LI. Divinations by dreams are of a similar order, because - presentiments which happen to diviners when awake, happen to ourselves during sleep. For in sleep the soul is vigorous, and free from the senses, and the obstruction of the cares of the body, which lies prostrate and deathlike; and, since the soul has lived from all eternity, and is engaged with spirits innumerable, it therefore beholds all things in the universe, if it only preserves a watchful attitude, unencumbered by excess of food or drinking, so that the mind is awake during the slumber of the body,—this is the divination of dreamers.
Here, then, comes in an important, and far from natural, but a very artificial interpretation of dreams by Antiphon: and he interprets oracles and prophecies in the same way; for there are explainers of these things just as grammarians are expounders of poets. For, as it would have been in vain for nature to have produced gold, silver, iron, and copper, if she had not taught us the means of extracting them from her bosom for our use and benefit; and as it would have been in vain for her to have bestowed seeds and fruits upon men, if she had not taught them to distinguish and cultivate them, —for what use would any materials whatsoever be to us, if we had no means of working them up’—thus with every useful thing which the Gods have bestowed on us, they have vouchsafed us the sagacity by which its utility may be appre- ciated; and so, because in dreams, oracles, and prophecies there are many things necessarily obscure and ambiguous, some have received the gift of interpretation of them.
But by what means prophets and sleepers behold those things, which do not at the time exist in sensible reality, is a great question. But when we have once cleared up those points which ought to be investigated first, then the other subjects of our examination will be easier. For the discussion about the Nature of the Gods, which you have so clearly ex- plained in your second book on that subject, embraces the whole question; for if we grant that there are Gods, and that their providence governs the universe, and that they consult for the best management of all human affairs, and that not only in general, but in particular,—if we grant this, which indeed appears to me to be undeniable, then we must hold it ON DIVINATION. 193 as a necessary consequence that these Gods have bestowed on - men the signs and indications of futurity. ° The mode, however, by which the Gods endue us with the gift and power of divination requires some notice.
LII. The Stoics will not allow that the Deity can be in- terested in each cleft in entrails, or in the chirping of birds. They affirm that such interference is altogether indecorous--- unworthy of the majesty of the Gods, and an incredible im- possibility. They maintain that from the beginning of the world it has been ordained that certain signs must needs precede certain events, some of which are drawn from the entrails of animals, some from the note and flight of birds, some from the sight of lightning, some from prodigies, some from stars, some from visions of dreamers, and some from exclamations of men in frenzy: and those who have a clear perception of these things are not often deceived. Bad con- jectures and incorrect interpretations are false, not because of any imposture in the signs themselves, but because of the ignorance of their expounders, It being, therefore, granted and conceded that there exists a certain divine energy, by which human life is supported and surrounded, it is not hard to conceive how all that hap- pens to men may happen by the direction of heaven; for this divine and sentient energy, which expands throughout the universe, may select a victim for sacrifice, and may, by exterior agency, effect any change in the condition of its entrails at the period of its immolation: so that any given characteristic may be found excessive or defective in the animal’s body. For by very trifling exertions nature can alter, or new-model, or diminish many things. And the prodigies which happened a little before Czesar’s death are of great weight in preventing us from doubting this,—when on that very day on which he first sat on the golden throne and went forth clad in a purple robe, when he was sacrificing, no heart was found in the intestines of the fat ox. Do you then suppose that any warm-blooded animal, unless by divine interference, can live an instant without a heart? He was himself surprised at the novelty of the phenomenon; on which Spurinna observed that he had reason to fear that he would lose both sense and life, since both of these proceed from the heart. The next day the liver of the victim was DE NAT, ETO, 0 194 ON DIVINATION; found defective in the upper extremity. Doubtless the im: mortal Gods vouchsafed Ceesar these signs to apprize him of his approaching death, =e not to enable him to pa against it.
‘When, therefore, we vita discover in the entrails. of the victim those organs without which the animal cannot live, we, must necessarily suppose that they have been annihilated by a superintending Providence at the wey instant that the sacrifice is offered.
