ancholy, or as eager expectancy the opposite of baffled failure; anxious excitement is the opposite of soothing calm. Similarly, a disagreeable tension is the opposite of a pleasant relaxation, but an alert preparedness is the opposite of a despondent unreadiness. The sensory dif- ferences may, by the concurrence of pleasantness-un- pleasantness, be turned into affective oppositions; without pleasantness-unpleasantness there is no opposition. It is noteworthy that Wundt, in his works upon psychology, strangely neglects the organic sensations: in the present instance, the neglect has led him to transform into simple affections what are, evidently, complexes of organic sen- sations.
In the last resort, the theory must be put to the test of experiment. Wundt himself appeals to the results of both experimental methods. The method of expression has, we must admit, appeared in a few cases to confirm the theory. Thus, an investigation published in 1907 states the correlation found between the Wundtian categories, on the one hand, and the changes in pulse and breathing, on the other, in the following table: Pulse slowed quickened strengthened weakened I I Pleasantness Tension Calm quickened slowed 1 strengthened weakened I Excitement Relaxation Unpleasantness quickened I slowed I weakened I strengthened 1 Breathing All that can be said is that results of this neat and clean- cut character are flatly negatived by those of other, equally careful experimenters. We saw in § 71 that the pulse Affection has often been found to slow (though not to slow and strengthen) in pleasantness, but that this change varies with the sense-organ to which the stimulus is applied. We saw, too, that respiration often grows quick and shal- low in pleasantness, but that its changes vary with the individual; it may, for instance, grow quick and deep, and it may grow slow and shallow! It is, plainly, too early to draw any positive inference from the results of the method of expression.
If we turn to the method of impression, we find results that tell very strongly against the theory. The stimuli — colours or tones or rhythms — are presented in pairs, in the usual way, and the observ- ers are asked to say, in successive series, which of the two is the more pleasant or unpleasant, the more exciting or depress- ing, the more strain- ing or relaxing. Now, in the first place, the affective curves for excitement, depres- sion, tension and re- laxation are always identical with the curve of pleasantness or unpleasant- ness; there is no special curve, no novel distribution FIG. 39. Curves of tension ( T) and of unpleas- antness {U), showing that the distribution of judgments under the two headings is practically identical. The stimuli were metronome-beats, given at the rates marked along the horizontal line: 44, 50,...in the 1 min. The figures on the vertical line denote the number of choices. It will be seen that the least straining were also the least unpleasant stimuli (76, 92), while the most straining were also the most unpleasant § 72. The Tridimensional Theory of Feeling 255 of preferences, corresponding to excitement, etc. More- over, the different observers put different interpretations upon these terms: if excitement is taken to mean anx- ious, nervous excitement, its curve agrees with that of unpleasantness; if it is taken to mean eager, expectant excitement, its curve agrees with that of pleasantness. Similarly, if relaxation is taken to mean comfortable rest- fulness, its curve is that of pleasantness; if it is taken to mean a despondent giving-up, the curve is that of unpleasantness. Objectively, then, in the course of the curves, there is no evidence of new affective dimensions. And secondly, the introspective report of the observers bears out the objective testimony of the curves; excitement and depression, tension and relaxation are always described as complexes of affection (pleasantness-unpleasantness) and organic sensation. What Wundt has to appeal to is nothing more than casual observation of his own; system- atic work by the method of paired comparisons has brought no support to his theory. — So far, we have simply discussed the three main cat- egories or dimensions of feeling. Wundt, it will be remembered, believes that each one of these dimensions comprises a very large number of ultimate affective qual- ities. We need concern ourselves only with pleasantness and unpleasantness: but we have still to ask whether there is just one sort of pleasantness and one of unpleasantness, or whether there are varieties of agreeableness under the common name of pleasantness, and varieties of disagree- ableness under the common name of unpleasantness.
To this question no final answer can be given. The experimental evidence is both scanty and conflicting. A distinction has been drawn, for instance, between the local- 256 Affection ised pleasantness of a taste, while the sweet substance is in the mouth, and the diffused pleasantness which remains after it has been swallowed. But in the former case con- sciousness as a whole is narrowed down to a taste-in-the- mouth (§ 69); and the pleasantness is diffused over that narrow consciousness just as, a moment later, it is diffused over a wider consciousness. Moreover, if the observer is told that he may keep the sweet substance in the mouth, as a matter of convenience, but that he is to observe his feeling as soon as he has tasted, — that he is not to hold his attention continuously upon the course of the sensation of taste, — then he reports that the pleasantness is not local- ised, but spread broadly over everything. And in any case a localised pleasantness need not differ in kind, in quality, from a diffused pleasantness: that difference has still to be proved. The writer has never found, in his own experience, the qualitative differences that Wundt assumes.
