also infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions”[83]—true conclusions, once more, being those which command the agreement of competent inquiries.
Summing up, we may say that Peirce’s pragmaticism is a doctrine concerning the meaning, conception, or rational purport of objects, namely, that these consist in the “effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”[84] “Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects,” and if we have any doubt as to whether we really believe the effects to be sensible or no, we have only to ask ourselves whether or no we should act any differently in their presence. In short, our own responses to sensory stimuli are the ultimate, or testing, ingredients in our conception of an object. In the literal sense of the word pragmatist, therefore, Peirce is more of a pragmatist than James.
He is also less of a nominalist. That is to say, he emphasizes much less the _particular_ sensible consequence, and much more the habit, the generic attitude of response, set up in consequence of experiences with a thing. In the passage in the Dictionary already quoted he speaks as if in his later life he attached less importance to action, and more to “concrete reasonableness” than in his earlier writing. It may well be that the relative emphasis had shifted. But there is at most but a difference of emphasis. For in his later doctrine, concrete rationality means a change in existence brought about _through_ action, and through action which embodies conceptions whose own specific existence consists in habitual attitudes of response. In his earlier writing, the emphasis upon habits, as something generic, is explicit. “What a thing means is simply what habits it involves.”[85] More elaborately, “Induction infers a rule. Now the belief of a rule is a habit. That a habit is a rule, active in us, is evident. That every belief is of the nature of a habit, in so far as it is of a general character, has been shown in the earlier papers of this series.”[86] The difference between Peirce and James which next strikes us is the greater emphasis placed by the former upon the method of procedure. As the quotations already made show, everything ultimately turned, for Peirce, upon the trustworthiness of the procedures of inquiry. Hence his high estimate of logic, as compared with James—at least James in his later days. Hence also his definite rejection of the appeal to the Will to Believe—under the form of what he calls the method of tenacity.
Closely associated with this is the fact that Peirce has a more explicit dependence upon the social factor than has James. The appeal in Peirce is essentially to the consensus of those who have investigated, using methods which are capable of employment by all. It is the need for social agreement, and the fact that in its absence “the method of tenacity” will be exposed to disintegration from without, which finally forces upon mankind the wider and wider utilization of the scientific method.
Finally, both Peirce and James are realists. The reasonings of both depend upon the assumption of real things which really have effects or consequences. Of the two, Peirce makes clearer the fact that in philosophy at least we are dealing with the _conception_ of reality, with reality as a term having rational purport, and hence with something whose meaning is itself to be determined in terms of consequences. That “reality” means the object of those beliefs which have, after prolonged and coöperative inquiry, becomes stable, and “truth” the quality of these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position. Thus while “we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be...it would be a great mistake to suppose that this definition makes the idea of reality perfectly clear.”[87] For it is only the outcome of persistent and conjoint inquiry which enables us to give intelligible meaning in the concrete to the expression “characters independent of what anybody may think them to be.” (This is the pragmatic way out of the egocentric predicament.) And while my purpose is wholly expository I can not close without inquiring whether recourse to Peirce would not have a most beneficial influence in contemporary discussion. Do not a large part of our epistemological difficulties arise from an attempt to define the “real” as something given prior to reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective inquiry is forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can stably cling?
Footnote 77: See article on “Pragmatism,” in _Baldwin’s Dictionary_, Vol. 2., p.
Footnote 78: Kant discriminates the laws of morality, which are _a priori_, from rules of skill, having to do with technique or art, and counsels of prudence, having to do with welfare. The latter he calls pragmatic; the _a priori_ laws practical. See _Metaphysics of Morals_, Abbott’s trans., pp. 33 and 34.
Footnote 79: See the article in the _Monist_ already mentioned, and another one in the same volume, p. 481, “The Issues of Pragmaticism.”
Footnote 80: It is probably fair to see here an empirical rendering of the Kantian generality of moral action, while the distinction and connection of “rational purport” and “sensible particular” have also obvious Kantian associations.
Footnote 81: P. 26.
Footnote 84: P. 45.
Footnote 85: P. 43.
Footnote 87: P. 53.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PEIRCE’S PUBLISHED WRITINGS I. Writings of General Interest.[88] _A._ Three papers in the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, Vol. 2 (1868).
