V Have endeavoured to make this edition ſomething more full and ſatigfactory than the firſt. I have faught with the ut- moſt care, and read with equal attention, every thing which has appeared in publick againſt my opinions; I have taken advan- tage of the candid liberty of my friends; and if by theſe means I have been better enabled to diſcover the imperfettions of the work, the indulgence it has received, im- perfect as it was, furniſhed me with a new motive to ſpare no reaſonable pains for its _ improvement. Though I have not found Sufficient reaſon, or what appeared to me ſuf- ficient, for making any material change i in my theory, T have found it neceſſary in many places to explain, illuſtrate and enforce it. J have prefixed an introductory diſcourſe concerning Taſte; it is a matter Curious it Mets and it leads naturally enough te the A 2 principal ir The PRE HAC principal enquiry. This avith the other ex- blanations has made the work conſiderably larger; and by increafing its bull bus, Tam afraid added to its faultss: 5 that notwithlanding all my attention, it may fland in need f a yet greater ſhare of indulgence than it required at its firſt appearance.
: They who are accuſtomed to fludies of this nature will expect, and they. will \altow tos or mam faults. -'T hey. know; that many of tbe objetts-of our enquiry are in themſelves obſcure. and intricate 3". and that many-others Have been rendered fo by affetted.refinements or falſe learning z. they know that there. Are many impediments in the ſubject, in the pre- judlices of others, and even in our own, that render it a matter of uo ſmall diſicuity to ſhew in a clear ligbt the genniue face.of naturr. T End that v the mind "7s intent on the general ſabeme \of \things, - fome' particular part}, mut le neglected; "that" we nuit oftensfubmt"the\ file to -the matter, and frequently" give up the" praiſe of elegance,” ſatisfied with" being clear.
The The) PREFACE „ De cbaratters of nature are legible it 1s true; but they are not plain enougb to en- able thoſe who run, to read them. We muſt make uſe: of u cautious; I had almaſt ſaid, a - t1morous method of proceeding. We muſt not attempt to fly, when we can ſcarcely pretend fo creep: In conſidering any complex mat- ter, we-ought to examine every diſtinct in- gredient in the compoſition; one by one; and reduce every thing to the utmoſt ſimplicity; Vince "the condition of” our nature binds us to a ftritt law and very narrow limits. We ought afterwards to re-examine the principles by the effect of the compoſition, as well as, the compoſition by that of the principles.
Me ought to compare our ſubjeft with things a fanular. nature, and even with things of -@. contrary nature; for diſcoveries may Ve, and often are made by the contraſt, which on A eſcape us on the fingle view. The greater number of. theſe compariſons we male, the more general and the more certain our knowledge is like to prove, as built upon o more extenſoue. and perfett induftion.
© SD i „ ner A OE Should fail at luſt of diſtowering the truth, it may anſiuer an end perhaps as uſeful, in diſcovering to us thi weakneſs of our own under landing., it does not make tus does not preſerve us from error, it may at leaft from the ſpirit of error, and may make u- cautions of pronouncing with” pofitioe- neſt by with haſte, when fo an hay N in fo much” writer tainty.
' Teould wiſh that" GE A 5 Ab the ame method were purſued” which Ten- dexvoured to obſerve" m" forming it. The objettions, in my option, ought" to be propoſed, either to the ſeveral principles as they are diſtinciiy confidered, or to the juſineſs of the concluſon which" is druum from them.
But it is common to þafs over both the premiſes and conclufion in filence, and fo produce as an objection, Jome "poetical Paſſage which does not e em egſßiy uccoEeʒad for "upon the principles endet Lo 'eftab}; D. Mie manner of gary Hound Tin very improper.
