Are men then to say, that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but that men who are virtuous through natural con- science follow that which is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it is the distinguishing cha- racteristic of the truly just and virtuous man to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the first of these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right to the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over those who have done vio- lence to any animal whatsoever. It is, therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator ofsuch crime! * * XII. For when he? inquired of a pirate by what right he dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: “ By the same right,” he replied, ‘* which is your warrant for conquering the world. 12 ee ae Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power, riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned without bound or limit?
But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to © consult the interests of the whole human race, to give to 1 Two pages are missing here. 1 Several pages are missing here. 2? He means Alexander the Great.
AAZ 356 ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
every one his due, and to injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honours, provinces, and kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.
However, as we are discussing public matters, those exam- ples are more illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the question between justice and policy applies equally to private and public affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I will not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own Roman people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from the eradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world.— Justice is’ ¥ be we ® * * * XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may learn from the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by means of the - fecials, and committing injustice with all legal formality, always coveting and laying violent hands on the property of others, acquired the possession of the whole world.
What is the advantage of one’s own country, but the disadvantage _ of another state or nation, by extending one’s dominions by terri tories evidently wrested from others, increasing one’s power, im~- proving one’s revenues, &c.? Therefore, whoever has obtained these advantages for his country,—that is to say, whoever has overthrown cities, subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow-citizens,—such a man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with consummate and: perfect virtue; and this mistake is fallen into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by philosophers, who even give rules for injustice. - XIV. * * * * For all those who haye the right of life and death over the people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title of king, which belongs to the all-cood Jupiter. But when certain men, by favour of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the entire govern- ment, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate them- selves an aristocracy.—lIf the people gets the upper hand, and rules everything after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is in fact licence.—And when every man is a guard upon his neighbour, and every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one trusts in his own strength, a 1 Six or eight pages are lost here..
ON THE COMMONWEALTH, 352 kind of compact is formed between the great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government which Scipio has been commending. Thus justice, according to these facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human imbecility. For when it becomes necessary to choose between these three predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong with retribution, or to do no wrong at all; it is best to do wrong with impunity; next, neither to do wrong, nor to suffer for it; but nothing is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we inflict and that we receive. ‘Therefore, he who attains to that XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men had established laws among themselves from considerations of advantage, varying them according to their different customs, and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but that there was no such thing as natural law; that all men and all other animals are led to their own advantage by the guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice, or if there be, that it is extreme folly, since aman would injure himself while consulting the interests of others. And he added these arguments, that all nations who were flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, who were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be just, that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to others, would have to return to their cottages, and to lie down in want and misery. _ Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume, dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive, pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field mice.
XVI. In reply to these statements, the following argu- ments are often adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we inquire, who is a good man? understanding by that term a frank and single- minded man, we have little need of captious casnists, quib- blers, and slanderers. For those men assert, that the wise man does not seek virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain suspicion, and 1 A great many pages are missing here, a 358 ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
always behold before their eyes images of judgment and pun- ishment. Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit or that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice, precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and hangs over his devoted XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honour and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but his vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken their characters, as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous, impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented, his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned, bound, burnt, extermi]nated, reduced to want, and to the last appears to all men to be most de- servedly the most miserable of men. On the other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all, and honours, offices, riches, and emoluments, are all conferred on him, and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best. and worthiest of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of prosperity. Yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these two men he would rather be?
XVIII. What happens among individuals, happens also among nations. There is no state soabsurd and ridiculous, as not to prefer unjust dominion to just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted respecting the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus Pompey had signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid before the people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the other side, opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had been regarded, Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason, counsel, and prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether? * * * 1 Six or eight pages are missing here.? Several pages are lost here.
‘ON THE COMMONWEALTH. 359 XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an un- wholesome house, with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these objections from the buyer! If he stated those facts he would be honest, no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would be thought a fool, because he would either get very little for his property, or else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects, on the other hand, he will be called a shrewd man—as one who has taken care of his own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding, because he will be deceiving his neighbours. Again, let us suppose that one man meets another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be copper or lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital bargain, or correct the mistake, and purchase ata fair rate? He would evidently be a fool in the world’s opinion, if he preferred the latter.
XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor robbery. What then would your just man do, if, in a case of shipwreck, he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank? Would he not thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape by his exertions, espe- cially as no human witness could be present in the mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would certainly do so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life. If, on the other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable ‘injury on his neighbour, he will be an eminently honourable and just man, but not the less a fool, because he saved an- other’s life at the expense of his own. Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were pressing in the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade mounted on a horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being killed himself, or shall he fling him from the horse in order to pre- serve his own life from the pursuers? If he does so he is a wise man, but at the same time a wicked one; if he does not he is admirably just, but at the same time stupid.: XXI. Scipio.—I might reply at great length to these sophistical objections of Philus, if it were not, my Leelius, that all our friends are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the present debate, especially as you 360 ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
promised yesterday that you would plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you, Lelius.—This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young men. I think all the while that I am hearing him, that he must be a very impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is not less pernicious, XXII.’ True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil, Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. -This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to de- rogation or abrogation, Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils which are usually accounted punish- ments,:: XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero’s treatise on the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken), it is argued that no war is ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth, unless it be one either for the sake of keeping faith, or for safety; and what he means by a war for safety, and what safety he wishes us to under- stand, he points out in another passage, where he says, ‘‘ But private men often escape from these penalties, which even the most stupid persons feel—want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes, by embracing the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death itself is a enalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state, as there is for a man, in whose case death is not only inevitable, but often even desirable; but when 1 This and the following chapters are not the actual words of Cicero, i quotations by Lactantius and Augustine, of what they affirm that e said, a ' ON THE COMMONWEALTH. 361 a state is put an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. It is in some degree, to compare small things with great; as if this whole world were to perish and fall to pieces.”
In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars are unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after a few sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to obtain restitution of what has been taken away.
But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the master of all the whole world.
XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of “justice against injustice. And since when a little time before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other men as their masters; but that unless a domi- nant state, such as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice, that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is advan- tageous to such men, and their interests are consulted by a right course of conduct,—that is, by the licence of doing injury being taken from the wicked,—and they will fare better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance, taken as it were from nature, was added, and it was said, Why then does God govern man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts of the mind?
XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the reasons for government. Do we not, says he, see that nature herself has - given the power of dominion to everything that is best, to the ex- treme advantage of what is subjected to it? Why then does God govern man, and why does the mind govern the body, and reason | govern lust and passion and the other vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be recognised in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is said to govern the ae, and also to govern lust, still it governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his slaves, because it restrains and breaks it, The authority of kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of the mind—that is to say, wisdom controls the vicious and weak parts of itself, suchas lust, passion, and the other perturbations.
- For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to some 362 ‘ ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
one else who might be their own masters; but when those are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury done.
XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was lying hid anywhere, and that some one who did not know it was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you, you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit down. Still you would not be lable to punishment. For who could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good faith, and justice proceed from nature; and if all these things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found. And on these topics a great dealis said by Leelius, in our treatise on the Republic.
' If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that trea- tise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is honourable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful. * * * * XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine, that the affection borne to our children is implanted by nature; indeed, if it be not, there can be no connexion between man and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not, then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro:: for, as they refer everything to themselves, do they think that any- thing is ever done for the sake of another? And when they say, that a man ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these arguments are argued, I ithink, in those books, by praising which you have given me spirits.
In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not that of.a wise man. - XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice, Leelius, says, Virtue is ‘clearly eager for honour, nor has she any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and exacts without bitterness. And in another place the same Lelius says: When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes — can you offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what em- pires? He considers these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of moral rectitude.: | XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be pniversal. Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow- ON THE COMMONWEALTH. 363 citizens, but he violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin peoples: But if this habit of arbi- trary violence begins to extend itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only restrained by fear; then although we, during our days, may escape the peril, yet am. I solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity, and the immortality of the commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might become perpetual and invincible, if our people would maintain their ancient institutions and manners.
XXX. When Leelius had ceased to speak, all those that were present expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio, more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy, exclaimed—You have pleaded, my Leelius, many causes with an eloquence superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators, [and never did I hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the cause of justice. |1 * %« * %* hat two things were wanting to\enable him to speak in public and in the forum, confidence and voice.
XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the state of Agrigentum a commonwealth, where - all men are oppressed by the cruelty of a single’ tyrant— where there is no universal bond of right, nor social con- sent and fellowship, which should belong to every people, properly so named? It is the same in Syracuse,—that illus- trious city which Timeeus calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a most beautiful city; and its ad- mirable citadel, its canals distributed through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its temples, and its walls, gave Syracuse the appearance of a most flourishing state. But while Dionysius its tyrant reigned there, nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were nothing better than the slaves of one master. “Thus, wherever I behold a tyrant, I know that the social constitution must ‘be not merely vicious and corrupt, as I.stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social constitution at all.
1 Twelve pages are missing here.
O64 ON THE COMMONWEALTH, XXXII. Lelius.—You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the point of your.observations.
Scypio.— You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power of a faction, cannot justly be entitled a political community?
Lelius.—That is evident.
Seypto.— You judge most correctly. For what was the state of Athens when; during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of Phidias, and the magnificent har- bour of Pirseus,—did they constitute it a commonwealth?