1. “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” pp.
103-114.
2. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” pp. 140-157.
3. “Ground of Validity of the Laws of Logic,” pp. 193-208.
These three papers, somewhat loosely connected, deal mainly with the philosophy of discursive thought. The first deals with our power of intuition, and holds that “every thought is a sign.” The second, one of the most remarkable of Peirce’s writings, contains an acute criticism of the Cartesian tradition and a noteworthy argument against the traditional emphasis on “images” in thinking. The third contains, _inter alia_, a refutation of Mill’s indictment of the syllogism. The same volume of the _Journal_ contains two unsigned communications on Nominalism and on the Meaning of Determined.
_B._ Review of Fraser’s “Berkeley,” in the _North American Review_, This paper contains an important analysis on medieval realism, and of Berkeley’s nominalism. (A Scotist realism continues to distinguish Peirce’s work after this.)
_C._ “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” in _Popular Science Monthly_, Vols. 12-13 (1877-1878). Reprinted in Pt. I of this volume. The first and second papers were also published in the _D._ Ten papers in the _Monist_, Vols. 1-3 (1891-1893), and 15-16 (1905-1906). The first five are reprinted in Pt. II of this volume.
The sixth paper, “Reply to the Necessitarians,” Vol. 3, pp. 526-570, is an answer to the criticism of the foregoing by the editor of the _Monist_, Vol. 2, pp. 560ff.; cf. Vol. 3, pp. 68ff. and 571ff., and McCrie, “The Issues of Synechism,” Vol. 3, pp. 380ff.
10. “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” Vol. 16, pp.
492-546.
The last four papers develop Peirce’s thought by showing its agreement and disagreement with the pragmatism of James and Schiller. The last paper contains his Method of Existential Graphs.
pp. 96-112. (This article contains brief indications of many of Peirce’s leading ideas.)
_F._ Six Papers in the _Open Court_, Vols. 6-7 (1893).
1. “Pythagorics” (on the Pythagorean brotherhood), pp. 3375-3377.
2. “Dmesis” (on charity towards criminals), pp. 3399-3402.
3. “The Critic of Arguments (I.), Exact Thinking,” pp. 3391-3394.
4. “The Critic of Arguments (II.), The Reader is Introduced to Relatives,” pp. 3415-3419. (The last two contain a very clear succinct account of the general character of Peirce’s logic.)
6. “The Marriage of Religion and Science,” pp. 3559-3560.
_G._ Articles in Baldwin’s “Dictionary of Philosophy”: Individual, kind, matter and form, possibility, pragmatism, priority, reasoning, sign, scientific method, sufficient reason, synechism, and uniformity.
Vol. 58 (1901), pp. 296-306. (A critique of Pearson’s conceptualism and of his utilitarian view as to the aim of science.)
II. Writings of Predominantly Logical Interest.
_A._ Five Papers on Logic, read before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Published in the _Proceedings of the Academy_, Vol. 7 (1867).
1. “On an Improvement in Boole’s Calculus of Logic,” pp. 250-261.
(Suggests improvements in Boole’s logic, especially in the representation of particular propositions. The association of probability with the notion of relative frequency became a leading idea of Peirce’s thought.)
2. “On the Natural Classification of Arguments,” pp. 261-287. (A suggestive distinction between the leading principle and the premise of an argument. Contains also an interesting note (pp. 283-284) denying the positivistic maxim that, “no hypothesis is admissible which is not capable of verification by direct observation.”)
3. “On a New List of Categories,” pp. 287-298. The categories are: Being, Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation (Reference to a Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), Substance. “Logic has for its subject-genus all symbols and not merely concepts.” Symbols include terms, propositions, and arguments.
4. “Upon the Logic of Mathematics,” pp. 402-412. “There are certain general propositions from which the truths of mathematics follow syllogistically.”
5. “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension,” pp. 416-432.
(Interesting historical references to the use of these terms and an attack on the supposed rule as to their inverse proportionality.)
_B._ “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relations,” in _Memoires of the American Academy_, Vol. 9 (1870), pp. 317-378.
(Shows the relation of inclusion between classes to be more fundamental than Boole’s use of equality. Extends the Booleian calculus to DeMorgan’s logic of relative terms.)