Wundt has on more than one occasion called attention, on behalf of his theory, to the feeling of the chord c-e-g. Tones, he says, usually bring out affective processes of the two dimensions pleasantness-unpleasantness and excitement-depression. Each one of the three tones c, e, g will therefore give rise to what we may call a quiet cheerfulness of a specific kind: there will be six affections for the three sensations. But, further, a simple affective quality may accompany a complex of sensations: so that we have three more affections for the complexes c-e, e-g, c-g, and yet another — probably the dominant — affection for the whole chord c-e-g. In sum, our affective experience of the chord is the resultant of no less than ten affective qualities. In the writer's introspection there is no evidence of this compounding; the sense-feeling entirely lacks the depth, the richness, the solidity that on the theory it ought to possess; the affective character of the chord seems to be adequately described in the terms ' slightly pleasant,' 'moderately agreeable.' — In spite of all that can be urged against this and similar theories § 73- The Dependence of Affection upon Stimulus 257 of a plurality of affective qualities, the alternative position may still seem barren and repellent. We have been so carefully taught to distinguish the higher from the lower pleasures that the denial of any differences of kind, within pleasantness and within unpleasantness, may come with something of a shock. Is it really true that the pleasure of a good dinner is identical with the pleasure of a good action?
Well! remember always that affective psychology is in the trial stage, and that no one can dogmatise on the question. But in the writer's belief it is true. A good dinner and a good action seem to him to differ — not in their pleasantness: that is precisely where they are alike; but — in practically everything else. The good dinner and the good action have been set apart, in popular psychology, by reference to their one point of resemblance. And if this sounds paradoxical, remember again that popular psy- chology does not analyse. For it, the good dinner and the good action are both matters of feeling, of enjoyment or satisfaction: if, then, they differ, they must differ as feelings: and if they differ as feelings, they must differ as the lower pleasure differs from the higher. The conclusion follows only if you accept an uncritical use of the term feeling, and shirk the task of psychological analysis.
§ 73. The Dependence of Affection upon Stimulus. — When we were discussing the different kinds of sensation, we sought in every instance to connect the mental with the physical, to refer a certain attribute of sensation to a cer- tain phase or aspect of stimulus. We found, for example, in § 15, that in general the wave-length, wave-amplitude and wave-form of light correspond to the three qualitative attributes of visual sensation, — hue, tint and chroma; although, in detail, the relation between visual stimulus and visual sensation is very far from simple. We have now to attack the same problem in regard to affection. How are pleasantness and unpleasantness related to the various aspects of stimulus? 5 258 Affection The question has been much debated, and the answei is exceedingly difficult. If we could not discover a simple, one-to-one correlation in the case of sensation, we can hardly expect to discover it in the case of affection. For we have taken the position — not, it is true, as demonstrated beyond the reach of doubt, but at any rate as the most tenable in the present state of psychology — that there are but two qualities of affection, and that these are incompati- ble in consciousness. Hence the affection of any given moment is, so to say, the algebraical sum of the affections attaching to all the various sensory processes that consti- tute our mind at that moment. Or rather, sincejcott&cious- ness is not a mosaic but a system,1 the affection of any given moment depends upon the interplay or concurrence of sensory processes that are combined in a certain conscious pattern; affection depends, primarily, upon the total dis- position or arrangement of consciousness.
Might we not, however, secure an indifferent frame of mind in our observer, and then subject him to stimuli of different qualities, of different durations, of different degrees of intensity, — and note how he is affected by them? Truly, if the indifferent frame of mind would remain indifferent. But the action of the stimnlns may be sufficient to shake consciousness out of its indifference, and to set up a wholly new, and perhaps highly affective, conscious pattern: pre- cisely as the very slightest touch upon the kaleidoscope will throw the bits of coloured glass into a new arrange- ment. We have seen (§ 60 ) that even a weak stimulus arouses a general bodily reverberation; and in the same way a single incoming stimulus may touch off a complete consciousness, so that its own special affective value is 1 Cf. the discussion uf the taste-blends, p. 134 above.
§ 73- The Dependence of Affection upon Stimulus 259 masked and obscured by the affective resultant of the system.
