Against Timocrates.
Of Magnanimity.
Of Epicurus's Weak Health.
Against the Dialecticians.
Against the Sophists, in nine books.
The Way to Wisdom.
Of Change.
Of Wealth.
In Criticism of Democritus.
Of Noble Birth.
Next came Polyaenus, One of the four pillars of the school: a great geometer until he became an Epicurean (Cic. Ac. Pr. 106 and De fin. i. 20). A letter of Epicurus to him is mentioned by Seneca ( Ep. 18. 9). son of Athenodorus, a citizen of Lampsacus, a just and kindly man, as Philodemus and his pupils affirm. Next came Epicurus's successor Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, a citizen of Mitylene, the son of a poor man and at the outset a student of rhetoric.
There are in circulation the following excellent works by him: Correspondence concerning Empedocles, in twentytwo books.
Of Mathematics.
Against Plato.
Against Aristotle.
He died of paralysis, but not till he had given full proof of his ability.
And then there is Leonteus of Lampsacus and his wife Themista, to whom Epicurus wrote letters; further, Colotes Colotes, a great admirer of the master, wrote a work to prove that life is impossible by the rules of any other philosophy. Plutarch wrote a tract against him: *pro\s *kolw/th n, 1107 e-1127; and also a *)epi/kour on, to prove that even a pleasurable life is unattainable on the principles of Epicurus. and Idomeneus, who were also natives of Lampsacus. All these were distinguished, and with them Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus; he was succeeded by Dionysius, and he by Basilides. Apollodorus, known as the tyrant of the garden, who wrote over four hundred books, is also famous; and the two Ptolemaei of Alexandria, the one black and the other white; and Zeno Cf. Cic. Ac. Post. 146; N.D. i. 59. of Sidon, the pupil of Apollodorus, a voluminous author; and Demetrius, Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. math.
viii. 348 sqq.; Strabo, xiv. 658. who was called the Laconian; and Diogenes of Tarsus, who compiled the select lectures; and Orion, and others whom the genuine Epicureans call Sophists.
There were three other men who bore the name of Epicurus: one the son of Leonteus and Themista; another a Magnesian by birth; and a third, a drillsergeant.
Epicurus was a most prolific author and eclipsed all before him in the number of his writings: for they amount to about three hundred rolls, and contain not a single citation from other authors; it is Epicurus himself who speaks throughout. Chrysippus tried to outdo him in authorship according to Carneades, who therefore calls him the literary parasite of Epicurus. "For every subject treated by Epicurus, Chrysippus in his contentiousness must treat at equal length; hence he has frequently repeated himself and set down the first thought that occurred to him, and in his haste has left things unrevised, and he has so many citations that they alone fill his books: nor is this unexampled in Zeno and Aristotle." Such, then, in number and character are the writings of Epicurus, the best of which are the following: Of Nature, thirty-seven books.
Of Atoms and Void.
Of Love.
Epitome of Objections to the Physicists.
Against the Megarians.
Problems.
Sovran Maxims.
Of Choice and Avoidance.
Of the End.
Of the Standard, a work entitled Canon.
Chaeredemus.
Of the Gods.
Of Piety.
Hegesianax.
Of Human Life, four books.
Of Just Dealing.
Neocles: dedicated to Themista.
Symposium.
Eurylochus: dedicated to Metrodorus.
Of Vision.
Of the Angle in the Atom.
Of Touch.
Of Fate.
Theories of the Feelings--against Timocrates.
Discovery of the Future.
Introduction to Philosophy.
Of Images.
Of Presentation.
Aristobulus.
Of Music.
Of Justice and the other Virtues.
Of Benefits and Gratitude.
Polymedes.
Timocrates, three books.
Metrodorus, five books.
Antidorus, two books.
Theories about Diseases (and Death)--to Mithras. The "Of Diseases and Death," is preserved in a Herculaneum papyrus, 1012, col. 38, thus correcting our mss. of D. L.
Callistolas.
Of Kingship.
Anaximenes.
Correspondence.
The views expressed in these works I will try to set forth by quoting three of his epistles, in which he has given an epitome of his whole system. I will also set down his Sovran Maxims and any other utterance of his that seems worth citing, that you may be in a position to study the philosopher on all sides and know how to judge him.
