_ Wherefore, as this religion which is united with the know- ledge of nature is to ‘be propagated, so also are all the roots of superstition to be destroyed. For it presses upon, and pur- ‘sues, and persecutes you wherever you turn yourself,—whether you consult a diviner, or have heard an omen, or have im- molated a victim, or beheld a flight.of birds; whether you have seen a Chaldean or a soothsayer; if it lightens or thunders, or if anything is struck by lightning; if any kind of prodigy occurs; some of which events must be frequently coming to pass; so that you can never rest with a tranquil mind.
_ Sleep seems to be the universal refuge from all labours and anxieties. And yet even from this many cares and perturba- ‘tions spring forth which, indeed, would of themselves have no influence, and would rather be despised, if certain philosophers ‘had not taken dreams under their special patronage; and those, too, not philosophers of the lowest order, but men of — vast learning, and remarkable penetration into the conse- ‘quences and inconsistencies of things, men who are looked pon as absolute and perfect masters of all science. Nay, if ON DIVINATION, 263 Carneades had not resisted their extravagances, I hardly know whether they would not by this time have been reckoned the only philosophers worthy of the name. And it is with those men that nearly all our controversy and dispute re- specting divination is mainly waged; not because we think meanly of their wisdom, but because they appear to defend _ their theories with the greatest acuteness and cautiousness. But, as it is the peculiar property of the Academy to inter- pose no personal judgment of its own, but to admit those opinions which appear most probable, to compare arguments, and to set forth all that may be reasonably stated in favour of each proposition; and so, without putting forth any au- thority of its own, to leave the judgment of the hearers free and unprejudiced; we will retain this custom, which has been handed down from Socrates; and this method, dear brother Quintus, if you please, we will adopt as often as pos- sible in all our dialogues together. Indeed, said he, nothing can be more agreeable to me. Having held these conversations we went away..
ON FATE.
PREFACE BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
Or all the treatises on Fate which have come down to us from antiquity, this essay of Cicero’s is the most valuable. Cicero regards Fate or Destiny as the decree of God, the dictum of Providence. But he supposes that it is essentially conditional, and it goes hand in hand with free-will, since free-will is one condition of Fate itself. He therefore agrees with the fathers of the first three centuries in their doctrine of free-will, so admirably explained by Erasmus and Leibnitz, While on one side he defends the decrees of Deity, on the other he defends the liberty of man in a qualified sense, and rescues his readers at once from impiety and fatalism. In this brief treatise will be found the germs of most of the arguments that have been so elaborately extended by more recent writers, who, while they have done much to elucidate the subject, have done yet more to obscure it.
[Zhe commencement of this treatise is lost. | I. * %* * Hat branch of philosophy which, because it relates to manners, the Greeks usually term ethies,! the Latins have hitherto called the philosophy of manners. But it may be well for one who designs to enrich the Latin language, to call it moral science. And here we have to explain the nature and force of certain propositions which the Greeks term axioms (agupara). When these propositions relate to - the future, and speak of possibilities and impossibilities, it is difficnlt to determine their precise force. Such propositions necessarily refer to the amount of possibility, and are only resolvable by logic, which I call the art of reasoning. But T cannot avail myself in this essay on Fate of the method I employed in that other style of mine in which I discussed the Nature of the Gods, or in the book which I published on the doctrine of Divination: in which treatises the senti- ments of each philosophic school are explained in a con- tinuous discourse; in order that each reader might the more easily adopt that opinion which appeared to him the more probable. In the present work I am compelled to adopt another mode of argumentation, for the following reason.— For when [ was spending some time at Puteoli, Hirtius 1 From 760s.