Nevertheless, so much seems clear: that affection depends less upon the several and separate attributes of stimulus than upon their combination. We noted in § 12 the existence of sensory attributes of the second order; and we gave as illustration the aggressiveness or insist- ence or importunity of sensation that results from the connection of clearness with intensity, or clearness with quality, or what not. It is this secondary attribute of aggressiveness that appears to determine the arousal of affection; and the higher degrees of it appear to arouse unpleasantness, the lower degrees pleasantness. We can hardly with confidence say more; and in saying this we must remember that affection is extremely liable to adap- tation, so that the insistence of a particular stimulus may quickly disappear.
Wundt connects the dimension of pleasantness-unpleasantness with the intensity of our experience (§ 72); and it must be admitted that intensity is one of the commonest and one of the most dominant factors in what we have termed insistence. But there are qualities that are similarly aggressive: bitter, for instance, or tickling. It is hardly possibleto make a strict comparison be- tween the intensities of different qualities; but it will probably be agreed that bitter is unpleasant at an intensity at which sweet is still indifferent, and tickling unpleasant at an intensity at which pressure is indifferent. And in general, sensations of taste and smell seem to be more insistent, and are certainly more affective, than sensations of sight and hearing.
There is some little evidence that affection, on its intensive side, obeys Weber's Law (§ 66). While the lower degrees of insistence are pleasant, and the higher degrees unpleasant, a progressive increase of insistence within either region of the scale will give us, of course, an increasing pleasantness or an increasing on* 260 Affection on* 260 Affection unpleasantness. Now we have seen that intensity of stimulus is oftentimes the dominant factor in insistence. Where this is the case, it seems probable that, if the intensity of affection is to pro- gress by equal steps or intervals, then the intensity of stimulus must increase by relatively equal amounts. At any rate, it is true as a general rule that what gives us pleasure or displeasure is roughly proportional to our income, our age and status, our ambi- tion, our standard of comfort. If I am starting a library with a hundred volumes, and a single book is given me, I am as pleased — other things being equal — as I should be by the addition of ten volumes to a library of a thousand. The stamp which com- pletes the set in the schoolboy's album gives him as much pleasure as the acquisition of the last farm which completes the ring-fence gives the wealthy landed proprietor. All these things sadly need experimental confirmation; but there seems no reason why affec- tive intensity should not, and there seems to be some evidence that in fact it does, follow the same law as the intensity of sensation.
§ 74. The Bodily Conditions of Affection. — If we know but little of the affective processes themselves, we know still less about their bodily conditions. The suggestions that follow are, therefore, entirely hypothetical.
It is natural to suppose that the material of conscious- ness, the stuff out of which mind is made, was originally homogeneous, all of a piece: so that sensations and affec- f tions are simply different species of the same genus. We have seen, indeed, that there is positive evidence for this view; there are fundamental resemblances between the two elementary processes, which point to their derivation from a common mental ancestor. If, then, we adopt it as a working hypothesis, the affections appear — not exactly as undeveloped sensations, for an undeveloped sensation is still a sensation — but at any rate as mental processes of the same general kind as sensations, and as mental pro- § 74- The Bodily Conditions of Affection 261 cesses that might, in more favourable circumstances, have developed into sensations. The writer hazards the guess that the peripheral organs of affection are the free afferent nerve-endings — what are ordinarily called the free sen- sory nerve-endings — distributed through the various tis- sues of the body; and he takes these free endings to represent a lower level of organic development than the specialised receptive organs, or organs of sense. Had\ mental development been carried further, pleasantness and unpleasantness might have become sensations: in all likelihood would have been differentiated, each of them, into a number of sensory qualities. Had our physical evolution been carried further, we might have had a cor- responding increase in the number of internal sense-organs.
It was said in § 42 that the free nerve-endings of the epidermis are probably to be regarded as the terminal organs of pain. If this hypothesis is correct, we might perhaps assume, as some psychologists do, that there is a close genetic kinship between the sensation of pain and unpleasurable affection. Pain would then appear as a specialised sensory derivative from unpleasantness, and would still retain an end-organ of the affective type.
On the other hand, we have to remember that the cutaneous pain-sense has three qualities, itch, prick, and pain proper, and that these qualities are by no means necessarily unpleasant. In- tensive pains are unpleasant; but so are bitter tastes, and so are rank and foul and nauseous odours. Besides, we know very little about the cutaneous sense-organs, aside from pressure, and we know nothing at all of the organs of the dull, deep-seated pain that seems to be different from the bright and thrilling pain at the surface of the body (§§ 41, 56). The pains proceeding from muscular tissue and from the peritoneum probably have special- ised organs. On the whole, therefore, it is best to leave pain out of account. If the free endings of the epidermis are not organs of pain, the physiological evidence for the connection of pain with 262 Affection unpleasantness falls to the ground. If they are, it is still possible that their exposed position and consequent liability to injury allow them to function as sense-organs, while they are replaced in the interior of the body by more highly specialised structures; or it is possible that they have become adapted, in some unknown way, to the reception of sensory stimuli. No opinion can be more than a conjecture.
