withdraw my mind from those things that it may more _distinctly_ perceive its _own Nature_.
Let me ask therefore _What I am, A Thinking Thing_, but What is That?
_willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. These truely are not a few _Properties_, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present _doubt_ almost of All things; yet _understand_ something, which thing onely I _affirm_ to be true, I _deny_ all other things, I am _willing_ to know more, I _would not_ be deceived, I _imagine_ many things _unwillingly_, and _consider_ many things as coming to me by my _senses_. Which of all these faculties is it, which is not as _true_ as that I _Exist_, tho I should _sleep_, or my _Creatour_ should as much as in him lay, strive to _deceive_ Me? which of them is it that is _distinct_ from my _thought_? which of them is it that can be _seperated_ from _me_? For that I am the same that _doubt_, _understand_, and _will_ is so _evident_, that I know not how to explain it more _manifestly_, and that I also am the same that _imagine_, for tho perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be _imagined_ is _true_, yet the _imaginative Power_ it self is _really_ existent, and makes up a part of my _Thought_; and last of all that I am the same that am _sensitive_, or _perceive corporeal_ things as by my _senses_, yet that I now _see_ light, _hear_ a noise, _feel_ heat, these things are false, for I suppose my self _asleep_, but I _know_ that I _see_, _hear_, and am _heated_, that cannot be _false_; and this it is that in me is _properly_ called _Sense_, and this strictly taken is the same with _thought_.
By these Considerations I begin a little better to _understand My self_ what I am; But yet it _seems_, and I cannot but _think_ that _Corporeal Things_ (whose _Images_ are formed in my _thought_, and which by my _senses_, I perceive) are much more _distinctly known_, then that _confused Notion_ of _My Self_ which _imagination_ cannot afford me. And yet ’tis strange that things _doubtful_, _unknown_, _distinct from Me_, should be _apprehended_ more _clearly_ by _Me_, then a Thing that is _True_, then a thing that is _known_, or then _I my self_; But the Reason is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded within the strict limits of _Truth_.
Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins, that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be more easily Govern’d.
Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived most _evident_, that is to say, _Bodies_ which we touch, which we see, not bodies in General (for those _General_ Conceptions are usually _Confused_) but some one _Body_ in particular.
Let us chuse for example this piece of _Bees-wax_, it was lately taken from the _Comb_, it has not yet lost all the _tast_ of the _Honey_, it retains something of the _smell_ of the _Flowers_ from whence ’twas ’tis _cold_, ’tis _easily felt_, and if you will knock it with your finger, ’twill _make a noise_: In fine, it hath all things requisite to the most perfect notion of a _Body_.
But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, its _tast_ is purged away, the _smell_ is vanish’d, the _colour_ is changed, the _shape_ is alter’d, its _bulk_ is increased, its become _soft_, ’tis _hot_, it can scarce be _felt_, and now (though you strike it) it makes no _noise_. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things have _seen_, _felt_, or _heard_, are all _vanish’d_, and yet the _Wax remains_. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on, _viz._ that the _Wax_ it self was not that _tast of Honey_, that _smell of Flowers_, that _whiteness_, that _shape_, or that _sound_, but it was a _Body_ which awhile before appear’d to me _so_ and _so modified_, but now _otherwise_. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me see what will remain, _viz._ this only, a _thing extended_, _flexible_, and _mutable_. But what is this _flexible_, and _mutable_? is it that I _imagine_ that this Wax from being _round_ may be made _square_, or from being _square_ can be made _triangular_? No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable of _innumerable_ such _changes_, and yet I cannot by my _imagination_ run over these _Innumerables_; Wherefore this notion of its _mutability_ proceeds not from my _imagination_. What then is _extended_? is not its _Extension_ also _unknown_? For when it _melts_ the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more various _Extensions_ than I can _imagine_.
It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot _imagine_ what this Wax is, but that I _perceive_ with my _Mind_ what it is. I speak of this _particular_ Wax, for of Wax in _general_ the _notion_ is more _clear_.
But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? ’Tis the same which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the _perception_ thereof is not _sight_, the _touch_, or the _imagination_ thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But the _perception_ thereof is the _inspection_ or _beholding_ of the Mind only, which may be either _imperfect_ and _confused_, as formerly it was; or _clear_ and _distinct_, as now it is; the _more_ or the _less_ I consider the Composition of the Wax.
In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for though I revolve these things with my self _silently_, and _without speaking_, yet am I intangled in _meer words_, and am almost deceived by the usual way of _expression_; for we commonly say, _that we see the Wax it self if it be present_, and not, _that we judge it present by its colour or shape_; from whence I should immediately thus conclude, therefore the Wax is known by the _sight_ of the _eye_, and not by the _inspection_ of the _mind_ only. Thus I should have concluded, had not I by chance look’d out of my window, and seen men passing by in the Street; which men I as usually say that I _see_, as I do now, that I _see_ this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which perhaps may cover only _artificial Machines_ and _movements_, but I judge them to be men; so that what I thought I only _saw_ with my eyes, I comprehend by my _Judicative Faculty_, which is _my Soul_. But it becomes not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of _doubt_ from those ways of _expression_, which the Vulgar have invented.
Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more _perfectly_ and _evidently_ what the Wax was, when I first look’d on’t, and believed that I knew it by my outward _senses_, or at least by my _common sense_ (as they call it) that is to say, _by my imagination_; or whether at present I _better understand_ it, after I have more diligently enquired both _what it is_, and how it may be _known_. Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true; What was there in my first _perception_ that was _distinct?_ What was there that seem’d not incident to every other Animal? But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it as if it were naked, with it’s coverings pull’d off, then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.