The first epistle is addressed to Herodotus and deals with physics; the second to Pythocles and deals with astronomy or meteorology; the third is addressed to Menoeceus and its subject is human life. We must begin with the first after some few preliminary remarks i.e. §§ 29-34, the first of those summaries of doctrine which take up so much of Book X. upon his division of philosophy.
It is divided into three parts--Canonic, Physics, Ethics.
Canonic forms the introduction to the system and is contained in a single work entitled The Canon. The physical part includes the entire theory of Nature: it is contained in the thirty-seven books Of Nature and, in a summary form, in the letters.
The ethical part deals with the facts of choice and aversion: this may be found in the books On Human Life, in the letters, and in his treatise Of the End. The usual arrangement, however, is to conjoin canonic with physics, and the former they call the science which deals with the standard and the first principle, or the elementary part of philosophy, while physics proper, they say, deals with becoming and perishing and with nature; ethics, on the other hand, deals with things to be sought and avoided, with human life and with the end-in-chief.
They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things. An opinion often emphasized: e.g. §§ 37, 73, 82, 152. Cf. Lucr. iii. 931 sqq. Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations Such mental pictures are caused by atoms too fine to affect sense: cf. § 64 infra; Lucr. ii. 740 sqq., iv. 722 sqq.; Cic. N.D. i. 54. On the whole subject consult Usener's Epicurea, Fr. 242-265, and, more especially, Sext. Emp. Adv. math. vii. 203-216. to be also standards. His own statements are also to be found in the Summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Sovran Maxims. Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same Cf. inf. § 146.; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees i.e. the trustworthiness of the senses ( ai)sqh/s ewn ) considered as faculties of sense-perception: cf. Sext. Emp.
Adv math. viii. 9 (Usener, Fr. 244). the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. More precisely a)/dhlon =that which does not come within the range of sense. Compare e.g. § 38 to\ prosme/n on kai\ to\ a)/dhlon, and the way in which the conception of void is obtained in § 40. In § 62 it is called to\ prosdoc azo/men on peri\ tou= a)ora/to u. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to madmen Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. math. viii. 63. and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects-- i.e.
movements in the mind--which that which is unreal never does.
By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension or a right opinion or notion, or universal idea stored in the mind; that is, a recollection of an external object often presented, e.g. Such and such a thing is a man: for no sooner is the word "man" uttered than we think of his shape by an act of preconception, in which the senses take the lead. i.e. in conformity with the sense-data which precede the recognition. Thus the object primarily denoted by every term is then plain and clear. And we should never have started an investigation, unless we had known what it was that we were in search of. For example: The object standing yonder is a horse or a cow. Before making this judgement, we must at some time or other have known by preconception the shape of a horse or a cow. We should not have given anything a name, if we had not first learnt its form by way of preconception. It follows, then, that preconceptions are clear. The object of a judgement is derived from something previously clear, by reference to which we frame the proposition, e.g. "How do we know that this is a man?"
Opinion they also call conception or assumption, and declare it to be true and false See § 124, where a true pro/lhyi s is opposed to a false u(po/lhyi s. In Aristotle u(po/lhyi s is often a synonym of do/ca: cf. Bonitz, Index Ar., s.v.; for it is true if it is subsequently confirmed or if it is not contradicted by evidence, and false if it is not subsequently confirmed or is contradicted by evidence. Hence the introduction of the phrase, "that which awaits" confirmation, e.g. to wait and get close to the tower and then learn what it looks like at close quarters. See §§ 50, 147. The tower which seems round at a distance and square when we get up to it was the typical example in the school of that process of testing beliefs by observation which is here prescribed. Cf. Lucr.
iv. 353 sqq., 501 sqq.; Sext. Emp. Adv. math. vii. 208.
They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined i.e. pleasure and pain are the criteria by which we choose and avoid.; and that there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words. Cf. inf. § 37. So much, then, for his division Division of philosophy is probably meant. and criterion in their main outline.
But we must return to the letter. The letter to Herodotus is the second and most valuable instalment of Epicurean doctrine.
The manuscript seems to have been entrusted to a scribe to copy, just as it was: scholia and marginal notes, even where they interrupt the thread of the argument, have been faithfully reproduced. See §§ 39, 40, "Epicurus to Herodotus, greeting.
