XXIV It has been maintained in a certain quarter that the practical deductions from my treatises would be the abandonment of the conquest of political power by the proletariat organised politically and economically. That is quite an arbitrary deduction, the accuracy of which I altogether deny.
I set myself against the notion that we have to expect shortly a collapse of the bourgeois economy, and that social democracy should be induced by the prospect of such an imminent, great, social catastrophe to adapt its tactics to that assumption. That I maintain most emphatically.
The adherents of this theory of a catastrophe, base it especially on the conclusions of the Communist Manifesto. This is a mistake in every respect.
The theory which the Communist Manifesto sets forth of the evolution of modern society was correct as far as it characterised the general tendencies of that evolution. But it was mis- taken in several special deductions, above all in the estimate of the time the evolution would take. The last has been unreservedly acknow- ledged by Friedrich Engels, the joint author with Marx of the Manifesto^ in his preface to the Class War in France. But it is evident that if social evolution takes a much greater period of time than was assumed, it must also take upon itself forms and lead to forms that were not foreseen and could not be foreseen then.
Social conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of things and classes as is XXV depicted in the Manifesto. It is not only useless, it is the greatest folly to attempt to conceal this from ourselves. The number of members of the possessing classes is to-day not smaller but larger. The enormous increase of social wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of all degrees. The middle classes change their character but they do not dis- appear from the social scale.
The concentration in productive industry is not being accomplished even to day in all its departments with equal thoroughness and at an equal rate. In a great many branches of pro- duction it certainly justifies the forecasts of the socialist critic of society; but in other branches it lags even to-day behind them. The process of concentration in agriculture proceeds still more slowly. Trade statistics show an extra- ordinarily elaborated graduation of enterprises in regard to size. No rung of the ladder is dis- appearing from it. The significant changes in the inner structure of these enterprises and their inter-relationship cannot do away with this fact.
In all advanced countries we see the privi- leges of the capitalist bourgeoisie yielding step by step to democratic organisations. Under the influence of this, and driven by the movement of the working classes which is daily becoming stronger, a social reaction has set in against the exploiting tendencies of capital, a counteraction which, although it still proceeds timidly and feebly, yet does exist, and is always drawing more departments of economic life under its XXVI influence. Factory legislation, the democratis- ing of local government, and the extension of its area of work, the freeing of trade unions and systems of co-operative trading from legal restrictions, the consideration of standard con- ditions of labour in the work undertaken by public authorities — all these characterise this phase of the evolution.
But the more the political organisations of modern nations are democratised the more the needs and opportunities of great political catastrophes are diminished. He who holds firmly to the catastrophic theory of evolution must, with all his power, withstand and hinder the evolution described above, which, indeed, the logical defenders of that theory formerly did. But is the conquest of political power by the proletariat simply to be by a political catas- trophe? Is it to be the appropriation and utilisation of the power of the State by the proletariat exclusively against the whole non- proletarian world?
He who replies in the affirmative must be reminded of two things. In 1872 Marx and Engels announced in the preface to the new edition of the Communist Manifesto that the Paris Commune had exhibited a proof that "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-made State machine and set it in motion for their own aims." And in 1895 Friedrich Engels stated in detail in the preface to War of the Classes that the time of political surprises, of the "revolutions of small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses" XXVI XXVI was to-day at an end, that a collision on a large scale with the military would be the means of checking the steady growth of social democracy and of even throwing it back for a time — in short, that social democracy would flourish far better by lawful than by unlawful means and by violent revolution. And he points out in con- formity with this opinion that the next task of the party should be " to work for an uninter- rupted increase of its votes M or to carry on a slow propaganda of parliamentary activity.
Thus Engels, who, nevertheless, as his numerical examples show, still somewhat over- estimated the rate of process of the evolution! Shall we be told that he abandoned the conquest of political power by the working classes, be- cause he wished to avoid the steady growth of social democracy secured by lawful means being interrupted by a political revolution?
If not, and if one subscribes to his conclu- sions, one cannot reasonably take any offence if it is declared that for a long time yet the task of social democracy is, instead of speculating on a great economic crash, "to organise the working classes politically and develop them as a democracy and to fight for all reforms in the State which are adapted to raise the working classes and transform the State in the direction of democracy. ' ' That is what I have said in my impugned article and what I still maintain in its full import. As far as concerns the question pro- pounded above it is equivalent to Engel's dictum, for democracy is, at any given time, XXVltl as much government by the working classes as these are capable of practising according to their intellectual ripeness and the degree of social development they have attained. Engels, indeed, refers at the place just mentioned to the fact that the Communist Manifesto has " proclaimed the conquest of the democracy as one of the first and important tasks of the fighting proletariat. " In short, Engels is so thoroughly convinced that the tactics based on the presumption of a catastrophe have had their day, that he even considers a revision of them necessary in the Latin countries where tradition is much more favourable to them than in Germany. " If the conditions of war between nations have altered, " he writes, M no less have those for the war between classes/ ' Has this already been forgotten?
