You have settled, by an economy as perverted as the policy, two* establishments of government; one real, one fictitious. Both maintained at a vast expense; but the fictitious at. I think, the greatest. Such a machine as the latter is not worth the grease of its wheels. The expense is exorbitant; and neither the show nor the use deserve the tenth part of the charge. Oh! "but I don't do justice to the talents of the legislator: I don't allow, as I ought to do, for necessity. Their scheme of executive force was not their choice. This pageant must In- kept. The people would not consent to part with it. Right: I understand you. You do, in spite of your grand theories, to which you would have heaven and earth to bend — you do know how to con- form yourselves to the nature and circumstances of things. But when you were obliged to conform thus far to circumstances, you ought to have carried your submission farther, and to have made, what you were obliged to take, a proper instrument, and useful to its end. That was in your power. For instance, among many others, it was in your power to leave to your king the right of peace and war. What! to leave to the executive magistrate the most dangerous of all prerogatives r I know none more dangerous; nor any more necessary to be so trusted. I do not say that this prerogative ought to be trusted • In reality three, to reckon the provincial republican establish- ments.
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 279 to your king, unless he enjoyed other auxiliary trusts along with it, which he does not now hold. But, if he did possess them, hazardous as they are un- doubtedly, advantages would arise from such a con- stitution, more than compensating the risk. There is no other way of keeping the several potentates of Europe from intriguing distinctly and personally with the members of your Assembly, from intermeddling in all your concerns, and fomenting, in the heart of your country, the most pernicious of all factions; factions in the interest and under the direction of foreign powers. From that worst of evils, thank God, we are still free. Your skill, if you had any, would be well employed to find out indirect cor- rectives and controuls upon this perilous trust. If you did not like those which in England we have chosen, your leaders might have exerted their abilities in contriving better. If it were necessary to exemplify the consequences of such an executive government as yours, in the management of great affairs, I should refer you to the late reports of M. de Montmorin to the National Assembly, and all the other proceedings relative to the differences between Great Britain and Spain. It would be treating your understanding with disrespect to point them out to you.
I hear that the persons who are called ministers have signified an intention of resigning their places. I am rather astonished that they have not resigned long since. For the universe I would not have stood in the situation in which they have been for this last twelvemonth. They wished well, I take it for granted, to the Revolution. Let this fact be 280 REFLECTIONS ON THE as it may, they could not, placed as they were upon an eminence, though an eminence of humiliation, hut be the first to see collectively, and to feel, each in his own department, the evils which have been produced by that Revolution. In every step which they took, or forbore to take, they must have felt the degraded situation of their country, and their utter incapacity of serving it. They are in a species of subordinate servitude, in which no men before them were ever seen. Without confidence from their sovereign, on whom they were forced, or from the assembly who forced them upon him, all the noble functions of their office are executed by com- mittees of the assembly, without any regard what- soever to their personal or their official authority. They are to execute, without power; they are to be responsible, without discretion; they are to deliberate, without choice. In their puzzled situa- tion, under two sovereigns, over neither of whom they have any influence, they must act in such a manner as (in effect, whatever they may intend) sometimes to betray the one, sometimes the other, and always to betray themselves. Such has been their situation; such must be the situation of those who succeed them. I have much respect, and many good wishes, for M. Necker. I am obliged to him for attentions. I thought, when his enemies had driven him from Versailles, that his exile was a sub- ject of most serious congratulation — ted mulkB urbes etpubheavota vicerunt. He is now sitting on the ruins of the finances, and of the monarchy of France. A great deal more might be observed on the strange constitution of the executory put of the REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 281 new government; but fatigue must give bounds to tlie discussion of subjects, which in themselves have hardly any limits.
As little genius and talent am I able to perceive in the plan of judicature formed by the National Assembly. According to their invariable course, the framers of your constitution have begun with the utter abolition of the parliaments. These venerable bodies, like the rest of the old govern- ment, stood in need of reform, even though there should be no change made in the monarchy. They required several more alterations to adapt them to the system of a free constitution. But they had particulars in their constitution, and those not a few, which deserved approbation from the wise. They possessed one fundamental excellence; they were independent. The most doubtful circumstance at- tendant on their office, that of its being vendible, contributed however to this independency of charac- ter. They held for life. Indeed they may be said to have held by inheritance. Appointed by the monarch, they were considered as nearly out of his power. The most determined exertions of that authority against them only shewed ' their radical independence. They composed permanent bodies politic, constituted to resist arbitrary innovation; and from that corporate constitution, and from most of their forms, they were well calculated to afford both certainty and stability to the laws. They had been a safe asylum to secure these laws, in all the revolutions of humour and opinion. They had saved that sacred deposit of the country during the reigns of arbitrary princes, and the struggles of 282 REFLECTIONS ON THE arbitrary factions. They kept alive the memory and record of the constitution. They were the great security to private property; which might be said (when personal liberty had no existence) to be, in fact, as well guarded in France as in any other country. Whatever ie supreme in a state, ought to have, as much as possible, its judicial authority 80. constituted as not only not to depend upon it, but in some sort to balance it. It ought to give a security to its justice against its power. It ought to make its judicature, as it were, something exterior to the state.
