I. Commuuis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam. Harum duplex modus est.
20 Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum, ueluti si hanc proponas: " Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est doctorum tantum, quae tanien ex talibus communis animi 25 conceptionibus uenit, ut est: " Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse/' et cetera; quae non uulgus sed docti comprobant.
II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero quod est accepta essendi 30 forma est atque consistit.
III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat. Fit enim partici- patio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid, cum esse susceperit.
35 IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic enim accidens hie 40 substantia significatur.
a On this mathematical method of exposition cf. Cons. ill pr. 10 (infra, p. 270).
6 Esse = Aristotle's rb ri tan; id quod est = r<55e rl. e Consistere = inroarrivai.
40 QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE a language understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore followed the example of the mathematical a and cognate sciences and laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that follows.
I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible; as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the re mainders are equal." Nobody who grasps that pro position will deny it. The other kind is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same class of common conceptions; as " Incorporeals cannot occupy space/' and the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
II. Being and a concrete thing6 are different. Simple Being awaits manifestation, but a thing is and exists c as soon as it has received the form which gives it Being.
III. A concrete thing can participate in some thing else; but absolute Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has acquired Being.
IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different; the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
41 BOETHII VI. Omne quod est1 participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.
45 VII. Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.
VIII. Omni composite aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.
IX. Omnis diuevsitas discors, similitude uero 50 appetenda est; et quod appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc ipsum quod appetit.
Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus; a prudeate uero rationis interprete suis unumquodque aptabitur 55 argumentis.
Quaestio uero huiusmodi est. Ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt 60 bona ipsa sunt. Sed quemadmodum bona sint, in- quirendum est, utrumne participatione an substantia? Si participatione, per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est album non est. Et de ceteris qualitatibus 65 eodem modo. Si igitur participatione sunt bona, ipsa per se nullo modo bona sunt: non igitur ad bonum tendunt. Sed concessum est. Non igitur participatione sunt bona sed substantia. Quorum 1 est codd. infer lores; om. codd. opt.
a Id quod est esse = rb ri ty elvai. 42 QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being a through the fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate in something else.
VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its particular Being.
VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one and the same.
IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it seeks.
These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to eacli point.
Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must, however, inquire how they are good — by participation or by substance. If by participation, they are in no wise good in them selves; for a thing which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are good not by participation but by substance.
43 BOETHII uero substantia bona est, id quod sunt bona sunt; 70 id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse. Esse igitur ipsorum bonum est; omnium igitur rerum ipsum esse bonum est. Sed si esse bonum est, ea quae sunt in eo quod sunt bona sunt idemque illis est esse quod boni esse; substantialia igitur bona 75 sunt, quoniam non participant bonitatem. Quod si ipsum esse in eis bonum est, non est dubium quin substantialia cum sint bona, primo sint bono similia ac per hoc hoc ipsum bonum eruiit; nihil enim illi praeter se ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit ut oirmia 80 quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est. Non sunt igitur substantialia bona ac per hoc non in his est esse bonum; non sunt igitur in eo quod sunt bona. Sed nee participant bonitatem; nullo enim modo ad bonum tenderent. Nullo modo igitur sunt 85 bona.
Huic quaestioni talis poterit adhiberi solutio. Multa sunt quae cum separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur; ut cum triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu 90 separat, mente tamen segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius praeter materiam speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni praesentiam paulisper ex animo, quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorurnque sententia barbararumque 95 gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper amoto ponamus omnia esse quae sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum bona esse a Cf. the similar reductio ad absurdum in Tr. 5 (infra, p. 98) and in Cons. v. pr. 3 (infra, p. 374). b Vide supra, p. 6, n. 6.
44 QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE But those things whose substance is good are sub stantially good. But they owe their actual Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good; therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness. But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself. Hence all things that are, are God — an impious assertion. Wherefore things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good."