No one has questioned the necessity for the working classes to gain the control of govern- ment. The point at issue is between the theory of a social cataclysm and the question whether with the given social development in Germany arid the present advanced state of its working classes in the towns and the country, a sudden catastrophe would be desirable in the interest of the social democracy. I have denied it and deny it again, because in my judgment a greater security for lasting success lies in a steady advance than in the possibilities offered by a catastrophic crash.
And as I am firmly convinced that important periods in the development of nations cannot XXIX be leapt over I lay the greatest value on the next tasks of social democracy, on the struggle for the political rights of the working man, on the political activity of working men in town and country for the interests of their class, as well as on the work of the industrial organisa- tion of the workers.
In this sense I wrote the sentence that the movement means everything for me and that what is usually called * 'the final aim of socialism ' ' is nothing; and in this sense I write it down again to-day. Even if the word ' 'usually' ' had not shown that the proposition was only to be understood conditionally, it was obvious that it could not express indifference concerning the final carrying out of socialist principles, but only indifference — or, as it would be better ex- pressed, carelessness — as to the form of the final arrangement of things. I have at no time had an excessive interest in the future, beyond general principles; I have not been able to read to the end any picture of the future. My thoughts and efforts are concerned with the duties of the present and the nearest future, and I only busy myself with the perspectives beyond so far as they give me a line of conduct for suitable action now.
The conquest of political power by the work- ing classes, the expropriation of capitalists, are no ends in themselves but only means for the accomplishment of certain aims and endeavours. As such they are demands in the programme of social democracy and are not attacked by me. Nothing can be said beforehand as to the XXX XXX circumstances of their accomplishment; we can only fight for their realisation. But the con- quest of political power necessitates the posses- sion of political rights; and the most important problem of tactics which German social democracy has at the present time to solve, appears to me to be to devise the best ways for the extension of the political and economic rights of the German working classes.
The following work has been composed in the sense of these conclusions.
I am fully conscious that it differs in several important points from the ideas to be found in the theory of Karl Marx and Engels — men whose writings have exercised the greatest influence on my socialist line of thought, and one of whom — Engels — honoured me with his personal friendship not only till his death but who showed beyond the grave, in his testa- mentary arrangements, a proof of his confidence in me.
This deviation in the manner of looking at things certainly is not of recent date; it is the product of an inner struggle of years and I hold in my hand a proof that this was no secret to Friedrich Engels, and moreover I must guard Engels from the suspicion that he was so narrow-minded as to exact from his friends an unconditional adherence to his views. Never- theless, it will be understood from the foregoing why I have till now avoided as much as possible giving to my deviating points of view the form XXXI of a systematic and detailed criticism of the Marx-Engels doctrine. This could the more easily be avoided up till now because as regards the practical questions with which we were concerned Marx and Engels in the course of time considerably modified their views.
All that is now altered. I have now a con- troversy with socialists who, like me, have sprung from the Marx-Engels school; and I am obliged, if I am to maintain my opinions, to show them the points where the Marx-Engels theory appears to me especially mistaken or to be self-contradictory.
I have not shirked this task, but, owing to the personal grounds already mentioned, it has not been easy to me. I acknowledge this openly so that the reader may not deduce uncertainty in the subject matter from the hesi- tating, clumsy form of the first chapters. I stand by what I have written with firm con- viction; but I have not always succeeded in choosing the form and the arguments by means of which my thoughts would have gained the clearest expression. In this respect my work is far behind many a work published by others on the same subject. I have rectified in the last chapter some omissions in the first chapters. Further, as the publication of the work was somewhat delayed, the chapter on "Co-opera- tion" has undergone some additions in which repetitions could not wholly be avoided.
For the rest, the work may speak for itself. I am not so ingenuous as to expect that it will forthwith convert those who have disagreed XXX11 with my previous essays, nor am I foolish enough to wish that those who agree with me in principle should subscribe to everything I have said in it. In fact, the most doubtful side of the work is that it embraces too much. When I came to speak of the tasks of the present time I was obliged, unless I wished to flounder into generalities, to enter on all kinds of isolated questions over which differences of opinion are unavoidable even among those who otherwise think alike. And yet the want of space com- pelled me to lay stress on some principal points by implication rather than by establishing them. But I repeat I am not concerned that others should agree with me in every single question. That which concerns me, that which forms the chief aim of this work, is, by opposing what is left of the Utopian mode of thought in the socialist theory, to strengthen equally the realistic and the idealistic element in the socialist movement.