ON FATE. 265 \ Pansa, the consul elect, and a most intimate friend of my own, who was greatly devoted to these studies, which have been my delight from childhood upwards, was there too, and we were a great deal together, and the principal topic of our * conferences was the best method of establishing peace and concord among our fellow-citizens. For after Czsar’s death certain individuals sought every pretext to excite new dis- turbances, and we were extremely anxious to prevent and frustrate their machinations, and nearly all our conversations were devoted to those deliberations; and one day when [ was more at leisure than usual, and less interrupted by visits, Hirtius called to see me, and our discourse turned on the daily, and I may almost say legitimate subject of peace and tranquillity. 7; II. And after some time, he said,—Since you have not, as I hope, abandoned your oratorical studies, my; Cicero, and though you have no doubt preferred philosophy to them, I should like to hear you now illustrate some leading philoso- phical problem. You may, replied I, either hear me discuss such, or argue it yourself; for you are quite right in sup- posing that I have not abandoned my oratorical studies, for which I have also been the means of exciting your own inclination; although I partially found you originally very much attached to it; nor, in fact, do the philosophical studies in which I am now most interested, impair that faculty, but I may rather say that they increase it. For the orator has a great affinity to this system of philosophy which we follow; for he borrows subtlety from the Academy, and in return he imparts to it a certain richness of expres- sion, and copiousness of ornament. Therefore, continued I, since we are equally possessed of oratory and philosophy, your choice shall determine the subject of our conversation. What you say, replied Hirtius, is very pleasing to me, and like everything that you utter, for your inclinations are never at variance with my desires. But as I have been already largely instructed in oratory, and have heard you often, and am likely again to hear you enlarge on the rhetorical art, and as I see by your Tusculan Disputations that you have adopted the Academic method of investigation, by arguing against all propositions; I will therefore now, - if you have no objection, propose a subject on which I am 266 ON FATE, eager to ‘have your opinion. Can I, I replied, find any.ob- jection to anything which will give you pleasure? Do not, however, forget that Iam ‘a Roman,:and as such naturally timid when approaching this kind of argument, and recurring to such studies only after a long interval, and discussing meta- physical:topics. I will listen to you, repilied he, while you speak on this intricate topic, with the same friendly disposition ri which I read your writing; so begin.! 4 ILI. Let us consider here Ris Breol sc Gms of which, as in the case of Antipater the poet, or of those who are born on the day of the winter solstice, or of two brothers whoare illat the same time, or as in the urime, or the nails, and other things of the same kind, the influence of nature prevails, which IT am far from denying;; I only say that there is here no appearance of fate, In other cases, some things may be purely fortuitous; as in that case.of shipwreck in the adventures of Icadius and Daphitas. Some of these stories indeed (if T may thus speak without offence to my master) appear to be the invention of Posidonius, and some are downright absurd. For what shall I say ’—ifit was the fate of Daphitas to fall from a horse and to lose his life by the fall, still can he have been predestined to fall from this:particular horse, which was no horse at all, but only a rock which was called “The Horse?” And when the oracle warned Philip to beware of a four-horsed chariot, did it signify that miniature chariot carved on the handle:of the sword which slew him? Why should we be surprised. that a.certain nameless person after having escaped shipwreck was drowned ina river? When the oracle forewarned him.that he should perish by water, did it indicate the particular stream which proved fatal to him? And in the adventure of the robbed Icadius, I see no trace of what you call destiny, for no special prediction was fulfilled in his death. {1.is nothing very wonderful that a piece of rock from the cavern should haye fallen on his legs; for I suppose that, this rock would still have fallen if Icadius had not been in the cavern just.atthat time. For-either there is nothing whatever fortuitous, or else such an accident as this may have been such,. J ask ’ then—and this principle is capable of extensive apeiieshion—sf there were absolutely no such name, no such nature, and no ‘such influence asthat of . 2 A good deal: of the. original is lostuhere, ©...|: ON FATE, QT ee Fate, and if, as a general rule, the majority of events, or every event, happened at random and by chance, would they happen otherwise than they do? Why then should we always resort to Fate, when without any such principle the cause.of every event may be fairly referred to nature, or to fortune?
IV. Let us, however, as we fairly may, dismiss Pos! do- nius, without any offence to him, and turn our attention to the sophisms of Chrysippus. And first let us answer those difficulties which he finds in the sympathy of things; and his other objections we will take afterwards. In the climates of different countries we observe a great variety; some are healthy, others unwholesome. In some, the animal constitution becomes phlegmatic,.and as it were exuberant; in others, dry and arid. And there area.great many other very considerable differences between place and place. At Athens the air is delicate, which is supposed to render the Athenians clever. In Thebes it ‘is gross and heavy, and the Beotians are proverbially sturdy and stupid. Yet the subtle air of Attica cannot be the cause why some:pupils follow Zeno, others Arcesilas, others Theophrastus. And the density of the Theban atmosphere can never cause a Theban athlete to aim at victory in the Nemean games rather than in the Isthmian. And tocome nearer home,—what influence cap. the nature of our climate have to make me prefer a walk in the portico of Pompey, rather than in the field of Mars? and in your society, rather than that of another? or at the period of the ides, rather than ‘the calends? As, then, the nature of the situations has some effect upon some things, ‘and none upon others, so also the influence of ‘the stars may, if you please, account for some phenomena, but certainly not for all. But, Chrysippus would reply, since there are dissimilarities in the natures of men, so that some persons like sweet things, others prefer what is bitter; some are libidinous, others irascible, or cruel, or proud, while others recoil from such faults; since, then, he would say, one con- stitution is so different from another, what is the wonder if these diversities result from different causes?
