I. THERE are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know) that most obscure and difficult ques- tion concerning the Nature of the Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind, and the prac- tice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men are so various and so different from each other, as to lead strongly to the inference that ignorance’ is the cause, or origin of philosophy; and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of the gravity and stability of a philosopher, as either to maintain false opinions, or without the least hesitation to support and defend what he has not thoroughly examined, and does not clearly comprehend?
In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras* doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene entirely believed ' Some read scientiam and some inscientiam; the latter of which is preferred by some of the best editors and commentators.
* For a short account of these ancient Greek philosophers, see the sketch prefixed to the Academics (Classical Library).
DE NAT. ETC. B 2 OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS, there were no such beings.. But they who have affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their places of abode, and the employment of their ~ lives. And these are matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether they are wholly inactive; totally unemployed, and free from all care and ad- ministration of affairs: or, on the contrary, whether all things were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. Thisis one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided, mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant of what is most im- portant to be known. ) II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have conceived that the Gods take not the least cognisance of human affairs. But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are offered to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground that ‘men are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many benefits are conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if the Gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is no single advan- tage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honours, or | to prefer any prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have any connexion with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety, neither sanctity nor religion can be sup- ported; the total subversion of which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.
I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent of all virtues, justice, may perish with it., There are other philosophers, and those too very great and illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 3 and governed by the will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do théy stop here, but conceive likewise that, the Deities consult and provide for the preservation of mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the other produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are brought to ma- turity, are designed by the immortal Gods for the use of man. They instance many other things, which shall be related in these books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal Gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and advantage of men. Against these opinions Carneades has advanced so much, that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not naturally slothful, to search after truth; for there is no subject on which the learned, as well as the unlearned, differ so strenuously as in this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely impossible that more than one should be right.
III. Now in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well- meaning opposers, and to confute invidious censurers; so as to induce the latter to repent of their unreasonable contra- diction, and the former to be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But I observe that the several books, which I have lately published,’ have occasioned much noise, and various discourse about them; some people wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing what my opinion is on such sub- jects. I likewise perceive that many peonle wonder at my following that philosophy? chiefly, which seems to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of artificial night; and that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the defence of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. But it is a mistake to suppose that this application to philo- sophical studies has been sudden on my part. I have applied ? Cicero wrote his philosophical works in the last three years of his life. When he wrote this piece, he was in the sixty-third year of his age, in the year of Rome 709.
2 The Academic.: no 4: OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
myself to them from my youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and I have been in the habit of philosophising a great deal, when I least seemed to think about it: for the truth of which I appeal to my orations, which are filled with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very learned men, who frequented my house and conversed daily with me; particularly Diodorus, Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,' under whom I was bred; and, if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference to the conduct of life, I am inclined to think that I have advanced, both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be supported by reason and authority.
IV. But if any one should ask, what has induced me, in the decline of life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for, when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the direction and care of one mau,’ [ thought it becoming for the sake of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy; and that it would be of import- ance, and much to the honour and commendation of our city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin tongue. I the less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I have excited in many a desire, not only of: learning, but of writing; for we have had several Romans well grounded in the learning of the Greeks, who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in Latin, which they had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I have succeeded so well, that what I have done is not, even in copiousness of expression, inferior to that language.
Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind. and the great and heavy oppression of fortune that was apon me; from which, if I could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in this pursuit. But I vould procure ease by no means better than by not only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the ex- amination of the whole body of philosophy. And every 1 Diodorus and Posidonius were Stoics; Philo and Antiochus were Academics; but the latter afterwards inclined to the doctrine of the Stoics. 2 Julius Ceesar.
OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 4) part and branch of this is readily discovered, when every question is propounded in writing; for there is such an ad- mirable continuation and series of things, that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked together and united. | V. Now those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every particular subject, have more curiosity than is necessary. or the force of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority; since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and rely im- plicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor could I ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, ‘who, when they affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to give this answer, “He him- self has said it;” and this “he himself,” it seems, was. Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion, that his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.