This theory of the bodily conditions of affection ex- plains, first, the lack of the attribute of clearness. Affec- tive processes are processes whose development has been arrested; they have not attained, and now they never can attain, to clear consciousness. Affective experience is the obscure, indiscriminable correlate of a medley of widely diffused nervous excitations. The theory explains, secondly, the movement of affective processes between opposites; for the nervous excitations will vary with the tone of the bodily systems in which they are set up, and that tone can itself vary only in two opposite ways. It explains, thirdly, the introspective resemblance of affection to certain organic sensations; genetically, the two sets of processes are near akin, and it is natural that they should be alike in experience. And it explains, fourthly, the apathy or lack of feeling that comes with visceral anaes- thesia (§ 56); for if the specialised nerve-terminals, the sense-organs of the viscera are paralysed, it is to be ex- pected that the unspecialised free endings, occurring in the same tissues, should share their fate. Finally, the theory is non-committal on the questions of mixed feeling and of a differentiation of qualities within pleasantnessunpleasantness. It thus serves well enough for the pres- ent state of our psychological knowledge. It is, neverthe- less, simply a guess.
References for Further Reading 263 Many other guesses have been made with regard to the bodily conditions of affection, both peripheral and central. Under the latter heading it has been conjectured, for instance, that the affections are indices of the state of nutrition of the cerebral cortex; that they are symptoms of the readiness of motor dis- charge; and that they are connected with the activity of a special cortical centre. Each one of these hypotheses has a certain plausibility, but none is within measurable distance of proof. — When physiology leaves us in this perplexity, it is but natural that we should make appeal to the wider science of biology. Can biology help us to a psychology of feeling? Well! a great deal has been written about the biological significance of pleasantness and unpleasantness. The pleasurable, we are told, corresponds to the useful, and the disagreeable to the harmful; pleasant ex- periences are good and unpleasant experiences are bad for the organism. And this means that pleasantness is felt when the activity of a bodily organ is in balance, outgo of energy equalling intake of nourishment; and that unpleasantness is felt when the organ is out of balance, either overworked or overnourished. But, first, the general law of correlation, pleasant-useful and un- pleasant-harmful, cannot be made out: there are gross and obvi- ous exceptions. Moreover, if it could be made out, it would not aid our psychology; for useful and harmful mean nothing until they are translated into psychological and physiological terms; and as soon as the translation has been made, we can dispense with biology altogether. Secondly, the theories of organic balance are as conjectural as the rest, and are very difficult to apply in detail. It is hardly worth while, therefore, to devote further space to biological considerations.
References for Further Reading §§ 68-74. Wundt's tridimensional theory is set forth in his Outlines of Psychology, 1907; or, at greater length, in the Grundziige der physi- ologischen Psychologies ii., 1902, 263. For a theory which identifies affec- tion with sensation, see C. Stumpf, Ueber Gefuhlsempfindungen, in the Zeitschrift f. Psychologic xliv., 1906, 1. A critique of these theories, and a discussion of the differences between sensation and affection, will 264 Affection be found in the author's Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feel- ing and Attention, 1908, Lectures II.-IV.
For the method of impression, see S. P. Hayes, A Study of the Affec- tive Qualities, in American Journal of Psychology, xvii., 1906, 358. For the method of expression, see J. R. Angell and H. B. Thompson, A Study of the Relations between Certain Organic Processes and Con- sciousness, in Psychological Review, vi., 1899, 32; P. Zoneff and E. Meumann, Ueber Begleiterscheifiutigen psychischer Vorgdnge in Athem und Puis, in Wundt's Philosophische Studien, xviii., 1903, 1; M. Kelch- ner, Die Abhangigkeit der At on- und Pulsverlinderung vom Reiz und vom Gefiihl, in Archiv f d. gesamte Psychologies-, 1905, 1; N. Alech- sieff, Die Grundformcn der Gefiihle. in Wundt's Psychologische Studien, iii., 1907, 156; P. Salow, Der Gefuhlscharakter einiger rhythmischer Schallfortnen in seiner respirator ischen Aejtsserutig, ibid., iv., 1908, I ff.; F. Peterson and C. G. Jung, Psycho-Physical Investigations with the Galvanometer and Pneumograph in Normal and Insane Individ- On the biological significance of feeling, see H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, i., 1881, pt. ii., ch. ix.; H. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge der Psychologie, i., 1905, 568; D. C. Nadejde, Die biologische Theorie der Lust und Unlust, i., 1908. A genetic theory of feeling, in some respects akin to that of the text, but differing from it on important points, is worked out by J. M. Baldwin, Mental Development in the Child and the Race: Methods and Processes, 1895, 481 ff.; 1906, 457 ff.
