioque refragentur, nihil esse illud uniuersale dicentes quod sese intueri ratio putet? Quod enim sensibile uel imaginabile est, id 25 uniuersum esse non posse; aut igitur rationis uerum esse indicium nee quidquam esse sensibile, aut quoniam sibi notum sit plura sensibus et imagination] esse subiecta, iiianem conceptionem esse rationis quae quod sensibile sit ac singulare quasi quiddam uniuer- 30 sale consideret. Ad haec, si ratio contra respondeat se quidem et quod sensibile et quod imaginabile sit in uniuersitatis ratione conspicere, ilia uero ad uni- uersitatis cognitionem adspirare non posse, quoniam 394 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.
and tlie passion of the body goeth before the vigour of the aetive mind, provoking her action to itseli' and exciting the inward forms which before lay quiet; if, I say, in perceiving these corporal objects the mind taketli not her impression from passion, but by her own force judgeth of the passion itself, which is objected to the body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind and not only follow the outward objects in their judgment, which are free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort have diverse and different substances knowledges of many kinds. For only sense destitute of all other means of knowledge is in those living creatures which are immovable, as some shell-fish and other which stick to stones and so are nourished; and imagination in movable beasts who seem to have some power to covet and fly. But reason belongeth only to mankind, as understanding to things divine. So that that knowledge is most excellent which of itself doth not only know her own object, but also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination repugn to dis course and reason, affirming that universality to b« nothing which reason thinketh herself to see? For that cannot be universal, they argue, which is either sensible or imaginable; wherefore either the judg ment of reason must be true and nothing at all sensible, or because they know that many things are subject to the senses and imagination, the conceit of reason is vain, which considereth that which is sensible and singular as if it were universal. More over if reason should answer that she beholdeth in her universality all that which is sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of umversal- itv because their knowledge cannot surpass corporal 395 BOETHII eorum notio corporales figuras non possit excedere, de 35 rerum uero cognitione firmiori potius perfectiorique iudicio esse credendum, in huiusmodi igitur lite nos quibus tarn ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiam sentieridique uis inest nonne rationis potius causam probaremus? Simile est quod humana ratio diuinam 40 intellegentiam futura, nisi ut ipsa cognoscit, non putat intueri. Nam ita disseris: Si qua certos ac necessarios habere non uideantur euentus, ea certo euentura praesciri nequeunt. Harum igitur rerum nulla est praescientia, quam si etiam in his esse 45 credamus, hihil erit quod non ex necessitate pro- ueniat. Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus, ita diuinae iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem sensumque rationi cedere oportere iudicauimus, sic diuinae sese menti humanam sub- 50 mittere rationem iustissimum censeremus. Quare in illius summae intellegentiae cacumen, si possumus, erigamur; illic enim ratio uidebit quod in se non potest intueri, id autem est, quonam modo etiam quae certos exitus non habent, certa tamen uideat 55 ac definita praenotio neque id sit opinio sed summae potius scientiae nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas.
V.
Quam uariis terras animalia permeant figuris! Namque alia extento sunt corpore puiueremque uerrunt 396 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.
figures and shapes, and that we must give more credit to the firmer and more perfect judgment about the knowledge of things, in this contention should not we, who have the power of discoursing as well as of imagination and sense, rather take reason's part? The very like happeneth when human reason doth not think that the divine understanding doth behold future things otherwise than she herself doth. For thus thou arguest: If any things seem not to have certain and necessary events, they cannot be certainly foreknown to be to come. Wherefore there is no foreknowledge of these things, and if we think that there is any, there shall be nothing which happeneth not of necessity. If, therefore, as \ve are endued with reason, we could likewise have the judgment proper to the divine mind, as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield to reason, so like wise we would think it most reasonable and just that human reason should submit herself to the divine mind. Wherefore let us be lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind; for there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in herself. And that is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the simplicity of the highest knowledge en closed within no bounds.
What several figures things that live upon the earth do keep! Some have their bodies stretched in length by which the dust they sweep 397 BOETHII Continuumque trahunt ui pectoris incitata sulcum, Sunt quibus alarum leuitas uaga uerberetque uentos 5 Et liquido longi spatia aetheris enatet uolatu, Haec pressisse solo uestigia gressibusque gaudent Vel uirides campos transmittere uel subire siluas. Quae uariis uideas licet omnia discrepare formis, Frona tamen facies hebetes ualet ingrauare sensus.