% The PREFA CE. vii we could efabliſh no principle until ue had previouſly unravelled the complex texture of every image er deſoription to be fund in poets and orators. And though we ſhould never be able to reconcile the effect of fuch images to our principles, this can never overturn the theory ſelf, whuft it is found. theory. founded on experiment and not g. Jumed, is always good for ſo much as it ex- plains. Our inability to puſh it endefinitely 25 u argument at all againſt it. This in- ability may be owing to our ignorance of Jome neceſſary mediums;- to a want of proper application; to many other cauſes beſides. - 4 defett in the principles we employ. In reality the ſubject requires a much cloſer atfention, thun we dare claim from our man- ner of treating it. V ſhould not appear on the 1 of the work,, I muſt caution the reader agamſt imagining that I intended a full differ tation on the Sublime and Beautiful, My enquiry \ A 4 went vii TRKPREPA CE went nd further than tui the origin of theſe ideas. If the qualities which" have ranged confftent with: each otber, and all different from thoſe" auhich I place under the bead of Beauty; and if thoſe aphich\ compoſe the "claſs of the. Beautiful have the fame confi/t- ency with themſelves, and the ſame oppyſition nation Sublime, Jam in litile pain whe- ther any body cbuſes to ſollou the name I grve' them or not, pruwidad be allows that abr I diſpoſe under different head are in reality different things in nature. The uſe I make of the worde may be blame at too well be miſunder toad. To conclude; whatever progreſs »may. be made towards the diſcovery of truth\in;this matter, I do not repent tbe pains I have taken in it. The uſe of ſuch enquiries may be very c confiderable;\» Whatever turns the foul inward on itſelf, 'tends'to'\concenter iti forges and to fit it for greater and ſironger fights fights The PN EHA CE uw fights of ſcience. By looking into phyſical cauſes. our minds are opened and enlarged; and in this purſuit whether awe take or whe= ther we loſe our game, the chace is certainly of ſervice. Cicero, true as be was to the Academic philoſophy, and conſeguently led to reject the certainty of phyliqal as of every other kind of nowledge, yet freely confeſſes « noſtrorum naturale quoddam quaſi pa- e bulum conſideratio contemplatioque & nature.” F ue can direct the ligbis wwe derive from fuch-exalted. ſpeculations, upon che humbler field tbe imagination, whilft wwe inveſirgate the ſpringrund trace the caur- fes of our paſſions, we may nat only. commu- nicate to the taſte a fort of philoſophical ſo- hdity, but we may reſtect back on the ſeverer ſciences ſome of the graces and elegancies of taſte, without which the greateſt proficiency in thoſe. ſciences vill akuays- Laue _ _ » 88 r Novelty | py Fs.
. * * * Iceberg 6 05 Taſte TRIP 1 N PART Ah, E CT. II. Pain and Pleaſute 75 B E CT. III. The difference between the removal of Pain and poſitive Plea- ſure. 47 E CT. IV. Of Deli ht and 5 f "0-1 ed to each other © © 51 5E CT. V. Joy and Grief 54 8 EC Ti ket Of He Palo which belong to Seli-preſervation. 6 5 EC 5. VII. "of the Sublime "IN 8 E oe T. VIII. Of the Paſtions which belong to footy wee EO SECT.
CONTENTS. S$ E CF: Ix; | Te final cauſe of the difference between the Paſſions belonging to Self-preſervation, and thoſe which regard the Society of the Sexes 03 VEL CT, 7 Of Beauty 68 SE CF Society and Solitude 6 SE C i Ki. Sympathy, Imitation and Ambition & SECT. XIII. Sympathy 70 8 ECF. MV. The effects of 97. pathy in the diſtreſſes of others S ECP: XV. ON the effects of Traged SECT. XVII. Ambition 82 8 ECT, XVIII. Recapitulation 84 SE C. < I The Concluſion 87 IP A R T Il. 81 C T. 1. Ot the Paſſion canſed by the Sublime 95 8 E C T. II. Terror 90 SECT. III. Obſcuri 8. E CT. IV. Of the difference Wake. Clearneſs and Obſcurity with regard to the Paſſions 101 SECT. [IV.] The fame ſubject con- tinued 103 SECT.
