that the sceptic must, if consistent, be ανενεργητος εν βιωι (Sext. _Pyrrh.
Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate τελος are made in accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression, ‛ωμοιωμενον τη φυσει; cf. 38 and _Impellimur_: κινουμεθα, Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.
§25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122 of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.
_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae...alienum_: Cic. uses this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non occurrit...aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.
§26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.
_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as αναιρειν does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The expression _dux vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5 and Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural light, _lumen_ artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus, nec satis difference between φως and φεγγος, the latter is used for the former (φεγγος ‛ηλιου) just as _lumen_ is for _lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not often _vice versa_. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where the φαντασια is called φεγγος. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom.
Eth._ Aristot. assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a τελος. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος etc., cf. Sextus _Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be _ratio_ above. Αποδειξις: cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. _Pyrrh.
Hyp._ II. 143 λογος δι' ‛ομολογουμενων λημματων (premisses) κατα συναγωγην επιφοραν (conclusion) εκκαλυπτων αδηλον, also Diog. VII. 45, λογον δια των μαλλον καταλαμβανομενων το ‛ηττον καταλαμβανομενον περαινοντα (if the reading be right).
§27. _Notio_: another trans. of εννοια. _Conclusisse_: although the Greeks used συμπερασμα instead of επιφορα sometimes for the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb συμπεραινειν which has been supposed to correspond to _concludere_. It is more likely to be a trans. of συναγειν, and _conclusum argumentum_ of συνακτικος λογος, which terms are of frequent occurrence. _Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus answers, ουκ εστιν αναγκαιον τας εκεινον (the dogmatists) δογματολογιας προβαινειν, πλασματωδεις ‛υπαρχουσας (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367). _Sapientiae...futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv. _Gram._ veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the determination of what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.
_Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque sit_ of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run _neque dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of the sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.
§28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very frequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De _Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of course the Academics would say they did not hold this δογμα as _stabile fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_ in _D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.
_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, ψιλη φασει ισον φερεται ψιλη φασις (_A.M._ VII. 315), φασει μεν φασις επισχεθησεται (_ib._ 337).
_Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a rather unusual phrase for the ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so κινεισθαι is perpetually used in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek ‛ικανος ειοησθω and the like. The 3, where _ut opinor_ is thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III.
§§30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.
Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.
How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.
Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).
_et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = παρρησια as often in Tacitus. _Abditis rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word συνεσκιασμενος Sext.
103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also 61. _Artificio_: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all its senses, cf. 114 and _De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression is sneered at in 87.
_Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS. _prima_ or _primo_, which latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in Cicero. _Primum_ is out of position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_, set in motion. For ‛ορμη see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx. given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir," rather than "source" here. It will be noted that συγκαταθεσις must take place before the ‛ορμη is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this theory is made in Plat. _Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv.
Math._ VII. 350 και ‛οι μεν διαφερειν αυτην των αισθησεων, ‛ως ‛οι πλειους, ‛οι δε αυτην ειναι τας αισθησεις...‛ης στασεως ηρξε Στρατον. All powers of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the ‛ηγεμονικον, cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.
"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to produce them. _Recondit_: so the εννοιαι are called αποκειμεναι νοησεις called θησαυρισμος φαντασιων. _Similitudinibus_: καθ' ‛ομοιωσιν Sext.
_Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In _D.F._ III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so MSS. Orelli gave _constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to distinguish between the φυσικαι εννοιαι or κοιναι which are the προληψεις, and those εννοιαι which are the conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. _Rerumque_: convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I.
20.
§31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.
_Cognitionem_: επιστημην. _Cognitio_ is used to translate καταληψις in repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future tense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read _dicamus_; cf. n. on 29. _Per se_: καθ' αυτην, there is no need to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the _reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in 99. _Animal...animo_: Cic. allows _animus_ to all animals, not merely _anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is therefore wrong. _Temeritate_: προπετεια, which occurs _passim_ in Sext.
The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic is called εμβροντητος for rejecting the καταληπτικη φαντασια.
"_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of the verb, and cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far as to complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7, 12, διαφοραν ειναι αδηλου και ακαταληπτου, και παντα μεν ειναι ακαταληπτα ου παντα δε αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this book. _Docere_: "to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45. _Stellarum numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. e.g.
_P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned among things αιωνιον εχοντα αγνωσιαν. So in the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_: contemptuous; απονενοημενους τινας. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 refers to this passage, which must have been preserved in the second edition.
§33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether."
The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.
_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the απαραλλακτος of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.
κοινη φαντασια αληθους και ψευδους Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175. _Notam_: the σημειον of Sextus; cf. esp. _P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) ουδεμια εστιν αληθης φαντασια ‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο ψευδης. _Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n.
on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus; _ista ratione si quis...privaverit, possit dicere_. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe _quem_ as a strong relative, making a pause between _quis_ and _quem_. _Visionem_: Simply another trans. of φαντασια. _Ut Carneades_: see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 την τε πιθανην φαντασιαν και την πιθανην ‛αμα και απερισπαστον και διεξωδευμενην (R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation.
The merely πιθανη is that sensation which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no sensation is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (περισπαν, περιελκειν) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention.
This last is only called απερισπαστος when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.)
The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The διεξωδευμενη ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one.
Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.
181--189).
§34. _Communitas_: απαραλλαξια or επιμιξια των φαντασιων; Sext. _A.M._ VII.
IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_ for _nota_, merely from love of variety.
The _in_ before _communi_, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W.
Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "_Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio_." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word _once_ in the plural (_Ad Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, and elsewhere. _Perspicua_: εναργη, a term used with varying signification by all the later Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what Halm retains the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of καταλαμβανεσθαι; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of ακριβως or κατ' ακριβειαν (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).
_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._ se moveri_), Greek κενοπαθειν (Sext. _P.H._ II. 49), κενοπαθεια (= _inanis motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184), κενοπαθηματα και αναπλασματα της διανοιας (_ib._ VIII. 354), διακενος ‛ελκυσμος (_ib._ VII. 241), διακενος φαντασια (_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase κινημα της διανοιας. For the meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. απολειπειν is constantly used as the opposite of αναιρειν (_tollere_).
§35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ πιθανη φαντασια is here meant; see 33.
quia...deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II. p. 796.
_Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting a number of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each _appearance_ to the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any _appearance_ even if you have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf. 47, and also 7. _Insigne_: σημειον, the same as _nota_ and _signum_ above. _Quo obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm keeps. Cf. _quam obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33. _Argumentum_: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word τεκμηριον, which, however, the Stoics hardly use. _Id quod significatur_: το σημειωντον in Sext.
§§37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).
_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless, cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 το μεν γαρ 69 sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_: cf. εικειν, ειξις in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, των δε αισθητικων μετα ειξεως και συγκαταθεσεως γινονται [‛αι φαντασια]; also 66 of this book. Οικειον: cf. 34. _Adsentitur statim_: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. _Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra potestate_: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Ac. Post._, which see.
§39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on 25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._ §§40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_, while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.
The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known sensation."]
§40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of θεμελιος or the like; cf.
‛ωσπερ θεμελιος in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method, like τεχνη, cf.
_M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_: the general character which attaches to all φαντασιαι; _genera_ the different classes of φαντασιαι.
_Totidem verbis_: of course with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the _reductio ad _una res videtur causam continere_. _Quae ita_: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish clearly the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the _thing_ which causes it. Here the _things_ are meant; two _things_ are supposed to cause two _sensations_ so similar that the person who has one of the _sensations_ cannot tell from which of the two _things_ it comes.
Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide _things_ into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of _things_, though not of _sensations_. If we could only pierce _through_ a sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume that _sensation_ and _thing_ correspond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 περι μεν του φαισθαι τοιον η τοιον το ‛υποκειμενον (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) ουδεις ισως αμφισβητει, περι δε του ει τοιουτον εστιν ‛οποιον φαινεται ζητειται. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.
remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from _recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.
Munio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf.
n. on I. 29.
quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: "general _quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is against Cic.'s usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton without being singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_, not _things_, to which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly apply. _Adiuncta_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) πασηι τη δοκουσηι αληθει καθεσταναι ευρισκεται τις απαραλλακτος ψευδης, also VII. 438, etc.
§§43--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
§43. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv.
was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. _P.H._ I. 14. _Num illa definitio...transferri_: I need hardly point out that the ‛ορος of the Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." _Vel illa vera_: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. _Vel_ = "even" i.e. if _even_ the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In falsum_: note that _falsum_ = _aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 209 μοχθηρους ‛ορους ειναι τους περιεχοντας τι των μη προσοντων τοις ‛οριστοις, and the schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet latior esse definito suo_. _Minime volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_ hardly ever stands for _omn. rebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter rebus_ for _partibus_. A little closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_, §44. _Impediri...fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of εναντιουσθαι as Goer. says, but of απανταν, which occurs very frequently in Sext. _Sumpta_: the two premisses are in Gk. called together λημματα, separately λημμα and points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like _ratio_ (συλλογισμος), _Profiteatur_: so ‛υπισχνεισθαι is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII.
283. _Patefacturum_: n. on 26, εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος, δηλωτικος (the last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse...nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_, _in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference.
_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of διαρτησις, which is opposed to συναρτησις and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.
§45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.
§§46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48) §46. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that the clause _quanta sint_ is inserted παρενθετικως! Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_. _Interrogationibus_: cf.
I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_ and _conclusio_ are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms are very frequently called ερωτησεις, and that he often introduces a new argument by ερωταται και τουτο, when there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all.
_Dissolvere_: απολυεσθαι in Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.
§47. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic.
cf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it may be a mere φαντασμα or αναπλασμα της διανοιας, a phantom behind which there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis videantur_: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination see Zeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7, etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from _dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo...nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage can only be properly explained in connection with 50 and with the general plan of the Academics expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate it as follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in 41 and 42 viz.
_omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism in 50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known to be Stoic, _omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_) sensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by 40, where see n.)?
_Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as have only a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding stages the resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_ is a sort of tertiary predicate after _efficere_ ("to manufacture so as to be probable"). It _must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section placed out of harmony with 50. _Plane approach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as διανοια is in Greek, to express our "imagination." _Non numquam_: so Madv.
for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_ with an interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III. 58 for _sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here is merely "as," "for instance," cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_ here is a repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before _esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 241 ητοι των εκτος η των εν ‛ημιν παθων, and the two classes of _falsa visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there _are_ false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.
§§49--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our waking ones. This we deny (52). "But," say they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).
§49. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and similar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: αυτα τα κεφαλαια. _Interrogationis_: the _sorites_ was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. _De Div._ II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary), _Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n.
quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50 _ille sorites, quo nihil putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read _hos_, which indeed in 136 is sc. τινι. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.: cf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_: not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf. _M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._ II. 112, and an instance of _proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75.