These parliaments had furnished, not the best certainly, but some considerable corrective to the excesses and vices of the monarchy. Such an independent judicature was ten times more necessary when a democracy became the absolute power of the country. In that constitution, elective, tem- porary, local judges, such BE you have contrived, exercising their dependent functions in a narrow society, must be the worst of all tribunals. In them it will be vain to look for any appearance of justice towards strangers, towards the obnoxious rich, to- wards the minority of routed parties, towards all those who in the election have supported unsuccess- ful candidates.. It will be impossible to keep the new tribunals clear of the worst spirit of faction. All contrivances by ballot, we know experimentally to be vain and childish to prevent a discovery of inclinations. Where they may the best answer the purposes of concealment, they answer to produce suspicion, and this is a still more mischievous cause of partiality.
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 283 If the parliaments had been preserved, instead of being dissolved at so ruinous a change to the nation, they might have served, in this new commonwealth, perhaps not precisely the same, (I do not mean an exact parallel,) but nearly the same, purposes as the court and senate of Areopagus did in Athens; that is, as one of the balances and correctives to the evils of a light and unjust democracy. Every one knows that this tribunal was the great stay of that state; every one knows with what care it was upheld, and with what a religious awe it was consecrated. The parliaments were not wholly free from faction, I admit; but this evil was exterior and accidental, and not so much the vice of their constitution itself, as it must be in your new contrivance of sexennial elective judicatories. Several English commend the abolition of the old tribunals, as supposing that they determined every thing by bribery and corruption. But they have stood the test of monarchic and republican scrutiny. The court was well disposed to prove corruption on those bodies when they were dissolved in 1771. — Those who have again dissolved them would have done the same if they could — but both inquisitions having failed, I con- clude that gross pecuniary corruption must have been rather rare amongst them.
It would have been prudent, along with the par- liaments, to preserve their ancient power of register- ing, and of remonstrating at least, upon all the decrees of the National Assembly, as they did upon those which passed in the time of the monarchy. It would be a means of squaring the occasional ■creea of a democracy to some principles of general 2S4 REFLECTIONS ON Till jurisprudence. The ruin of the ancient democracies was, that they ruled, as you do, by occasional de- crees, psephismata. This practice soon broke in upon the tenor and consistency of the laws; it abated the respect of the people towards them j and totally destroyed them in the end.
Your vesting the power of remonstrance, which, in the time of the monarchy existed in the par- liament of Paris, in your principal executive officer, whom, in spite of common sense, you persevere in calling king, is the height of absurdity. You ought never to suffer remonstrance from him who is to execute. This is to understand neither council qoi execution; neither authority nor obedience. The person whom you call king, ought not to have this power, or he ought to have more.
Your present arrangement is strictly judicial. Instead of imitating your monarchy, and seating your judges on a bench of independence, your object is to reduce them to the most blind obedience. As you have changed all things, you have invented new principles of order. You tirst appoint judges, who, I suppose, are to determine according to law j and then you let them know, that, at some time or other, you intend to give them some law by which they are to determine. Any studies which they have made (if any they have made) are to be useless to them. But to supply these studies, they are to be sworn to obey all the rules, orders, and instruc- tions, which from time to time they are to receive from the National Assembly. These, if they submit to, they leave no ground of law to the subject! They become complete, and most dangerous instruJ REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 285 merits in the hands of the governing power, which, in the midst of a cause, or on the prospect of it, may wholly change the rule of decision. If these orders of the National Assembly come to be con- trary to the will of the people, who locally choose those judges, such confusion must happen as is terrible to think of. For the judges owe their places to the local authority; and the commands they are sworn to obey come from those who have no share in their appointment. In the mean time they have the example of the court of Chatelet to encourage and guide them in the exercise of their functions. That court is to try criminals sent to it by the National Assembly, or brought before it by other courses of delation. They sit under a guard to save their own lives. They know not by what law they judge, nor under what authority they act, nor by what tenure they hold. It is thought that they are sometimes obliged to condemn at peril of their lives. This is not perhaps certain, nor can it be ascertained; but when they acquit, we know they have seen the persons whom they discharge, with perfect impunity to the actors, hanged at the door of their court.