ON. Ber. V. Power I. nn SE CT. VI. Privatin 125 SE C T. VII. Vaſtnefss 17 27 SECT. VIII. Infinity 129 SECT. IX. Succeſſion and Und SE CT. X. Magn itude i in Building 1 36 SE CF. XI. Tnbnity 3 in. Ob- SECT. XII. Difficulty / 1439 8E CT. XIII. Ma ee 140 8. E CT. XIV. Li 1 8 ECT. XV. Light in Building: 147 SECT. XVI. Colour conſidered as productive of the Sublime 149 8 EC es Fel Sound and Loudneſs 8 E C T. XVIII. Suddenmeſs 152 8 E CT. XIX. Intermitting 153 SE CT. XX. The cries of Animals 1 8 E CT. XXI. Smell and ri Bit- 8 E 0 15 I Of Beauty FE 261 SE CT. II. Proportion not the cauſe f Beauty in Vegetables - 141 3 163 8E CT. III. Proportion not the cauſe 1 of Beauty in Animals. 343 SECT, * CON WT ENT 8. S E CT. IV. Proportion not the cauſe of Beauty in the human ſpecies 174 SECT. V. er conſi- dered al III T3488 SE C T. VI. Fitneſ not the cauſe of Beauty 191 En 535 \The red effefs of Fit neſs d M Minn IT 197 8 E C T. VII. The Reeapitulatiaa 202 S ECT. IX. Perfection not the cauſe of Beau è II 203 SECT. X. How far he idea of Beauty ee to. the enen, of the Mind e ö T7 0 8. XI. EHowr far the 0 of Beauty may be applied to Virtue 208 s E CF: XII. The real cauſe of Beauty 8 E C T. XIII. Beautiful objects amal 5 . 8 nin tex An i SE OT. Mv. [Sadotliicl 2 SECT. XV. Gradual Variation 214 TI XVI. | Delicaty- | 3 218 C T. XVII. Beauty in Colour 220 C T. XVIII Recapitulation 222 C T. XIX. The. 223 C T. XX. The Eye 1224 E 0 81 8 8 8 8 o T. XXI. Uglineſs fi” HIS 225 T. XXII. Grace s de py AS fy -$ECT, CONTENTS. SE CT. XXIII. Elegance and Specis -ouſneſs | 227 8 E CT. XXIV. in Beautiful inFeels SE C T. XXV. TheBeautifulin Sounds SE c T. XXVI. Taſte and Smell f 36 8 E CT. XXVII. n en 2 Beautiful mee 237 r= PART IV.
V4 1.JOW.AEY A £4 SECT, 'E of the efficient cauſe of the Sublime and Beautiful 241 8 ECT. I. Aſſociation 2244 S ECT. III. Cauſe ol Pain and Fear e bon 2124 SECT: TV. Combikied” 2249 8 ECT. V. How te Subine i peo duced 0: £6...1 abs SECT. VI. How pain can be acauſe of Delight B03 GC FORE» 254 8 E CT. VII. Exerciſe erk for the finer Organs SHI IIVY C IEA 2 56 $ E CT. VIII. Why thitigh not 1 -ous ner produce Aa paſſion like Terror Oi1(M193nG.d4 E 0 258 4 $ECT. IX. Why viſual objects of great dimenſions are Sublime 259 CONTENTS.