LIII. And the same divine ‘ieibaeiine may likewise be the cause why birds fly in different directions on different. occa- sions, why they hide themselves sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, and why they sing on the right hand or on the left. For if every animal according to its own will can direct the motions of its body, so as to stoop, to look on one side, or to look up, and can bend, twist, contract, or extend its limbs as it pleases, and does those things almost before think-+ ing of doing them, how much more easy is it for a God to do 80, whose deity governs and regulates all things.
It is the Deity, too; which presents various signs to us, many of which history has recorded for us; as for instance; we find it stated that if the moon was eclipsed a little before sunrise in the sign of Leo, it was.a sign that Darius should be slain and the Persians be defeated by Alexander and the Macedonians. And if a girl was born with two heads, it was a sign that there was to be a sedition among the people and - corruption and adultery at home. Ifa woman should dream that she was delivered of a lion, the country in which such an occurrence took place would soon be subjected to foreign domination. Of the same kind is the fact. mentioned. by Herodotus, that the son of Croesus spoke, though the gift of speech was by nature denied him; which prodigy was an indication that his father’s kingdom and family would be utterly destroyed. And all our histories relate that the head of Servius Tullius while sleeping appeared to be on fire, which was a sign of the extraordinary events which followed, y As, therefore, a man who falls asleep while his mind is full of pure meditations, and all circumstances around him adapted to tranquillity, will experience in his dreams true and certain presentiments; so also the chaste and ptire a ie ia : rc i Rt iy. We xe Ly a iP + 4 a ‘ ; i) ON DIVINATION: 195 mind of a waking man is better suited to thé observation of the course of the stars, or the flight of birds, and the intimations of the truth to be collected from entrails. SG LIV. And connected with this principle is the tradition which we have received concerning Socrates, which is often ~ affirmed by himself in the books of his disciples—that he possessed a certain divinity, which he called a demon, and to which he was always obedient,—a genius which never com- pelled: him to-action, but often deterred him from it.. The same Sovrates (and where can we find a better authority?) being consulted by Xenophon, whether he should follow Cyrus to the wars, gave him his counsel, and then added these words,—* The advice I give you is merely human: in such obscure and uncertain cases, it is best to consult the oracle of Apollo, to whom the Athenians have always publicly appealed in questions of importance.”
It is likewise written of Socrates, that having once seen his friend Crito with his eye bandaged, and having asked him what was the matter with it, he received for answer, that as he was walking in the fields, a branch of a tree he had attempted to bend sprang back, and hit him in the eye. Upon this, Socrates replied, “This is the consequence of your _ not having obeyed me when I recalled you, following the divine presentiment, according to my custom.”
Another remarkable story is told of Socrates. After the battle in which the Athenians were defeated at Delium, under the command of Laches, he was obliged to fly with that unfortunate general. At length reaching a spot where three | ways met, he refused to pursue the same track. as the rest.
_ When they inquired the cause of his behaviour, he said that he was restrained by a God. The others, who left Socrates, fell in with the enemy’s cavalry. } Antipater has collected many other instances of the admi- rable divination of Socrates, which I omit, for they are quite familiar to you, and I need not further enumerate them. IT cannot, however, avoid mentioning one fact in the history of this philosopher, which strikes me as magnificent, and almost divine;—namely, that when he had been condemned by the sentence of impious men, he said, he was prepared to die with the most perfect equanimity; because the God within him had not suffered him to be afflicted with any idea of ania 196 ON DIVINATION.
impending evil, either when he left his home, or when he appeared before the court.
LV. I think, therefore, that true divination exists, although those men are often deceived who appear to proceed on con- jecture, or on artificial rules. For men are fallible in all arts, and we cannot suppose they are infallible here. It may happen that some sign, which has an ambiguous signification, is received in a certain one. It may happen that some par- ticular has escaped the notice of the inquirer, or is purposely concealed by him, because opposed to his interest.