Lelius.—Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real welfare of the community.
Scipro.—And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost all its securities and all its blessings?
Leelius.—Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted, and the people soon roused themselves, and re- covered their appropriate rights, | XXXIII. Scipio.—I now come to the third, or democratical, form of government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and are carried into execution just as they please, Here the populace inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep possession, and distribute pro- perty, without let or hindrance. Can you deny, my Leelius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the state?
Lelius.—There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely deny the name of a commonwealth, than that in which all things lie in the power of the multitude. Ifa commonwealth, which implies the welfare of the entire com- munity, could not exist in Agrigentum, Syracuse, or Athens, when tyrants reigned over them,—if it could not exist in Rome, when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs,—neither do I see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy, and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community, properly so .
ON THE COMMONWEALTH: =| 365 called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights. And, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and ap- pearance of the people. "Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property «ik the sane into the anaes of the mad multitude]. * m XXXIV. * * * [Itis ae more satis to assert ie a wise and virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.
And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy, consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of govern- ment which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is.
XXXV. Scipio replied—I am well acquainted, my Mum- mius, with your decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although we may speak of it with rather more in- dulgence than you are accustomed to accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three particular forms -of government, none is less commendable than democracy.
I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the state, is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch, as in many nobles?
But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion like the present. When we pronounce the word. “ aristocracy,’ which, in Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived more excellent—for what can be thought better than the best? But when, on the other hand, the title “king” is mentioned, we begin to imagine a tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not speaking of an unjust king, when we are examining the true nature of royal authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the idea of a Romulus, a 1 Hight pages are missing here.
366 ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less severe to the monarchical form of constitution. | Mummius.—Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of democratical government?
Scipwo.— Why, I think some democratical forms less ob- jectionable than others; and by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of the government in the Isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together; did it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution?
Mummius.—I{t did, and not much liable to abuse.
Scipio.—You say truly. But if you recollect, it was a very extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alter- nately senators and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much influence, and were of as much importanceas * * FRAGMENTS.
XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in individuals, which either exults in pleasure, or is crushed by annoyance.
[The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such, unintelligible. | The Phoenicians were the first who by their commerce, and by the merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and magnificence and insatiable degrees of everything into Greece.
Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully, in the third book of his treatise on the Republic, says “the notorious Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than even by his name.”
What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless some one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For what is Athos or the vast Olympus? * * * * XXXVII. I will endeavour in the progee place to show it, ac-— cording to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which, putting forth Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained what a commonwealth ra what a republic is; adducing also many assertions of his own, and of those whom he has represented as ra Port in that discusath!
ON THE COMMONWEALTH. 367 sion, to the effect that the state of Rome was not such a common- wealth, because there has never been genuine justice in it. However, according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was a common- wealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by the more ancient than by the later Romans.
It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as clearly as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I promised to prove, according to the definitions which Cicero, in his books on the Com- monwealth, puts into the mouth of Scipio, arguing that the Roman state was never a commonwealth; for, he briefly defines a common- wealth as a state of the people: the people as an assembly of the multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a community of interests. What he calls a common feeling of right he explains by discussion, showing in this way that a commonwealth cannot proceed without justice: where, therefore, there is no genuine justice, there can be no right; for that which is done according to right is done justly. And what is done unjustly, cannot be done according to right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be called or thought rights; since they themselves call that right (jus) which flows from the source of justice: and they say that. that assertion which is often made by some persons of erroneous sentiments, namely, that that is right which is advantageous to the most power- ful, is false. Wherefore, where there is no true justice, there can be no company of men united by a common feeling of right; there- - fore there can be no people (populus), according to that definition of Scipio or Cicero: and if there be no people, there can be no state of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, which is not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that 1s not a people which is not united by a common feeling of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then the undoubted inference is, that where there is no justice there is no commonwealth. Moreover, justice is that virtue which gives every one his own. 4 No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state, unless for faith or self-defence. ‘This self-defence of the state is enough to ensure its perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what - all patriots desire. Those afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under—poverty, exile, prison, and torment— private individuals seek to escape from by an instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be so constituted as to live for ever. For a commonwealth, there is no natural dissolution, as there is fora man, to whom death not only becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays and falls, it is so utterly revolu- 368 ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
tionized, that if we may compare great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.
All wars, undertaken without a proper motive, are unjust. And no war can be reputed just, unless it be duly announced | and proclaimed, and if it be not preceded by a rational. demand for restitution. | Our Roman commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of the world.
BOOK IV.
INTRODUCTION BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
In this Fourth Book Cicero treats of morals and education, and. the use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing of this im- portant book, save a few scattered fragments, the beauty of which fills us with the greater regret for the passages we have lost.
FRAGMENTS.