V. While he argues: in this way, he shows that he dans not understand the true question, nor its principal difficulties. For, allowing that ‘different men. haye different inclinations, 268 ON FATE.
owing to anterior natural causes, yet it does not follow on that account that the causes of our wills and desires are also natural and anterior, for if that were the case nothing what- ever would be in our own power. At present we confess that it does not depend upon ourselves to be clever or stupid, robust or weak; but he who thinks that it therefore follows that it does not depend upon our own will whether we shall sit or walk, is plainly ignorant of what consequences flow from what premises. For although it may be owing to antecedent causes that men are born clever or stupid, powerful or weak, still it does not follow that it is defined and settled by prin- _ cipal causes, whether they are to sit, or walk, or do any par- ticular thing.
Stilpo, a philosopher of Megara, a particularly shrewd man, and famous enough in his day, was, according to.the account of his friends, vehemently addicted to wine and women. Nor do they mention this to diminish his credit, but to illustrate his virtue; for they assert that his philosophy so tamed and subdued his vicious nature that no one ever saw in him the slightest trace of drunkenness or debauchery. Need I say more? Have we not all heard what judgment Zopyrus, the physiognomist, who had pretended to ascertain the disposi- tions and habits of men by the inspection of their bodies, countenances, foreheads, and eyes, pronounced upon Socrates, affirming that he was stupid and dull, because his throat was protuberant, saying that these parts were obstructed and blocked up? He added that Socrates was decidedly lasci- vious respecting women; at which Alcibiades is reported to have laughed heartily. But such vicious inclinations may arise from natural causes, and yet for them to be so extir- pated and entirely eradicated, that a person who was originally inclined to them may have wholly repressed their influence, would not depend so much on natural causes as on energy of will, study and discipline; all which things are discarded if the power and nature of fate is to be con- firmed on principles of divination.
VI. If you insist on the reality of divination, I once more ask, from what perceptions of art does it proceed 3 I call those things perceptions, which the Greeks call theorems (Gewphpara). “For I do not suppose that any other workmen employ no perceptions in their work, or that those who use a ON FATE. 269 divination can really predict futurity. The axioms of the astrologers, then, are something of this sort; “If any one,” say they, ‘is born at the period when the dog-star rises, he will never be drowned in the sea.” Take care, Chrysippus, and defend your cause as well as you can, for Diodorus, a powerful logician, will have a great contest with you on this subject. For if the argument thus connectedly stated be true—If any one is born at the rising of the dog-star, he shall not perish in the sea; then it is true—If Fabius was born at the rising of the dog-star, Fabius could not perish in the sea. There is, therefore, a contradiction between these two clauses, that Fabius was born at the rising of the dog- star, and that Fabius will die in the sea. This conjunction, then, consists of repugnant clauses,—Fabius does exist, and Fabius will die in the sea; which, in the way in which it was stated, is impossible: therefore, this statement, that Fabius will die in the sea, is of that kind which is impossible. Every proposition, then, relative to the future, which is false, in fact must be regarded as impossible.? VII. This consequence, however, is by no means agreeable to you, O Chrysippus, and this very point is your main dis- pute with Diodorus: for this philosopher only admits that to be possible which is either true or will be true; and what- ever will be true, that he says is unavoidable; and whatever will not be true, that he says is impossible. You both regard as possible that which will never happen, as, for instance, that this precious stone may be broken, though it never will be; and you deny that it was inevitable that Cypselus should reign at Corinth, although Apollo’s oracle had predicted such a fact a thousand years before. But if you approve of these divine predictions, then you will also look upon what are falsely predicted as future events, as things which itisimpossibleshould — come to pass—as, for instance, if it were said that Scipio Afri- canus shall conquer Africa, and if this statement is realized, — then you must assert that it was unavoidable; and this agrees with the opinion of Diodorus which is opposed to yours. But if that conditional proposition is true, If you are born at the rising of the dog-star, you can never be drowned in the sea; and if the first clause of this proposition is necessary (for in past propositions all statements which are true are neces- sary, according to Chrysippus, who disagrees with his master ue 270 ON FATE.