Ed. Bernstein.
London, January, 1899.
Chapter I.
THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF MARXIST SOCIALISM.
(a) The Scientific Elements of Marxism.
" With them Socialism became a science which has now to be worked out in all its details and connections." — Engels: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science.
German Social Democracy acknowledges to-day as the theoretical foundation of its activity the theory of society worked out by Marx and Engels and called by them scientific socialism. That is to say, that whilst Social Democracy, as a fighting party, supports certain interests and tendencies, it strives for aims set up by itself. In the designation of those aims it follows closely the methods of a science which is capable of an objective proof based only on an experience and logic to which it conforms. For what is not capable of such proof is no longer science but rests on subjective impulses, on mere desire or opinion.
In all sciences a distinction can be drawn between a pure and an applied science. The first consists of principles and of a knowledge, which are derived from the whole series of corresponding experiences and therefore looked upon as universally valid. They form the element of stability in the theory. From the application of these principles to single phenomena or to particular cases of practical experience, is formed an applied science; the knowledge won from this application put to- gether in propositions forms the principles of the applied science. These form the variable element in the structure of a science.
The terms constant and variable are only to be taken here conditionally. For the principles of pure science are also subject to changes which, however, occur in the form of limita- tions. With advancing knowledge, proposi- tions to which formerly absolute validity was attached are recognised as conditional and are supplemented by new scientific propositions which limit that validity, but which, at the same time, extend the domain of pure science. On the other hand single propositions of the applied science retain their validity for defined cases. A proposition in agricultural chemistry or electrical engineering in so far as it has been tested at all, always remains true as soon as the preliminary conditions on which it rests are restored. But the great number of the elements of these premises and their manifold possibili- ties of combination cause an infinite variety of such propositions and a constant shifting of their importance in relation to one another. Practice creates ever new materials of know- ledge, and every day changes, so to say, its aspect as a whole, continually placing under the heading of outworn methods what was once a new acquisition.
A systematic stripping of its applied parts from the pure science of Marxist socialism has not hitherto been attempted, although impor- tant preparations for it are not wanting. Marx's well-known presentation of his concep- tion of history in the preface of A Contribution to the Criticism of Political Economy and the third part of Fr. Engels' Socialism, Utopian and Scientific should be named here in the first place as being of the greatest importance. In the preface just mentioned Marx presents the general features of his philosophy of history and society in such concise and decisive sen- tences, so free from all reference to special phenomena and special forms, as has never been found elsewhere with equal clearness. No important thought concerning the Marxist philosophy of history is wanting there.
Engels' writing is partly a more popular drafting of Marx's propositions, partly an extension of them. Reference is made to special phenomena of social evolution, such as modern society, characterised by Marx as bourgeois society, and its further path of development is sketched out in more detail so that one, as regards many passages, can apply the term of applied science to it. Single details can be passed over without the fundamental thoughts suffering any damage. But in its principal propositions the presentation is still sufficiently general to be claimed for the pure science of Marxism. This is warranted and required by the fact that Marxism claims to be more than an abstract theory of history. It claims at the same time to be a theory of modern society and its development. If one wishes to discriminate very strictly, one could describe this part of the Marxist theory as an applied doctrine, but it is a thoroughly essential application of the Marxist theory with- out which it would lose nearly all significance as a political science. Therefore the general or chief propositions of these deductions regarding modern society must be ascribed to the pure doctrine of Marxism. If the present order of society resting legally on private property and free competition is a special case in the history of humanity, it is at the same time a general and lasting fact in the present civilised world. Everything in the Marxist characterisation of bourgeois society and its evolution which is unconditioned — that is, everything whose validity is free from national and local pecu- liarities— would accordingly belong to the domain of pure science; but everything that refers to temporary and local special phenomena and conjectures, all special forms of develop- ment, would on the other hand belong to applied science.
When we separate the fabric of the Marxist doctrine in the manner above named we are able to estimate the import of its separate propositions to the whole system. With every proposition of the pure science a portion of the foundation would be torn away and a great part of the whole building would be robbed of its support and fall down. But it is otherwise with the propositions of the applied science. These could fall without shaking the foundations in the least. A whole series of propositions in the applied science could fall without dragging down the other parts in sympathy.