They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular, may find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions. But I deny that I have under- taken the protection of what is neglected and forsaken;. for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they may perhaps want the author's explanation. This manner of philosophising, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly, was begun by Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, con- firmed by Carneades, and has descended with all its power even to the present age; but I am informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but to the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every sect? which, however, must necessarily be known to those, who resolve, for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all philosophers without partiality.
I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavoured to make myself so; and it is impossible that they, who choose this manner of philosophising, should not meet at least with 6 OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
something worthy their pursuit. I have spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual ‘need of caution, -For we are not people who believe that there is nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that there is no certain rule for judging of, or assenting to propositions; from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable, which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so per- suasive and beautiful an aspect, that a wise man chooses to direct his conduct by them.
VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of raittinlity, I propose to lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the nature of the Gods; by which means all men may judge which of them are consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall be found to have dis- covered what may be absolutely called truth, I will then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the words of Statius, in the Synephebi,— ~ Ye gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and old;” ~yet not on so trifling an occasion, as when the person in the play complains that, “Tn this city we have dtseovered a most flagrant es here is a professed courtezan, who refuses money from her lover;” but that they may attend, know, and consider what senti- ments they ought to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanc- tity, ceremonies, faith, oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to think of the auspices, over which I preside;?;! for all these have relation to the present question. The manifest disagreement among the most learned -on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they ~ chave some certain knowledge of the subject. Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and I did so more especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta’s, concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the greatest care, accuracy, ‘and precision: 1 Cicero was one of the College of Augurs, OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 7 for coming to him at the time of the Latin holidays,’ accord- » ing to his own invitation and message from him, I found him — sitting in his study,’ and in a discourse with C. Velleius the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the ablest of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a great proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to the most eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as Cotta saw me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a dispute with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in.
VII. Indeed, says I, I think Iam come very seasonably, as you say; for here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M..Piso* was present, no'sect of philosophy that is in any esteem, would want an advocate. If Antiochus’s book, replies Cotta, which he lately sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend Piso; for Antio- chus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus? I? says he. I wonder that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the honest and the pro- fitable, not only in name but absolutely in kind; and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in things: but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to what we began with.
With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (look- ing at me), who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods; concerning which, as it is a subject ' The Latinze Ferize was originally a festival of the Latins, altered by Tarquinius Superbus into a Roman one. It was held in the Alban ° Mount in honour of Jupiter Latiaris: This holiday lasted six days: it was not held at any fixed time; but the consul was never allowed to take. the field till he had held them.—V. Smith, Dict. Gr, Rom. Ant. p. 414.
? Exhedra, the word used by Cicero, means a study, or place where disputes were held.: * M. Piso was a Peripatetic. The four great sects were the Stoics, the Peripatetics, the Academics, and the Epicureans.
8 OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
that always appeared very obscure to me, I prevailed on Vel- leius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus. Therefore, con- tinues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat what you have already stated to us. I-will, says he; though this new comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both, adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of nothing." What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not bound by any obliga- tion to defend any particular principle, whether I like or dislike it., VIII. After this Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect, dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus’s intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God of Plato’s Timeeus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the Ipévoua of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round, ~ that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of in- quisitive philosophers, but of dreamers!
For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be modelled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the air, fire, water, and earth, pay obedience and submit to the will of the archi- tect? From whence arose those five forms,’ of which the rest were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort that they look more like things to be- desired than to be discovered.
But, what is most remarkable, he gives us a world, which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. ‘Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy 1 It was a prevailing tenet of the Academics, that there is no certain knowledge.
* The five forms of Plato are these, ovcla, rabrdv, Erepov, ordois, Kivnots.
OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 9 who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God?
IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world- builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude, that if there was no world there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscrip- tion of seasons; but how that was in space we cannot under- stand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labour? But that could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labour, since all nature, air, fire, earth, and water, would obey the divine essence. What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an eedile, to illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better accom- modated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling - an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we imagine that he was afterwards delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.