SECT. X. Unity | why requiſite to Vaſtneſs. 261 SECT. XI. The artificial Infinite 264 $ E C T. XD, 2 vibrations muſt be fimilar 11 267 5 E CT. XIII. beg ede Soqreflion in viſual objects explained 2868 8 E C T.“ XIV. Locke s opinion con- cerning darkneſs conſidered 272 SECT. XV. Darkneſs niht 3 in its own nature 275 8 E C T. XVI. N Darkneſs | is terri- | -Jobletos. 105) 278 8 E C T. un. The effects of Black- 8 E C T. XVIII. The effects of Black- neſs moderated. $BCT. XIX. The phyſical cauſe” of SECT. XX. w Smoothneſ is beau-. tiful 4290 8 EC T. XXI. Syeetueſ, its nature 8 E C T. XXII. Swoetulh relaxing 6 SE CT. XXIII. en why beau- tiful 2099 8 ECT. XXIV. Concerning Smallneſs SE C T: XXV. Of Omen 308 PART * CONTENTS, PART V. SECT. I. Of Words _ 41x SECT. II. The common effect of P oetry, not by raiſing ideas of things SEC x SECT. IV. The effect of Words 319 SECT. V. Examples that Words may affect without raiſing unages. 322 tative art 333 SECT. vn. How. Words FFe4 dhe Paſſionsçgs SEP 334 * 46 us TAS F..
_ N ua; path 2.view,. we may: — ſeem to differ very widely from each other in our feaſonings, and no leſs in our pleaſures: but notwith- ſtanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is pro- bable that the ſtandard both of reaſon _ and Taſte is the ſame in all human crea- | tures. | For if there were not ſome prin- ciples of judgment as well as of ſenti- ment common to all mankind, no hold could poſſibly be taken either on their reaſon or their paſſions, ſufficient to maintain the ordinary correſpondence of life. It appears indeed to be generally B acknow- 2 INTRODUCTION. acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falſhood there is ſomething fixed.
We find people in their diſputes continually appealing to certain teſts and ſtandards which are allowed on all ſides, and are ſuppoſed to be eſtabliſhed in our comman nature. But there is not the ſame obvious concurrence in any uniform or ſettled principles which relate to Taſte. It is even commonly ſuppoſed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which ſeems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be pro- perly tried by any teft, nor regulated by any ſtandard. There is ſo continual 4 call for the exereiſe of the reaſoning faculty, and je is ſo much ſtrengthened by perpetual contention non, that certain maxims of right reaſon ſeem to be tacitly ſettled amongſt the moſt ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude feience, and reduced thoſe maxims in- to a ſyſtem. If Taſte has not been ſo 2 6 cultivated, it was not that the ſubject ON -/ TASTE. -+ yg ſubject was barren, but that the labourers were few or negligent; for to fay the truth, there are nat the ſame intereſting motives to impel us to fix the one, which urge us to aſcertain the other. And after all, if men differ in their opinion con- cerning ſuch matters, their difference is not attended with che ſame important con- ſequences, elſe I make no doubt but that the logic of Taſte, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, might very poſſibly be as well digeſted, and we might come to diſ- cufs matters of this nature with as much certainty, as thoſe which ſeem more im- mediately within the province of mere reaſon. And indeed it is very neceſſary at the entrance into ſuch an enquiry, as our preſent, to make this point as clear as poffible; for if Taſte has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not af- fected according to ſome invariable and certai laws, our labour is like to be em- ployed to very little purpoſe; as it muſt be 0 ged an uſeleſs, if not an abſurd "2 under- 4 INTRODUCTION. undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and-to ſet up for a legiſlator " whims and fancies. - n The term Taſte, like all och figu- dun terms, 1s not extremely accurate: the thing which we underſtand by it, TY far from a ſimple and determinate idea in the minds of moſt men, and is i. there fore liable to uncer I have no great opinion of; a definition, the celebrated remedy for the cure of ſeem in danger of circumſcribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard, or embrace on truſt, or form out of a li- mited and partial conſideration of the object before us, inſtead of extending our ideas tog take in all that nature compre- anner of com- bining. We are. limited i in our enquiry by the ſtrict laws to which we. have Gab-. cn at our x ſein e Moot on heroes bends, according to her ma .
* er ee e e 8 PPP Are. N, . N „CC RRR 1 Se MPT ES Bag NOR.
ON TASTE.: === Circa vilem patulumque morabimur orbem Vnde pudor proferre pedem vetat aut operis lex.
A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little, way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined; but let the virtue of a definition be what it will, in the order of things, it ſeems rather to follow than to precede our enquiry, of which it ought to be conſidered as the reſult. It _ muſt be acknowledged that the methods of diſquiſition and teaching may be ſome- times different, and on very good reaſon undoubtedly; but for my part, Iam con- vinced that the method of teaching which approaches moſt nearly to the me- thod of inveſtigation, is incomparably the beſt; ſince not content with ſerving up a few barren and lifeleſs truths, it leads to the ſtock on which they grew; it tends to ſet the reader himſelf in the track of invention, and to direct him into thoſe 888 in which the author has made his B 3 | own.
9 — WAS FDIC Gi sf P FU FOG I Tp I * N o x N r 6 INTRODUCTS3ON. own diſcoveries, if he ſhould be ſo happy as to have made any that are valuable.
But to cut off all pretence for cavil- ling, I mean by the word Tafte no more than that faculty, or thoſe faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgment of the works of imagination and the elegant arts. This is, I think, the moſt general idea of that word, and what is the leaſt connected with any particular theory. And my point in this enquiry is to find whether there are any principles, on which the imagination is affected, fo common to all, ſo grounded and cer- tain, as to ſupply the means of reaſon» ing ſatisfactorily about them. And ſuch principles of Taſte, I fancy there are; however | paradoxical it may ſeem to thoſe, who on a ſuperficial view ima- gine, that there is ſo great a diverſity of Taſtes both in kind and degree, that no- thing can be more indeterminate. _ 4 85 72 EST.
og OY ON TASTE. 7 All the natural powers in man, which I know, that are converſant about external objects, are the Senſes; the Imagination; and the Judgment. And firſt with re- gard to the ſenſes. We do and we muſt ſuppoſe, that as the conformation of their organs are nearly, or altogether the ſame in all men, ſo the manner of per- ceiving external objects is in all men the fame, or with little difference.
We are ſatisfied that what appears to be light to one eye, appears light to another; that what ſeems ſweet to one palate; 18 ſweet to another; that what is datk-and bitter to this man, is likewiſe dark and bitter to that; and we conclude © in the fame manner of great and little, hard and ſoft, hot and cold, rough and ſmooth;. and indeed of all the natural qualities and affections of bodies. If we ſuffer. ourſelves to imagine, that their ſenſes preſent to different men different images of things, this ſceptical proceedws will make every ſort of reaſoning on B 4 Every 8 INTRODUCTION.
every ſubject vain and frivolous, even that ſceptical reaſoning itſelf, which had per- ſuaded us to entertain a doubt concern- ing the agreement of our perceptions. But as there will be very little doubt that bodies preſent ſimilar images to the whole ſpecies, it muſt neceſſarily be allowed, that the pleaſures and the pains which every object excites in one man, it muſt raiſe in all mankind, whilſt it operates naturally, ſimply, and by its pro- per powers only; for if we deny this, we muſt imagine, that the fame cauſe opejects of the ſame kind, will produce dif- ferent effects, which would be highly abſurd. Let us firſt conſider this point in the ſenſe of Taſte, and the rather as the faculty in queſtion has taken its name from that ſenſe. All men are agreed to call vinegar ſour, honey ſweet, and aloes bitter; ana as they are all agreed in finding theſe qualities in thoſe objects, they do not in the leaſt differ concerning their $09”. effects = N TASTE. 9 7 effcts with regard to pleaſure and pain. q They all concur in calling ſweetneſs pleaſant, and ſourneſs and bitterneſs unpleaſant. Here there is no diverſity in their ſentiments; and that there is not appears fully from the. Conſent of all men in the metaphors which are taken from the ſenſe of Taſte. A ſour temper, bitter expreſſions, bitter curſes, a bitter fate, are terms well and ſtrongly underſtood by all. And we are alto- gether as well underſtood when we * a ſweet diſpoſition, a Fveer perſon, a ſweet condition, and the like. It is con- feſſed, that cuſtom, and ſome other cauſes, have made many deviations from the natural pleaſures or pains which be- long to theſe ſeveral' Taſtes; but then the power of diſtinguiſhing between the natural and the acquired reliſh remains to the very laſt. A man frequently cotnies to prefer the Taſte of tobacco to that of ſu- gar, and the flavour of vinegar to that of milk; LY — K ES ENENNN LS — 10 INTRODUCTION.
milk; but this makes no confuſion in Taſtes, whilſt he is ſenſible that the to- bacco and. vinegar are. not ſweet, and whilſt he knows that habit alone has re- conciled his palate to theſe alien pleaſures.
Even with ſuch a perſon we may ſpeak, and with ſufficient preciſion, concerning Taſtes. But ſhould any man be found who declares, that to him tobacco has a Taſte like ſugar, and that he cannot di- ſtinguiſn between milk and vinegar; or that tobacco and vinegar are ſweet, milk bitter, and ſugar ſour, we immediately conclude that the organs of this man are out of order, and that his palate is utterly vitiated. We are as far from conferring with ſuch a perſon, upon Taſtes, as from reaſoning concerning the relations of quan- tity with one who ſhould deny that all the parts: together were equal. to the whole. We do not call a man of this kind wrong in his notions, but abſolutely mad, Ex- ceptions of this fort in either way, do Ez not ONO TASDEI tt: not at all impeach our general rule, nor make us conclude that men have various principles concerning the relations of quantity, or the "Taſte of things. 80 that when it is ſaid, Taſte cannot be diſputed, it can only mean, that no one can ſtrictly anſwer what pleaſure or pain ſome particular man may find from the Taſte of ſome particular thing. This indeed cannot be diſputed; but we may dif pute, and with ſufficient clearneſs too, concerning the things which: are naturally pleaſing or diſagreeable to the ſenſe. But when we talk of any peculiar or acquired reliſh, then we muſt know the habits, the prejudices, or the diſtempers of this particular man, and we muſt draw our con- chene from thoſe.
This agreement of machingd is not confined to the Taſte | ſolely. The principle of pleaſure derived from fight is the ſame in all. Light is more pleaſ- ing than darkneſs. Summer, when the carth 12 INTRODUCTTON. earth is clad in green, when the hea- agreeable than winter, when 9s thing makes a different appearance. I never remember chat any thing beautiful, whe- ther ſa man, a beaſt, a bird, or a plant, was ever ſhewn, though it were to an hundred people, that they did not all immediately agree that it was beau- tiful, though ſome might have thought that it fell ſhort of their ex- pectation, or that other things were ſtill finer. I believe no man thinks a gooſe to be more beautiful than a ſwan, or imagines that what they call a Friezland hen excells a peacock. It muſt be obſerved too, that the pleaſures af che fight are not near ſo complicated, and confuſed," and altered by unnatural habits and aſſociations, as the pleaſures of the; Taſte are; | becauſe the pleaſures of the-,fight-more commonly acquieſce in themſelves;//and are not ſo often altered IR, | by * ON TASTE: 13 * ON TASTE: 13 by conſiderations which are independe of the ſight itſelf. But things ds not ſpontaneouſly preſent themſelves: to the b generally applied to it, either as | food os q- as medicine; and from the qualities which q they poſſeſs for nutritive or medicinal purpoſes, they often form the palate by degrees, and by force of theſe aſſocia- tions. Thus opium is pleaſing to Turks. on account of the agreeable delirium it produces. Tobacco is the delight of Dutchmen, as it diffuſes a torpor and pleaſing ſtupifaction. Fermented ſpirits baniſh care, and all conſideration: of fun ture or preſent evils. All of theſe would lie abſolutely neglected if their properties had originally gone no further than the Taſte; but all of theſe, together with tes and coffee, and ſome other things, have paſt from the apothecary's ſhop to aut tables, and were taken for health long before 14 INTRODUCTION.
before they were thought of for pleafire. The effect of the drug has made us uſe it frequently; and frequent uſe, combined with the agreeable effect, has made the Taſte itſelf at haſt agreeable. Bur this does not in the leaſt perplex our reaſoning; becauſe we diſtinguiſh to the Wt the acquired from the natural reliſh. In deſcribing the Taſte of an unknown fruit, you would ſcarcely ſay, that it had 4 feet and pleuſant flavour like tobacco, 6pium, or garlic, although) you ſpoke to thoſe bo were in the cofiſtant uſe of theſe drugs, and had great pleaſure in dem. We in all men a ſuffieient briby all things offered to theit ſenſes to that ſtandard, and to regulate their feel- ings and opinions” by it. Suppoſe one who had fo vi vitiated his palate as to take mbte ploafore' in the Taſte of opium than in that” of butter or honey, to be pre- PEE * | ſented 9 NY ON TASTE. | Ig ſented with a - bolus of ſquills; there. is hardly any doubt but that he would nas f fer the butter or honey to this nauſe - ous mortel, or to any other bitter drug which proves that his palate Was natu- rally like that of other men in all things, that ĩt ĩs ſtill like the palate of: other men in many things, and only vitiated in ſome particular points. For in judging: of any new thing, even of a Taſte ſimilat to that which lib has been formed by habit to like, he finds his palate affected in the natural manner, and on the com- mon principles. Thus the pleaſure of all the ſenſes, of the ſight, and even. f the Taſte, that moſt ambiguous: of the ſenſes, is the fame in all, high and law, learned and unlearned.
Zeſides the ideas, with as annex+ ol pains and 'pleafures, which are pre- ſented by the ſenſe; the mind of man poſſeſſes a fort of creative power of 5 INTRODUCTION.
its 6wn; either in repreſenting; at plea- ſure the images of things in the order and manner in which they were received bythe ſenſes, or in combining thoſe images in a new manner; and according to a diffe- rent order. This power-is:called Imagi-, nation; and to this belongs whatever is called witz:fancy, invention, and the like. But ĩt muſt be obſerved, that this power of the imagination is incapable of pro- ducing any thing 3 it can, only vary the diſpoſition of thoſe ideas which it has rn? "TM the ſeriſes. Now the imagination is the moſt ex- tenſive piovince of pleaſure: and pain, as it is the region of our fears and our hopes, and of all our paſſions that are connected with them; and whatever is calculated to affect the imagination with theſe: commanding ideas, by force of Any original natural impreſſion, muſt have the ſame power pretty equally over all men. For fince the imagination is only ON PAST E. 17 only the repreſentative of the ſenſes, it can only be pleaſed or diſpleaſed with the images from the ſame principle on which the ſenſe is pleaſed or diſpleaſed with the realities; and conſequently there muſt be juſt as cloſe an agreement in the imagi- nations as in the ſenſes of men.. A little attention will convince us that this muſt of neceſſity be the caſe.
But in the imagination, beſides che pain or pleaſure ariſing from the properties of the natural object, a pleaſure is perceived from the reſemblance, which the imita- tion has to the original; the imagination, I conceive, can have no pleaſure but what reſults from one or the other of theſe cauſes. And theſe cauſes operate pretty uniformly upon all men, becauſe they operate by principles in nature, and which are not derived from any particular habits or advantages. Mr. Locke very juſtly and finely obſerves of wit, that it is chiefly converſant in tracing reſemblances; he remarks at the ſame time, that the buſi- G - neſs 18 INTRODUCTION.
neſs of judgment is rather in finding dif- ferences. It may perhaps appear, on this ſuppoſition, that there is no material diſtinction between the wit and the judgment, as they both ſeem to, reſult from different operations of the ſame fa- culty of comparing. But in reality, whe- ther they are or are not dependent on the ſame power of the mind, they differ fo very materially in many reſpects, that a perfect union of wit and judgment is one of the rareſt things in the world. When two diftin& objects are unlike to each other, it is only what we expect; things are in their common way; and therefore they make no impreſſion on the imagina- tion: but when two diſtinct objects have a reſemblance, we are ſtruck, we attend to them, and we are pleaſed. The mind of man has naturally a far greater alacri- ty and ſatisfaction in tracing reſemblances than in ſearching for differences; becauſe by making reſemblances we produce neu images, we' unite, we create, we enlarge our ON TASTE. 19 our ON TASTE. 19 our ſtock; but in making diſtinctions we offer no food at all to the imagination; the taſk itſelf is more ſevere and irkſome, and what pleaſure we derive from it is ſomething of a negative and indirect na- ture. A piece of news is told me in the morning; this, merely as a piece of news, as a fact added to my ſtock, gives me ſome pleaſure. In the evening I find there was nothing in it. What do I gain by this, but the diſſatisfaction to find that T had been impoſed upon? Hence it is, that men are much more naturally in- clined to belief than to incredulity. And it is upon this principle, that the moſt ignorant and barbarous nations have fre- _ quently excelled in ſimilitudes, compari- fons, metaphors, and allegories, who have deen weak and backward in diſtinguiſh- ing and forting their ideas. And it is for a reafon of this kind that Homer and the orienta writers, though very fond of ſimilitudes, and though they often ftrike out ſuch as are truly admirable, they ſel- C 2 dom.
20 INTRODUCTION.
dom take care to have them exact; that is, they are taken with the general reſem- blance, they paint it ſtrongly, and they take no notice of the difference which may be found between the things compared. Nov as the pleaſure of reſemblance is that which principally flatters the imagi- nation, all men are nearly equal in this point, as far as their knowledge of the things repreſented or compared extends. The principle of this knowledge is very much accidental, as it depends upon ex- perience and obſervation, and not on the ſtrength or weakneſs of any natural facul- ty; and it is from this difference in knowledge that what we commonly, though with no great exactneſs, call a difference i in Taſte proceeds. A man to whom ſculpture is new, ſees a barber's block, or ſome ordinary piece of ſtatuary; he is immediately ſtruck and pleaſed, be- cauſe he ſees ſomething like an human figure; and entirely taken up with this likeneſs, he does not at all attend to its detects. 0 .
.
(ON TASTE. I 22 defects. No perſon, I believe, at the firſt time of ſeeing a piece of imitation ever did. Some time after, we ſuppoſe that this novice lights upon a more artifi- cial work of the ſame nature; he now begins to look with contempt on what he admired at firſt; not that he admired it even then for its unlikeneſs to a man, but for that general though inaccurate reſem- blancewhich it bore to the human figure. What he admired at different times in theſe ſo different figures, is ſtrictly the ſame; and though his knowledge is im- proved, his Taſte is not altered. Hither- to his miſtake was from a want of know ledge in art, and this aroſe from his inexperlence; but he may be ſtill deficient from a want of knowledge in nature. For it is poſſible that the man in queſtion may ſtop here, and that the maſter- piece of a great hand may pleaſe him no more than the middling performance of a vul- gar artiſt; and this not for want of better or higher reliſh, but becauſe all men do Elz not 22 INTRODUCTION.
22 INTRODUCTION.
not obſerve with ſufficient accuracy on the human figure to enable them to judge pro- perly of animitation of it, And that the cri- tical Taſte does not depend upon a ſuperior principle in men, but upon ſuperior know- ledge, may appear from ſeveral inſtances. The ſtory of the ancient painter and the ſhoemaker is very well known. The ſhoemaker ſet the painter right with re- gard to ſome miſtakes he had made in the ſhoe of one of his figures, and which the painter, who had not made ſuch ac- curate. obſervations on | ſhoes, and was content with a general reſemblance, had never obſerved. But this was no im- peachment to the Taſte of the painter, it only ſhewed ſome want of know- ledge in the art of making ſhoes. Let us imagine, that an anatomiſt had come in- to the painter s working room. His piece is in general well done, the figure in que- ſtion in a good attitude, and the parts well adjuſted to their various movements; yet the anatomiſt, critical in his art, Je may ON TASTE 77 ' uy