I should, however, consider my plea for divination suffi- ciently established, if only a few well-authenticated cases of presentiment and prophecies could be discovered; whereas, in truth, there are many. I will even declare without hesi- tation, that a single instance of presage and prediction, all the points of which are borne out by subsequent events— and that definitely and regularly, not casually and fortuitously —would suffice to compel an admission of the reality of divi- nation from all reasonable minds. | It appears to me, moreover, that we should refer all the virtue and power of divination to the Divinity, as Posi- donius has done, as before observed; in the next place to Fate, and afterwards to the nature of things. For reason compels us to admit that by Fate all things take place. By Fate I mean that which the Greeks call civappévy, that is, a certain order and series of causes—for cause linked to cause produces all things: and in this connexion of cause cousists the constant truth which flows through all eternity. From whence it follows that nothing happens which is not pre- destined to happen; and in the same way nothing is predes- tined to happen, the nature of which does not contain the efficient causes of its happening.
From which it must be understood that fate is not a mere superstitious imagination, but is what is called, in the lan- guage of natural philosophy, the eternal cause of things; the cause why past things have happened, why present things do happen, and why future things will happen. And thus we are taught by exact observation, what consequences are usually produced, by what causes, though not invariably. And thus the causes of future events may truly be discerned by those who behold them in states of ecstasy or quiet.
ON DIVINATION. 197 ON DIVINATION. 197 LVI. Since, then, all things happen by a certain fate, (as will be shown in another place,) if any»man could exist who could comprehend this succession of causes in his intellectual view, such a man would be infallible. For being in possession of a knowledge of the causes of all events, he would neces- sarily foresee how and when all events would take place.
But as no being except the Deity alone can do this, man can attain no more than a kind of presentiment of futurity, by ebserving the events which are the usual consequences of certain signs. For those events that are to happen in future do not start into existence on a sudden. But the regular course of time resembles the untwisting of a cable, producing nothing absolutely new, but all things in a grand concatena- tion or series of repetitions.
And this has been observed by those who possess the gifs. of natural divination, and by those who study the regular- successions of certain things. For though they do not. always apprehend the causes, yet they clearly discern the- signs and marks of the causes. And by diligently investi-. gating and committing to memory all such signs, and the. traditions of our ancestors concerning them, they produce. an elaborate system of that divination which is termed. technical respecting the entrails of victims, thunder and lightning, prodigies, and celestial phenomena.
We must not, therefore, be astonished that those who. addict themselves to divination foresee many events which. have no place of existence. For all things do even now exist, though they are removed in point of time. And as the vital embryo of all vegetation exists in seeds, from which they afterwards germinate, so are all things even now hidden in their causes, and perceived as hereafter to happen by the mind when it is thrown into an ecstasy, or relaxed in sleep, and cool reason and calculation is often granted a presenti- ment of them. And as the astrologers who watch the risings, settings, and various courses of the sun, moon, and other stars, can predict long before all their revolutions and phenomena; so those who have noted the series and conse- quence of events, with constant and indefatigable atten- tion, during a very long period, do generally, or (if that is too difficult) at least occasionally, foresee with certainty the things that are to come to pass, 198 ON DIVINATION.
Such are some of the arguments derived from the nature of fate, by which the reality of divination may be proved. | LVIL. ‘Another powerful plea in favour of divination, may be drawn from Nature herself, which teaches us how great is the energy of the mind when abstracted from the bodily Senses, a8 it 18 most especially in ecstasy and sleep. For even as the Gods know what passes in our minds without the aid of eyes, ears or tongues, (on which divine omniscience is founded the feeling of men, that when they wish in silence for, or offer up a prayer for anything, the Gods hear them,) so when the soul of man is disengaged from corporeal impe- diments, and set at freedom, either from being relaxed in sleep, or in a state of mental excitement, it beholds those wonders which, when entangled beneath the veil of the flesh, it is unable to see.
It may be difficult, perhaps, to connect this principle of nature with that kind of divination which we have stated to result from study and art. Posidonius, however, thinks that there are in nature certain sigus and symbols of future events. We are informed that the inhabitants of Cea, according to the report of Heraclides of Pontus, are accus- tomed carefully to observe the circumstances attending the rising of the Dog Star, in order to know the character of the ensuing season, and how far it will prove salubrious or pestilential. For if the star rose with an obscure and dim appearance, it proved that the atmosphere was gross and fogey, and its respiration would be heavy and unwhole- some. But if it appeared bright and lucid, then that was a sign that the air was light and pure, and therefore healthful.