_C._ “On the Algebra of Logic,” _American Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 3 (1880), pp. 15-57. (Referred to by Schroeder as Peirce’s _Hauptwerk_ in “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik,” Vol. 1., p.
107.)
_D._ “On the Logic of Number,” _American Journal of Mathematics_, _E._ “Brief Description of the Algebra of Relatives,” Reprinted from ??, pp. 1-6.
_F._ “On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of 180-202.
_G._ “A Theory of Probable Inference” and notes “On a Limited Universe of Marks” and on the “Logic of Relatives” in “Studies in Logic by members of the Johns Hopkins University,” Boston, 1883, pp.
126-203.
“The Logic of Relatives,” _Monist_, Vol. 7, pp. 161-217. (An elaborate development of his own logic of relatives, by way of review of Schroeder’s book.)
_I._ Miscellaneous Notes, etc.
July, 1867.
2. “On the Application of Logical Analysis to Multiple Algebra,” _Proceedings of the American Academy_, Vol. 10 (1875), pp. 392-394.
5. Notes and Additions to Benjamin Peirce’s “Linear Associative 92ff., especially pp. 221-229.
(1888).
and Vol. 19 (Jan., 1909).
_J._ A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic. 1903. Boston. Alfred Mudge & Son (a four page brochure).
_K._ Articles in Baldwin’s “Dictionary of Philosophy” on: laws of thought, leading principle, logic (exact and symbolic), modality, negation, predicate and predication, probable inference, quality, quantity, relatives, significant, simple, subject, syllogism, theory, truth and falsity universal, universe, validity, verification, whole and parts.
III. Researches in the Theory and Methods of Measurement.
_A._ General and Astronomic.
1. “On the Theory of Errors of Observation,” _Report of the Superintendent of the U. S. Coast Survey_ for 1870, pp. 220-224.
2. “Note on the Theory of Economy of Research,” _Report of the U. S.
Coast Survey_ for 1876, pp. 197-201. (This paper deals with the relation between the utility and the cost of diminishing the probable error.)
3. “Apparatus for Recording a Mean of Observed Times,” _U. S. Coast 4. “Ferrero’s Metodo dei Minimi Quadrati,” _American Journal of 5. “Photometric Researches,” _Annals of the Astronomical Observatory of Harvard College_, Vol. 9 (1878), pp. 1-181.
6. “Methods and Results. Measurement of Gravity.” Washington. 1879.
7. “Methods and Results. A Catalogue of Stars for Observations of Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 2 (1879), pp. 330-347.
12. “Proceedings Assay Commission” Washington, 1888. (Joint Reports on Weighing.)
_B._ Geodetic Researches. The Pendulum.
1. “Measurement of Gravity at Initial Stations in America and 410-416.
2. “De l’influence de la flexibilité du trépied sur l’oscillation du pendule a réversion,” Conférence Geodesique Internationale (1877) Comptes Rendus, Berlin, 1878, pp. 171-187. (This paper was introduced by Plantamour and was followed by the notes of Appolzer.)
3. “On the Influence of Internal Friction upon the Correction of the Length of the Second’s Pendulum,” _Proceedings of the American 4. “On a Method of Swinging Pendulums for the Determination of Gravity proposed by M. Faye,” _American Journal of Science_, Vol. 18 Vol. 20 (1880).
7. “On the Deduction of the Ellipticity of the Earth from the 442-456.
8. “Determinations of Gravity at Stations in Pennsylvania,” _Report 9. “On the Use of the Noddy,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1884, pp. 475-482.
10. “Effect of the Flexure of a Pendulum upon the Period of 11. “On the Influence of a Noddy, and of Unequal Temperature upon the Periods of a Pendulum,” _Report of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic _C._ Psychologic. “On Small Differences in Sensation” (in cooperation with J. Jastrow), _National Academy of Sciences_, Vol. 3 (1884), pp. 1-11.
IV. Philologic.
“Shakespearian Pronunciation” (in coöperation with J. B. Noyes), V. Contributions to the _Nation_.
Lazelle, Capt. H. M., One Law in Nature. _Nation_, Vol. 17, No. 419.
Newcomb, S., Popular Astronomy. Vol. 27, No. 683.