This problem admits of the following solution.'' There are many things which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive 45 BOETHII possent, si a primo bono minime defluxissent. Hinc intueor aliud in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod 100 sunt. Ponatur enini uiia eademque substantia bona esse alba, grauis, rotunda. Tune aliud esset ipsa ilia substantia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas; nam si haec singula idem essent quod ipsa substantia, idem esset grauitas quod color, quod 105 bonum et bonum quod grauitas — quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud igitur tune in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse, ac tune bona quidern essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent, non a bono ac bona essent ac non idem 110 essent quod bona, sed eis aliud esset esse aliud bonis esse. Quod si nihil omnino aliud essent nisi bona neque grauia neque colorata neque spatii dimensione distenta nee ulla in eis qualitas esset, nisi tantum bona essent, tune non res sed rerum uideretur esse 115 principium nee potius uiderentur, sed uideretur; unum enini solumque est huiusmodi, quod tantum bonum aliudque nihil sit. Quae quoniam non sunt simplicia, nee esse omnino poterant, nisi ea id quod solum bonum est esse uoluisset. Idcirco quoniam 120 esse eorum a boni uoluntate defluxit, bona esse dicuntur. Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est; secundum uero bonum, quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum quo- que bonum est. Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo 125 fluxit quod est primum bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum. Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est; tune enim in eo.
46 QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE from the Prime Good. This process leads me to perceive that their Goodness and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it must be admitted that its substance, roundness, colour, and goodness are all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as its substance, weight would be the same thing as colour or goodness, and goodness would be the same as colour; which is contrary to nature. Their Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good. Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good substances, and were neither heavy, nor coloured, and possessed neither spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They are called good simply because their Being is derived from the Will of the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is good; for thereby it resides in Him.
47 BOETHII Qua in re soluta quaestio est. Idcirco enim licet in eo quod sint bona sint, non sunt tamen similia 130 priino bono, quoniam non quoquo modo sint res ipsum esse earum bonum est, sed quoniam non potest esse ipsum esse rerum, nisi a primo esse defluxerit, id est bono; idcirco ipsum esse bonum est nee est simile ei a quo est. Illud enim quoquo modo 135 sit bonum est in eo quod est; non enim aliud est praeterquam bonum. Hoc autem nisi ab illo esset, bonum fortasse esse posset, sed bonum in eo quod est esse non posset. Tune enim participaret forsitan bono; ipsum uero esse quod non haberent a bono, 140 bonum habere non possent. Igitur sublato ab his bono primo mente et cogitatione, ista licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod essent bona esse non possent, et quoniam actu non potuere exsistere, nisi illud ea quod uere bonum est produxisset, idcirco et esse 145 eorum bonum est et non est simile substantial} bono id quod ab eo fluxit; et nisi ab eo fluxissent, licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod sunt bona esse non possent, quoniam et praeter bonum et non ex bono essent, cum illud ipsum bonum primum est et ipsum 150 esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse bonum. At non etiam alba in eo quod sunt alba esse oportebit ea quae alba sunt, quoniam ex uoluntate dei fluxerunt ut essent, alba minime. Aliud est enim esse, aliud albis esse; hoc ideo, quoniam qui ea ut essent effecit 155 bonus quidem est, minime uero albus. Voluntatem 48 QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circum stances, but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good, would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial Good is not like its source which pro duces it. And unless they had derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we need not say that white things are white through the fact that they exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore in accord - o 49 BOETH1T igitur boni comitatum est ut essent bona in eo quod sunt; uoluntatem uero non albi non est comitata talis eius quod est proprietas ut esset album in eo quod est; neque enim ex albi uoluntate defluxerunt.
160 Itaque quia uoluit esse ea alba qui erat non albus, sunt alba tantum; quia uero uoluit ea esse bona qui erat bonus, sunt bona in eo quod sunt. Secundum hanc igitur rationem cuncta oportet esse iusta, quoniam ipse iustus est qui ea esse uoluit? Ne hoc 165 quidem. Nam bonum esse essentiam, iustum uero esse actum respicit. Idem autem est in eo esse quod agere; idem igitur bonum esse quod iustum. Nobis uero non est idem esse quod agere; non enim simplices sumus. Non est igitur nobis idem bonis 170 esse quod iustis, sed idem nobis est esse omnibus in eo quod sumus. Bona igitur omnia sunt, non etiam iusta. Amplius bonum quidem generale est, iustum uero speciale nee species descendit in omnia. Idcirco alia quidem iusta alia aliud omnia bona.
50 QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE ance with the will of the Good that they should be good through the i'act that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be good. Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the same sort of Being in virtue of our existence. Therefore all things are good, but all things are not just. Finally, good is a general, but just is a species, and this species does not apply to all. Wherefore eome things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.