Cleanthes, because they are immutable, and because what is past cannot be changed from true to false)—if the first mem- ber of the conditional proposition be necessary, the conse- quent is also necessary: although Chrysippus denies the universal applicability of this principle. Still, however, if there is any natural cause why Fabius will not die in the sea, then Fabius cannot die in the sea.
VIII. On this topic Chrysippus exerts all his ingenuity. He pretends that the Chahdeans are deceived as much as other diviners; and that they cannot avail themselves of conditional propositions like the foregoing—“If any one is born under the dog-star he cannot be drowned in the sea.” He would rather have them announce the prognostic in. this fashion,—‘ It is not the case that if any one is born under the dog-star he will be drowned in the sea.” What an excel- lent joke! Rather than agree with the rational Diodorus, he sets about instructing the Chaldeans how they should frame their responses. I ask, then, if the Chaldeans should. allow themselves to change affirmative indefinites into negative indefinite conjunctives, why may not the professors of medi- cine and mathematics, and other sciences, do the same? Above all men the physician will no longer propose what he is certain of in his.art in this fashion, “If any man’s veins are agitated in this manner, he has a fever;” but thus, “This man’s veins are not agitated in this way, and therefore, he has not a fever.” Again, the mathematician will no longer say, “In the sphere, when we describe great circles, they divide themselves into equal parts in the centre;” but rather, “It is not the case that when we do describe great circles in the sphere, they do not divide themselves into equal parts in the centre.” What proposition is there which, by _ the employment of such means, cannot be changed from a — conditional. affirmative into a negative conjunctive? And, indeed, we might bring out the same results in other’ manners, I said just now—* In the sphere great circles’ divide themselves equally in the centre:” I might say, “Inthe sphere great circles will be formed;” or I might say, “ Because in the sphere great circles will be formed.” There are many ways of enunciating a proposition, but there is no more — distorted one than that which Chrysippus wishes the Chal- deans to put up with in order to please. But there is no Pe | ON FATE. a7 danger of their adopting it; for it would be harder to understand these contortions of phraseology, than to learn with precision the rising and setting of every star in the heavens. gaia IX. But let us return to the question concerning possibility, so warmly contested by Diodorus, in which the question is examined, What is the signification of the term possible? Diodorus asserts that nothing is possible, except what either is true or is going to be so. This statement comes to this, that nothing happens which is not unavoidable; and that every thing which is possible either exists now, or will exist; and that things future, being certain, can no more be changed from true to false than things past; but that in things already past, the impossibility of change is very apparent; but that in things future, as they do not yet appear, we can- not equally discern that immutability. For instance, we may say with truth, of a person attacked by a mortal disease— ‘This person will die of this malady; and if this same thing were to: be said with equal truth of another person in whom the same violence of disease is not apparent, it will certainly happen as well as it will in the case of the other. Hence, we affirm that even in the case of future things, for instance, there cannot possibly be any change from true to false. This proposition, “Scipio will die,” has such force, that al- though we announce a future event, it is still such an one that it cannot be converted into a falseone, for it is said of a man, and all men are sure to die. | ‘But if it were said, “Scipio will die in his bed during the night by the hand of his enemy,” it might still be said with truth, as it might be about to happen; but it can only be known — to have been about to happen from the fact that it has hap- pened. Norwas it more true to say, Scipio will die, than to - say, Scipio will die in such and such a manner; and his death itself was not less inevitable than the circumstances which at- tended it. Nor was it more possible to alter from true to false, the statement of, “Scipio has been slain,” than this, “Scipio will be slain.” Nor, since this is the case, do I see any reason why Epicurus has such a horror of Fate or Destiny, and why he flies for assistance to his atoms, and leads them out of the way, and why he endeavours to establish two inex- plicable principles at the same time: first, that anything is 272 ON FATE, produced. without cause, from which it will follow that nothing can produce something; an opinion adopted neither by Epicurus himself nor by any other natural philosopher: secondly, that when two atoms move in empty space, one proceeds in a right line, and the other in an oblique, For Kpicurus, granting as he does that every proposition is either true or false, ought not to have hesitated to admit that everything eventually takes places in consequence of Fate. For there are no natural causes flowing from the necessity of things which determine the truth of this propo- sition. Carneades came down into the Academy. This fact was.not without its causes; but we must distinguish between those antecedent causes which depend on chance, and those efficient causes which contain a physical energy and influence. Thus this proposition was always true and certain, “ Epicurus will die at the age of seventy-two, in the Archonship of Pitharatus.” And yet there were no fatal causes which determined this event: but since it took place we may be sure that it necessarily happened in the way it did. And those who affirm that things future are immutable, and that things true and certain cannot become false and uncertain, ought not to be regarded as the partisans of strict fatalism, since they are only explaining the meaning of words. But those philosophers who introduce a chain of eternal causes of absolute necessity, despoil the human soul of its free-will, and bind it hand and foot in the necessity of fate.