Democritus believed that the ancients had wisely enjoined the inspection of the entrails of animals which had been sacrificed, because by their condition and colour it is possible to determine the salubrity or pestilential state of the atmo- sphere, and sometimes even what is likely to be the fertility or sterility of the earth. And if careful observation and ‘practice recognise these rules as proceeding from nature, then every day might bring us many examples which might ‘deserve notice and remark; so that the natural philosopher ‘whom Pacuvius introduces in his Chryses, seems to me a ignorant of the nature of things, when he says,— All those who understand the speech of birds And hearts of victims better than their own, May be just listen’d to, bat not obey’d.
Why should he make such a remark here, when a little after he speaks thus plainly in a contrary sense!— . Whatever God may be, ’tis he who forms, Preserves and nurtures all. Unto himself He back absorbs all beings,—evermore The universal Sire, —at once the source And end of nature. | Why, then, since the universe is the sole and common home of all creatures, and since the minds of men always have existed, and will exist, why, I say, should they not be able to perceive the consequences, and what is the result indicated by each sign, and what events each sign foreshows { These are the arguments which I had to bring forward on the subject of divimation. For the rest, I in nowise believe in those who predict by lots, or those who tell fortunes for the sake of gain, nor those necromancers who evoke the manes, whom your friend Appius consulted. 7 Of little service are the Morsian prophet, The Haruspi of the village, the astrologer Of the throneg’d circus, or the priest of Isis, Or the imposturous interpreter Of dreams. All these are but false conjurors, Who have no skill to read futurity, They are but hypocrites, urged on by hunger; Ignorant of themselves, they would teach others, To whom they promise boundless wealth, and beg A penny in return, paid in advance. ad Such is the style in which Ennius speaks of those pre- tenders of divination; and a few verses before, he has affirmed that though the Gods exist, they take no care of the _ human race. I am of a contrary opinion, and approve of divination, because I believe that the Gods do watch over men, and admonish them, and presignify many things to them, all levity, vanity, and malice being excluded.: 3 And when Quintus had said this, You are, indeed, said I, admirably prepared. |.:: Gis [The rest of this Book is lost.]
200 ON DIVINATION, BOOK II, I. Wuen I have been considering, as I frequently have, with deep and prolonged cogitation, by what means I might Serve aS many persons as possible, so as never to cease from doing service to my country, no better method has occurred to me than that of instructing my fellow-citizens in the noblest arts. And this I flatter myself that I have already in some degree effected in the numerous works which I have written. In the treatise which I have entitled “ Hortensius,” I have earnestly recommended them to the study of philoso- phy; and in the four books of Academic Questions, I have laid open that species of philosophy which I think the least arrogant, and at the same time the most consistent and © elegant.
Again, as the foundation of all philosophy is the knowledge of the chief good and evil which we should seek or shun, I have thoroughly discussed these topics in five books, in order to explain the different arguments and objections of the various schools in relation thereto.! In five other books of Tusculan Questions, I have explained what most conduces to render life happy. In the first, I treat of the contempt of death; in the second, of the endurance of pain and sorrow; in the third, of mitigating melancholy; in the fourth, of the other perturbations of the mind; and in the fifth, I elaborate that most glorious of all philosophic doctrines— the all-sufficiency of virtue; and prove that virtue can secure our perpetual bliss without foreign appliances and assistances. ) When these works were completed, I wrote three books on the Nature of the Gods. I have discussed all the different bearings and topics of that subject, and now I proceed in the composition of a treatise on Divination, in order to give ? He is here referring to the treatise De Finibus, a ON DIVINATION, 201 that subject the amplest development. And if, when this is finished, I add another on Fate, I shall have abundantly | examined the whole of that question.
To this catalogue of my writings, I must likewise add my six books on the Republic, which I composed when I was directing the government of the State. A grand subject, indeed, and peculiarly connected with philosophy, and one which has been richly elaborated by Plato, Aristotle, Theo- phrastus, and the whole tribe of the Peripatetics.