Read, C., Theory of Logic, 1878. Vol. 28, No. 718.
Rood, O. N., Modern Chromatics, 1879. Vol. 29, No. 746.
Note on the _American Journal of Mathematics_. Vol. 29, No. 756.
Jevons, W. S., Studies in Deductive Logic, 1880. Vol. 32, No. 822.
Ribot, Th., The Psychology of Attention, 1890. Vol. 50, No. 1303.
James, W., The Principles of Psychology, 1890. Vol. 53, Nos. 1357 and 1358.
Comte, A. (F. Harrison, editor), The New Calendar of Great Men, Lobatchewsky, N. (Translator: G. B. Halsted), Geometrical Researches on the Theory of Parallels, 1891. Vol. 54, No. 1389.
Lombroso, C., The Man of Genius, 1891. Vol. 54, No. 1391.
Note on William James’ abridgment of his Psychology, 1892. Vol. 54, No. 1394.
McClelland, W. J., A Treatise on the Geometry of the Circle, 1891.
Vol. 54, No. 1395.
Buckley, Arabella B., Moral Teachings of Science, 1892. Vol. 54, No.
1405.
Hale, E. E., A New England Boyhood, 1893. Vol. 57, No. 1468.
Mach, E. (Translator: T. J. McCormack), The Science of Mechanics, Ritchie, D. G., Darwin and Hegel, 1893. Vol. 57, No. 1482.
Huxley, T. H., Method and Results, 1893. Vol. 58, No. 1489.
Scott, Sir Walter, Familiar Letters of Sir Walter Scott. Vol. 58, No. 1493.
Gilbert, W. (Translator: P. F. Mottelay), Magnetic Bodies. Vol. 58, No. 1494 and No. 1495.
Forsyth, A. R., Theory of Functions of a Complex Variable, 1893; and Harkness, J., A Treatise on the Theory of Functions, 1893; and A Short Sketch of Helmholtz, Sept. 13, 1894. Vol. 59, No. 1524.
Windelband, W. (Translator: J. H. Tufts), A History of Philosophy; and Falkenberg, R. (Translator: A. C. Armstrong), History of Modern Philosophy; and Bascom, J., An Historical Interpretation of Philosophy; and Burt, B. C., A History of Modern Philosophy. Vol.
Spinoza (Translators: W. H. White and Amelia H. Stirling), Ethics, Watson, J., Comte, Mill, and Spencer, 1895. Vol. 60, No. 1554.
Jones, H., A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze, 1895; and Eberhard, V., Die Grundbegriffe der ebenen Geometrie, 1895; and Klein, F. (Translator: A. Ziwet), Riemann and his Significance for the Development of Modern Mathematics, 1895; and Davis, N. K., Elements of Inductive Logic, 1895. Vol. 61, No. 1566.
Benjamin, P., The Intellectual Rise in Electricity, 1895. Vol. 62, No. 1592.
Baldwin, J. M., The Story of the Mind, 1898. Vol. 67, No. 1737.
Darwin, G. H., The Tides and Kindred Phenomena in the Solar System, Marshall, H. R., Instinct and Reason, 1898. Vol. 68, No. 1774.
Britten, F. J., Old Clocks and Watches and their Makers, 1899. Vol.
69, No. 1778.
Renouvier, Ch., et Prat, L. La Nouvelle Monadologie, 1899. Vol. 69, No. 1779.
Mackintosh, R., From Comte to Benjamin Kidd, 1899; and Moore, J. H., Avenel, G. d’, Le Mécanisme de la vie moderne, 1900. Vol. 70, No.
1805.
Reid, W., Memoirs and Correspondence of Lyon Playfair, 1899. Vol.
70, No. 1806.
Stevenson, F. S., Robert Grosseteste, 1899. Vol. 70, No. 1816.
Thilly, F., Introduction to Ethics, 1900. Vol. 70, No. 1825.
Wallace, A. R., Studies, Scientific and Social, 1900. Vol. 72, No.
1854.
Sime, J., William Herschel and His Work, 1900. Vol. 72, No. 1856.
Rand, B. (Editor), The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, 1900; and Robertson, J. M.