The Assembly indeed promise that they will form a body of law, which shall be short, simple, clear, and so forth. That is, by their short laws, they will leave much to the discretion of the judge; whilst they have exploded the authority of all the learning which could make judicial discretion (a thing I perilous at best) deserving the appellation of a sound discretion.
It is curious to observe, that the administrative ■JHi nil LE( i IONS ON i ill bodies are carefully exempted from the jurisdiction of these new tribunals. Thai is, those persons are exempted from the power of the laws, who ought to be the most entirely submitted to them. Those who execute public pecuniary trusts, ought of all meri to be the most strictly held to their duty. One would have thought that it must have been among your earliest cares, if you did not mean that i In isc administrative bodies should be real, sovereign* independent states, to form an awful tribunal, like your late parliaments, or like our king's - bench, where all corporate officers might obtain protection in the legal exercise of their functions, and would find coercion if they trespassed against their leg tl duty. Hut the cause of the exemption is plain. These administrative bodies are the great instru- ments of the present leaders in their progress through democracy to oligarchy. They must there- fore be put above the law. Tt will be said, that the legal tribunals which you have made are unfit to coerce them. They are undoubtedly. They are unfit for any rational purpose. It will be said too. that the administrative bodies will be accountable to the general assembly. This I fear is talking without much consideration of the nature of that assembly, or of these corporations. However, to be subject to the pleasure of that assembly, is not to be subject to. law, either for protection or for constraint.
This establishment of judges as yet wants some- thing to its completion. It is to be crowned by a new tribunal. This to lie a grand state judi- cature: and it is to judge of crimes committed aurain>t the nation, that is, against the power of the REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. '287 Assembly. It seems as if they had something in their view of the nature of the high court of justice erected in England during the time of the great usurpation. As they have not yet finished this part of the scheme, it is impossible to form a direct judg- ment upon it. However, if great care is not taken to form it in a spirit very different from that which has guided them' in their proceedings relative to state offences, this tribunal, subservient to their inquisition, the committee of research, will extinguish the last sparks of liberty in France, and settle the most dreadful and arbitrary tyranny ever known in any nation. If they wish to give to this tribunal any appearance of liberty and justice, they must evoke them, or send to it the causes relative to their own members, at their pleasure. They must also remove the seat of that tribunal out of the republic of Paris.* Has more wisdom been displayed in the constitu- tion of your army than what is discoverable in your plan of judicature? The able arrangement of this part is the more difficult, and requires the greater skill and attention, not only as a great concern in itself, but as it is the third cementing principle in the new body of republics, which you call the French nation. Truly it is not easy to divine what that army may become at last. You have voted a very large one, and on good appointments, at least fully equal to your apparent means of payment. But what is the principle of its discipline? or whom is it to obey? You have got the wolf by the ears, and I • For further elucidations upon the subject of all these judica- tures, and of the committee of research, see M. det'alonne's work.
288 REFLECTIONS ON THE wish you joy of the happy position in which you have chosen to place yourselves, and in which you are well circumstanced for a free- deliberation, re- latively to that army, or to any thing else.
The minister and secretary of state for the war department is M. de la Tour du Pin. This gentle- man, like his colleagues in administration. is a most zealous assertor of the Revolution, and a sanguine admirer of the new constitution which originated in that event. His statement of facts relative to the military of France, is important, not only from Ins official and personal authority, but because it displays very clearly the actual condition of the army in France, and because it throws light on the principles upon which the Assembly proceeds in the adminis- tration of this critical object. It may enable us to form some judgment, how far it may be expedient in this country to imitate the martial policy of France.
M. de la Tour du Pin, on the 4th of last June, conies to give an account of the state of his depart- ment, as it exists under the auspices of the National Assembly. No man knows it so well; no man can express it better. Addressing himself to the National Assembly, he says, " His majesty lias tliis "dm/ sent me to apprise you of the multiplied dis- orders of which evert/ day he receives the most "distressing intelligence. The army (le corps "militarie) threatens to fall into the most turbulent "anarchy. Entire regiments have dared to violate "at once the respect due to the laws, to the king, "to the order established by your decrees, and to "the oaths which they have taken with the most "awful solemnity. Compelled by my duty to give REVOLUTION IN FHANCE. 289 ' you information of these excesses, my heart bleeds ' when I consider who they are that have committed ' them. Those, against whom it is not in my ' power to withhold the most grievous complaints, ' are a part of that very soldiery which to this day ' have been so full of honour and loyalty, and with ' whom, for fifty years, I have lived the comrade ' and the friend. ' " What incomprehensible spirit of delirium and 'delusion has all at once led them astray? Whilst ' you are indefatigable in establishing uniformity in ' the empire, and moulding the whole into one ' coherent and consistent body; whilst the French ' are taught by you, at once the respect which the ' laws owe to the rights of man, and that which the ' citizens owe to the laws, the administration of the 'army presents nothing but disturbance and con- ' fusion. I see in more than one corps the bonds ' of discipline relaxed or broken; the most unheard- ' of pretensions avowed directly and without any ' disguise; the ordinances without force; the chiefs ' without authority; the military chest and the 'colours carried off; the authority of the king 'himself \risum teneatis?] proudly defied; the ' officers despised, degraded, threatened, driven ' away, and some of them prisoners in the midst of ' their corps, dragging on a precarious life in the ' bosom of disgust and humiliation. To fill up the ' measure of all these horrors, the commandants of ' places have had their throats cut, under the eyes, ' and almost in the arms, of their own soldiers.