DE FIDE CATHOLICA DE FIDE CATHOLICA CHRISTIANAM fidem noui ac ueteris testamenti pan dit auctoritas; et quamuis nomen ipsum Christ! uetus intra semet continuerit instrumentum eumque semper signauerit affuturum quern credimusperpartum 5 uirginis iam uenisse,tamen in orbem terrarum ab ipsius nostri saluatoris mirabili manasse probatur aduentu.
Haec autem religio nostra, quae uocatur Christiana atque catholica, his fundamentis principaliter nititur asserens: ex aeterno, id est ante mundi constitu- 10 tionem, ante omne uidelicet quod temporis potest retinere uocabulum, diuinam patris et filii ac spiritus sancti exstitisse substantial^ ita ut deum dicat patrem, deum filium, deum spiritum sanctum, nee tamen tres deos sed unum: patrem itaque habere 16 filium ex sua substantia genitum et sibi nota ratione coaeternum, quern filium eatenus confitetur, ut non sit idem qui pater est: neque patrem aliquando f'uisse filium, ne rursus in infinitum humanus animus a The conclusions adverse to the genuineness of this tractate, reached in the dissertation Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat de Fide Catholica (Jahrbucher fur kl. Phil. xxvi. (1901) Suppleraentband) by one of the editors, now seem to both unsound. The writer of that dissertation intends to return to the subject elsewhere. This fourth tractate, though lacking, in the best MSS., either an ascrip tion to Boethius or a title, is firmly imbedded in two distinct recensions of Boethius's theological works. There is no 52 ON THE CATHOLIC FAITH THE Christian Faith is proclaimed by the authority of the New Testament and of the Old; but although the Old scripture b contains within its pages the name of Christand constantly gives token that He will come who we believe has already come by the birth of the Virgin, yet the diffusion of that faith throughout the world dates from the actual miraculous coming of our Saviour. Now this our religion which is called Christian and Catholic is founded chiefly on the following assertions. From all eternity, that is, before the world was esta blished, and so before all that is meant by time began, there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, and yet not three Gods but one God. Thus the Father hath the Son, begotten of His substance and coeternal with Himself after a manner that He alone knoweth. Him we confess to be Son in the sense that He is not the same as the Father. Nor has the Father ever been Son, for the human mind must not reason to disturb it. Indeed the capita dogmatica mentioned by Cassiodorus can hardly refer to any of the tractates except the fourth.
* For instrumentum = Ho\y Scripture cf. Tertull. Apol. 18, 19, adv. Hermoff. 19, etc.; for instrumentum - any histori cal writing cf. Tert. De Sped. &.
53 BOETHII diuinam progeniem cogitaret, neque filium in eadem 20 natura qua patri coaeternus est aliquando fieri patrem, ne rursus in infinitum diuina progenies tenderetur: sanctum uero spiritum neque patrem esse neque filium atque ideo in ilia natura nee genitum nee generantem sed a patre quoque pro- 25 cedentem uel filio; qui sit tamen processionis istius modus ita non possumus euidenter dicere, quemad- modum generationem filii ex paterna substantia non potest humanus animus aestimare. Haec autem ut credantur uetus ac noua informat instructio. De 30 qua uelut arce religionis nostrae multi diuersa et humaniter atque ut ita dicam carnaliter sentientes aduersa locuti sunt, ut Arrius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur. Sabelliani quoque 35 non tres exsistentes personas sed uiiam ausi sunt affirmare, eundem dicentes patrem esse qui filius est eundemque filium qui pater est atque spiritum sanctum eundem esse qui pater et filius est; ac per hoc unam dicunt esse personam sub uocabulorum 40 diuersitate signatam.
Manichaei quoque qui duo principia sibi coaeterna et aduersa profitentur, unigenitum dei esse non credunt. Indignum enim iudicant, si deus habere filium uideatur, nihil aliud cogitantes nisi carnaliter, 45 ut quia haec generatio duorum corporum commixa Boethius is no heretic. By the sixth century uel had lost its strong separative force. Cp. " Noe cum sua uel trium natorum coniugibus," Greg. Tur. H.F. i. 20. Other examples in Bonnet, La Latinite de Gr6g. de Tours, p. 313, and in Brandt's edition of the Isag. Index, s.v. uel.
b Vide Cons. i. pr. 3 (infra, p. 140), and cf. Dante, De Mon. iii. 16. 117.
