or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the _Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse...uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the _perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; ‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.
Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233.
_Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232.
_Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances.
He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic.
repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the _De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf.
_Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R.
and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P.
materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι, (Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp. 134, 135.
§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44 _e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.
_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.
Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II.
38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.
§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν, a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_.
Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused.
_Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου.
Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed.
This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.
§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk.
word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_: there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof.
(See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant.
removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.
§§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.
Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (46).
consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.
Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be...that it is to be thought," etc.
The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.
This is a total mistake; cf. _ait...putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15, _aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from Cic.
§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.
14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci...idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107.
_Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_, etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R.
and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance.
_Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for _deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often thus repeated by Cic.
though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.
122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the _Lucullus_. _Temeritatem...turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66, note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_: this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the _probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense, §46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον.
Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων, ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd.
p. 5.
BOOK I.
'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment belongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I suppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.
2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which places it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis discrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had already mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische remarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated that part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.
must have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order to excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).
BOOK II.
3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments which Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius, see Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as the sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level.
4. On this I have nothing to remark.
5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to determine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who 6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as invalidating the evidence of the senses.
7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles _Lucullus_ 105.
8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy the senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is a plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a corruption of the Greek γνωμων (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3), _regula_, a rule.
9. The different colours which the same persons show in different conditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober and when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence there is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense.
10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A diver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81, which are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so illustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision.
11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy.
Different people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The student will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument intended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should probably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of distinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the _Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties of the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck, the twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in both editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been summed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from the _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36).
BOOK III.
12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in substance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this extract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the battle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we must cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own way. See another view in Krische, p. 62.
13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show that the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with which the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as evidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile to the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to me very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in _Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am inclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and not Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the Lucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_ for the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa on the Lucrine.
14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by Varro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be attainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and elsewhere.
15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than in that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in Nonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a dogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my conjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a different opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63.
16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the καταληψις, _temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and Stoics as by the Academics cf. I. 42.
17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think that in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to illustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the καταληψεις was added to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the _Lucullus_.
I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a similar expression fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have agreed with some lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing.
18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische notes, the Stoic εναργεια had evidently been translated earlier in the book by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17.
BOOK IV.
Further information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the parallel passages of the _Lucullus_.
23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105).
Most likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische supposes, p. 64.
latter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be supported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by have another alteration, see Krische, p. 64.
30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz.
31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out _est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be noted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the _Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the _Luc._ into two portions at or about 63.
UNCERTAIN BOOKS.
32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary assault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book.
33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of Catulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was incorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To that part this fragment must probably be referred.
34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular application of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words 35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book.
With this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the _Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this allusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred either in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever appears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as belonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in the second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not be supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and 36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if not in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI.
6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the whole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a single day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of so general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand ready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.)
* * * * * Besides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its contents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra Academicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions, imitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No writings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture and opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I give, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the former which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr.
Ac._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of Book I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as having revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new doctrine of καταληψις advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of ακαταληψια though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken distinct shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was rather enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism under the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife between it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic. must have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his opinion (_Contra. Ac._ II.
1) that New Academicism was excusable from the necessities of the age in which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in Aug. are scarce, but to it I refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni nostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non valeat pervenire_, also _ibid._ III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse posse hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_. These I refer to Cicero's development of the _probabile_ in Book II., although I ought to say that Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance of Catulus' exposition in the _Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the _Ac. Posteriora_. As this would leave very meagre material for Book II., nothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the senses, I cannot accede to his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a much smaller departure from the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the attack on the senses by Cic. in Book II. are difficult to fix, as they apply equally well to the later attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and IV., I do not think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of agreement between them and the _Lucullus_, which will find a better place in my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear from other sources. These are the translation of σοφισματα by _cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._ III.), and the insertion in 118 of _essentia_ as a translation of ουσια.
BOOK II.
ENTITLED _LUCULLUS_.
§§1--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).
Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.
This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter against Philo (12).
a good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: "gained," "won;" cf. _percipere fruges_, "to reap," _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: "was cut off from;" _carere_ comes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading _dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold.
_Admodum_: "to a degree." _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M.
Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._ _Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained greater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any interval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation.
_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II.
16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in the East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.
§2. _Laus_: "merit," as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means a deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter ejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures, though he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_ is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether.
In addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in _T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants.
_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_.
_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12, Ov. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making silver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam memoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same distinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is told _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf.
_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an ablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare in the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.
_Instrumento et adparatu_: κατασκευη και παρασκευη. _Rex_: Mithridates.
_Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course _rex_ to be nom.