"These evils arc great; but they are not the " worst consequences which may be produced by 2f>0 REFLECTIONS ON THE •' such military insurrections. Sooner or later they •'may menace the nation itself. The natttrx of "things requires that the army should never ad "but as an instrument. The moment that, erecting " itself into a deliberative body, it shall act according " to its own resolutions, the government, he it what " it may, will immediately degenerate into a militant "democracy; a species of political monster, which "has always ended by devouring those who have " produced it.
" After all this, who must not be alarmed at the "irregular consultations, and turbulent committees, "formed in some regiments by the common soldiers "and non-commissioned officers, without the know- ledge, or even in contempt of the authority, of "their superiors; although the presence and con- currence of those superiors could give no au- thority to such monstrous democratic assemblies " [cornices]."
It is not necessary to add much to this finished picture: finished as far as its canvass admits; but, as I apprehend, not taking in the whole of the nature and complexity of the disorders of this military democracy, which, the minister-at-war truly and wisely observes, wherever it exists, must be the true constitution of the state, by whatever formal appellation it may pass. For, though he informs the Assembly that the more considerable part of the army have not cast off their obedience, but are still attached to their duty, yet those travellers who have seen the corps whose conduct is the best, rather observe in them the absence of mutiny than the existence of discipline.
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 291 I cannot help pausing here for a moment, to reflect upon the expressions of surprise which this minister has let fall, relative to the excesses he relates. To him the departure of the troops from their ancient principles of loyalty and honour seems quite inconceivable. Surely those to whom he addresses himself know the causes of it but too well. They know the doctrines which they have preached, the decrees which they have passed, the practices which they have countenanced. The soldiers remember the 6th of October. They re- colject the French guards. They have not forgotten the taking of the king's castles in Paris and at Marseilles. That they murdered, with impunity, the governors in both places, has not passed out of their minds. They do not abandon the principles laid down so ostentatiously and laboriously of the equality of men. They cannot shut their eyes to the degradation of the whole noblesse of France, and the suppression of the very idea of a gentleman. The total abolition of titles and distinctions is not lost upon them. But M. du Fin is astonished at their disloyalty, when the doctors of the Assembly have taught them at the same time the respect due to laws. It is easy to judge which of the two sorts of lessons men with arms in their hands are likely to learn. As to the authority of the king, we may collect from the minister himself (if any argument on that head were not quite superfluous) that it is not of more consideration with these troops, than it is with every body else. " The king," says he, "has over and over again repeated his orders to put " a stop to these excesses: but, in so terrible a crisis, " your [the Assembly's] concurrence is become in- "dispensably necessary to prevent the evils which "menace the state. You unite to the force of the "legislative power, that of opinion still more hu- " portant." To be sure the army can have no opinion of the power or authority of the kinfr. Perhaps the soldier has by this time learned, thai the Assembly itself does not enjoy a much greater degree of liberty than that royal figure.
It is now to be seen what has been proposed in this exigency, one ofjhe greatest that can happen in a state. The minister requests the Assembly to array itself in all its terrors, and to call forth all its majesty. He desires that the grave and severe principles announced by them may give vigour to the king's proclamation. After this we should have looked for courts civil and martial; breaking of some corps, decimating others, and all the terrible means which necessity has employed in such cases to arrest the progress of the most terrible of all evils; par- ticularly, one might expect that a serious inquiry would be made into the murder of commandants in the view of their soldiers. Not one word of all this, or of any thing like it. After they had been told that the soldiery trampled upon the decrees of the Assembly promulgated by the king, the Assembly pass new decrees; and they authorise the king to make new proclamations. After the secretary-at- war had stated that the regiments had paid no regard to oaths pretes avec la plus mtposantt solem* tiitc — they propose — what V More oaths. They renew decrees and proclamations as they experience their insufficiency, and they multiply oaths in pro- REVOLUTION IN FRANCE. 293