(Editor), Characteristics of Men, _etc._, by Shaftesbury, 1900. Vol.
72, No. 1857.
Bacon, Rev. J. M., By Land and Sea, 1901. Vol. 72, No. 1865.
Jordan, W. L., Essays in Illustration of the Action of Astral Gravitation in Natural Phenomena, 1900. Vol. 72, No. 1876.
Goblot, E., Le Vocabulaire Philosophique, 1901. Vol. 72, No. 1877.
Fraser, A. C. (Editor), The Works of George Berkeley, 1901. Vol. 73, No. 1883.
Frazer, P., Bibliotics, 1901. Vol. 73, No. 1883.
Caldecott, A., The Philosophy of Religion in England and America, Review of four physical books. Vol. 73, No. 1887.
Maher, M., Psychology: Empirical and Rational, 1901. Vol. 73, No.
1892.
Report of the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Philadelphia, 1901. Vol. 73, No. 1899.
Crozier, J. B., History of Intellectual Developments on the Lines of Modern Evolution. Vol. III., 1901, Vol. 74, No. 1908.
Richardson, E. C., Classification, Theoretical and Practical, 1901.
Vol. 74, No. 1913.
Vallery-Radot, R. (Translator: Mrs. R. L. Devonshire), The Life of Pasteur. Vol. 74, No. 1914.
Giddings, F. H., Inductive Sociology, 1902. Vol. 74, No. 1918.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Emerson, E. R., The Story of the Vine, 1902. Vol. 74, No. 1926.
Joachim, H. H., A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 1901. Vol. 75, No.
1932.
Review of four chemistry text-books, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1934.
Royce, J., The World and the Individual, Vol. II., 1901. Vol. 75, No. 1935. (For a review of Vol. I., probably by Peirce, see 1900, Vol. 70, No. 1814.)
Thorpe, T. E., Essays in Historical Chemistry, 1902. Vol. 75, No.
1938.
Paulsen, F., Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1941.
Aikens, H. A., The Principles of Logic, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1942.
Drude, P., The Theory of Optics, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1944.
Valentine, E. S., Travels in Space, 1902; and Walker, F., Aerial Navigation, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1947.
Baillie, J. B., The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic, 1901.
Vol. 75, No. 1950.
Forsyth, A. R., Theory of Differential Equations, Vol. IV., 1902.
Vol. 75, No. 1952.
Ellwanger, G. W., The Pleasures of the Table, 1902. Vol. 75, No.
1955.
Earle, Alice M., Sundials and Roses of Yesterday, 1902. Vol. 75, No.
1956.
Smith, Rev. T., Euclid: His Life and System, 1902. Vol. 76, No.
1961.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Mellor, J. W., Higher Mathematics for Students of Chemistry and Physics, 1903. Vol. 76, No. 1977.
Sturt, H. C. (Editor), Personal Idealism, 1902. Vol. 76, No. 1979.
Baldwin, J. M., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II., Note on Kant’s Prolegomene edited in English by Dr. P. Carus, 1903.
Vol. 76, No. 1981.
Smith, N., Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, 1902. Vol. 77, No.
1985.
Clerke, Agnes M., Problems in Astrophysics, 1903. Vol. 77, No. 1987.
Michelson, A. A., Light Waves and their Uses, 1903; and Fleming, J.
A., Waves and Ripples in Water, 1902. Vol. 77, No. 1989.
Note on Sir Norman Lockyer. Vol. 77, No. 1794.
Note on British and American Science, 1903. Vol. 77, No. 1996.
Welby, Lady Victoria, What is Meaning? 1903; and Russell, B., The Principles of Mathematics, 1903. Vol. 77, No. 1998.
Note on the Practical Application of the Theory of Functions, 1903.
Vol. 77, No. 1999.
Fahie, J. J., Galileo. Vol. 78, No. 2015.
Halsey, F. A., The Metric Fallacy, and Dale, S. S., The Metric Failure in the Textile Industry. Vol. 78, No. 2020.
Newcomb, S., The Reminiscences of an Astronomer, 1903. Vol. 78, No.
2021.
Boole, Mrs. M. E., Lectures on the Logic of Arithmetic, 1903; and Bowden, J., Elements of the Theory of Integers, 1903. Vol. 78, No.