"For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome This, as the most authentic summary of Epicurean physics which we possess, serves as a groundwork in modern histories, e.g. Zeller's. The reader may also consult with advantage Giussani, Studi Lucreziani (vol. i.
of his Lucretius ); Bignone, Epicurea, pp. 71-113; Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 118-181. of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, Only the principal doctrines are contained in this epistle; more, both general and particular, was given in the Larger Compendium. to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study of Physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.
"To the former, then--the main heads--we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail.
"Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.
"In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.
For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving Epicurus explains this more fully in Fr. 258 (Usener, p. 189). For "proof" and "proving" Bignone substitutes "declaration" and "declare."; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.
"Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.
"When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. This is no innovation of Epicurus but a tenet common to all the pre-Socratics: the One, or Nature as a whole, assumed by the Ionians, is unchangeable in respect of generation and destruction; cf. Aristotle, Met. i. 3. 984 a 31. The pluralists were naturally even more explicit: see the expands the doctrine. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs. Cf. §§ 41, 54. Lucr. i.
125 f. is the best commentary.
And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.
"Further [ this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature" ], the whole of being consists of bodies and space. Usener's insertion of "bodies and space" comes from § 86; cf. Diels, Dox. Gr. 581.
28. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.
And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), Cf. Lucr. i. 426.
bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.
"Again [ he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome ], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.
These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. Cf. § 54. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.
"Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: The missing premiss is supplied by Cicero, De div.
ii. 103 "at quod omne est, id non cernitur ex alio extrinsecus." Cf. Lucr. i. 960. ) hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.
"Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.
For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counterchecks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.
"Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them--out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved--vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.
[ For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below Properly "further within"--a proof that the Scholiast read his Epicurus from a papyrus scroll which had to be unrolled. Hence "further within" or "nearer the centre" expresses the same thing as "further on" or "below" in a modern book.; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum." ] "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [ Further, he says below, Properly "further within"--a proof that the Scholiast read his Epicurus from a papyrus scroll which had to be unrolled. Hence "further within" or "nearer the centre" expresses the same thing as "further on" or "below" in a modern book. that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. ] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling. Note the distinction between (1) solids, composed of interlacing atoms (which have got entangled), and (2) fluids, composed of atoms not interlaced, needing a sheath or container of other atoms, if they are to remain united. To (2) belongs Soul (§ 66). See Lucr. ii. 80-141; Cic. De fin. i. 7.
"This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting.
[ He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense. ] "The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.
"Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it. This remark is not misplaced.
For infinity of worlds follows from the infinity of ( a ) atoms, ( b ) space; see inf. §§ 73, 89; Lucr. ii. 1048 foll. For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.
"Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of `images' or `idols.' Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.
"Not that, if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, Cf. Lucr.
iv. 794-8: "In one unit of time, when we can perceive it by sense and while one single word is uttered, many latent times are contained which reason finds to exist" Obviously such minute "times" are immeasurably short. The unit of sensible time appears to be that called (in § 62) "the minimum continuous time." Cf. Sext. Emp. x.§§ 148-154. the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable), although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if it changed its direction, that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance, even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight. This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind.
In the next place the exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides, their incessant effluence meets with no resistance, Or, inserting to\, not tw=|, before tw=| a)pei/rw|, "a passage of the proper size to secure that nothing obstructs their endless emanation." But the meaning cannot be called certain. or very little, although many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once encounter resistance.
"Besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought. For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place. If vision is to be not merely intermittent but continuous, images must be perpetually streaming from the objects seen to our eyes; there must be a continual succession of similar images. Cf. Fr. 282 (Us.); Lucr. ii.
67-76, iv. 143-167. And those given off for a long time retain the position and arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the solid bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion. Sometimes such films e.g. mirage and monstrous shapes of clouds: Lucr. iv. 129-142; Diod. iii. 56. are formed very rapidly in the air, because they need not have any solid content; and there are other modes in which they may be formed. For there is nothing in all this which is contradicted by sensation, if we in some sort look at the clear evidence of sense, to which we should also refer the continuity of particles in the objects external to ourselves.
"We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. Thought, as well as vision, is explained by images, but images of a much finer texture, which fail to affect the eyes but do affect the mind: cf. Fr. 317 (Us.); Lucr. iv. 777 f. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us, This was the view of Democritus; cf. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, p. 26. or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves.