But what shall I now say as to my _mind_, or my _self_? (for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but a _mind_.) Why (shall I say?)
should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so _distinctly_, know my _self_ not only more _truly_ and more _certainly_, but more _distinctly_ and _evidently_? For if I judge that _this Wax exists_, because I _see_ this Wax; surely it will be much more _evident_, that I _my self exist_, because _I see this Wax_; for it may be that this that I see is not really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any thing; but it cannot be, when I _see_, or (which is the same thing) when _I think that I see_, that I who _think_ should not _exist_. The same thing will follow if I _judge that this Wax exists_, because I _touch_, or _imagine_ it, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply’d to all other outward things.
Moreover, if the _notion_ of Wax seems more _distinct_ after it is made known to me, not only by my _sight_ or _touch_, but by more and other causes; How much the more _distinctly_ must I confess my _self known_ unto my _self_, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in the _perception_ of _Wax_, or any other _Body_, does also encrease the proofs of the _nature_ of my _Mind_. But there are so many more things in the very _Mind_ it self, by which the _notion_ of it may be made more _distinct_, that those things which drawn from _Body_ conduce to its knowledge are scarce to be _mention’d_.
And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in; for seeing I have now discover’d that _Bodies themselves_ are not _properly perceived_ by our _senses_ or _imagination_, but only by our _understanding_, and are not therefore _perceived_, because they are _felt_ or _seen_, but because they are _understood_; it plainly appears to me, that nothing can possibly be _perceived_ by _me easier_, or more _evidently_, than my _Mind_.
But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.
MEDITAT. III.
_Of GOD, and that there is a God._ Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to them, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self.
_denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things, _willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of, as without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I call _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of _Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention’d whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my self to _know_.
Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_ ’tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of a Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True._ But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and _manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What sort of Things were they? _Viz._ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of These _Clearly? Viz._ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_ in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived; Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either _Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my _Perception_.
But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that I should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem’d most _Clear_ to me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_ comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge my self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it shall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present ’tis True _that I am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five; for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing I have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perswaded.
Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can be a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly be fully _Certain_ of any Other thing.
But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_.
Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as _Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t’other. Also in the _Will_ and _Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for _evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_ that I Wish for them.
Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual _Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are _without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of _Erring_.
Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_ Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_ heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by _My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_, or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not as yet discover’d their true _Original_.
But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count _Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_, that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat, and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the _heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.
When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that ’tis _discover’d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the _Light_ of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other _Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the _Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing _one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever _trust_ them in any other thing.
And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_.
For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the _Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External Object_.
And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are _different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be _like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the _Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers _Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very _smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from certain _natural notions_) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self.
All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a _true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their _Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other way.
But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me; And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_, them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_ are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_; _Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those _Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited.
But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be _as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the _Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its _Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that _Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it?
And from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of _Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in it self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_.
And this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_ or _Formal Reallity_ is Consider’d, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose _Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_, should now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or _Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before was _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of _Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have an _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some _Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its own _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence conclude that ’tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the _Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal reality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which ’tis a _mode_. But that this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any _other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be at least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_ in the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which was not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_; but (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the thing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not _altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_.
Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in my _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_ of these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as that _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of an _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest causes_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must arrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original copy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally contain’d_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that the _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may easily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_ then them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these things, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to be _true_.
But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective reallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either _formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_ of _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do not only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that But if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_.
Some of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_ to _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_ things, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me _men like my self_.
As touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily understand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of _my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither _man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being.
And as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of that _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (_in the second Medit._) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz.
the _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that have in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to which may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to the other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very _obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether they are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of them are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For altho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the _judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of existent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have of _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot collect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a _privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or whether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_ the thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the _privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing _real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas.
And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of these _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent things that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they proceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and _imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little _reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_, I see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them.
But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are _clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow’d from the _Idea_ I have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like; For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_, the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_ in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as _now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which afterwards I apply to other things.
As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as _extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain _modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may seem to be in me _eminently_.
* Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do _Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.
From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_; for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a _substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the _negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_ of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or _desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own _Imperfections_.
Neither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_, and that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of the _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c._ For on the contrary, seeing this _notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more _objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in it self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This _Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho it may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot be supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing _real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_ also is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy _contain’d_ in this _Idea_ of _God_.
Neither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or that there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither _conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very nature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am _finite_. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to be the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all those _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_ is _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_ perceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other innumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either _Doubt._ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to _be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_, are _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may be _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_ by degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I may not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the _power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_.
_Solution._ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are in me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to the making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_, for tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be encreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more encreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it can never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of an _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_, that nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive that the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the _potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but requires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_.
Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not _evident_ by the _light_ of _reason_ to any one that will diligently consider them.
Yet because that (when I am careless, and the _Images_ of _sensible_ things _blind_ my _understanding_) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_ should of necessity proceed from a _being_ which is _really more perfect_; It will be requisite to enquire further, whether _I_, who have this _Idea_, can possibly _be_, unless _such_ a _being_ did _exist_. To which end let me aske, _from whence_ should I _be_? From _my self_? or from my _Parents_? or from any other thing _less perfect_ then _God_? for nothing can be thought or supposed _more perfect_, or _equally perfect_ with _God_.
But first, If _I_ were from my self, I should neither _doubt_, nor _desire_, nor _want_ any thing, for I should have given my self all those