Such a systematic division into the finer details lies, however, beyond the plan of this work, as it is not intended to be an exhaustive presentation and criticism of the Marxist philo- sophy. It suffices for my purpose to denote as the chief parts of what in my opinion is the building of the pure science of Marxism, the programme already mentioned of historical materialism, the theory (the germ of which is already contained therein) of the wars of the classes in general and the class war between bourgeoisie and proletariat in particular, as well as the theory of surplus value with that of the method of production in a bourgeois society and the description of the tendencies of the development of this society. Like the propositions of the applied science, those of the pure science are of different values to the system.
No one will deny that the most important element in the foundation of Marxism, the fundamental law so to say which penetrates the whole system, is its specific philosophy of history which bears the name of the materialist interpretation of history. With it Marxism Stands or falls in principle; according to the measure in which it suffers limitations will the position of the other elements towards one another be affected in sympathy.
Every search into its validity must, therefore, start from the question whether or how far this theory is true.
(b) The Materialist Interpretation of History and Historic Necessity.
11 We had to emphasise face to face with our opponents the chief principle (the econo- mic side) denied by them, and there was not always time, place, and opportunity to do justice to the other considerations concerned in and affected by it." — Friedrich Engels: Letter of 1890 reprinted in the Sozialistischen Akademiker, October, 1895.
The question of the correctness of the materialist interpretation of history is the question of the determining causes of historic necessity. To be a materialist means first of all to trace back all phenomena to the necessary movements of matter. These movements of matter are accomplished according to the materialist doctrine from beginning to end as a mechanical process, each individual process being the necessary result of preceding mechanical facts. Mechanical facts determine, in the last resort, all occurrences, even those which appear to be caused by ideas. It is, finally, always the movement of matter which determines the form of ideas and the directions of the will; and thus these also (and with them everything that happens in the world of humanity) are inevitable. The materialist is thus a Calvinist without God. If he does not believe in a predestination ordained by a divinity, yet he believes and must believe that starting from any chosen point of time all further events are, through the whole of exist- ing matter and the directions of force in its parts, determined beforehand.
The application of materialism to the interpretation of history means then, first of all, belief in the inevitableness of all historical events and developments. The question is only, in what manner the inevitable is accomplished in human history, what element of force or what factors of force speak the decisive word, what is the relation of the different factors of force to one another, what part in history falls to the share of nature, of political economy, of legal organisations, of ideas.
Marx, in the already quoted passage, gives the answer, that he designates as the determin- ing factor, the material productive forces and the conditions of production among men at the time. * ' The method of production of the material things of life settles generally the social, political, and spiritual process of life. It is not the consciousness of men that deter- mines their mode of existence, but on the contrary their social existence that determines [the nature of] their consciousness. At a certain stage in their development the material pro- ductive forces of society come into opposition with the existing conditions of production or, which is only a legal expression for it, with the relations of property within which they have hitherto moved. From forms of development of the forces of production, these relations change into fetters. Then enters an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the whole gigantic super- structure (the legal and political organisations to which certain social forms of consciousness correspond) is more slowly or more quickly overthrown. One form of society never perishes before all the productive forces are evolved for which it is sufficiently comprehen- sive, and new or higher conditions of production never step on to the scene before the material conditions of existence of the same have come to light out of the womb of the old society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production...but the productive forces developing in the heart of the bourgeois society create at the same time the material conditions for the solution of this antagonism. The pre- vious history of human society, therefore, ter- minates with this form of society.* It must first be observed by anticipation that the concluding sentence and the word " last M in the preceding sentence are not capable of proof but are hypotheses more or less well founded. But they are not essential to the theory and even belong much more to the * A Contribution to the Criticism of Political Economy. Preface.
applications of it, and they may therefore be passed over here.
If we look at the other sentences we are struck, above all, by their dogmatic wording, except the phrase the " more slowly or more quickly M (which indeed hides a good deal). In the second of the quoted sentences ' * conscious- ness M and " existence n are so sharply opposed that we are nearly driven to conclude that men were regarded solely as living agents of histori- cal powers whose work they carry out positively against their knowledge and will. And this is only partly modified by a sentence omitted here as of secondary consideration in which is em- phasised the need of discriminating in social revolutions between the material revolution in the conditions of production and the M ideolo- gistic forms M in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. On the whole the consciousness and will of men appear to be a very subordinate factor of the material move- ment.
In the preface to the first volume of Capital we come across a sentence savouring no less of predestination. uWe are concerned,' ' it reads, with reference to the " natural laws n of capitalist production, " with these tendencies working and forcing their way with iron necessity. " And yet just when he was speaking of law, a milder concept comes forward — that of tendency. And on the next page stands the sentence so often quoted, that society can 11 shorten and soften " the birth pains of phases of development in conformity with nature.
IO