ATTENTION §75. The Attentive Consciousness. — The word 'atten- tion,' like the word ' feeling,' has been employed in the history of psychology to denote very different things. Attention has been regarded, at various times, as a peculiar power or capacity, the faculty of concentration, the ability to restrict at will the field of consciousness: as a peculiar form of mental activity, an effort that one puts forth or an initiative that one takes, radically different from the passiv- ity with which impressions are received: as a state of the whole consciousness, a state of clear apprehension and of effective thought: as a feeling or emotion: and, finally, as a complex of sensations, and more especially of kinaes- thetic sensations.
It is plain that not all these views can be correct, though every one of them can find a certain support in the facts of observation. When I am so deeply sunk in a scientific problem that I forget my headache, or fail to hear the dinner bell, I seem, pretty clearly, to be exercising the power of concentration. When I force myself to go to work, in face of the temptation to finish an interesting novel, I seem to be exerting a spontaneous activity, to be myself determining my world rather than determined by it. When, again, I wish thoroughly to understand a thing, to make myself master of it, I give it my full atten- tion: attention is, then, that state of consciousness, that degree of being conscious, which guarantees the best 266 Attention results of mental labour. When I am keenly attending, I am also keenly interested; and interest is a mode of affective experience. Lastly, when I am trying to attend, I invariably find myself frowning, wrinkling my forehead, holding the breath, setting the body in some definite and rigid attitude. All such sets and movements give rise to characteristic complexes of cutaneous and kinaesthetic sensations. Why should not these sensations represent, in psychology, what we popularly call attention?
The appeal lies to experimental introspection: and our rule must be here as it has been elsewhere, that if the experimental results come into conflict with our precon- ceived opinions, the opinions are to be given up. But before we enter upon the experimental study of attention, let us try a bit of straightforward analysis; let us look at a typical attentive consciousness, and see whether our schooling in psychological method helps us to dissect it.
The most promising case will be a case of suddenly aroused attention. Suppose, then, that I am working or eading quietly, and that a telephone message or the entrance of a visitor suddenly demands my attention. e firgj; thing that happens is that there is_-a-xedistribu- lon of the entire contents of consciousness. The incom- ing ideas — my friend's business or the subject of the message — drive to the centre, and everything else, my previous occupation as well as my sensory surroundings, are banished to the outskirts. Consciousness, in attention, is patterned or arranged into focus and nmrgin,_foj-e£round and background, ccntre_and periphery. And the differ- ence between the processes at the focus and the processes in the margin is, essentially, a difference of clearness: the__ central area of consciousness lies clear, the^moxe-jemote §75- The Attentive Consciousness 267 regions are obscure. In this fact we have, indeed, the key to the whole problem of attention. In the last resort, and in itssirnplest^terms^ttention is_identical with sen- sory clearness.
However, we must confine ourselves to observation, and not anticipate. The attentive consciousness is arranged as clear and obscure: so much is evident. Is the consciousness affective? Not necessarily. We may greet our friend [/£** with an absorbed interest, with pleasurable concern or with k~*^< foreboding of unpleasantness; but we may also give him ak perfunctory and mechanical attention, which leaves us/ wholly unaffected. Is the consciousness kinaesthetic? Again, not necessarily. There may be a wide-spread arousal of kinaesthetic sensations, or there may be no sensible change in the muscular system: itdepends upon ' £ circumstances. So that it appears, even to unaided intro- spection, that the redistribution of contents into the_ groups of clear and obscure is the one universal and^c h arac t eris.t ic feature of the attentive consciousness.
It should hardly be necessary to repeat here that modern psychology knows nothing of a permanent mind, or of faculties or activities or manifestations of such a mind (§3). Whatever attention is, it must be described in terms of mental processes, sensations and images and affections, and explained by reference to its physiological conditions. On the other hand, attention offers itself as an admirable touchstone by which the views of modern psychology may be tested. For the whole situation in attention seems, at first sight, to imply a selective and spontaneous mental activity. As I lean back in my chair to think out a psy- chological problem, I am subject to all sorts of sensory stimuli: the temperature of the room, the pressure of my clothes, the sight of various pieces of furniture, sounds from house and street, scents coming from the room itself or borne in through the open window, 268 Attention