0 Ut quia. A very rare use. Cf. Baehrens, Beitrdge zur 54 DE FIDE CATHOLICA imagine a divine lineage stretching back into infinity; nor can the Son, being of the same nature in virtue of which He is coeternal with the Father, ever become Father, for the divine lineage must not stretch forward into infinity. But the Holy Spirit is neither Father nor Son, and therefore, albeit of the same divine nature, neither begotten, nor begetting, but proceeding as well from the Father as the Son." Yet what the manner of that Pro cession is we are no more able to state clearly than is the human mind able to understand the genera tion of the Son from the substance of the Father. But these articles are laid down for our belief by Old and New Testament. Concerning which fortress and citadel b of our religion many men have spoken otherwise and have even impugned it, being moved by human, nay rather by carnal feeling. Arius, for instance, who, while calling the Son God, declares Him to be vastly inferior to the Father and of another substance. The Sabellians also have dared to affirm that, there are not three separate Persons but only One, saying that the Father is the same as the Son and the Son the same as the Father and the Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; and so declaring that there is but one divine Person expressed by different names.
The Manichaeans, too, who allow two coeternal and contrary principles, do not believe in the Only- begotten Son of God. For they consider it a thought unworthy of God that He should have a Son, since they entertain the very carnal reflection that inasmuch asc human generation arises from the mingling of two lat. Syntaxis (Philologus, Supplenicntband xii. 1912). It perhaps = Aristotle's ' olov tied. Cf. McKinlay, Harvard Studies in Cl. Ph'doL xviii. 153.
55 BOETHII tione procedit, illic quoque indignura esse intellectum huiusmodi applicare; quae res eos nee uetus facit recipere testamentum neque in integro nouum. Nam sicut illud omnino error eorum non recipit ita 60 ex uirgine generationein filii non uult admittere, ne humano corpore polluta uideatur del fuisse natura. Sed de his hactenus; suo enim loco ponentur sicut ordo necessarius postularit.
Ergo diuina ex aeterno natura et in aeternum 65 sine aliqua mutabilitate perdurans sibi tantum conscia uoluntate sponte muiidum uoluit fabricare eumque cum omnino non esset fecit ut esset, nee ex sua substantia protulit, ne diuinus natura crederetur, neque aliunde molitus est, ne iam exstitisse aliquid 60 quod eius uoluntatem exsistentia propriae naturae iuuaret atque esset quod neque ab ipso factum esset et tamen esset; sed uerbo produxit caelos, terram creauit, ita ut caelesti habitation e dignas caelo naturas efficeret ac terrae terrena componeret. De 65 caelestibus autem naturis, quae uniuersaliter uocatur angelica, quamuis illic distinctis ordinibus pulclira sint omnia, pars tamen quaedam plus appetens qtiam ei natura atque ipsius auctor naturae tribuerat de caelesti sede proiecta est; et quoniam angelorum 70 numerurn, id est supernae illius ciuitatis cuius ciues angeli sunt, imminutum noluit conditor permanere, formauit ex terra hominem atque spiritu uitae ani- mauit, ratione composuit, arbitrii libertate decorauit a In integro = prorsus; cf. Brandt, op. cit. Index, s.v. integer.
6 The doctrine is orthodox, but note that Boethius does not say ex nihilo creauit. Vide infra, p. 366 11. 24 ff.
56 DE FIDE CATHOLICA bodies, it is unworthy to hold a notion of this sort in respect of the divine nature; whereas such a view finds no sanction in the Old Testament and absolutely a none in the New. Yea, their error which refuses this notion also refuses the Virgin birth of the Son, because they would not have the God's nature defiled by the man's body. But enough of this for the present; the points will be presented in the proper place as the proper arrangement demands.
The divine nature then, abiding from all eternity and unto all eternity without any change, by the exercise of a will known only to Himself, determined of Himself to form the world, and brought it into being when it was absolutely naught, nor did He produce it from His own substance, lest it should be thought divine by nature, nor did He form it after any model, lest it should be thought that anything had already come into being which helped His will by the existence of an independent nature, and that there should exist something that had not been made by Him and yet existed; but by His Word He brought forth the heavens, and created the earth6 that so He might make natures worthy of a place in heaven, and also fit earthly things to earth. But although in heaven all things are beautiful and arranged in due order, yet one part of the heavenly creation which is universally termed angelic/ seeking more than nature and the Author of Nature had granted them, was cast forth from its heavenly habitation; and because the Creator did not wish the roll of the angels, that is of the heavenly city whose citizens the angels are, to be diminished, He formed man out of the earth and breathed into him the breath of life; He endowed him with reason. He