Or were these things made, as you almost assert, by God, for the sake of men? Was it for the wise? If so, then this great design was adopted for the sake of a very small number. Or for the sake of fools? First of all, there was no reason why God should consult the advantage of the wicked; and, further, what could be his object in doing so, since all fools are, without doubt, the most miserable of men, chiefly because they are fools? For what can we pronounce more deplorable 10 OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
than folly? Besides, there are many inconveniences in life which the wise can learn’ to think lightly of, by dwelling rather on the advantages which they receive; but which fools are unable to avoid when they are coming, or to bear when they are come. _ X&X. They who affirm the world to be an animated and in- telligent being, have by no means discovered the nature of the mind, nor are able to conceive in what form that essence can exist; but of that I shall speak more hereafter. At present, I must express my surprise at the weakness of those, who endeavour to make it out to be not only animated and im- mortal, but likewise happy, and round, because Plato says that is the most beautiful form; whereas I think a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid, more beautiful. But what life do they attribute to that round Deity? ‘Truly it isa being whirled about with a celerity to which nothing can be even conceived by the imagination as equal; nor can I imagine how a settled mind and happy life can consist in such motion, the least degree of which would be troublesome to us. Why therefore should it not be considered troublesome also to the Deity? For the earth itself, as it is part of the world, is part also of the Deity. We see vast tracts of land barren and un- inhabitable; some, because they are scorched by the too near approach of the sun; others, because they are bound up with frost and snow, through the great distance which the sun is from them. Therefore, if the world is a Deity, as these are parts of the world, some of the Deity’s limbs must be said to be scorched, and some frozen.
These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are, I will endeavour to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things; and that God was that mind, which formed. all things from water. If the Gods can exist without cor- poreal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why did he annex a mind to water?
It was Anaximander’s opinion that the Gods were born; that after a great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?
_ Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God; and OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 1l that he was generated; and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful form; besides, is not everything that had a beginning, subject to mortality?
XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaxi- ~ menes, was the first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which infinity he did not. per- ceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense, in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of animal, then there must be some more internal principle, from whence that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal than the mind? Let it therefore be clothed with an external body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it. AOS Alemzeon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.
Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the human mind is afflicted, (as is the case in many instances,) that part of the Deity must likewise be afflicted; which cannot be. If the human mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how could that Deity, if it is nothing but “soul, be mixed with, or infused into, the world?
Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world ~ which had any existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite. | 3 Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something cir- cular like a crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat around the heavens; this he calls 12 OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
God; in which there is no room to imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to lust, and other passions of the same kind; which are de- -stroyed by disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honour he gives to the stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, having already done it in another place.
XII. Empedocles, who erred in many things, is most grossly mistaken in his notion of the Gods. He lays down four natures! as divine, from which he thinks that all things were made. Yet it is evident that they have a beginning, that they decay, and that they are void of all sense.
Protagoras did not seem to have any idea of the real nature of the Gods; for he acknowledged that he was altogether ignorant whether there are or are not any, or what they are.
What shall I say of Democritus, who classes our images of objects, and their orbs, in the number of the Gods; as he does that principle through which those images appear and have their influence? He deifies likewise our knowledge and un- derstanding.. Is he not involved in a very great error? And because nothing continues always in the same state, he denies that anything is everlasting; does he not thereby entirely destroy the Deity, and make it impossible to form any opinion of him?
Diogenes of Apollonia looks upon the air to be a Deity. But what sense can the air have? or what divine form can be attributed to it?
It would be tedious to show the uncertainty of Plato’s opinion; for, in his Timeeus, he denies the propriety of assert- ing that there is one great father or creator of the world; and, in his book of Laws, he thinks we ought not to make too strict an inquiry into the nature of the Deity. And as for his statement when he asserts that God is a being without any body, what the Greeks call acwparos, it is certainly quite unintelligible, how that theory can possibly be true; for such a God must then necessarily be destitute of sense, prudence, and pleasure; all which things are comprehended in our ' The four natures here to be understood, are the four elements, fire, water, air, and earth; which are mentioned as the four principles of Empedocles by Diogenes Laertius.
OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 13 notion of the Gods. He likewise asserts in his Timeus, and in his Laws, that the world, the heavens, the stars, the mind, and those Gods which are delivered down to us from our ancestors, constitute the Deity. These opinions, taken separately, are apparently false; and, together, are directly inconsistent with each other.
Xenophon has committed almost the same mistakes, but in fewer words. In those sayings which he has related of Socrates, he introduces him disputing the lawfulness of in- quiring into the form of the Deity; and makes him assert the sun and the mind to be Deities: he represents him likewise © as affirming the being of one God only; and at another time of many; which are errors of almost the same kind which I before took notice of in Plato.
XIII. Antisthenes, in his book called the Natural Philoso- pher, says that there are many national, and one natural Deity; but by this saying he destroys the power and nature of the Gods. Speusippus is not much less in the wrong; who, fol- lowing his uncle Plato, says that a certain incorporeal power governs everything; by which he endeavours to root out of our minds the knowledge of the Gods.
Aristotle, in his third book of Philosophy, confounds many things together, as the rest have done; but he does not differ from his master Plato. At one time he attributes all divinity to the mind, at another he asserts that the world is God. Soon afterwards he makes some other essence pre- side over the world, and gives it those faculties by which, with certain revolutions, he may govern and preserve the motion of it. Then he asserts the heat of the firmament to be God; not perceiving the firmament to be part of the world, which in another place he had described as God. How can that divine sense of the firmament be preserved in so rapid a motion? And where do the multitude of Gods dwell, if heaven itself is a Deity? But when this philosopher says that God is without a body, he makes him an irrational and insensible being. Besides, how can the worldymove itself, if it wants a body? Or how, if it is in perpetual self-motion, can it be easy and happy?
Xenocrates, his fellow-pupil, does not appear singh wiser on this head; for in his books concerning the nature of the Gods, no divine form is described; but he says the number of eee ¥ y % + lahat ee ad mere 14 OF THE NATURE OF THE GODS.’
them is eight. Five are moving planets,’ the sixth is con- tained in all the fixed stars; which, dispersed, are so many several members, but, considered together, are one single Deity. The seventh is the sun; and the eighth the moon. But in what sense they can possibly be happy, is not easy to be understood.
From the same school of Plato, Heraclides of Pontus stuffed his books with puerile tales. ‘Sometimes he thinks the world a Deity, at other times the mind. He attributes divinity likewise to the wandering stars. He deprives the Deity of sense, and makes his form mutable; and, in the same book again, he makes Earth and Heaven Deities.
The unsteadiness of Theophrastus is equally intolerable. At one time he attributes a divine prerogative to the mind; at another, to the firmament; at another, to the stars and celestial constellations.
Nor is his disciple Strato, who is called the naturalist, any more worthy to be regarded; for he thinks that the divine power is diffused through nature, which is the cause of birth, increase, and diminution; but that it has no sense nor form.
XIV. Zeno (to come to your sect, Balbus,) thinks the law of nature to be the divinity; and that it has the power to force us to what is right, and to restrain us from what is wrong. How this law can be an animated being I cannot conceive; but that God is so, we would certainly maintain. The same per- son says, in another place, that the sky is God; but can we possibly conceive that God is a being insensible, deaf to our prayers, our wishes, and our vows, and wholly unconnected with us? In other books he thinks there is a certain rational essence, pervading all nature, indued with divine efficacy. He attributes the same power to the stars, to the years, to the months, and to the seasons. In his interpretation of Hesiod’s Theogony,? he entirely destroys the established notions of the Gods; for he excludes Jupiter, Juno, and Vesta, and those esteemed divine, from the number of them; but his doctrine is that these are names which by some kind of: allusion are given to mute and inanimate beings. The sentiments of his disciple Aristo are not less erroneous. He thought it 1 These five moving stars are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury and Venus. Their revolutions are considered in the next book, — 2 Or, Generation of the Gods.