2024.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Lévy-Bruhl, L. (Translator: Kathleen de Beaumont-Klein), The Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 1903. Vol. 78, No. 2026.
Turner, W., History of Philosophy, 1903. Vol. 79, No. 2036.
Duff, R. A., Spinoza’s Political and Ethical Philosophy. Vol. 79, No. 2038.
Allbutt, T. C., Notes on the Composition of Scientific Papers, 1904.
Vol. 79, No. 2039.
Sylvester, J. J., The Collected Mathematical Papers of, Vol. I. Vol.
79, No. 2045.
Renouvier, Ch., Les Derniers Entretiens, 1904, and Dewey, J., Studies in Logical Theory, 1903. Vol. 79, No. 2046.
Royce, J., Outlines of Psychology. Vol. 79, No. 2048.
Straton, G. M., Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture. Vol. 79, No. 2055.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, New York, Boole, Mrs. M. E., The Preparation of the Child for Science, 1904.
Vol. 80, No. 2062.
Royce, J., Herbert Spencer, 1904. Vol. 80, No. 2065.
Strutt, R. J., The Becquerel Rays and the Properties of Radium, Schuster, A., An Introduction to the Theory of Optics, 1904. Vol.
80, No. 2071.
Findlay, A., The Phase Rule and its Application, 1904. Vol. 80, No.
2074.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Flint, R., Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum, 1904; and Peirce, C.
S., A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, 1903. Vol. 80, No. 2079.
Arnold, R. B., Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality, 1904, also a Note on Mendeleeff’s Principles of Chemistry. Vol. 80, No. 2083.
Note on Ida Freund’s The Study of Chemical Composition. Vol. 80, No.
2086.
Carnegie, A., James Watt, 1905. Vol. 80, No. 2087.
Ross, E. A., Foundations of Sociology, 1905, and Sociological Papers, 1905, published by the Sociological Society. Vol. 81, No.
2089.
Wundt, W. (Translator: E. B. Titchener), Principles of Physiological Psychology, 1904. Vol. 81, No. 2090.
Roscoe, H. E., A Treatise on Chemistry, Vol. I., 1905, and de Fleury, M., Nos Enfants au Collège, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2097.
Varigny, H. de, La Nature et la Vie, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2101.
Note on Mr. G. W. Hill’s Moon Theory. Vol. 81, 2103.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, New Haven, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2108.
Gosse, E., Sir Thomas Browne, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2111.
Wallace, A. R., My Life, 1905. Vol. 82, No. 2121.
Haldane, Elizabeth S., Descartes. Vol. 82, No. 2125.
Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Rogers, H. J. (Editor), Congress of Arts and Sciences, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904. Vol. 82, No. 2136.
Loeb, J., The Dynamics of Living Matter; and Mann, G., Chemistry of the Proteids. Vol. 83, No. 2140.
Roscoe, H. E., The Life and Experiences of Sir Henry Enfield Roscoe.
Vol. 83, No. 2141.
Marshall, T., Aristotle’s Theory of Conduct. Vol. 83, No. 2150.
Joseph, H. W. B., An Introduction to Logic. Vol. 83, No. 2156.
OTHER ARTICLES AND REVIEWS Old Stone Mill at Newport, _Science_, 4, 1884, 512.
Criticism on “Phantasms of the Living,” _Proc. Am. Soc. Psychical Napoleon Intime, _The Independent_, December 21 and December 28, 1893.
Decennial Celebration of Clark University, _Science_, 11 (1900), p.
620.
Century’s Great Men of Science, _Smithsonian Institute Reports_, 1900.
French Academy of Science, N. Y. Evening _Post_, March 5, 1904.
Footnote 88: The following classification is arbitrary, as some of Peirce’s most significant reflections occur in papers under headings II. and III. It may, however, be useful.
○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
Text that was in bold face is enclosed by equals signs (=bold=).
○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are referenced.
○ Numbers raised to a power are denoted by the caret sign: 2^5 is 2 raised to the 5th power. Powers may be enclosed in curly brackets, so 2^{32} is 2 raised to the 32nd power.
○ Subscripts are denoted by an underscore followed by the subscript in curly brackets, so O_{2} means O followed by a subscript 2.