10 Viiica gens hominura celsurn leuat altius cacumen Atque leuis recto stat corpore despicitque terras. Haec nisi terrenus male desipis, admonet figura, Qui recto caelum uultu petis exserisque frontem, In sublime feras animum quoque, ne grauata pessum 16 Inferior sidat meiis corpore celsius leuato.
VI.
Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omne quod scitur non ex sua sed ex conprehen- dentlum natura cognoscitur, intueamur nunc quantum fas est, quis sit diuinae substantiae status, ut quaenam 398 CONSOLAT, PHILOSOPH. V.
And do continual furrows make while on their breasts they creep. Some lightly soaring up on high with wings the wind do smite And through the longest airy space pass with an easy flight. Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight, Which through the pleasant fields do pass or to the woods do go, Whose several forms though to our eyes they do a difference show, Yet by their looks cast down on earth their senses heavy grow. Men only with more stately shape to higher objects rise, Who with erected bodies stand and do the earth despise. These figures warn (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes) That thou who with an upright face dost look upon the sky, Shouldst also raise thv mind aloft, lest while thou bearest high Thine earthly head, thy soul opprest beneath thy body lie.
VI.
Seeing, therefore, as hath been showed, all that is known is not comprehended by its own nature SHI! h\ I h. power oi' him \\ liifii c^mprehendj th n. let us see now, as much as we may, what is the state of the divine substance that we may also know what 399 BOETHII 399 BOETHII 5 etiam scientia eius sit, possimus agnoscere. Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeternitas consideremus; haec enim nobis naturam paritei diuiiiam scientiamque patefacit. Aeternitas igitur 10 est interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta pos- sessio, quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid uiuit in tempore id praesens a prae- teritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod totum uitae suae spatium pariter 15 possit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem nondum ad- prehendit, hesternum uero iam perdidit; in hodierna quoque uita non amplius uiuitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur temporis patitur condicionem, licet illud, sicuti de mundo censuit 20 Aristoteles, nee coeperit umquam esse nee desinat uitaque eius cum temporis irinnitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est ut aeternum esse iure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitae licet uitae spatium com- prehendit atque complectitur, sed futura nondum 25 transacta iam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis uitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit nee prae- teriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse iure perhibetur, idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper ad- 30 sistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere prae- sentem. Vnde non recte quidam, qui cum audiunt uisum Platoni mundum hunc nee habuisse initium temporis nee habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coaeternum putant.
85 Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci uitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis uitae totam 400 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.
His knowledge is. Wherefore it is the common judgment of all that live by reason that God is ever lasting, and therefore let us consider what eternity is. For this declareth unto us both the divine nature and knowledge. Eternity therefore is a perfect pos session altogether of an endless life, which is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever liveth in time, that being present pro- ceedeth from times past to times to come, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace all the space of its life at once. But it hath not yet attained to-morrow and hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in that movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, what soever suffereth the condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time, vet it is not such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness of an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent, nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself, it may always be present. t£LJts.elf, and have an infinity of movable time present to it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever have any end, think that by this means the created world should be coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing o 401 BOETHII pariter complexum esse praesentiam, quod diuinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque deus conditis rebus aiitiquior uideri debet temporis quan- 40 titate sed simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim uitae immobilis praesentarium statum infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur cumque eum effingere atque aequare non possit, ex irnmobilitate deficit in motum, ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit 45 in infinitain futuri ac praeteriti quantitatem; et cum totani pariter uitae suae plenittidinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo numquam esse desinit, illud quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus uidetur aemulari alligans se ad 50 qualemcumque praesentiam huius exigui uolucrisque momenti, quae, quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque contigerit id praestat ut esse uideantur. Quoniam uero manere non potuit, infinitum temporis iter arripuit eoque 55 modo factum est ut continuaret eundo uitam cuius plenitudinem complecti non ualuit permanendo. Itaque si digna rebus nomina uelimus imponere, Platonem sequentes deum quidem aeternum, mun- dum uero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur 60 omne iudicium secundum sui riaturam quae sibi sub- iecta sunt comprehendit., est autem deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status; scientia quoque eius omnem temporis supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque praeteriti 65 ac futuri spatia complectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si prae sentiam pensare uelis qua cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis; unde non 402 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. V.