I must not forget to mention my Essay on Consolation, which afforded me myself no inconsiderable comfort, and will, I trust, be of some benefit to others. Besides this, I lately wrote a work on Old Age, which I addressed to Atticus; and since it is owing to philosophy that our friend Cato is. the good and brave man that he is, he is well entitled to an honourable place in the list of my writings, Moreover, as Aristotle and Theophrastus, two authors emi- nently distinguished both for the penetration and fertility of their genius, have united with their philosophy precepts like- wise for eloquence, so I think that I too may class among my philosophical writings my treatise on the Oratorical Art. So there are three books on Oratory, a fourth Essay entitled Brutus, and a fifth named the Orator.
II. Such are the works I have already written, and I am girding myself up to what remains, with the desire (if I am not hindered by weightier business) of leaving no philosophical topic otherwise than fully explained and illustrated in the Latin language, For what greater or better service can we render to our country, than by thus educating and instructing the rising generation, especially in times like these, and in the present state of morality, when society has fallen into such disorders as to require every one to use his best exertions to check and restrain it?
Not that I expect to succeed (for that, indeed, cannot be even hoped) in winning all the young to the study of philo- sophy. I shall be glad to gain even a few, the fruits of whose industry may have an extended effect on the republic.
Indeed, I already begin to gather some fruit of my labour, from those of more advanced years, who are pleased with my various books. By their eagerness for reading what I write, my ambition for writing is from day to day more yehe- 202 ON DIVINATION.
mently excited. And indeed such individuals are far more numerous than I could have imagined. A magnificent thing it will be, and glorious indeed for the Romans, when they.
shall no longer find it necessary to resort to the Greeks for philosophical literature. And this desideratum I shall cer-.
tainly effect for them, if I do but succeed in accomplishing my design. | To the undertaking of explaining philosophy I was origi- nally prompted by disastrous circumstances of the state. For during the civil wars I could not defend the commonwealth by professional exertions; while at the same time I could not remain inactive. And yet I could not find anything worthy of myself for me to undertake. My fellow-citizens, therefore, will pardon me, or rather will thank me; because when Rome had become the property of one man, I neither concealed myself, nor deserted them, nor yielded to grief, nor conducted myself like a politician indignant at either an individual or the times,—nor played the part of a flatterer of, or courtier to, the power of another, so as to be ashamed of myself. For from Plato and philosophy I had learnt this lesson, that certain revolutions are natural to>all republics, which alternately come under the power of monarchs, and democracies, and aristocracies., And when this fate had befallen our own Commonwealth, then, being deprived of my customary employments, I applied: myself anew to the study of philosophy, doing so both to alleviate my own sorrow for the calamities of the state, and also in the hope of serving my fellow-countrymen by my writings. And thus in my books I continued to plead and to harangue, and took the same care to advance the interests of philosophy as I had before to- promote the cause of the Republic. Now, however, since Iam again engaged in the affairs of government, I must devote my attention to the state, or I should rather say, all my labours and cares must be occupied about that; and I shall only be able to give to philosophy whatever little leisure I can steal from public business and public employments. Of these matters, however, I shall find a better occasion to speak; let me now return to the subject of divination. For when my brother Quintus had concluded his arguments on the subject of divination, con- tained in the preceding book, and we had walked enough to 3 be _ Gh Ss Seal i 4 ON DIVINATION, 203 satisfy us, we sat down in my library, which, as I before noticed, is in my Lyceum.
III. Then I said,—Quintus, you have defended the doctrine of the Stoics, respecting divination, with great accuracy, and on the strictest Stoical principles. And what particularly pleased me was, that you supported your cause chiefly by authorities, and those, too, of great force and dignity, borrowed from our _ own countrymen. It is now my part to notice what you have advanced. But I shall do so without offering anything absolutely on one side or the other, examining all your argu- ments, often expressing doubts and distrusting myself. For if T assumed anything I could say on this subject as certain, I should play the part of a diviner even while denying divination. I am, no doubt, greatly fuiluenieed by that preliminary question which Carneades used to raise,—namely, What is the subject matter of divination? Is it things perceived by the senses, or not? Such things we see, or hear, or taste, or smell, or touch. Is there, then, among such, anything which we perceive more by some foreseeing power, or agitation of the mind, than through nature herself? Or could a diviner, if he were blind as Tiresias, somehow or other distinguish between white and black? or if he were -deaf, could he distinguish between the articulations and modulations of voices? Divi- nation, therefore, cannot be applied to those objects which come under the cognisance of the senses.