X. This is all that we need say concerning possibility. Let us pass on to other matters.
Chrysippus adopts this mode of reasoning. If any motion exists without a cause, then it is not the case that every pro- position called an axiom by the logicians, is neither logically true nor false. For that which has not efficient causes, is neither true nor false. Now, every proposition is either true or false. If it be so, then all effects owe their existence to anterior causes. This once admitted, we must grant that all things are governed by fate. It follows therefore that everything which happens, happens by fate. Here let me take the liberty for a moment to agree with Epicurus, and deny that every proposition is either true or false. I would rather expose myself to criticism for this, than grant that fate governs all things. For this last opinion is entirely ON FATE. 973 ON FATE. 973 untenable, while the former is merely doubtful. Therefore Chrysippus strains all his energies to prove that every pro- position must be true or false. For as Epicurus fears that by conceding this point, he may be obliged to admit that everything happens through fate, since the truth or falsehood of any given proposition existing from all eternity, must be certain in one sense or other, and if certain, then necessary according to the necessity of fate; and so he thinks that necessity and fate are established: so Chrysippus, on the other hand, fears that, if he cannot establish his point that every proposition is either true or false, then it will be im- possible to prove that everything is done in consequence of fate, and of the eternal causes of all future events. - Epicurus, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by his fortuitous concourse of atoms. Hence arises a third motion beside those of gravity and percussion—attrac- tion and repulsion, by which atoms pass through minute spaces. Epicurus calls it éAdyesros or infinitesimal. And he is compelled in fact, if not in express words, to confess that this is an effect without a cause. For an atom moves not by the impulse impressed on it by another atom. For how can one atom be impelled by another, if they are all, as Epicurus asserts, borne perpendicularly downwards in straight lines by the force of gravity? For it follows, that if none of these bodies is ever impelled by another, then no contact can exist between them. From all which it appears that even if an atom exists, and varies from its straight course, it varies without a cause. Epicurus adopted ‘this idea because he was afraid that if he granted that atoms always move by a natural and necessary attraction, © he should deprive man of his liberty. The soul experiences no motions but those it might receive from the irresistible impulse of atoms. And from this consideration, Democritus, the author of the Atomic Philosophy, preferred admitting the necessity of fate to depriving indivisible bodies of their’ natural motions, } XI. Carneades argued more acutely when he taught that» the Epicureans might defend their cause without this imagi- nary declination of atoms. For when he taught that the soul might possess free-will, and a voluntary original motion. of its own, that was a proposition much wiser to maintain _ DE NAT. ETC, | T QT4 ON FATE - than to introduce an atomic declination, especially one. for which. no cause can be assigned. By means: of. this doctrine, these sages might easily parry all the arguments of Chry- sippus. For in granting that there exists no motion without a cause, they need not grant that all which happens, does so by antecedent causes. Our will, for instance, is. not. sub- mitted to antecedent and exterior causes. It is, therefore, an abuse of language to say that any one wills, or wills not, without cause. For in saying without. cause, we mean ' without antecedent external cause, not without any cause whatever. As when we say that a vessel is empty, we do not mean empty in the sense of the natural. philosopher, who denies the existence of absolute emptiness, but we merely mean. that the vessel contains no water, wine, oil, or other liquor. So when we say that our soul is moved without cause, we mean without antecedent extrinsic cause, not independently of all, cause whatever. As to an atom, when it moves through void space by its specific gravity, we may say that its motion has no cause, meaning no cause extrinsic to itself. Therefore not to expose ourselves to the ridicule © of the natural philosophers by asserting that anything happens without a cause, we must distinctly propound that the nature of an atom is such’ that. it may be moved by its own specific gravity, and that its intrinsic nature is the very cause of its motion.. And in the same manner we need