They move with rapid motion; The reader is left to infer that, the more rapid the motion, the more continuous is the succession of fresh images. It is this uninterrupted train of images which guarantees the continued existence of the external object, just as their similarity or identity guarantees its oneness: cf. Lucr. iv.
105. and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnexion which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. The film suffers from obstacles especially in its passage through the air, and is sometimes torn into tatters. When these reach the eye, the result is faulty perception; e.g. a square tower appears round, and the like: cf. Lucr. iv. 353-363, 379-390.
Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion Cf. Fr. 247-254 (Us.); Lucr. iv. 462-468, 723-826. (when a fact awaits) confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed (or even contradicted) [ following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented--which is the cause of error. ] "For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact.
Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, dia/lhy in e)/xein, "to be distinct"; again,§ 58; so dialhpt o/n, "distinguishable" (§ 57). the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.
"And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of sense, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth. Epicurus was a severe critic of the Sceptics; cf. §§ 146, 147; Frs. 252, 254 (Us.); Lucr. iv.
507-521.
"Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object, whether person or thing, which emits voice or sound or noise, or produces the sensation of hearing in any way whatever. This current is broken up into homogeneous particles, which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception in that case or, if not, merely indicate the presence of the external object.
For without the transmission from the object of a certain interconnexion of the parts no such sensation could arise. Therefore we must not suppose that the air itself is moulded into shape by the voice emitted or something similar Air is not, as Democritus held (Beare, op.
cit. p. 99), the medium, any more than for vision (§ 49). By "something similar" Epicurus probably means to include sound or noise. Lucretius treats of hearing in iv. 524-614, ii.
410-413.; for it is very far from being the case that the air is acted upon by it in this way. The blow which is struck in us when we utter a sound causes such a displacement of the particles as serves to produce a current resembling breath, and this displacement gives rise to the sensation of hearing.
"Again, we must believe that smelling, Cf. Lucr. iv.
673-705, ii. 414-417. Neither taste nor touch is treated separately in this epistle. like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.
"Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined with shape. For shape cf. Lucr. ii.
333-521, iii. 185-202; for weight cf. Lucr.
ii. 184-215, i. 358-367. For qualities generally cf. Epic. Frs. 288, 289 (Us.); Sext. Emp. Adv. math. ix. 335. Atoms have no colour (Frs. 29, 30, 289; Lucr. ii. 730-841), nor smell (Lucr. ii. 846-855) nor flavour nor sound nor cold nor heat ( ib.
856-859), in short no variable quality ( ib.
859864); but the various qualities are due to the arrangement, positions, motions, and shape of the component atoms. For every quality changes, but the atoms do not change, since, when the composite bodies are dissolved, there must needs be a permanent something, solid and indissoluble, left behind, which makes change possible: not changes into or from the non-existent, but often through differences of arrangement, and sometimes through additions and subtractions of the atoms. If something unchanging underlies every change, the transformation of things and of their qualities must be due to the motion of the component atoms.
With e)n polloi=s understand sterem ni/ois: the arrangement of the atoms varies in solid objects. Hence these somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructible, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive mass In § 53 o)/gkos was translated "particle," since the context shows that a group of atoms analogous to a visible film is meant. But here each of the permanent somethings, i.e. the atoms, has its own mass and configuration. This must remain.
"For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation.
"Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, The opinion of Democritus. lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.
But to attribute any and every magnitude to the atoms does not help to explain the differences of quality in things; moreover, in that case atoms large enough to be seen ought to have reached us, which is never observed to occur; nor can we conceive how its occurrence should be possible, i.e.
that an atom should become visible. Cf. Lucr. iv. 110-128, i. 599-627, ii. 478-521. The first of these passages states that the atom is "far below the ken of our senses" and "much smaller than the things which our eyes begin to be able to see."
"Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate Admitting indivisible atoms, hard solid bodies can be explained; whereas, if atoms were soft and thus divisible ad infinitum, all things would be deprived of solidity (Lucr. i. 565-576). Just before Lucretius has argued that, if atoms did not set a limit to the division of things, production or reproduction would be impossible, since destruction is wrought more quickly than it is repaired, and endless future time could not undo the waste of endless past time. Possibly, however, Epicurus is thinking of an argument similar to that used by Lucretius in ii.
522-568--that a finite number of shapes implies and requires an infinity of atoms of each shape. them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.
"For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself