tota ilia dedisset tempora scpvitiw." — All things in this his fulminating bull are not of so innoxious a ten- dency. His doctrines affect our constitution in its vital parts. He tells the Revolution Society, in this political sermon, that his majesty " is almost the only lawful king in the world, because the only one who owes his crown to the choice of his people?' As to the kings of the world, all of whom (except one) this archpontiff of the rights of men, with all the pleni- tude, and with more than the boldness of the papal deposing power in its meridian fervour of the twelfth century, puts into one sweeping clause of ban and anathema, and proclaims usurpers by circles of longitude and latitude, over the whole globe, it behoves them to consider how they admit into their territories these apostolic missionaries, who are to tell their subjects they are not lawful kings. That is their concern. It is ours, as a domestic interest of some moment, seriously to consider the solidity of the only principle upon which these gentlemen acknowledge a king of Great Britain to be entitled to their allegiance.
This doctrine, as applied to the prjnce now on the British throne, either is nonsense, and therefore neither true nor false, or it affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconstitutional position. According to this spiritual doctor of politics, if his majesty does not owe his crown to the choice of his people, he is no lawful king. Now nothing can be more untrue than that the crown of this kingdom is so held by his majesty. Therefore if you follow their rule, the king of Great Britain, who most certainly does not owe his high office to any form of popular election, is in no respect better than the rest of the gang of usurpers, who reign, or rather rob, all over the face of this bur miserable world, without any SOrl of right or title to the allegiance of their people. The policy of this general doctrine, so qualified, is evident enough. The propagators of this political L'ospel are in hopes their abstract principle (their principle that a popular choice is necessarj to the legal existence of the sovereign magistracy) would be overlooked whilst the king of Great Britain was not affected by it. In the mean time the ears of their congregations would be gradually habituated to it, as if it were a first principle admitted without dispute. For the pr it would only operate as a theory, pickled in the preserving juices of pulpit eloquence, and laid by for future use. ('undo >i cm/tpono i/uce mox depro- mere possim. By this policy, whilst our government is soothed with a reservation in its favour, to which it has no claim, the security, which it has in common with all governments, so far as opinion is.security, is taken away.
Thus these politicians proceed, whilst little notice is taken of their doctrines: but when th be examined upon the plain meaning of their words and the direct tendency of their doctrines, then equivocations and slippery constructions come into play. When they s;ly the king owes his crown to the choice of his people, and is- therefore the only- lawful sovereign in the world, they will perhaps tell US they mean to say no more than that some of the king's predecessors nave been called to the throne by some sort of choice; and therefore he owe- his REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 17 crown to the choice of his people. Thus, by a miserable subterfuge, they hope to render their proposition safe, by rendering it nugatory. They are welcome to the asylum they seek for their offence, since they take refuge in their folly. For, if you admit this interpretation, how does their idea of election differ from our idea of inheritance? And how does the settlement of the crown in the Bruns- wick line, derived from James the First, come to legalize our monarchy, rather than that of any of the neighbouring countries? At some time or other, to be sure, all the beginners of dynasties were chosen by those who called them to govern. There is ground enough for the opinion that all the kingdoms of Europe were, at a remote period, elective, with more or fewer limitations in the objects of choice; but whatever kings might have been here or elsewhere, a thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynasties of England or France may have begun, the king of Great Britain is- at this day king by a fixed rule of succession, according to the laws of his country; and whilst the legal conditions of the compact of sovereignty are per- formed by him (as they are performed) he holds his crown in contempt of the choice of the Revolutionary Society, who have not a single vote for a king amongst them, either individually or collectively; though I make no doubt they would soon erect themselves into an electoral college, if things were ripe to give effect to their claim. His majesty's heirs and successors, eacli in his time and order, will come to the crown with the same contempt of their choice with which his majesty has succeeded to that he wears. c 3 Whatever may be the SUCCe ion in explaining away the gross error oifact, which sup] that his majesty (though he holds it in concurrence with the wishes) owes his crown t<> the choice of his people, yet nothing ran evade their full explicit declaration, concerning the principle of a right in the people to choose, which right is directly maintained, and tenaciously adhered to. All the oblique insinu- ations concerning election hottom in this proposition, and are referrible to it. Lest the foundation of the king's exclusive legal title should pass for a mere rant of adulatory freedom, the political divine proceeds dogmatically to assert,* that by the principles of the Revolution the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights, all of which, with him, compose one system, and lie together in one short sentence; namely, that we have acquired a right — 1. "To choose our own governors." "2. " To cashier them for misconduct." 3. " To frame a government tor ourselves." Tins new, and hitherto unheard-of bill of rights, though made in the name of the whole people,belongs to those gentlemen and their faction only. The body of the people of England have no share in it. They utterly disclaim it. They will resist the practical assertion of it witli their lives and fortunes. They are bound to do so by the laws of their country, made at the time of that very Revolution which is appealed to in favour of the fictitious rights claimed by the society which abuses its nam ■.
These gentlemen of the Old Jewry, in all their * Discourse on the Lore of our Country, bj Pr Price, REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 19 reasonings on the Revolution of 1688, have a revo- lution which happened in England about forty years before, and the late French revolution, so much before their eyes, and in their hearts, that they are constantly confounding all the three together. It is necessary that we should separate what they con- found. We must recal their erring fancies to the acts of the Revolution which we revere, for the dis- covery of its true principles. If the principles of the Revolution of 1688 are any where to be found, it is in the statute called the Declaration of Right. In that most wise, sober, and considerate declaration, drawn up by great lawyers and great statesmen, and not by warm and inexperienced enthusiasts, not one word is said, nor one suggestion made, of a general right " to choose our own governors; to cashier them for misconduct; and to form a government for ourselves."
This Declaration of Right (the act of the 1st of William and Mary, sess. ii. ch. 2,) is the corner-stone of our constitution, as reinforced, explained, im- proved, and in its fundamental principles for ever settled. It is called " An act for declaring the "rights and liberties of the subject, and for settling " the succession of the crown." You will observe, that these rights and this succession are declared in one body, and bound indissolubly together.
A few years after this period, a second opportunity offered for asserting a right of election to the crown. On the prospect of a total failure of issue from King William, and from the princess, afterwards Queen Anne, the consideration of the settlement of the crown, and of a further security for the liberties of 90 BEFLKCTIONS ON THE the people) again came before the legislature. Did thej this second time make any provision for legaliz- ing the crown on the spurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry? No. They followed the prin- ciples which prevailed in the Declaration of Right j indicating with more precision the persons who were to inherit in the Protestant line. This ad bIbo incorporated, by the same policy, our liberties and an hereditary succession in the same act. Instead of a right to choose our own governors, they declared that the succession in that line (the Protestant line drawn from James the First was absolutely necessary "for the peace, quiet, and security of tin- realm," and that it was equally Urgent on them "to maintain "a. certainty in the succession thereof, to which the " suhjects may safely have recourse for their pro- "tection." Both these act-;, in which are heard the unerring, unambiguous oracles of revolution policy, instead of countenancing the delusive, gipsy pre- dictions of a " right to choose our governors," prove to a demonstration how totally adverse the wisdom of the nation was from turning a case of necessity into a rule of law.
Unquestionably there was at the Revolution, in the person of King William, a small and a temporary de\ iatioii from the strict order of a regular hereditary succession; but it is against all genuine principles of jurisprudence to draw a principle from a law made in a special case, and regarding an individual person. Privilegium not) transit in exttnphm. If ever there was a time favourable tor establishing the principle, that a kiii!_r of popular choice was the only legal kin«r. without all doubt it was at the Revolution.
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 21 Its not being done at that time is a proof that the nation was of opinion it ought not to be done at any time. There is no person so completely ignorant of our history, as not to know that the majority in parliament of both parties were so little disposed to any thing resembling that principle, that at first they were determined to place the vacant crown, not on the head of the Prince of Orange, but on that of his wife Mary, daughter of King James, the eldest born of the issue of that king, which they acknowledged as undoubtedly his. It would be to repeat a very trite story, to recal to your memory all those circumstances which demonstrated that their accept- ing King William was not properly a choice; but, to all those who did not wish, in effect, to recal King James, or to deluge their country in blood, and again to bring their religion, laws, and liberties into the peril they had just escaped, it was an act of necessity, in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken.
In the very act, in which for a time, and in a single case, parliament departed from the strict order of inheritance, in favour of a prince, who, though not next, was however very near in the line of succes- sion, it is curious to observe how Lord Somers, who drew the bill called the Declaration of Right, has comported himself on that delicate occasion. It is curious to observe with what address this temporary solution of continuity is kept from the eye; whilst all that could be found in this act of necessity to countenance the idea of an hereditary succession is brought forward, and fostered, and made the most of, by this great man, and by the legislature who 22 REFLECTIONS ON THE followed him. Quitting the dry, imperative style of an act of parliament, lie makes the lords and com- mons fall to a pious, legislative ejaculation, and declare, that they consider it "as a marvellous " providence, and merciful goodness of God to this " nation, to preserve their said majesties' roy a/persons, "most happily to reign over us on the thront of their " ancestors, for which, from the bottom of their hearts, "they return their humblest thanks and praises." — The legislature plainly had in view the act of recognition of the 1st of Queen Elizabeth, chap. 3, and that of James the First, chap. 1, both acts strongly declaratory of the inheritable nature of the crown; and in many parts they follow, with a nearly literal precision, the words and even the form of thanksgiving which is found in these old declaratory statutes.
The two houses, in the act of King William, did not thank God that they had found a fair opportunity to assert a right to choose their own governors, much less to make an election the only lawful title to the crown. Their having been in condition to avoid the very appearance of it, as much as possible, was by them considered as a providential e They threw a politic, well-wrought veil over every circumstance tending to weaken the rights, which in the meliorated order of succession they meant to perpetuate; or which might furnish a precedent for any future departure from what they had then settled for ever. Accordingly, that they might not relax the nerves of their monarchy, and that they might preserve a close conformity to the practice of their ancestors, as it appeared in the declaratory statutes REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 23 of Queen Mary* and Queen Elizabeth, in the next clause they vest, by recognition, in their majesties, "all the legal prerogatives of the crown, declaring, "that in them they are most fully, rightfully, and "entirely invested, incorporated, united, andannexed." In the clause which follows, for preventing questions, by reason of any pretended titles to the crown, they declare (observing also in this the traditionary lan- guage, along with the traditionary policy of the nation, and repeating as from a rubric the language of the preceding acts of Elizabeth and James) that on the preserving "a certainty in the succession thereof, "the unity, peace, and tranquillity of this nation doth, " under God, wholly depend."
They knew that a doubtful title of succession would but too much resemble an election; and that an elec- tion would be utterly destructive of the " unity, peace, and tranquillity of this nation," which they thought to be considerations of some moment. To provide for these objects, and therefore to exclude for ever the Old Jewry doctrine of " a right to choose our own governors," they follow with a clause, con- taining a most solemn pledge, taken from the preceding act of Queen Elizabeth, as solemn a pledge as ever was or can be given in favour of an hereditary succession, and as solemn a renunciation as could be made of the principles by this society imputed to them: " The lords spiritual and tempo- ral, and commons, do, in the name of all the people "aforesaid, most humbly and faithfully submit them- " selves, their heirs, arid posterities for ever; and do * 1st Mary, sess. iii. ch. 1.
•• faithfully promise, that tin y will stand to, maintain, " and defend their said majesties, and also the Kmi- "tation of tin crown, herein specified and contained.
''to the Utmost nl' their powers," &C. &C.
So far is it from being true, that we acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings, that if we had possessed it before, the English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves and for all their posterity for ever. e gentlemen may value themselves as much as please on their whig principles; but I never ■ to be thought a better whig than Lord Somers; or to understand the principles of the Revolution better than those by whom it was brought about; or to read in the Declaration <.l Right any mysteries unknown to those whose pene- trating style has engraved in our ordinances, and in our hearts, the words and spirit of that immortal law.
It is true that, aided with the powers derived from and opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some sense, free to take what course it pleased for tilling the throne; hut only free to do so upon the grounds on which they might have wholly abolished their monarchy, and every Other part of their constitution. However, they did not think such bold changes within their commission. It is indeed difficult, perhaps impossible, to give limits to the mere abstract competence of the supreme power, such as was exercised by parliament at thai time; but the limits of a moral competence, subject- ing, even in powers more indisputably sovereign, occasional will to permanent reason, and to the REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 2.J steady maxims of faith, justice, and fixed funda- mental policy, are perfectly intelligible, and perfectly binding upon those who exercise any authority, under any name, or under any title, in the state. The house of lords, for instance, is not morally competent to dissolve the house of commons; no, nor even to dissolve itself, nor to abdicate, if it would, its portion in the legislature of the kingdom. Though a king may abdicate for his own person, he cannot abdicate for the monarchy. By as strong, or by a stronger reason, the house of commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The en- gagement and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the constitution, forbids such inva- sion and such surrender. The constituent parts of a state are obliged to hold their public faith with each other, and with all those who derive any serious interest under their engagements, as much as the whole state is bound to keep its faith with separate communities. Otherwise competence and power would soon be confounded, and no law be left but the will of a prevailing force. On this principle the succession of the crown has always been what it now is, an hereditary succession by law: in the old line it was a succession by the common law; in the new by the statute law, operating on the principles of the common law, not changing the substance, but regu- lating the mode, and describing the persons. Both these descriptions of law are of the same force, and are derived from an equal authority, emanating from the common agreement and original compact of the state, communi sponsione rcipubliccc, and as such are equally binding on kin<j and people too, as long as the 26 REFLECTIONS ON Till.
terms are observed, and they continue the same body politic.
It is far from impossible to reconcile, if we do not suffer ourselves to be entangled in the mazes of metaphysic sophistry, the use both of a fixed rule and an occasional deviation; the sacredness of an hereditary principle of succession in our government, with a power of change in its application in cases of extreme emergency. Even in that extremity it' we take the measure of our rights by our exercise of them at the Revolution) the change is to be confined to the peccant part only; to the part which produced the necessary deviation; and even then it is to be effected without a decomposition of the whole civil ami political mass, for the purpose of originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society.
A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve. The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king. At both those periods the nation had lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice; they. did not. however, dis- solve the whole fabric. On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the deficient part of the old constitution through the parts which were not im- paired. They kept these old parts exactly as they were, that the part recovered might be suited to them. They acted by the ancient organized states in the shape of their old organization, and not by the organic molecuke of s disbanded people. At no REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. '27 time, perhaps, did the sovereign legislature manifest a more tender regard to that fundamental principle of British constitutional policy, than at the time of the Revolution, when it deviated from the direct line of hereditary succession. The crown was carried somewhat out of the line in which it had before moved; but the new line was derived from the same stock. It was still a line of hereditary descent; still an hereditary descent in the same blood, though an hereditary descent qualified with protestantism. When the legislature altered the direction, but kept the principle, they shewed that they held it in- violable.
On this principle, the law of inheritance had ad- mitted some amendment in the old time, and long before the era of the Revolution. Some time after the conquest great questions arose upon the legal principles of hereditary descent. It became a matter of doubt, whether the heir per capita or the heir per stirpes was to succeed; but whether the heir per capita gave way when the heirdom per stirpes took place, or the catholic heir when the protestant was preferred, the inheritable principle survived with a sort of immortality through all transmigrations — mtdtosque per annos stat for tuna domus et avi nume- rantur avorum. This is the spirit of our constitution, not only in its settled course, but in all its revolutions. Whoever came in, or however he came in, whether he obtained the crown by law or by force, the here- ditary succession was either continued or adopted.
The gentlemen of the Society for Revolutions see nothing in that of 1688 but the deviation from the constitution; and they take the deviation from the EEI LECTIONS OK principle for the principle. They have little r to the obvious consequences of their doctrine, though they must see that it leaves positive authority in very few of the positive institutions of this country. When such an unwarrantable maxim is once established, that no throne is lawful but the elective, no one act of the princes who preceded this era of fictitious election can be valid. Do these theorists mean to imitate some of their pre- decessors, who ('.ragged the bodies of our ancient sovereigns out of the quiet of their tombs? Do they mean to attaint and disable backwards all the kings that have reigned before the Revolution, and conse- quently to stain the throne of England with the blot of a continual usurpation? Do they mean to invali- date, annul, or to call into question, together with the titles of the whole line of our kings. • body of our statute law which passed under those whom they treat as usurpers? to annul laws of inesti- mable value to our liberties — of as great value at least as any which have passed at or since the period of the Revolution? If kings, who did not owe their crown to the choice of their people, had no title to make laws, what will become of the statute non concedendof — of the petition of right 1 — of the act of habeas corpus? Do these new doctors of the rights of men presume to assert, that King James the Second, who came to the crown as next ofblood, according to the rules of a then unqualified SU sion, was not to all intents and purposes a lawful king of England, before he had done any of those acts which were justly construed into an abdication of his crown J If he was not, much trouble in par- REVOLUTION IN' FRANCE. 29 liament might have been saved at the period these gentlemen commemorate. But King James was a bad king with a good title, and not an usurper. The princes who succeeded according to the act of parliament which settled the crown on the electress Sophia and on her descendants, being Protestants, came in as much by a title of inheritance as King James did. He came in according to the law, as it stood at his accession to the crown; and the princes of the House of Brunswick came to the inheritance of the crown, not by election, but by the law, as it stood at their several accessions of protestant de- scent and inheritance, as I hope I have shewn suffi- ciently.