Nor is it of much use, even in matters of art and science, In medicine for instance, if a person is sick we do not call in the diviner or the conjuror, but the physician; and in music, if we wish to learn the flute or the harp, we do. not take ‘ lessons from the soothsayer, but from the musician.
It is the same in literature, and in-all those sciences which are matters of education and discipline. Do you think that those who addict themselves to the art of divination can thereby inform us whether the sun is larger than the earth or of the same size as it appears, or whether the moon shines by her own light or by a radiance borrowed from the sun, or what are the laws of motion obeyed by these orbs, or by those other five stars which are termed the planets?
None of those who pass for diviners pretend to be able to instruct mankind in these matters, nor can they prove the 204 ON DIVINATION.
truth or falsehood of the problems of geometry. Such mat- ters belong to the mathematician, not to conjurors.
IV. And in those questions which are agitated in moral philosophy, is there any one with respect to which any diviner ever gives an answer, or is ever consulted as to what is good, bad, or indifferent? For such topics properly belong to philosophers. As to duties, who ever consulted a diviner how to regulate his behaviour to his parents, his brethren, or his friends? or in what light he should regard wealth, and honour, and authority? These things are referred to sages, not diviners.
Again, as to the subjects which belong to dialecticians, or natural philosophers. What diviner can tell whether there is one world or more than one? what are the principles of things from which all things derive their being? That is the science of the natural philosopher, Or who asks a diviner how ta solve the difficulty of a fallacy, or disentangle the perplexity of a sorites, which we may render by the Latin word acervalem (an accumulation), though it is unnecessary; for just as the word philosophy, and many other Grecian terms, have become naturalized in our language, so this word sorites is already sufficiently familiar among us, These subjects belong to the logician, not to the diviner.
Again, if the question be, which is the best form of govern- ment, what are the relative advantages or disadvantages of such and such laws and moral regulations, should we dream of advising with a soothsayer from Ktruria, or with princes and chosen men experienced in political matters?
Now, if divination regards neither those things which are perceived by the senses, nor those which are taught by art, nor those which are discussed by philosophy, nor those which affect the politics of the state, 1 scarcely understand what can be its object. It must either bear upon all topics, or else some particular one must be allotted to it in which it may be exercised, Now common sense certifies us that it does not bear on all topics, and we are at a loss to discover what particular topic, or subject matter, it can embrace, It follows, therefore, that divination does not exist.
V. There is a common Greek proverb to this effect:— The wisest prophet ’s he who guesses best. Will, then, a soothsayer conjecture what sort of weather is ON DIVINATION. 205 coming better than a pilot? or will he divine the character of an illness more acutely than a doctor? or the proper way to carry on a war better than a general?
But I observe, O Quintus, that you have prudently dis- tinguished the topics of divination from those matters which lie within the sphere of art and skill, and from those which are perceived by the observation of the senses, or by any system. You have defined it thus:—Divination is the pre- sentiment and power of foretelling or predicting those things which are fortuitous. But, in the first place, you are only arguing ina circle. For does not a pilot, or a physician, or a general foresee the probabilities of things fortuitous as well as your diviner? Can, then, any augur whatsoever, or sooth- sayer, or diviner, conjecture better whether a patient will escape from sickness, or a ship from peril, or the army from the manoeuvres of the enemy, than a physician, or pilot, or general? | _ But you said that these matters did not belong to the diviner; but that men could foresee impending winds or showers by certain signs; and to confirm this argument, you have cited certain verses of my translation of Aratus. And yet these atmospheric phenomena are fortuitous; for they only happen occasionally, and not always. What, then, is this presentiment of things fortuitous, which you call divina- tion, and to what can it be applied? For those things of which we can have a previous notion by some art or reason, you speak of as belonging not to diviners, but to men of skill in them. Thus you have left divination nothing but the power of predicting those fortuitous things which cannot be foreseen by any art or any prudence.